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ABSTRACT
History has lessons for the present; could this be the case for modern counterinsurgency operations in countries resembling Iraq and Afghanistan? This research set out to
study three historical counter-insurgencies campaigns in, Malaya (1947-1960), Kenya (19521960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), with a view to establishing whether or not the Colonial
authorities had a substantial advantage over modern forces when combating insurgencies. If
this was the case, are these advantages transferable to aid forces involved in modern counterinsurgencies?
The research questions focussed on how important the role of the Colonial Forces was
to the eventual outcome, examining the principal factors that contributed to their
effectiveness? Included in this examination were aspects of strategy, together with an
appreciation of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’, tactics and the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine.
A qualitative research design was adopted, using a case study methodology based
upon comparative analysis of the data collected. Case studies were constructed for the three
conflicts, based around the narratives obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews,
with surviving members of the security forces; predominately police and Special Branch. The
primary data was coded, using a thematic framework developed from the Literature Review.
These themes were then synthesised, analysed and interpreted in response to the research
questions related to the perceived problem. Lastly, the findings were compared and
contrasted to provide theoretical recommendations and conclusions.
The study indicated the significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces,
especially Special Branch, which appears to have been instrumental in dominating initiatives
against the rebels. Supporting the police, were Colonial army units together with locally
recruited indigenous militias in a combined approach to prosecuting an effective counterinsurgency campaign. In addition, this was reinforced by the Colonial Government’s ability
to apply draconian legislation in support of the strategic plan, to reinforce the rule of law by
the police, coupled with its ability to garner popular support through civil projects, such as
schools, clinics and housing. Evolving counter-insurgency doctrine advocated the need to cut
off the insurgents from their supplies, by separating them from the general population.
Separation was achieved by the forced movement of the population into ‘Protected Villages’
backed up by food control, harsh collective punishments, detention and curfews. Further key
beneficial factors for the Colonial Forces included their knowledge of religious customs,
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culture and language, which enhanced their ability to gather vital intelligence direct from the
population; rather than second hand.
Analysing the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ since 1947, indicated it was evolving as a
strategy and was not operationally as well accepted as it is today. Although often considered
a benevolent approach to gaining the support of the population, the research also
demonstrated the antithesis of this approach occurred by the insurgents applying power over
‘minds’ of the population though intimidation, terrorism, and physiological control. This
psychological control was achieved through sorcery, spirit mediums and the taking of oaths.
Ultimately, political solutions not military ones ended the insurgencies.
The theoretical recommendations indicated that greater attention needs to be
expended in training counter-insurgency forces to empathise with the local population when
conducting overseas operations; especially improved knowledge of religious customs, culture
and language. The outcome would enhance their capabilities through better population
support resulting in superior intelligence.

v

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
(i)

incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a

degree or diploma in any institution of higher education.
(ii)

contain any material previously published or written by another person except

where due reference is made in the text; or
(iii)

contain any defamatory material.

I also grant permission for the Library at Edith Cowan University to make duplicate
copies of my thesis as required.

Signature:

Date:

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Doctor David Brooks, my supervisor for his support, attention to detail and
guidance throughout this study. The support from Professor William Hutchinson, Professor
Narayanan Srinivasan for his insights, Major Paul Naish for his technical expertise and
Doctor Mike Hickox; my long term mentor and friend.
The former members of the Kenya Police, the Federation of Malaya Police Force,
British Service personnel and the British South Africa Police (BSAP) who assisted and
supported me in providing a voice for their contributions to countering insurgency in the
colonies. There number are many and too numerous to name in this acknowledgment but my
thanks for their time and support is directed at them all.

My parents Barbara and John Bailey for their life time support

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE .................................................................................................................................................. i
USE OF THESIS ............................................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... iv
DECLARATION............................................................................................................................... vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xvii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ xviii
PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERNCE PRESENTATIONS ..................................................... xix
Abstract: Creating a Counter-Insurgency Plan: ......................................................................... xix
Abstract: Case Studies .................................................................................................................... xix
Abstract: Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter-Insurgency ...................................... xx
Conference Presentations ................................................................................................................ xx
Abstract: Counter-Insurgency and Intelligence Gathering Tactics Using Pseudo Gangs ....... xxi
Abstract: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists by Another Name .................................................... xxi
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1

1.1

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

1.2

Background and the Context .................................................................................. 2

1.2.1 End of Empire ............................................................................................ 3
1.2.2 African Conflicts ........................................................................................ 4
1.3

The Problem.............................................................................................................. 5

1.4

Significance ............................................................................................................... 6

1.5

Research Design Overview ...................................................................................... 7

1.5.1 Primary Research Question ........................................................................ 8
1.5.2 Sub-Questions: ........................................................................................... 8
1.6

Hypotheses and Assumptions .................................................................................. 8

1.7

Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 9

1.8

Outline of the Thesis .............................................................................................. 10

1.9

Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 10

Chapter 2

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERING INSURGENCY..................................... 12
viii

2.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 12

2.2

End of Empire......................................................................................................... 15

2.3

Defining the Discussion .......................................................................................... 17

Table 2.1 Low intensity warfare and its variants.......................................................................... 18
2.4

Insurgency ............................................................................................................... 21

2.5

Counter-insurgency ................................................................................................ 22

2.5.1 Doctrine .................................................................................................... 22
2.6

The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency Doctrine .................................... 24

2.7

Hearts and Minds ................................................................................................... 29

2.8

Strategies ................................................................................................................. 33

2.9

The Colonial Police................................................................................................. 35

2.10 Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 37
2.11 Special Branch ........................................................................................................ 39
2.12 Specialised and Elite Units .................................................................................... 40
2.12.1 Pseudo Gangs ......................................................................................... 42
2.12.2 Indigenous Forces .................................................................................. 43
2.12.3 Internal Affairs ....................................................................................... 44
2.12.4 Police Special Units ............................................................................... 44
2.13 Propaganda ............................................................................................................. 45
2.14 Colonial Administration ........................................................................................ 46
2.15 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths ............................................................................. 47
2.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan................................................................................... 50
2.17 Significant Actors ................................................................................................... 53
2.18 Underlying Theory ................................................................................................. 53
2.19 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 57
Chapter 3

METHODS AND MATERIALS .......................................................................... 60

3.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 60

3.2

Methodology overview ........................................................................................... 61

3.2.1 Criterion Sampling ................................................................................... 62
Figure 3.1 Study Design for this study ........................................................................................... 63
Table 3.1 Contrasting essential elements of positivism and constructivism ............................... 65
ix

3.3

Case Study ............................................................................................................... 65

3.3.1 How the Case Study was used in this Research ....................................... 68
3.3.2 Case Study Building Process.................................................................... 69
3.3.3 Hermeneutics within the process.............................................................. 69
3.3.4 Heuristic Inquiry ...................................................................................... 70
3.3.5 Narrative ................................................................................................... 71
3.4

Two Stage Study: Pilot Study First ...................................................................... 72

3.5

Population and Sampling....................................................................................... 72

3.6

Research Instrument .............................................................................................. 74

3.7

Interviews ................................................................................................................ 75

3.8

Research Quality Criteria and Reliability ........................................................... 77

3.9

Historiography ........................................................................................................ 81

3.10 Ethical Issues .......................................................................................................... 83
3.11 Study limitations ..................................................................................................... 84
3.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 85
Chapter 4

PILOT STUDY....................................................................................................... 86

4.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 86

4.2

Why use a Pilot Study? .......................................................................................... 86

4.3

Research Process and Design ................................................................................ 89

4.4

Population and Sample .......................................................................................... 89

Table 4.1 Participants in this pilot study ....................................................................................... 90
4.5

Primary Research Questions ................................................................................. 90

4.5.1 Sub-Questions .......................................................................................... 90
4.6

Interpretative Outcomes ........................................................................................ 90

4.7

Methodology ........................................................................................................... 92

4.8

Outcomes from the Pilot Study ............................................................................. 92

4.8.1 Research Design Changes ........................................................................ 92
4.8.2 Trial run of the Subsidiary Questions ...................................................... 93
Table 4.2 Changes to the original questions .................................................................................. 94
4.9

Pilot Study: Reliability and Validity..................................................................... 95
x

4.10 Study Modifications ............................................................................................... 95
4.11 Primary Research Questions ................................................................................. 96
4.11.1 Sub-Questions Modified ........................................................................ 96
4.12 Pilot Study Limitations .......................................................................................... 96
4.13 Ethical considerations ............................................................................................ 97
4.14 Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 97
Chapter 5

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960: A CASE STUDY ...................... 99

5.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 99

5.2

Thematic Approach................................................................................................ 99

Table 5.1 Themes identified from the Literature Review Chapter 2 ........................................ 100
5.3

Population and Sample ........................................................................................ 100

Table 5.2 Population sample details of participants in this case study ..................................... 101
5.4

Malaya 1948-1960: The Emergency ................................................................... 102

5.5

The Conflict Begins .............................................................................................. 104

5.6

Counter-insurgency .............................................................................................. 106

5.7

Hearts and Minds ................................................................................................. 108

5.8

Strategies ............................................................................................................... 111

5.9

The Colonial Police in Malaya ............................................................................ 115

5.10 Intelligence ............................................................................................................ 117
5.11 Special Branch ...................................................................................................... 119
5.11.1 Surrendered Enemy Personnel ............................................................. 120
5.11.2 Running an Operation .......................................................................... 121
5.12 Specialised and Elite Units .................................................................................. 122
5.12.1 Home Guard ......................................................................................... 123
5.12.2 Malayan Scouts-SAS............................................................................ 124
5.12.3 Tracker Units ........................................................................................ 124
5.13 Propaganda ........................................................................................................... 125
5.14 Colonial Administration ...................................................................................... 126
5.15 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths ........................................................... 126
5.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan................................................................................. 127
xi

5.17 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency .................................................. 128
Table 5.3 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Malaya .......................... 129
5.18 Summary ............................................................................................................... 130
5.19 Significant and Influential Actors ....................................................................... 131
5.20 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 131
Chapter 6

THE KENYAN EMERGENCY 1952-1960: A CASE STUDY........................ 134

6.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 134

6.2

Thematic Approach.............................................................................................. 134

6.3

Population and Sample ........................................................................................ 135

Table 6.1 Population sample details of participants in this case study ..................................... 135
6.4

Kenya: The Emergency 1952-1960 ..................................................................... 136

6.5

The Conflict Begins to Intensify .......................................................................... 140

6.6

Counter-Insurgency ............................................................................................. 143

Figure 6.2 Main areas of Mau Mau activity ................................................................................ 144
6.7

Hearts and Minds ................................................................................................. 145

6.8

Strategies ............................................................................................................... 146

6.8.1 British Army in Support of Civil Authority ........................................... 149
6.8.2 The British Air Force ............................................................................. 151
6.8.3 Spotter Planes ......................................................................................... 152
6.8.4 Prohibited Areas ..................................................................................... 152
6.8.5 Screening ................................................................................................ 152
6.9

The Colonial Police............................................................................................... 153

6.9.1 Police Reservists .................................................................................... 154
6.10 Intelligence ............................................................................................................ 155
6.11 Special Branch ...................................................................................................... 156
6.12 Specialised and Elite Units .................................................................................. 157
6.12.1 Mounted Units ...................................................................................... 158
6.12.2 Dogs ..................................................................................................... 158
6.12.3 General Service Units........................................................................... 159
6.12.4 Tracker Units ........................................................................................ 159
xii

6.12.5 Pseudo Gangs ....................................................................................... 159
6.13 Propaganda ........................................................................................................... 161
6.14 Colonial Administration ...................................................................................... 162
6.15 Public Works ........................................................................................................ 164
6.16 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths ........................................................... 164
6.16.1 De-oathing ............................................................................................ 165
6.17 A Counter-Insurgency Plan................................................................................. 166
6.18 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency .................................................. 168
Table 6.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Kenya ............................ 169
6.19 Summary ............................................................................................................... 169
6.20 Significant and Influential Actors ....................................................................... 171
6.21 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 171
Chapter 7

THE RHODESIAN BUSH WAR 1964-1980: A CASE STUDY ..................... 173

7.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 173

7.1.1 Thematic Approach ................................................................................ 174
7.1.2 Population and Sample ........................................................................... 174
Table 7.1 Population sample breakdown details ......................................................................... 174
7.2

Rhodesia: the Stage is Set .................................................................................... 175

7.3

Rhodesia 1965: The ‘Bush War’ Begins ............................................................. 176

7.4

Counter-Insurgency ............................................................................................. 180

7.5

Hearts and Minds ................................................................................................. 181

7.5.1 Intimidation ............................................................................................ 183
7.6

Strategies ............................................................................................................... 184

7.6.1 Incentives ............................................................................................... 187
7.7

The Rhodesian Police: The British South Africa Police (BSAP) ..................... 188

7.7.1 Ground-Coverage ................................................................................... 188
7.7.2 Operations .............................................................................................. 189
7.7.3 Police Anti-Terrorist Unit ...................................................................... 190
7.8

Intelligence ............................................................................................................ 190
xiii

7.9

Special Branch ...................................................................................................... 192

7.9.1 Selous Scouts and Special Branch ......................................................... 192
7.10 Specialised and Elite Units .................................................................................. 195
7.11 Fire-Force.............................................................................................................. 196
7.11.1 Dogs ..................................................................................................... 196
7.11.2 Mounted Units ...................................................................................... 197
7.11.3 Grey Scouts .......................................................................................... 197
7.11.4 Rhodesian SAS ..................................................................................... 197
7.11.5 Tracker Units ........................................................................................ 197
7.11.6 Selous Scouts........................................................................................ 198
7.11.7 Psychological Action Unit ................................................................... 198
7.12 Propaganda ........................................................................................................... 199
7.13 Rhodesian Administration ................................................................................... 199
7.13.1 Legal Measures .................................................................................... 200
7.14 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Spirit Mediums ........................................................... 201
7.15 A Counter-Insurgency Plan................................................................................. 202
7.15.1 Joint Operations Centre ........................................................................ 202
7.15.2 What Worked ....................................................................................... 203
7.16 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency .................................................. 205
Table 7.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Rhodesia ....................... 205
7.17 Summary ............................................................................................................... 206
7.18 Significant and Influential Actors ....................................................................... 209
7.19 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 209
Chapter 8

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION............................. 211

8.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 211

8.2

The Research Problem ......................................................................................... 211

8.3

Primary Research Question ................................................................................ 212

8.3.1 Sub-Question: ......................................................................................... 212
8.4

The Contributory Factors and Roles for Effectiveness .................................... 213

xiv

Table 8.1 Combined list of elements involved with countering insurgencies ........................... 215
8.4.1 Significant Actors ................................................................................... 216
8.4.2 Specialised Units .................................................................................... 216
8.4.3 Indigenous Forces .................................................................................. 217
8.4.4 Actionable Intelligence .......................................................................... 218
8.4.5 Special Branch........................................................................................ 219
8.4.6 Over-Arching Supremo .......................................................................... 219
8.4.7 Emergency Powers Legislation .............................................................. 220
8.5

The Substantial Factor of ‘Hearts and Minds’ .................................................. 220

8.5.1 Psychological Control ............................................................................ 223
8.5.2 Independence and Decolonisation .......................................................... 225
8.5.3 Good Governance................................................................................... 226
8.5.4 The Winning Aspect............................................................................... 227
8.6

Understanding the Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ .......................................... 228

8.7

Effective Colonial Strategy .................................................................................. 232

Table 8.2 French approach in each campaign............................................................................. 233
8.8

Primary Research Question ................................................................................ 235

8.8.1 Substantial Advantage ............................................................................ 235
8.8.2 Colonial Administration ......................................................................... 237
8.8.3 Using the Police ..................................................................................... 238
8.8.4 Special Branch........................................................................................ 239
8.8.5 Knowledge of Language and Culture..................................................... 239
8.8.6 Population Control ................................................................................. 240
8.8.7 Rule of Law and Legislation .................................................................. 240
8.9

Can any of the Lessons Learnt be Applied to Conflicts Today? ...................... 241

8.10 Underlying Theory ............................................................................................... 247
8.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 247
Chapter 9

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ............... 250

9.1

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 250

9.2

Pertinent Points Addressing the Research Questions ....................................... 251

9.3

Objective-Using Colonial Forces......................................................................... 251
xv

9.4

Effectiveness: the Factors and Roles Adopted by the Security Forces............ 253

9.5

Substantial Factor: ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Strategy .................................. 254

9.6

Understood and Applied: Overt Concept and Strategies ................................. 256

9.7

Significance of Strategy: Administration and Counter-Insurgency ................ 257

9.8

Applicability: Past Factors to Modern day Counter-Insurgency Practice ..... 260

9.9

Theoretical Recommendations ............................................................................ 262

9.10 Further Research.................................................................................................. 266
9.11 Limitations ............................................................................................................ 267
9.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 268
Chapter 10

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 272

Chapter 11

APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................... 296

11.1 Example 1 is taken from the Malaya case study. .............................................. 296
11.2 Example 2 is taken from the Kenya case study ................................................. 304
11.3 Example 3 is taken from the Rhodesia case study............................................. 313
Chapter 12

APPENDIX B ....................................................................................................... 324

12.1 Significant Actors ................................................................................................. 324
Chapter 13

APPENDIX C ....................................................................................................... 326

13.1 Combined Table of Elements .............................................................................. 326

xvi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Literature Review development process ................................................................ 14
Figure 3.1 Study Design for this study .................................................................................... 63
Figure 3.2 Positioning case study as a research method .......................................................... 67
Figure 5.1 Malaya Colony ..................................................................................................... 103
Figure 5.2 The badge worn by the police denoting 'service' .................................................. 109
Figure 6.1 Map of Kenya Colony 1952 ................................................................................. 136
Figure 6.2 Main areas of Mau Mau activity .......................................................................... 144
Figure 7.1 Operational areas in Rhodesia .............................................................................. 181

xvii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Low intensity warfare and its variants ..................................................................... 18
Table 3.1 Contrasting essential elements of positivism and constructivism ........................... 65
Table 4.1 Participants in this pilot study .................................................................................. 90
Table 4.2 Changes to the original questions ............................................................................ 94
Table 5.1 Themes identified from the Literature Review Chapter 2 ..................................... 100
Table 5.2 Population sample details of participants in this case study .................................. 101
Table 5.3 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Malaya ....................... 129
Table 5.4 Summary of elements from findings ..................................................................... 130
Table 6.1 Population sample details of participants in this case study .................................. 135
Table 6.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Kenya ......................... 169
Table 6.3 Summary of elements from the findings................................................................ 170
Table 7.1 Population sample breakdown details.................................................................... 174
Table 7.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Rhodesia .................... 205
Table 7.3 Summary of important elements from the findings ............................................... 208
Table 8.1 Combined list of elements involved with countering insurgencies ....................... 215
Table 8.2 French approach in each campaign ........................................................................ 233

xviii

PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERNCE PRESENTATIONS
A number of publications together with conference proceedings were generated from
this research. The list follows together with the abstracts.
Publications
Bailey, W. J. (2012). Creating a counter-insurgency plan: Elements required based upon a
comparative analysis of research findings. Paper presented at the 5th Australian Security and
Intelligence Conference, Perth, Western Australia.

Abstract: Creating a Counter-Insurgency Plan:
The development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary process: no two
insurgencies are the same. However, certain fundamental principals remain consistent and
these can be applied to meet the required circumstances. The creation of an overarching plan
encompassing a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control
of a single authority is central. Therefore, understanding the basics allows for the
development of a tactical strategy based upon a structured plan. Compiling the ‘Plan’ should
be based upon the lessons learnt from the past. To this end, the methodology used is
supported by a literature review and interviews from participants in a limited assessment of
the two historical conflicts: Malaya and Kenya.
Based upon the findings, a condensed table is presented to aid analysis, using a
French doctrinal approach as a tool for interpretation. In addition, this is supported by quotes
from the respondents involved in the research process. These findings are the preliminary
results of a research study looking at what was effective during the prosecution of the
selected insurgencies. Outcomes indicate that the fundamental principals are pertinent today
and are therefore generally applicable.

Bailey, W. J. (2011, December, 2011). Case Studies: A Security science research
methodology. Paper presented at the 4th Australian Security and Intelligence Conference.,
Perth, Australia.

Abstract: Case Studies
As a relatively new discipline Security Science is searching for academic acceptance very
often combining established hard science approaches with those of Social Science and
Humanities. Methodologies need to be developed to equip the discipline to conduct more
varied research. One such method is the use of the case study approach, as it allows multiple
xix

inputs from a variety of sources to build up the research into a central review, allowing
conclusions and recommendations to be drawn from the data. Though relatively common in
the business world for conducting reports, this has not hitherto been the position in academia
The objective of this speculative paper develops a process used for research and seeks
to open a debate as to the importance of case studies in the security field; the paper argues
that it is an underutilized research paradigm. The merits of using the case study structure will
be discussed, including the debate over positivism and constructivism, which will then lead
on to a potential analytical method called Interpretative Phenomological Analysis (IPA); used
predominately in ethnographical studies. The importance of using a pilot study before
proceeding to the full study is also suggested to avoid costly mistakes later in the research.

Bailey, W. J. (2010). Hearts and minds, pseudo gangs and counter-insurgency:
Based upon experiences from previous campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60)
and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Paper presented at the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism
Conference, Perth, Australia.
Abstract: Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter-Insurgency
Pseudo Gangs were used with great effect in both the Kenya (1952-60) and Malaya (1948-60)
and later in the Rhodesian campaign (1964-1979) Although this type of activity was not new
to counter-insurgency, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902); it
was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. Capt Kitson in
Kenya together with Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police Special Branch are often cited as the
instigators of this concept, which was developed during the ‘Emergency”.
The principal concept is to ‘turn’ actual insurgents through a series of inducements to
change sides and join the counter insurgency but not as regular forces. Rather they are to
keep their actual identities or their ‘assumed’ identities and return to the conflict areas as part
of a ‘gang’ which would be made to appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This
‘pseudo’ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and either capture, gain further
intelligence or eliminate them. Recent research conducted by Bailey. W. into the Kenya
campaign for a PhD thesis will be used to expand this model as one that could be developed
for current conflicts against insurgents.
Conference Presentations
Bailey, W. J. (2011). Counter-insurgency and intelligence gathering tactics using pseudo
gangs: Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Paper presented at
xx

the Conference, Threat from below: How intelligence counters irregular adversaries, Kings
College, London, England.
Abstract: Counter-Insurgency and Intelligence Gathering Tactics Using Pseudo
Gangs
The capacity to control the psychological sphere of influence is crucial to fighting of
asymmetrical wars as much as gaining intelligence is to undermining the enemy. ‘Pseudo
gangs’ was a tactic which combined both of these elements making it a very effective tool in
counter insurgency operations. The Colonial forces in Kenya, during the Mau Mau
Emergency, are credited with instigating this tactic, which was copied in the Malayan
Emergency and later in Rhodesian ‘Bush-War’ too. Although not totally new to counterinsurgency tactics, the use of such phoney gangs was certainly perfected during these
campaigns producing excellent results.

Bailey, W. J., & McGill, A. (2008). Freedom fighters or terrorists by another
name. Paper presented at the 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Perth,
Australia.
Abstract: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists by Another Name
The term “terrorism” has been over-used in recent history. This has led to the term losing
some of value as its meaning has been altered. This essay will refute the statement that
freedom fighters are but terrorists of a different name. It will be argued that there are certain
actions and practices that separate the two. Performing these behaviours will cause a group to
fall under either one heading or the other. Defining Terrorism has been a challenge in recent
history. Early usage of word stems from the writings of Russian Revolutionaries, modern day
definitions have changed somewhat from these early beginnings.

The term freedom fighters first emerged in British controlled Palestine with creation
of the group “Freedom Fighters for Israel”. Differentiating between freedom fighters and
terrorists involves the identification of a number of issues including; who has the right to
label activist groups, the requirement of popular support, freedom as a primary goal, their
targets and areas of operation. Included within this paper will be an examination of the IRA
which aims to isolate and identify changes in behaviours that lead to a group shifting its focus
from freedom fighting to terrorism. It is certainly possible to evaluate a group by its actions
and goals and categorize it as either a terrorist group or freedom fighters.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
The objective of this research study has been to ascertain whether the British Colonial

Authorities had a substantial advantage over modern governments and coalitions when it
came to prosecuting counter-insurgency. A review of the past is often capable of providing
different insights to present-day problems. Consequently, an historical re-appraisal of three
previous colonial insurgencies has been conducted with a view to identifying any potential
lessons capable of being used today.
This chapter outlines the overall structure used to conduct a qualitative study to
investigate which aspects of counter-insurgency were effective and how they operated in the
recent past. Three historical conflicts were chosen: the Emergency in Malaya, the Emergency
in Kenya and the ‘Bush War’ in Rhodesia. Malaya has always been held high by many
authors as an example of how to counter an insurgency effectively (Hack, 2009; Marston &
Malkasian, 2008; Mockaitis, 1990a; Short, 1975). Therefore, it was considered suitable to use
this conflict as a bench mark to compare and contrast two further conflicts fought in Africa.
Kenya and Rhodesia were selected; as they went through a traumatic period of
decolonisation, as part of Britain divesting itself of its Colonial Empire during the Cold War
period at a time of change and Communist expansion (White, 1998). Furthermore, these
insurgencies were sequential, with a number of similarities worthy of further research; such
as the assumed transfer of expertise, strategies, policies and tactics from one conflict to the
other. In addition, by analysing conflicts in Africa, the considerable problems related to
dealing with complex ethnic cultures, traditional religions and the use of indigenous forces
against the insurgents could be explored. The selection was also based upon access to former
participants from all three conflicts; even though for Malaya and Kenya these respondents
were now in their 80s.
The case study approach was considered to be the most appropriate methodology to
deal with perceived the Research Problem. Primarily, as this method facilitates dealing with
multiple empirical cases of a “contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not
clearly evident “(Yin, 2009, p. 18). Accordingly, case studies were constructed around the
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narrative produced from a series of semi-structured interviews; with a number of former
participants who were involved in the three selected conflicts. The data was then coded into
appropriate themes identified by the Literature Review as well as those that surfaced during
the coding process. Comparative analysis was then applied to the data, to address the
Research Problem, in an effort to understand whether any lessons could be learnt, together
with any potential recommendations.
1.2

Background and the Context
This study addressed an aspect of counter-insurgency that has been causing a number

of complex problems especially for those involved in recent actions, to be precise, the
problems associated with operating in what are considered foreign lands (Mackinlay, 2007).
For a number of complicated economic and geopolitical reasons, it has been found necessary
by the United States (US) and its collation allies to conduct counter-insurgency operations in
hostile and non-aligned countries to establish more stable governments resulting in a less
threatening international environment. In an effort to curb international terrorism, it has
become desirable to restructure certain unstable countries (Krepinevich, 2005). The
consequence of this policy has been a long and drawn out involvement in extensive counterinsurgency operations; as a result of occupying and trying to pacify such openly hostile
countries as Iraq and Afghanistan (Nagl, 2007).
The changes in the global geopolitical structures have meant it is no longer viable for
the sole super power to act alone. The US now needs to act in collaboration and in coalitions
in order to accomplish its role as international sheriff; even if it is operating under a United
Nations (UN) mandate. Together with this re-alignment of expediencies, is the necessity of
political adhesion to keep the Coalition unified and focused on the desired objectives.
Historically, military might alone has been found to be incapable of subduing any
country long term that is experiencing rebellion and insurgency. The evidence for this can be
found in Aden and Cyprus for the British; in Indo- China and Algeria for the French; in
Angola and Moçambique for the Portuguese and for the Americans in Vietnam and Somalia.
There has been an evolutionary development of counter-insurgency doctrine for
conducting what are euphemistically called asymmetric or small wars, against mainly
guerrilla operations. These types of conflicts have forced military generals to restructure their
tactics and strategies away from direct full scale confrontations; as the armies they are now
encountering during insurgencies operate as guerrillas in small bands, not as regimented
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armies. Countering an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war, as many countries have
found to their detriment.
1.2.1

End of Empire

The re-adjustment for the European Powers, particularly Britain, post World War
Two was a difficult and painful process. This period has become known as the ‘End of
Empire’, a period when the European Powers began divesting themselves of their colonial
possessions, not always by choice either, but often through violent conflicts with the
inhabitants. The expansion of international Communism was seen at this time as a major
threat to the interests of the west, with the fear of what was known and the ‘Domino Theory’;
with states falling progressively under Communist control: either Maoist or Soviet (Hill,
Chase, & Kennedy, 1996; Merrill, 2006).
Whereas, all-out-warfare was an established concept, particularly after two world
wars, the model of countering-insurgency was very much in its infancy requiring the adoption
of new doctrines, tactics and strategies. Understanding how this could be accomplished
produced a number of discourses, not least of these from a series of French military theorists,
such as Galula (1964), Trinquier (1964) and Beaufre (1965), together with some notable
British theorists as well, Thompson (1966) and Paget (1967).
The Emergency in Malaya (1948-60), required a considerable change of mind-set by
the British authorities and the Colonial Government, in order to confront the insurgency. The
old style of imperial policing was no longer capable of dealing with complex social-politicaleconomic demands, made by the colonised population. A concerted military and socially
changing approach had to be adopted in order to confront the challenges presented by the
insurgency. Reinforcing the under strength and under trained police was foremost in these
series of changes (Anderson & Killingray, 1992, pp. 110-122). In addition, an evolutionary
process saw innovative and progressive reforms to the strategies and tactics used, which
eventually brought about a dramatic turnaround in the ability of the colonial authorities to
counter the Communist led insurrection (Stockwell, 1992) Part of this turnaround was the
development of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’, based upon the creation of a revised
approach to understanding that the population were an important, if not vital, component to
achieving an effective outcome.
Subsequently, came a complete re-organisation of the available resources being
brought about, which included a far larger police force, predominately locally recruited;
supported by an effective intelligence gathering machinery operated by Special Branch
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(Comber, 2008). The British Army were brought in to bolster the weak civil power. A
comprehensive plan was adopted to incorporate all areas of government in support of
destroying the capability of the Communist led insurgents from over running the country
(Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, pp. 100-127). Later, the principle of divide-and-rule was applied by
offering full Independence to the Malays, which ensured the Malay population fully
supported the counter-insurgency measures, and turned against the insurgents (Jackson, 2008,
pp. 116-118). Based upon all these elements, a satisfactory outcome was achieved for
Malaya. Consequently, it is often held up as an example of how to prosecute an effective
counter-insurgency (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 130).
1.2.2

African Conflicts

During this time period, a number of the colonies in Africa were clamouring for
greater self government with rising discontentment prevalent in most (McCarthy, 1994, pp.
82-88). Kenya, in the 1940s experienced a serious set of land grievances, which confronted
the European settlers and the Colonial Government. The Kikuyu tribe felt the most aggrieved,
with a section of the tribe creating a revolutionary movement known as the Mau Mau
(Wachanga, 1975, pp. xiv-xx). By the 1950s, a major conflict was underway requiring the
declaration of a state of Emergency in 1952. British forces were required in support of the
civil power, together with similar counter-measures as had been imposed in Malaya. It took
ten years to subdue the insurrection. The British Government also had to change its policy on
colonialism (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 352), in order to gain the support of the majority of
the population, by declaring that Kenya would gain its independence once the insurrection
was defeated (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, pp. 354-366).
The ability of one tribe, the Kikuyu, to cause so much disruption to a major Colonial
power made a significant influence on other African independence movements; especially as
the Kikuyu received no identifiable assistance from outside of Kenya. The same issues of
nationalism, identity and self determination were raised in other colonies in Africa,
particularly in southern Africa. Unrest was spreading in Angola, Moçambique, South Africa,
South-West Africa, the Belgium Congo, Nyasaland and Rhodesia (Hargreaves, 1988, pp.
166-167).
The European settlers in Rhodesia took note of the fate of their northern neighbours in
Kenya and attempted to control their own destiny outside of the British Empire. A Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 saw Rhodesia become a renegade state, but with
few supporters on the world stage. Similar to Kenya, land grievances unpinned the initial
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unrest. However, the most notable difference was the support and training the rebels were
given by both the Soviet Union and Maoist China, which turned the insurgency in to one that
was Communist led. Although the Rhodesian forces were able to hold their own militarily
until the negotiated settlement brought about the British sponsored elections in 1980, they
lacked the political support to affect their own internal compromise (Preston, 2004). The
shortage of manpower, resources and dwindling support, both internally and externally,
brought an end to Rhodesia and the creation of Zimbabwe within the British Commonwealth.
These three conflicts are considered to have a number of important lessons in the
development of effective counter-insurgency strategies and tactics. Foremost amongst these
was the control of legislation that was available to the colonial states, supported by a well
integrated police force capable of leading the offensive against the insurgents. Furthermore,
this was coupled with the multiple capabilities of their forces, most notably the high level of
indigenous forces in their ranks, with the ability to gather effective intelligence through an
extensive local network; led by Special Branch. In addition, they had a comprehensive
understanding of their opponents including their weaknesses as well as their capabilities. All
of these elements when combined together would seem to have provided a substantial
advantage to the Colonial Forces when compared to those forces involved in counterinsurgencies today.
1.3

The Problem
Research indicates (Alderson, 2007a; Egnell, 2011; Mackinlay, 2009; Nagl, 2007;

Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012; Webber, 2009) that there has been a significant problem
encountered by the United States (US) and its Coalition allies, when they attempt to conduct
counter-insurgency operations within a foreign country, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The
problem relates to difficulties in dealing with the local population, due to their lack of sociocultural anthropological understanding, which inflames local sensitivity and causes animosity
resulting in lack of population support (Lucas, 2008; McFate, 2005). The consequence of this
failure undermines the ability of the Coalition forces to stabilise the country. Furthermore,
this problem hampers and hinders the ability to gather effective intelligence, so necessary to
conducting successful counter-insurgency operations
The rationale behind the study was to ascertain what were the effective elements used
by the Colonial Forces, particularly the police and Special Branch, in the conflicts to see if
they are transferable, or can even be adapted to benefit the prosecuting of counterinsurgencies today.
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An early review of the literature, indicated a dearth of research related to the role
played by the Colonial Police Forces in countering the insurgencies, which appeared to be
incongruous, as a number of the historical accounts indicated how important the police are
supposed to be to the whole effort (Anderson & Killingray, 1992; Hutchinson, 1969; Marston
& Malkasian, 2008; Mumford, 2012; Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012; Sepp, 2005). Therefore, by
using former colonial policemen as part of this research, it was thought this would address the
imbalance and could provide valuable insights from their narratives as to how the counterinsurgency was conducted.
1.4

Significance
The proposed significance of this study would be to indicate directions for modern

planners to consider when conducting counter-insurgency operations in foreign countries. It
was thought it would be of particular significance to Australia, as a major participant in
United Nations (UN) peace-keeping and peace-making efforts. The demands made on the
Australian Forces involved, might be better served if they were able to adopt and adapt a
number of the outcomes and recommendations derived from this study.


The significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces in combating the
insurgencies and how important the role of the police force was to re-asserting
the rule of law in support of a fair judicial system. Understanding how
important it is to have a functioning and accepted police force to created
confidence in the elected government.



Recording the narratives of the Colonial Police, particularly those now in their
80s, as soon their record of events will be lost forever without these types of
studies; in fact some respondents have already passed on since this study
begun. History can only be interpreted authentically if there are sufficient
records to assist with this aspiration.



Another significant area was the relationship the Colonial Forces had with
their indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently,
providing more recorded data on the important role indigenous forces played,
as part of the structure of combating insurgencies, has been part of this
research process. There appears to be latent recognition of this important
aspect when dealing with countering insurgencies in other lands, “most
counterinsurgency [sic] campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but
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by indigenous forces”(Jones, 2008, p. 9). Although a difficult and complex
area for modern forces to adjust to and implement, it is considered almost
imperative for the future of most counter-insurgency operations (Byman,
2005; Byman, 2006; Corum, 2006).


A further significant feature discussed in this research, has been the role of
religion, particularly the role of tribal religion and beliefs. Specifically, the
psychological control this is capable of applying to the minds of the
population. A failure to recognise and understand how this manifests itself, is
capable of undermining all attempts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the
population; considered so necessary in combating insurgencies. Furthermore,
in developing societies, the role of the local witch-doctor, sprit medium or
Imam can seriously challenge all endeavours to garner the support of the local
population if their influence is underestimated. It is necessary to understand
and appreciate the importance of culture and customs when operating in other
than lands, as is the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan or Somalia.



Intimidation through terrorism, coercion and death underlies much of the
activities of insurgent and rebel organisations. Failure to recognise and
account for this activity is a further hindrance to gaining the support of the
population though any ‘hearts and minds’ imitative; as does compulsive and
coercive indoctrination (Anderson, 2011c, pp. 122-124; Kilcullen, 2010, p.
153; Leites & Wolf Jr, 1970, pp. 90-120). All of these aspects have been
discussed in this study, as a result of the narratives from the respondents
regarding their experiences in countering insurgency.

1.5

Research Design Overview
Concurrent with the research problem, the use of case studies was considered the most

appropriate method for dealing with multiple layers of data in a historical context. The design
also considered the difficulties in accessing the required data; especially from a primary
source context, if this study was to generate any new outcomes. Consequently, a qualitative
approach has been adopted incorporating supporting elements to ensure validity and
reliability.
A pilot study was also incorporated as part of the design, even though this is an
unusual approach when using qualitative methodology. Nonetheless, the benefits of testing
the whole design before embarking upon the extensive data collection process have been
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vindicated as mistakes would have been hard to rectify at a later stage, because extensive
travel was required to conduct the interviews and access the archives.
The nature of the case studies necessitated selection of suitable participants and
criterion sampling was used to ensure they had the required background and knowledge to
participate in this study. The semi-structured interview technique was also considered the
most appropriate due to the age of the participants. The data was coded and isolated using
inductive analysis to allow any new themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data,
which was supported by logical analysis to elicit further patterns through cross-classification.
The three case studies were then compared and contrasted in relation to the themes
identified, before being analysed, synthesised and interpreted. The outcomes provided the
conclusions and theoretical recommendations to the initial Research Questions.
1.5.1

Primary Research Question

A primary Research Question was developed:
What was the role played by the Colonial Forces in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya
(1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), and can any of the lessons
learnt be applied to conflicts today?
Supporting the primary question, a further four sub-questions were developed:
1.5.2

Sub-Questions:

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces effectiveness in the
insurgency campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Was ‘hearts and minds’ a substantial factor in the conflicts?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and
practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be effective?
1.6

Hypotheses and Assumptions
Based upon the use of a central research hypothesis, as Kumar ((1996, pp. 64-70)

defines it for qualitative studies in humanities, a number of assumptions were formed, which
needed to be tested.
The primary hypothesis was that the structural make up of the British Colonies—
including Rhodesia as a renegade British Colony—provided them with a substantial
advantage when compared to modern day conflicts involving countering insurgency. The
ability to support the coercive forces with punitive legislation when required, thus ensuring
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support for the strategies and policies was foremost in their capabilities. Furthermore, that
this advantage was based upon a number of multi- facetted and possibly uniquely time
specific factors difficult to replicate today. In addition, the research sought to confirm or
redefine a modern assumption that ‘hearts and minds’ played a significant part in countering
the three insurgencies used for this study. Insofar as not only was it central to the overall
strategy for conducting operations, but was also understood by those involved on the ground
at the time to be central to the overall strategy.
A further assumption concerned the role played by Special Branch (SB). Indications
are that SB was the vital cog of the combined network that held the Colonial Forces together
giving them a distinct advantage; through an extensive intelligence gathering network
allowing commanders to optimise their decision making process for operations to great
effect. Far reaching networks were established on back of the extensive capabilities of the
Colonial Forces operating within the country, as they spoke the local languages and were
culturally aware. Furthermore, the policy of incorporating indigenous forces into their
competencies greatly enhanced their overall capabilities. The result was a significant ability
to source valuable and accountable intelligence; a fundamental requirement for all counterinsurgency operations.
Supporting Special Branch (SB) was the colonial police, as they formed part of the
police structure. Consequently it is argued, SB could not have been as effective had they not
formed part of the police; all officers were drawn from police service. The assumption made
for this study, is that the police were not only at the forefront of countering the insurgencies
but were also a vital part of the combined structure, and this fact needs to be more firmly
established into the literature of these events.
An additional hypothesis was that the role of ‘hearts and minds’ was not as well
known as it is today and appears to have been imposed on these conflicts by revisionism
trying to over impose modern interpretations on past events.
1.7

Theoretical Framework
A number of theories have been considered to underpin this study. Consequently, as

part of the research processes the merits of each were explored for suitability. Conflict theory
has been considered to be the most appropriate based upon the thoughts of Marx
(1867/1999), Engels (1969/1848) and Turner (1954), and these provided the central tenets
upon which the theory is suggested. Conflict theory readily supports the notions of colonial
conflict, especially as there was a strong element of class war involved, at all levels. In
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addition to conflict theory, elements of cultural theory, anomie theory and general strain
theory are also present in the theoretical framework.
1.8

Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is structured in a sequential manner to ensure a progression of ideas and

outcomes are obtained, before undertaking a comparative analysis to provide the conclusions.
Chapter Two outlines the literature review process to establish the definitions required to
conduct such a study. Primarily, to outline the difficulties in defining insurgency, before
establishing what is meant by countering an insurgency. Chapter Three discusses the
justification for using the methodology, together with explanation for the choice of the case
study approach. The need for reliability underpinned by validity is made clear, as are the
limitations in the study. To this end, bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the
validity of the data collection and the analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407).
The Pilot Study outcomes are discussed in Chapter Four, along with the importance of
having tested the study design to ensure a robust outcome. In essence this is a case study in
its own right, as the whole process has been conducted in order to verify the results were
what were expected of the study design and therefore acceptable.
Chapters, Five, Six and Seven are the case studies for Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia.
The context of the conflicts is established in relation to the literature, before presenting the
data from the semi-structured interviews. Each case study is based upon the themes identified
in the Literature Review, as expounded by the narrative provided by the participants in reply
to the Research Questions.
The last two chapters deal with the outcomes of the case studies. Chapter Eight is the
comparative analytical component, through interpretation, triangulating the findings with the
literature to verify the context. Chapter Nine brings together the conclusions, extracted from
the findings in order to present a series of theoretical recommendations. Further areas of
research are suggested, based upon this study, along with the limitations in the conclusion.
1.9

Conclusion
The study set out to research three historical conflicts from the perspective of how the

authorities were able to counter the insurgencies in their respective countries, in an effort to
understand if any of the strategies, tactics and methods used, were actually transferable to
modern day conflicts. The purpose of this multicase study was to explore three previous
counter-insurgency conflicts by interviewing a number of former participants, in order to
10

identify if there was a specific aspect that could be identified that was effective and could be
re-applied again today. A case study methodology was considered the most appropriate for
this type of comparative historical research.
Malaya was chosen as case study because it is well documented, with a number of
strategies and tactics developed, which have been utilised elsewhere. Therefore, it was
considered a useful benchmark upon which to compare two further insurgencies. Kenya and
Rhodesia were chosen, as they represented specific problems related to strong ethnic
religious and tribal identities coupled with self-determination with nationalistic undertones;
found in all developing nations. These particular conflicts required further interpretation, as
they were more likely to have a greater number of similarities and relevance to those being
fought by the Western Coalitions today.
The use of primary sources was important to achieve the objectives of this study.
Consequently, former members of the Security Forces, specifically from the police and
Special Branch, were traced and interviewed in an effort to obtain a further dimension to that
normally given by using solely the army. Accordingly, the case studies are built around the
narratives provided by the respondents to the questions developed from the themes, identified
in the Literature Review. These themes provided the framework for the case studies and
remained consistent throughout the study.
A sequential process has been followed to allow the narrative to develop using the
case studies as the vehicle and to demonstrate the exchange of ideas from one conflict to the
next. The data was then synthesised, in order to conduct a comparative analysis of the
findings and provided an interpretation and a conclusion. A series of theoretical
recommendations are also presented in the Conclusion: these may provide lessons for future
planning and strategy for counter-insurgency.
The study was designed specifically to be comparative, as it was felt this approach
was more capable of providing fresh insights into to the perceived research problem.
Furthermore, the use of two case studies from Africa has provided additional appreciation as
to how counter-insurgency has evolved to combat complex socio-political-cultural conflicts.
The next chapter discusses this evolution, with a review of the existing literature to position
the study, prior to presenting the case studies.
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Chapter 2
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERING
INSURGENCY
2.1

Introduction
When undertaking research it is imperative to position the study within the existing

literature in order to demonstrate how it adds to the debate, thus increasing the sum body of
knowledge. The crux of this chapter considered insurgency or revolutionary warfare, as it is
sometimes referred to, from the viewpoint of three conflicts: Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia.
Principally, insurgency is discussed from the perspective of countering, or opposing those
who wish to topple an existing government and is termed ‘counter-insurgency’. There are
many broad aspects that come under the heading of ‘counter-insurgency’ but this study
looked at how the Colonial Security Forces operated and developed their tactics and
strategies during the three selected campaigns.
In order to accomplish the desired aims, there are several viewpoints that have been
considered significant if the study is to achieve the outcomes as proposed. Firstly, it was
important to define the time period, then evolution of counter-insurgency as a doctrine and
what is meant by the terms used in this study. Terms such as Guerrilla, Asymmetrical or
Revolutionary warfare have been reviewed for clarification (Laqueur, 1976). Secondly, the
methods used to counter-insurgency have been assessed by looking at policy, strategy and
tactics from a historical perspective. Thirdly, although, the French de-colonisation experience
was a bitter one, it has been included in the discussion, as many tactics developed by the
French forces have been transferred elsewhere (Trinquier, 1964). Lastly, by looking at
prominent themes, a framework was developed that was used in the case studies to evaluate
the three conflicts: Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia.
Some of the more notable tactics are discussed such as: ‘hearts and minds’, the use of
the military as an aid to civil power, creating a ‘Home Guard’ by using volunteer indigenous
forces, intelligence gathering, resettlement of the population, food restrictions, collective
punishments, together with any factors that appeared to have a significant impact of the
course of the conflicts. The role of the Colonial Police predominates this study; in an effort to
demonstrate how important their involvement was to counter-insurgency efforts in these
conflicts (Hutchinson, 1969). Fundamentally, their importance stems from local knowledge
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linked to their ability to harness intelligence gathering capabilities through multiple means
under the direction of the Colonial Police Special Branch. Other specialised units are
discussed, as many evolved during this period and became central to the thrust against the
insurgents, such as Tracker Units, Pseudo Gangs, Fire-Force, SAS and Police Anti-Terrorist
Units. The concept of ‘hearts and minds’ developed at this time, as did psychological warfare
and propaganda. The role of intimidation through sorcery, black magic and tribal religions is
also examined, as it is considered to be a significant aspect when dealing with conflicts in
Africa. It is difficult to explain some of the contradictions in the African psyche without
dealing with the aspect of tribal religion and sorcery (Mbiti, 1969; Ranger, 1985). A further
feature that required consideration too, was the role played by the Colonial Administration in
the general strategy and structure of the Governments’ plan for defeating the insurgency. The
Administration complemented the coercive forces by providing and implementing the
necessary civilian improvements to the overall strategic plan.
The ability to measure ‘success’ in terms of counter-insurgency is fraught with
difficulty; as it would have to be defined to suit various paradigms. It could be argued that for
Malaya, not allowing the country to become a Chinese dominated Communist country was
success. The same applies for Kenya, whereby the Kikuyu who formed the Mau Mau with
their revolutionary, insurrectional and anti-traditional views did not defeat the colonial
authority and assume power upon Independence. These outcomes suited the long term
aspirations of Britain and the formation of the Commonwealth to replace the colonial
structure associated with Empire, therefore, this can be treated as a success. Rhodesia is more
problematic to assess, as the ‘Bush War’ sought to maintain a white minority Government. In
this aspect it was a failure. However if viewed from a military perspective perhaps it can be
argued that Rhodesia was a partial success, or at least was successful in many aspects of its
counter-insurgency tactics “victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla forces in the field,
but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population”
(Evans, 2007, p. 176). Therefore, ‘success’ is more a measure of favourable political
outcomes related to tactics, objectives and plans, than measured as actually winning the
counter-insurgency, “success in counter-insurgency is compromise” (Mumford, 2012, p. 12).
Consequently, the research considers effectiveness rather than success as an outcome.
The last section, 2.18, deals with the literature that is associated with underlying
theory that emerges and supports this research. The philosophical dimension is are an
important part of research at this level, consequently an abstract argument flows through the
whole discussion underpinning the study. Conceptually ‘conflict theory’ is the most
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prominent within the context of underlying theory, but this is discussed in relation to
‘anomie’ and ‘general strain theory’; all of which are derivatives from the structural class
theory as proposed by Marx and Engels (Marx, 1867, 1974; Marx & Engels, 1969/1848;
Williams, 1991).
Figure 2.1 Literature Review development process

Figure 2. 1 summarises the important points that have been discussed in this chapter
and show the thought process involved to obtain the themes. The central boxes are the key
points; these are supported by areas that have been considered significant in arriving at the
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points chosen. In addition, this is a visual outline that assists in indentifying the themes that
formed the framework for analysing the case studies. The sub-headings used in the chapter
further categorize the themes in order to contextualise their importance based upon the
literature.
2.2

End of Empire
The period of history within which these conflicts took place is from 1948-1980. This

period was the era when the majority of British colonies sought either to move towards self
government or full independence, with several taking up arms against the sovereign power in
attempt to gain supremacy post independence. The process of decolonisation began soon after
hostilities had ended the Second World War. Although, American had been allies with
Britain, they were fundamentally against her keeping the colonies post war and sought to
have the Empire disbanded (Porter, 1976, p. 315). However, the fear of Communism taking
hold, especially in the Far East, tempered this policy and it developed into a much more
measured approach. The Korean War (1950-53) emphasised how real the threat of
Communist expansion was to western capitalism and democratic values. Britain, with the
tacit support of the Unite States of America (USA), attempted to hold on to those colonies
that were economically vital to her best interests; this included Malaya, which provided tin
and rubber badly needed to fight the war in Korea (Porter, 1976, p. 321).
Malaya, was seen as necessary for two reasons, one, for its rubber and tin. The other,
was because the insurgency was Communist led and this was contrary to American foreign
policy ambitions of ensuring that the Far East remained within the western sphere of
influence. This policy became known as the Truman Doctrine (1947) (Gaddis, 1973, p. 386;
McLean, 1986; Merrill, 2006, p. 36). Britain began to fight a rear-guard action in Malaya
against the insurgents, who were in the main Chinese and inspired by Maoist Communism.
Whether Britain was intent on keeping Malaya long term as a Colony is debatable, it is more
likely this was an exigency based upon the realities of post war economics (Brendon, 2007,
pp. xix-xxii). Britain was certainly ill prepared to fight counter-insurgency at the start of
hostilities in 1948. Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011a) argues that the counter-insurgency policy
eventually adopted by the British was “one carefully calculated to allow decolonization to
occur on British terms rather than those of the indigenous peoples” (2011a, p. 2). A view not
shared by some of the reviewers of his argument (Murphy, 2011). This study did not seek to
support either view, rather it was a review of what strategies, policies and tactics were
developed and used as part of the counter-insurgency efforts in the three selected conflicts.
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De-colonisation was taking place across the globe, not all of it peaceful either. In
addition to Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands lost their colonial
possessions too, some of them through bitter insurgencies; such as Portugal in Angola and
Mozambique and France in Indo-China and Algeria. Although never the colonial power in
Vietnam, nevertheless the USA was also defeated in its counter-insurgency battle in support
of the American puppet regime (Kolko, 1987). Fighting insurgencies against nationalist
guerrillas required some considerable changes in both strategies and tactics by all of those
engaged in these types of conflicts.
In Africa the development of nationalism was met with recalcitrance by the European
settlers and in some cases outright opposition to any form of majority rule for the African
population (Birmingham, 1995; Davidson, 1994). Insurgency using guerrilla tactics became
“the most effective means of defeating the highly organized and heavily armed, but also
cumbersome alien armies of the major powers” (Clapham, 1998, p. 2). It was a very
traumatic period for Britain, having come out of a devastating and extremely costly World
War. Pacifying internal rebellion in the colonies was distressing as well as expensive, as often
British servicemen were now pitted against former fellow soldiers who had fought with them
in defence of the British Empire. The monetary outlay involved was considerable, for a
country that had been devastated by war and was only grudgingly given in limited amounts to
aid the counter-insurgency efforts; the colonies were expected to carry the burden
themselves. The limitations imposed by budget restraints hampered effective strategy but
ironically forced local innovative initiatives to take place, which will be assessed in this
study.
The conflicts selected for study were in fact civil wars, but were called ‘Emergencies’
and this was for a very good reason. If they were called wars, or civil wars, then the insurance
companies would not pay out for destruction of goods and services. However, if they were
called ‘Emergencies’ caused by civil commotion then claims could be made for loss of
property and goods (Barber, 1972, p. 11). The conflicts were not only against the colonial
power, but set a section of society against another, with one side supporting the government
of the day. They can be called insurrections or rebellions too, as they sought to change the
constituted political order of power within the country by attempting to overthrow the
authorized Government (Paget, 1967, p. 16). Importantly the rebels were not recognised as
belligerents either under the terms of lawful warfare in international law-jus in bello
(Howard, Andreopoulos, Shulman, & Devries, 1995; Posner, 2002, 2004; Posner & Sykes,
2004).
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2.3

Defining the Discussion
The broad-spectrum type of warfare that took place in these conflicts goes by many

names: revolutionary, insurgency, hybrid warfare, small wars, proxy wars, irregular,
unconventional, guerrilla, asymmetrical, fourth-generation, and low-intensity conflict, to
name the most prominent ones (Beckett, 2001; Joes, 2004; Kilcullen, 2010; Laqueur, 1976;
Metelits, 2010; Nagl, 2002; O'Neill, 2005; Paget, 1967; The US Army/Marine Corps, 2006).
There are notable differences in these terms and they are often interchangeable, but all of
them refer to warfare conducted by relatively weak parties against more dominant
adversaries; the constitutional government:
There are no declarations of war, there are no seasons for campaigning, and few end
with peaces treaties. Decisive battles are few. Attrition, terror, psychology, and actions
against civilians highlight “combat”. Rather than highly organised armed forces based
on a strict command hierarchy, wars are fought by loosely knit groups of regulars,
irregulars, cells, and not infrequently by locally-based warlords under little or no
central authority (Holsti, 2005, p. 20).
A description given here is of limited action by small bands, terrorising the general
population with sporadic attacks toward the goal of gaining political concessions or
overthrowing the legitimate government.
The contents of Table 2.1, demonstrates how many terms are available that basically
describe the same thing. Unfortunately, some of the terms shown here can appear simplistic
when analysed, however it does illuminate the complexities that are found when discussing
differing types of conflicts. For the purposes of this study, the conflicts will be called anticolonial insurgencies, although the tactics used by the insurgents were certainly guerrilla in
nature. “Guerrilla warfare does not automatically produce a revolution” (Clapham, 1985, p.
164), but it certainly was the most effective means available in these conflicts. Furthermore,
they were conflicts in which one side tried to destabilise the country by undermining law and
order and the other attempts to uphold it. (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 4). The objective of “the
guerrillas was ‘to disrupt the civil administration and ultimately, to cause it to
collapse”(Ranger, 1985, p. 180). Undermining the social fabric is far cheaper than trying to
maintain it “guerrilla warfare is cheap, and the fight against it is very costly” (Laqueur, 1976,
p. 379)
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Table 2.1 also defines Colonial war as a policing and public order issue, which is very
limited in its definition. In fact, all the definitions used on the right of the table could be used
to define the conflicts discussed in this study as could most of those on the left hand side as
well.

Table 2.1 Low intensity warfare and its variants

(Smith, 2003, p. 21)
Guerrilla war is not new and has been practiced since time immemorial, it has been
evolving to the point where it can be termed fourth generation warfare, using “ all available
networks-political, economic, social, and military” (Hammes, 2004, p. 2) Based upon the
writings of Van Crevald’s (1991), The Transformation of War, which highlights how
irregular forces have been able to defeat regulars and have been more adept in learning new
methods to overcome regular forces military superiority. Van Crevald (1991) posits that
conventional militaries may well become irrelevant (Artelli & Deckro, 2008). An aspect
discussed by Kilcullen (2009) paraphrasing from the work of Francart (1999), proposing that
ground forces in the future would only intervene in extremely compound conditions of state
failure to end violence rather than “achieve policy ends through violence” (p. 5). Others
(Gray, 2005; Melshen, 2007) are hesitant to agree totally, for example Gray’s (2005)
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conclusions in Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare is that “Irregular warfare may well
be the dominant mode in belligerency for some years to come, but interstate war, including
great power conflict, will enjoy a healthy future.” (2005, p. 282).
In On War, Von Clausewitz (1968/1832), a Prussian General famous for his treaties
on warfare, writing around 1827, is renowned for his dictum that war is “the continuation of
political intercourse with an admixture of other means” (as cited in Esposito, 1954), often
misquoted as "war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means"; lists five general
conditions that he considers essential if it is to be considered guerrilla warfare, and ergo
insurgency:
The war must be carried on in the interior of the country;
The war cannot hinge on a single battle;
The theatre of war must extend over a considerable area;
The national character must support the war; and
The country must be irregular, difficult, inaccessible (1968, p. 1 ch XXVI).
These conditions were certainly present during the colonial conflicts, furthermore, as
Janos (1963) points out, “if the objective of warfare is revolution-the transfer or destruction of
organized power in society-then, on the other hand, we may speak of revolutionary warfare. The
latter is a type of war that may be fought conventionally as well as unconventionally” (1963, p.
643).

Therefore, based upon these points the anti-colonial insurgencies have the necessary
elements to be called revolutionary; as they set out to change the existing political order.
However, Clapham (1998) breaks down the definition further by classifying them in to four
subgroups: liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies and lastly
war-lord insurgencies. For the purposes of this study the first definition is the most useful as
it clearly describes the conflict by armed liberation movements against colonial rule in
pursuit of self-determination and nationhood. Nevertheless, the revolutionary class aspect
associated with Mao Tse Tung doctrine is also present, so this has to be understood as part of
the underlying structural raison d’être (Clapham, 1998, p. 2); as does the underlying ethnic
differentiation between the peoples and tribes involved in revolution in each conflict (p. 7).
The latter point appears in all three conflicts, although in Malaya it was not termed tribal, but
‘ethnic’ with the Chinese being the predominant component of the insurgents against the
Malays.
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Although Rhodesia did not consider itself to be a British Colony during the period of
the ‘Bush war’ 1964-1980, it was in fact an illegitimate state under international law, as it had
declared unilaterally its own independence from Britain on the 11th- November 1965; a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Coggins, 2006; Marshall, 1968; Smith,
2001a; Wilkinson, 1980). Consequently, for the purposes of this study it is grouped under the
definition of a British Colony, particularly as the structures of power remained very much the
same and the security forces had been set up and were run along those employed elsewhere in
British colonies.
Thompson (1966), whose own book Defeating Communist insurgency in Malaya and
Vietnam is considered a seminal work on fighting insurgences, outlines in the forward to the
book by McCuen (1966), four accepted phases an insurgency conflict goes through as
according the theory of guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung (1954). These phases are:
The period of organisation ( subversion);
The period of terrorism ( and to a certain extent low-scale guerrilla warfare);
The period of guerrilla warfare;
And finally, the period of mobile warfare. (McCuen, p. 17)
While this tends not to be a direct sequential process, and does not happen
everywhere in the country at the same time, it does describe the progression that takes place
during the attempt to overthrow the existing government. Insurgencies tend to be protracted
affairs, which wax and wane depending on the fortunes of both sides; trying to put a defined
process to this progression would be difficult to support. However, understanding the
structure used by revolutionaries in their quest to overthrow the existing government is
paramount if a sustainable and coherent counter strategy is to be developed and successfully
applied (Taber, 1970, pp. 19-21). In two of the three conflicts studied (Malaya and Rhodesia),
the four-element-strategy described above to conduct the insurgency was used by the
revolutionaries; predominately as they were Communist inspired. The strategy was based
upon the teachings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung (1954) and forms part of his discourse on how
to conduct revolutionary warfare. However, no direct evidence has been found to show that
the Mau Mau conflict in Kenya ever followed any such strategy, or was ideologically based
upon Communist inspired revolutions found elsewhere. Although, all the components were
certainly present for a class conflict: poverty, exploitation, imperialism, poor administration
and land issues, nonetheless they were not formalised into a structured communist ideology
(Clapham, 1985, pp. 161-162).
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2.4

Insurgency
Defining ‘insurgency’ for the purposes of this study has required looking at many

definitions (Beckett, 2001; Laqueur, 1976; McCuen, 1966; O'Neill, 2005; Paget, 1967; Taber,
1970). Guerrilla warfare and insurgency have become almost synonymous and the use of
terror is common to both, so it has been important to clarify which aspects are being studied.
However, “insurgency is essentially a political legitimacy crisis of some sort”(O'Neill, 1978,
p. 12). Consequently, there is a need to understand what are the aims of the insurgents and
what type of insurgency is it. Based upon political objectives six types can be identified:
“secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative and reformist”(O'Neill,
1978, p. 12).
The writings of Lawrence (1927), known as Lawrence of Arabia, are a touch stone for
all students of counter insurgency tactics and strategies. Lawrence’s experiences as a British
officer leading irregular Arab bands against the Turks during the First World War are laid out
in his classic work the Seven Pillars of Wisdom. The book emphases how guerrilla war can be
effectively waged by dedicated irregulars “ours would be a war of detachment...not
disclosing ourselves till we attacked.” (Lawrence, 1927, p. 200). The principles of attacking
vulnerable targets and disappearing back into the desert are discussed through his personal
insights in living and fighting with the Arabs. The ability to use the terrain, in this case the
desert, to their advantage and wrong footing their adversaries; gaining an almost mythical
superiority by their actions is poetically described. Basically Lawrence(1927) is expounding
the crucial principal of gaining the support of the population, together with the doctrine of
psychological warfare to undermine the moral of the opponents (Beckett, 2001). The ironic
aspect of this book is that it is written from the side of the insurgent fighting against
conventional troops, using small highly mobile forces striking out from secure bases
equipped with tactical intelligence. Not from the perspective of countering the resistance
from the governments side.
Notwithstanding the irony, what makes this book important is that it is based upon the
classical doctrine of a Chinese military strategist from the 6th BC, Sun Tsu “It is said that if
you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred
battles”(Tzu, 2011/ 6th Century BC, pp. 14, ch III) , often paraphrased to ‘ know your enemy,
you must become your enemy’. Although a well-known saying it has been extremely difficult
for modern armies fighting counter-insurgencies to put into practice. To many Generals it
was demeaning to lower their tactics to level of those that they are fighting, as they often
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considered the local indigenous insurgents to be less than capable of matching their own
prowess; this attitude was particularly prevalent during the anti-colonial campaigns fought
after the Second World War. Nevertheless, what becomes apparent when studying the
selected conflicts, is once the axiom of ‘know you enemy’ had been adopted and the security
forces started to understand their enemy’s weaknesses and modus operandi, they began to
quickly overhaul their enemies and take the initiative in various campaigns.
2.5

Counter-insurgency
The strategy, factors and roles to combat armed conflict can be summed up by the

term ‘counter-insurgency’, which involves all the means available to accomplish success
including repression, intimidation, reprisals, coercion, destruction and death (Beckett, 2001,
pp. 26-43; Joes, 2004, pp. 233-246; Taber, 1970). As an evolving model, this has taken on
many guises as it has developed over the years, which need to be defined in relation to this
period of study (Beckett, 2012). Hence, “an effective counterinsurgency (sic) program
depends on an accurate, substantive, and comprehensive profile of the adversary and the
environmental context within which he operates”(O'Neill, 2005, p. 155). In essence, by
analysing the three Emergencies through the use of case studies, this research seeks to
understand how government forces adapted and adopted their strategies in an attempt to
thwart the rebellions; as no two insurgencies are the same.
2.5.1

Doctrine

Defining what has become known as a counter-insurgency doctrine has been an
evolutionary practice, as it must move with the times if it is to remain relevant to those that
use it.
Doctrine articulates an approach based on firm principles, which result from rigours
analysis and therefore should hold true. It is more than simple definitions found in
publications: it is how to think, not the what to think. It is a guide, something that is
flexible, not rigid. It needs to be relatively timeless and it is only valid if it is derived
from practical experience and has broad acceptance.(Alderson, 2007b, p. 7)
The ways in which this process is brought about defines much of this study, as
essentially only by exploring the past and performing an analysis can the fundamentals be
understood and then applied; this is the case with doctrine (Alderson, 2007a; Anderson,
2011a; Corum, 2007; Harvey & Wilkinson, 2009; Rid, 2010; Roberts, 2009).
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From the doctrine the strategy is developed. The process of developing a counterinsurgency strategy requires identification of the goals of the insurgents as well as your own;
as this will assist in developing ways to frustrate their aims. This important aspect appears not
to have been made at the start of the Emergencies in either Kenya or Malaya. Four major
works of the time, point out this requirement in their methodologies for dealing with
insurgencies, by stressing the need to understand the aims of the insurgents (Galula,
1964/2006; McCuen, 1966; Paget, 1967; Thompson, 1966).
There appears to have been recognition of failure that the methods used at the start of
conflicts post World War II, were based upon out dated methods largely used by countries
such as Britain and France; prior to the war; when they had the manpower to overwhelm any
insurgency movements. However, as Strachan (2007) points out, strategy was evolving very
quickly through necessity, as the British learnt the heavy lessons from the brutal campaign in
Palestine, 1946 to 1948, and tried to apply them to Emergencies in both Kenya and Malaya.
Palestine policemen were recruited directly to the colonial forces in both Kenya and
Malaya, to supplement the limited local police in 1948; as soon as they were de-mobbed (p.
9). Those men who had experience in dealing with terrorist activities were in particular
demand (Jones, 1948). Approximately 500 joined the Malaya Police Force, with around 113
joining the Kenya Police Force, with incentives to keep them after the initial contract by
increasing their level of rank, as the majority had been sergeants in Palestine and were
consequently quickly promoted to higher ranks. Although these policemen brought several
fresh ideas with them, they were often resented by the existing police (Sinclair, 2002, p. 35).
The four works mentioned (Galula, 1964/2006; McCuen, 1966; Paget, 1967;
Thompson, 1966), all attest to the necessity to construct a strategic plan based upon the
nature of the insurgency that is confronting them as the recognised government. Galula’s
(1964/2006) approach centres upon his theory that counterinsurgency is not solely military,
but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single
authority. The four basic rules that he puts forward form the strategies for most of the
operations that have followed across the globe, in one form or another:
Galula (Galula, 1964/2006), lays out the framework for conducting a counterinsurgency operation based upon four primary laws and six principals. The four laws are:
The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent (sic) as for the
Insurgent;
Support is gained through an active minority;
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Support from the population is conditional;
Intensity of efforts and vastness of means. (pp. 52-55)
The interpretation of these laws indicates the aim of counter-insurgency is to gain the
support of the population rather than control of territory. The majority of the population will
try to remain neutral in the conflict; from bitter experience they know being on the wrong
side can mean death. However, there will be those that see advantage in supporting the
government and they can help in convincing the masses to turn against the insurgents. The
fear of retribution remains constant amongst the population. Normally the population will
only give their support, active or passive, to the government if they know they will be
protected. This support is fickle and quickly lost if they see any sign of weakness or lack of
resolve from the government. The aim of the insurgents is to erode that support by any means
available; including intimidation and terrorism (O'Neill, 1978, p. 16). Achieving order and
support of the population can only be done by progressively removing armed opponents from
the surrounding district thus securing the area from reprisals. Building infrastructure and
strengthening positions will assist in creating long-term supportive relationships with the
population (Artelli, 2007; Galula, 1964/2006).
2.6

The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency Doctrine
Despite the French having a poor record in countering-insurgency within their own

sphere of influence, there has developed a respect for what could be termed a French
doctrinal approach to counter-insurgency (Beaufre, 1965; Galliéni, 1908; Galula, 1964/2006;
Trinquier, 1964). Consequently, no appraisal of approaches to counter-insurgency would be
complete without inclusion of these noted authors.
McCuen (1966) emphasises the importance of controlling territory and using superior
force to defend the local population, very much basing his analysis on that proposed by
Galula (1964/2006) for fighting against the Front de Liberation National (FLN) in Algeria, by
the French forces. Securing the major base areas is a priority. Once this can be achieved the
population feels more at ease and starts to support the Government. In time, this will result in
improved intelligence allowing strike forces to go out and attack the insurgents directly.
The process of gradually acquiring defended territory was named as tâche d'huile, or
the oil-spot now called in common parlance the ‘ink-spot’(Gougeon, 2005, p. 300). General
Gallieni, who pre-dates Galula, called this carefully coordinated military and social strategy
the tâche d'huile; as in spoken French when you drop oil on water it rapidly spreads
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outwards, an oil-spot. But he also qualified this by adding that this must consist of aid in the
form of improved administration, economic management and education to be given to the
colonized (sic) population (Galliéni, 1908, p. 326; Rid, 2010, p. 750).
It can be argued that Gallieni’s ideas are the basis of many modern strategists
(Chaliand, 1990); as he implement and adapted Governor General De Lanessan’s plan (1892)
in the French colony of Cochinchina. He used walled towns, both old and newly built ones,
to secure the population from attacks in Indo-China; a definite fore-runner to the
‘villagisation’ process that was used in all three conflicts being studied (Phōam, 1985;
Wright, 1991, p. 179). Gallieni successfully dealt with rebels or ‘pirates’, as they were often
termed, in Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin from 1893 to 1895 – a region that today largely
coincides with Vietnam, and consequently developed a successful strategy for dealing with
insurgency (Rid, 2010, p. 748).
The importance of the previous paragraph highlights that when dealing with what is
termed ‘counter-insurgency’, many of the ideas are not new and have been evolving for
centuries under many guises. However, understanding how difficult it is to implement these
theories into complex situations has been recognised by many (Berger, Burgess, Mauldin, &
Sullivan, 2007), especially those who have taken part in such conflicts. The much used
phrase “trying to eat soup with a knife” from Lawrence’s (1920, p. 8) article, describing the
problems of managing the Arab militias in their revolt against the Turks, has become
synonymous with how difficult it is to put into practice.
Intellectually grasping the concept that fighting insurgents is messy and slow is a
different thing from knowing how to defeat them; knowing how to win, in turn, is a
different thing from implementing the measures required to do it (Nagl, 2002, pp. xixvi)
Many concepts and ideas are proposed during conflicts, some of them are put into
practice whilst others are discarded. The formation of a counter-insurgency doctrine is thus
an evolutionary process that progresses in stages. Reviewing the past allows a better
understanding of how this occurs. Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey, of the French army, who
had served under Gallieni in Indochina, re-organised his resources when he was dealing with

the colonial situation in Madagascar. The structure of his command was broken down:
In[to] seven offices: 1st personnel, 2nd operations, 3rd civil affairs, 4th topographic
service, 5th printing and publications, 6th indigenous affairs, and 7th intelligence. An
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officer headed all bureaus except indigenous affairs. The 3rd bureau, civil affairs, had
an elevated importance and was structured into four sections responsible for a wide
portfolio of tasks: political affairs, local budget, judiciary system, militias, public
works, and civil construction projects; personnel; commerce and colonization,
agriculture, forests, mines, taxes, tariffs, and imports. The indigenous affairs bureau
was responsible for education, religion and cults (Rid, 2010, p. 749).
The important point to note in this quote is that this structure was set out in 1897! It
should have been standard practice when the conflicts that erupted in Kenya and Malaya in
the late 1940s, but this was not the case. It appears that ‘lessons learnt’ was not an accepted
practice at that time and it had to be re-learnt again before it could be applied. In addition, the
French laid out a structured framework for dealing with their overseas possessions that shows
an understanding of the holistic requirements necessary to conduct successful colonial
campaigns.
When assessing how the British government dealt with the conflicts in both Malaya
and Kenya when they started, it appears as if there was little coordination or structure to their
counter-insurgency efforts. It was not until Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed
Director of Operations in 1950 did any structure become apparent to produce an overall plan.
The Plan became known as the Briggs Plan (1950) for Malaya, followed by the one
developed later by Erskine in Kenya (1953); loosely based upon the same principals. Briggs
sought to cut off the supplies to the insurgents by a series of measures, one of which was
building new villages to keep the inhabitants away from being intimidated or supporting the
rebels (Hack, 2009, pp. 387-388).
The plan incorporated much of what was basic structure for dealing with insurrections
used by the French. Of note from the quote by Rid (2010) in the French structure is the 3rd
bureau, civil affairs, which incorporated a wide portfolio of administrative and political tasks.
In defence of the British Colonial structure, this would have been the role carried out by the
Colonial civil administration. What was different was bringing it under the central
coordinated counter-insurgency structure with a military man at the head as part of the
strategy to manage the conflict. Only when in 1952 General Templer, was appointed as High
Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya with full authority over the civilian and
military resources did the British recognise the advantages this structure would have to the
prosecution of the conflict (Hack, 2009, p. 387; Ucko, 2010, p. 16).
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Another aspect that will be dealt with in the case studies, for both Kenya and
Rhodesia, is the impact and influence of local religion, sorcery and cults had on the conflicts
(Lan, 1985). It should be noted that in the French model, quoted above by Rid (2010), this
was included in the indigenous affairs bureau. A recognition by the French of the importance
traditional religions played amongst the indigenous populations of Africa and the power this
had over their minds. A point developed later in this study.
As already noted Galula (Galula, 1964/2006) lays out the framework for conducting a
counter-insurgency operation based upon four primary laws and six principals:
1. Seize the initiative and become offensive
2. The “full utilization of the counterinsurgent’s assets” , by which he includes all
resources available to the nation: economic, administrative, judicial, military and
police, control of the information and the political element too.
3. Economy of force, which in colonial terms was taken to mean both being thrifty,
as fighting in the colonies was expensive and also not to wipe out the local
population either; as this could prove counter-productive.
4. The concept of irreversibility, which means defending the ground gained and not
to cede this back to the insurgents. It is this principle that underpins the whole
strategy as once ground is gained, this goes a long way to convincing the
population that the government forces are winning. Once this conviction is
accepted then superior intelligence comes forth from the local population as they
recognise it is in their best interests not to allow the insurgents to return. The fear
of retribution if they did return becomes too great.
5. “to command is to control” . Control means to take over the administration, safety
and security returning the area to a fully functioning part of the state where the
rule of law is paramount. To achieve this will require the acquiescence of the local
leaders incorporating them into the political structure, otherwise they have little to
gain and their support will wane and fluctuate.
6. Simplicity: do not over complicate the whole process. The last of six principles,
requires building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the
population. (Galula, 1964/2006, pp. 55-60)
This discussion encapsulates how important the population are to the whole effort
involved in countering- the-insurgency. In addition to the four laws presented by
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Galula(1964/2006, pp. 52-55) , the third law has four important implications, according to
Artelli (2007):
1. Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police
operations against the insurgent political organizations;
2. Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be
wanted and popular, are inoperative while the insurgent still controls the population;
3. The counterinsurgency needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to
demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win;
4. The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of
strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side (2007, p. 33).
These measures formed the backbone of the strategy used by the French in both Indo
China and in Algeria; insurgencies which they lost. The reasons for losing are many not least
because they were applied to late in Indochina and in Algeria the harshness of their approach
turned the support of the population against them. Every town, village and alleyway became a
potential death trap for the security forces denying them vital intelligence. As argued
intelligence is the key to successful operations and without it no counter-insurgency can be
effective (Trinquier, 1964, pp. 32-33). Nonetheless, what was outlined above has been
adopted by others and refined in order to make them work more effectively becoming the key
essentials to combating insurgency (Beckett, 2001; Charters, 2009; Kilcullen, 2006a; Lewis,
2006).
There are some important reasons why the French experience of conducting counterinsurgency operations is important to this study. The experiences that the French acquired
during their colonial campaigns are significant; especially recruiting the use of the local
indigenous population on their side, together with an understanding of how important local
political considerations were to the overall conduct of the campaign.
Trinquier (1964), a contemporary of Galula, and also a noted French combatant and
military historian, writing in 1961 succinctly identifies these critical aspects in his work Le
Guerre Moderne. He stresses the need to treat the population with consideration and respect,
but also points out that the insurgency is seeking to do the same, “impose its will upon the
population”; not necessarily with either consideration or respect but by terrorising them
(Trinquier, 1964, p. 7). Essentially, he argues to combat this threat the government forces
must use all the means at their disposal; primarily to combat terrorism: the weapon of
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subversive warfare. By identifying terrorism, Trinquier explains how effective this weapon is
against classic forces, dispiriting them and putting fear into the general population (p. 15).
Another noteworthy characteristic was the ability of the French officer corps to
identify with the local population. They did not remain aloof from them but recruited them
into their defensive structure and learnt their local languages (1964, p. xii). It was these
aspects that gave the security forces in both Kenya and Rhodesia a greater capability ability
to understand their enemies. A considerable number had been born and raised or had spent
long periods in these countries. However, in Malaya there was a serious deficiency of
European officers within the security forces who had any experience of the conditions to be
found at the time the insurgency broke out. Once this shortfall of expertise was recognised as
a key component, efforts were made to increase the recruitment of Malays and particularly
Chinese into the security forces; particularly the police. Fighting counter-insurgencies
requires a lot of manpower, which places a heavy reliance on recruiting large numbers to fill
the ranks (Corum, 2006). Recruiting indigenous forces helped to overcome the shortages.
It is particularly poignant from these works by the French to note the tactic of using
native tribes as part of the thrust against the insurgents. This strategy formed the backbone of
tactics used in all three of the case studies. It can be argued without this use of local tribes
against the insurgents, dividing them against each other, the capabilities of the security forces
would have been severely restricted; perhaps their successes would have even been
impossible to achieve without this type of support.
2.7

Hearts and Minds
An important aspect of strategy was the development of the concept of ‘hearts and

minds’ in the post war period. This phrase has become synonymous with discussions of
counter- insurgency and combating asymmetrical conflicts, frequently interpreted as using
less violent and coercive measures (Carruthers, 1995a; Charters, 1989; Dixon, 2009; Fine,
2010; Hack, 2009; Mockaitis, 1990a; Stubbs, 1989b; Zambernardi, 2010).
The concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ has become has become central to all modern day
discussions concerned with counter insurgency and combating asymmetrical conflicts.
Although often attributed to General Templer from the time of the Malayan Emergency, “the
answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the
people” (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 3; Stubbs, 1989b, pp. 1-2) there are many other claimants, not
least Steinbeck (1939) in his book Grapes of Wrath, in which he says “the hearts and minds
of the people, the grapes of wrath were growing heavy with vintage”. Lyndon B. Johnson,
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certainly was keen on using the phrase often inverting it to ‘minds and hearts’ when
discussing the war in Vietnam. Many think he took this from President Jon Adams’s letter
dated 18th of February 1818 (Adams, 1818):
The Revolution was effected (sic) before the War commenced. The Revolution was in
the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their
duties and obligations.... This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments,
and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution (as cited in Dickinson,
2009, p. 1).
This quote very much epitomizes what is at stake and links well with the principle as
outlined above by Galula (1964/2006), and encapsulated in his first law of counterinsurgency where, “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as
for the insurgent.” (p. 52). In order to gain their support the government forces must also
demonstrate that they are capable of winning and furthermore that they are capable of
protecting the population too, “for no one likes being shot as a reward for loyalty”(Paget,
1967, p. 176). The ability to achieve this has now become a recognised part of the total
strategy, but this appears not to be the case during its development in the 1950’s, as its
concept was not very well understood. Trying to trace the evolution through the conflicts was
part of this research project.
Carruthers (1995a) outlines how this concept developed as part of strategy, in
particular how the British government attempted to influence opinion to any challenges to its
colonial rule in four counter-insurgency campaigns: Palestine, Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus; as
well as how the propaganda war was fought by stigmatising the opponents (p. 2). The use of
propaganda became very pronounced during the prosecution of the insurgencies being
analysed and will be discussed in the case studies in Chapters 5.13, 6.12 and 7.13. O’Neill
(2005) offers a more detailed definition:
Popular support [for insurgency] from the elites and especially the masses stems
primarily from concrete grievances concerning such things as land reform, injustice,
unfair taxation, and corruption. It is over these issues that the battle to win hearts and
minds is most directly enjoined. History suggests that a government can most
effectively undercut insurgencies that rely on mass support by splitting the rank and
file away from the leadership through calculated reforms that address the material
grievances and needs of the people. (pp. 171-172)
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It must be recognised that the rebellions have their roots in many long seated
grievances; failure to take account of this factor will restrict any long term solutions. The
military solution can only work with a comprehensive negotiated settlement. Therefore, the
objective is to separate the rebels from their support, both tacit and direct, they may be
obtaining from the general population (Dixon, 2009; Jones & Smith, 2010). Other authors
including Mockaitis (2003) support this premise:
Trust and cooperation depend . . . on recognizing and as far as possible addressing the
real needs and the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds . . . .People
generally support an insurgency out of a shared sense of wrong or frustration at not
having their basic needs met’. (pp. 21-22)
Understanding this linkage to the people is often attributed to Mao Tse-tung (1961, ch
6) in his treaties On Guerrilla Warfare in which he points out the synergy between the two;
without the support of the masses of the population then the insurgent cannot survive, he is
liken to a fish in the sea. Take away the sea and the fish dies (Egnell, 2010, p. 286;
Fitzsimmons, 2008, p. 340). Accordingly the complex social-economic-political-military
strategy often becomes abbreviated to ‘hearts and minds’, but it is in addition to all the other
tactics, not in place of them. Furthermore, it is not a soft option, as is sometimes
misunderstood to be, it “denoted authority, not appeasement”(Strachan, 2007, p. 8).
Defining the difficulties involved with ‘hearts and minds’ approach from a military
perspective, has brought out a number of interpretations, not least from Lieutenant General
Sir Kiszley (2006), regarding the:
complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty;... problems that the military alone cannot
solve requiring cooperation with other highly diverse agencies and individuals to
achieve a comprehensive approach; the need for interaction with indigenous people
whose culture it does not understand; and a requirement to talk to at least some of its
opponents, which it can view as treating with the enemy (p. 20).
Stubbs (1989b) uses the Malayan Emergency to demonstrate how the process of
winning hearts and minds actually occurred, with the blending of the social, political,
economic and coercive structures under a more centralised strategy designed to win over the
population to the merits of rejecting the Communist insurgents rebellion. The demand for
both rubber and tin to fight the Korean War made Malaya an important resource. Therefore,
the British Government was prepared to offer a carrot in the form of independence to the
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Malays if they rejected the predominately Chinese Communists call to oust the Colonialists.
Wages and working conditions improved greatly undermining communist propaganda
(Brendon, 2007, pp. 461-466). The ‘New Villages’ gave tenure to the occupants; most of
whom could never have afforded to own their own houses previously. When this is put into
context, the whole process of hearts and minds can be seen to be a way of drawing the
population over to the Government side. A firm and fair approach to law and order is a
further requirement, ensuring the general population are not exploited, “justice must be done
(and be seen to be done!)” (Paget, 1967, p. 177).
However, as Charles Colson, Chief Counsel to U.S. President Nixon, once said, "if
you grab them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow”. Although this quote is
sometimes attributed to Lyndon B. Johnson, the meaning is the same and moves away from
the much vaunted idea of ‘hearts and minds’ as a soft or benign approach and towards one
which requires a more ruthless determination to achieve desired success. Galula (1964/2006)
expounds the ideas that lie behind a successful campaign, which involve the ability to gain
the support of the population and ultimately to solve the country’s problems, through a series
of actions. The aims of counterinsurgency are to gain the support of the population rather
than control of territory
‘Hearts and minds’ has developed into meaning civic support for the population in the
form of aid both financial and technical assistance, with the “provision of amenities such as
schools, hospitals, roads, new industries, food and welfare”(Paget, 1967, p. 178). In Malaya,
the police were ordered to take part in ‘Operation Service’ in 1952 by the Commissioner of
Police, Colonel Young, to offer every assistance and kindness where possible to the people.
Reports indicate this was very effective in gaining the support of the everyday citizens
(Paget, 1967, p. 67). “The military and the police also had to cooperate with the civil
government to implement programmes connected with the ‘hearts and minds’
campaign”(Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69).
Malaya is often used as the shining example of how to fight a counter insurgency,
with the combined strategy of structural reform, sound law and order principals adhering to
justice for all and the inclusion of ‘hearts and minds’ too as a core aspect of policy. General
Templer constantly emphasised this approach through actions and deeds thus limiting the
appeal of rebellion (Komer, 1972, p. 64). The improvement in economic circumstances
certainly allowed the authorities to implement and try many measures that may not have been
considered had this not been the case (Edwards, 1990, p. 418). Detractors to Malaya as a
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counter-insurgency success story, tend to insist the strategy could only have worked at this
time and place and was non transferable to other conflicts (Nagl, 1999; Taber, 1970).
The ability to convince the population that the government will ultimately win is an
essential part of the overall strategy “The counterinsurgent [sic]cannot achieve much if the
population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent” (Galula, 1964/2006, p.
83). Consequently, the security forces have to gain the support of the population in their
efforts to eradicate the country of the insurgency. In this instance the meaning of “gaining”
support of the population can be interpreted many ways but rarely do ‘kind acts’ achieve
strategic successes, although they will achieve local support. The need for a more directed
approach is one that is reviewed in this study.
2.8

Strategies
Developing a sustainable working strategy is central to any counter-insurgency,

clearly defining the aims and objectives. Paget (1967) structures these aims and objectives
around three core considerations; once it has been accepted that the military aim is dependent
on political considerations. These are “purpose and scope of military operations”, secondly,
“short- term political and military aims governing the campaign and finally, the long term
political aim which it is hoped to achieve when the military campaign is over” (p. 156)
The need for synergy between political and military is thus stressed as a major
requirement, referred to as Civil-Military understanding. However, this needs to be broken
down further to appreciate what this means in practice. Upon arrival in Malaya, General
Templer issued this statement soon after his arrival:
Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the
Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and for all. The two
activities are completely and utterly interrelated ( as cited Komer, 1972, p. 31).
To back this statement, up General Templer laid out a declaration of national policy.
In the case of Malaya, this was fundamental to ensuring the support of the Malays against the
predominately Chinese led insurgents. Once they understood they would be granted
independence, if they supported the government to defeat the insurgency. In Kenya the
Colonial Government did not articulate that they would grant independence until much later
in the conflict. In Rhodesia, it was certainly understood by those that supported the
Government of Ian Smith, that defeat would mean the end to any aspirations they might have
had to maintaining their version of independence. Therefore, developing a national vision of
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policy objectives capable of gaining the support of the population is central to garnering all
sides under a single direction, if a common caused is to be prompted.
There are a number of strategies have been identified that were used and passed on to
other insurgencies: collective punishment, food control, restricted movement, identification
documentation and resettlement or ‘Villagisation’ are considered the most potent.
Resettlement was also termed as ‘New Villages’ and fell into two defined areas recognised as
crucial for defeating the unity of purpose for the subversives. On one side, it separated the
rebels from the population depriving them of their nourishment: food, supplies, fuel,
ammunition, intelligence and additional manpower. On the other, it afforded the Government
the opportunity to prove they were capable of protecting them from intimidation, as well as
improving their welfare, by providing them with housing, health services, education and
security (French, 2011, p. 2; Smith, 2001b, p. 62).
The policy of Villagisation (Hack, 1999c, pp. 98-102), was based upon the concept of
securing the rural population from the being terrorised by the insurgents. In Malaya over half
a million people were moved to 500 ‘New Villages’ to fulfil this policy (Robinson, 1956, p.
96). Consequently, the ability to control the population by separating them from the
insurgents fulfils one of many basic counter-insurgency requirements. One of these was food
control. By limiting the amount of food that was available to the rebels made many of them
desperate and forced them out into the open to seek supplies. Away from their sanctuaries
they were vulnerable; a fact not lost on the security forces that set ambushes for them. “[T]he
most important factor in destroying the [Communist Terrorist] is to complete his isolation
from the rest of the community. He must get no money, no food or clothing; no help of any
sort”(as cited in Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 119)
A centralised command structure was paramount for ensuing unity of action and
purpose (Hack, 1999a; Hamby, 2002; Paget, 1967, p. 158). Although not in place at the start
of the conflicts in either Kenya or Malaya, however, once it was recognised that it was
fundamental to defeating the insurgency it was soon put in place. Rhodesia, with the benefit
of lessons learnt policy, had this in place very early in the ‘Bush war’. The ability to bring
together all the machinery needed to prosecute the conflict including the armed forces, the
police, the intelligence organisations both civil and military and the relevant Government
departments is considered essential if the counter-insurgency efforts are to be successful
(Jeffery, 1987, p. 124; Paget, 1967, p. 158).
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2.9

The Colonial Police
From the perspective of this research the Colonial Police have been identified as one

of the key areas that needed to be assessed in more detail. Most works dealing with
insurgencies tend to consider the conflict from the military view point. As a result a very
important factor is ignored, which is how vital the police, and particularly Special Branch, are
to the blending of the civil-military-police concept together (Hutchinson, 1969). Therefore:
The police are a crucial nexus between state and people. Their behavior (sic) will
affect the perceptions people have and the evaluations they make of the state and its
performance; they are a powerful socializing and symbolic agency (Marenin, 1982, p.
384).
The critical part of this quote is that insurgencies are fought with an eye to the future,
when the situation is expected to return to normal. Central to normality is the maintenance of
law and order, which is a police function, not a military one. Although difficult to assess just
how important the Colonial Police role has been, they represent the visual front to the public
of the Government in action. The police must be seen to be upholding the law and protecting
the population from criminal activity, as well as protecting them from the insurgents. Public
confidence can only be re-asserted if the everyday functions of law and order are seen to be
working normally. The presence of the military on the streets does little to restore confidence
that the insurgency is over.
Under the colonial structure, the military would only be brought in as an aid to the
civil power (Huntington, 1981); recognition that the police would normally be the ones to
maintain law and order (Epstein, 1968). Only when the police could not fulfil this function,
was it necessary to supplement their numbers with additional armed units who would conduct
quasi-police functions. Although, considered to be standard practice over many decades, it
was still fraught with petty squabbles between the higher echelons over which force, the
police or the army, had outright authority. “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong
police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p.
9). Normally it was recognised that the police had a greater knowledge and understanding of
local conditions based on living in the country, but just did not have the numbers necessary to
combat an insurgency.
The development of colonial policing, according to Brogden (1987), has evolved
through a need to legitimise imperial order, less through coercion and more through general
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acceptance (pp. 10-15). But the Colonial Police was also formalised along the lines of the
French Gendarmerie, in that it was a Para-military force capable of operating “in a military
capacity as the colony’s first line of defence” (Sinclair, 2006, p. 69). They were armed and
trained to maintain law and public order.
When the situation was considered beyond the capabilities of the Colonial Police
force then the military was brought in but only as an aid to civil power. Usually this was not
without its problems, as the military officers often considered themselves superior to the local
expatriate personnel and therefore disliked ceding authority to them. There was also the
tendency to try and ignore the law, as it was found to be too burdensome to use when
countering insurgents. Often the military saw the law as an obstacle that prevented them
doing what they were trained to do and that was to kill the enemy. Whereas the police tended
to see the law as necessary in order to show that a civil society can only be based upon the
rule of law. Failure to uphold this tenet would indicate they were no better than the insurgents
that were terrorising the population at large. Arbitrary brutality is nearly always
counterproductive (Brown, 1997, p. 123; Hutchinson, 1969, p. 57; Jeffery, 1985, pp. 119121).
Once the situation became too serious for the limited police resources, control passed
to the military and the police became part of a three legged stool: army police and
administration (Sinclair, 2006, p. 155) The unified command structure was certainly far more
capable of being effective as was seen by the results in Malaya when it was put into
operation. General Briggs was appointed as Director of Operations in 1950 and developed the
‘Briggs Plan’, which was to become the over -arching operational template for prosecuting
the insurgency (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 76; Smith, 2001b, p. 62). “The military and the
police must also cooperate with the civil government to implement programmes connected
with the hearts and minds campaign” (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69).
The major argument in favour of the joint command approach is that it eliminates the
squabbles over who has overall control of operations. For many generals the situation where
the army acts ‘in support of the Police’ is unsatisfactory (Paget, 1967, p. 159). The preferred
structure was to use a Director of Operations, with a totally integrated team comprising of the
police, military, civil and intelligence personnel; all in unison to form the triumvirate of civilmilitary-police with the intelligence service becoming the fourth member. The other services
should be used in a consultancy role when appropriate (Jeffery, 1987, p. 145; Paget, 1967, p.
160).
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It is important to recognise the central role that the police must continue to perform
whilst efforts are being made to counter the insurgency (Hutchinson, 1969, p. 56). The
everyday functions of policing still have to take place, as well as combating the tactics used
by the insurgents in an effort to discredit and destabilise the Government. Typical tactics by
insurgents is to overload the police by terrorising the local population with murders and
kidnappings, as well as carrying out multiple criminal activities such as thefts, burglaries,
civil disturbances leading to riots (Epstein, 1968, p. 151). It needs to be recognised that it is a
difficult time, “in any counter-insurgency campaign there is confusion between ‘police’ and
‘military’ methods. This confusion is unavoidable because the threat is by nature confused”
(Jeffery, 1987, p. 144).
2.10 Intelligence
The need for intelligence is fundamental to all aspects of warfare and this readily
understood by strategists as an essential aspect to counter insurgency. However, intelligence
also attempts to pursue another crucial aspect of countering insurgency, in that it attempts to
build a more comprehensive picture of the insurgents’ operational status; incorporating their
mental, physical, political and economic positions into a structural image that can be readily
analysed and quickly understood. This dimension is crucial to the ultimate aim of success, as
military means alone can never achieve total victory. A political dimension that corresponds
to the military one is an integral part of counter-insurgency tactics. Therefore, "essential
though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to
afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population”(Galula,
1964/2006, p. 63) . Intelligence assists in achieving this objective.
A core feature of conducting a counter-insurgency campaign is ability to harness
good, sound intelligence. The failure to understand and apply this aspect will undermine all
attempts at gaining advantage. However, it is the police that are the fundamental link to
achieving a sound intelligence gathering network (Jeffery, 1987, p. 118) . They should be
“intimately acquainted with the local population” (p. 118) and capable of obtaining extensive
information regarding the activities of the insurgents. Yet, it was apparent that in neither
Malaya nor Kenya was the required level of intelligence sufficient to deal with insurgencies
when they started. It can be further argued that had the intelligence been better in the first
place, then the insurgencies may have been nipped in the bud and not have been able to
develop at all (Hack, 1999a). Both countries were able to rectify this short coming and
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proceeded to develop a considerable ability that greatly enhanced their ability to counter the
insurgents in field.
Developing a comprehensive intelligence organisation is fundamental to the overall
ability to prosecute an effective counter insurgency strategy (Jeffery, 1987, p. 120).
Successful tactics are based upon the ability to know and then anticipate what the enemy is
about to do and then counter it. The intelligence is divided into political and operational;
neither is exclusive to the other as it assists in maintaining a comprehensive picture of the
whole insurgency together with its aims (Kitson, 1971, p. 72). Furthermore, the organisation
needs to be co-ordinated as it will have to deal with intelligence from multiple sources
including: the police, Special Branch, the military forces on the ground, civil authorities and
agencies inclusive of a population (Beckett, 2001, p. 107; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69; Mumford,
2012, p. 12). The process of gaining intelligence is a complicated one:
Practically speaking, there are three methods of intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency operations: overt (collected by uniformed patrols on the ground),
confidential (retrieved largely from detainees under interrogation) and clandestine
(including undercover or paralegal surveillance). These forms are collected by both
police and military (Mumford, 2012, p. 15).
Mumford’s examples are limited in their scope as intelligence comes from a far wider
range of sources than has been offered, but he is correct when he says they fulfil three
functions: background, operational and criminal. Each interlinking and illuminating the
strategies needed to “undermine, subdue and eventually suppress an insurgency” (Mumford,
2012, p. 15). Most military strategists would agree on the need to ‘know-the-enemy’.
Although a simple enough statement, it is far more difficult when you are not part of the local
population and even more difficult if they are directly opposed to your presence in their
country anyway. From the perspective of the Colonial Administration, intelligence fulfilled a
far wider purpose, it was:
Integral to the survival of the regime, colonial intelligence was also broader and
encompassed not only Special Branch but also information acquired in the course of
day-to-day administration. This political intelligence was important not only in
providing warnings, but also in effective monitoring and in linking the administration
and the population (Cormac, 2010, p. 804).
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2.11 Special Branch
The British developed a strategic arm of policing capable of dealing with political
crime called Special Branch, which was developed from the need to infiltrate the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the 1880s (Porter, 1991). Transposed to the Colonies it has had a
chequered and secretive evolution, but has been formidable nonetheless. The importance of
this specialist task force should not be underestimated and by many accounts was one of the
single most effective weapons used against the insurgencies in all three of the insurgencies
studied (Comber, 2008; Flower, 1987; Gentry, 2010; Melson, 2005; Modarelli, 2008;
Randall, 1990). Its role will be discussed in all three case studies as the majority of
participants in this study worked with Special Branch.
For many non specialists Military Intelligence is often confused with role of Special
Branch. The difference is that Military Intelligence mainly provides information and plans to
assist the military commander in making tactical plans; it is a support role. The role of
Special Branch is far more complex, as it has to provide not only intelligence to police, the
military and the Government, but it is also charged with destroying the insurgents from
within; an operational role. The requirement involves infiltrating the subversive organisation
at every level; even to the point of influencing decisions with disinformation and
misinformation (Hutchinson, 1969, p. 58).
In Malaya, General Templer, former Director of Military Intelligence, U.K, created a
combined intelligence unit together with a staff intelligence training school. Templar also
separated Special Branch from the police Central Investigation Department (CID); as well as
setting up a new psychological warfare section to undermine the insurgent’s Communist
propaganda machine. The other key aspect taken from the Briggs Plan was the creation of
‘safe villages’, which became the back bone of the strategy to deny the rebels succour from
the local population. General Templer said “the shooting side of the business is only 25% of
the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us” (Beckett &
Pimlott, 1985, p. 102). Since the end of the Emergency it is now become more fully
recognised how important Special Branch was to the overall changes in fortune for the
security forces in Malaya (Comber, 2008; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b; Jeffery, 1987).
Kenya too, was found to be deficient in its capabilities regarding the structure of
Special Branch. In 1952, a delegation from Military Intelligence 5, (MI5) was brought to the
Colony with a remit to remedy the short comings and provide recommendations for
improving the intelligence gathering capabilities. The recommendations were put into
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immediate effect by the Governor (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 77; Jeffery, 1987, p. 125). The
team was led by Sir Percy Stillitoe, Director General of MI5; who also had served earlier in
Rhodesia as part of the police service (Majdalany, 1962, p. 111).
Rhodesia chose to integrate the roles performed by Special Branch and national
intelligence gathering in 1963, under the tutelage of Ken Flower, into a new Security and
Intelligence organisation called the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Special Branch
effectively became part of the CIO, but continued to have a function for internal security
working with the police as it had done previously through the Provincial, District and Station
Units. A unique structure but one that worked (Flower, 1987, p. 15).
The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) had penetrated both
Communist Insurgency organisations very early on in the conflict and this was “made easier
by the tribalism and nepotism with which both organisations were afflicted at this stage”
(Flower, 1987, p. 104). The penetration of the guerrilla organisations from the pre- UDI
(Unilateral Declaration of Independence November the 11 th 1965) until the early 1970s was
as complete as it could have been by the Central Intelligence Organisation (p. 105). This
assessment by Flower head of the of the Central Intelligence Organisation, of the intelligence
gathering capabilities of his organisation are truly remarkable and attest to the comprehensive
ability to manage and manipulate large numbers of informers over long periods of time. Ken
Flower was also one of the prime movers for the setting up of pseudo operations, ( discussed
in detail in each Case Study) but he also knew the value of not broadcasting the success either
and made sure that pseudo operations remained clandestine (Baxter, 2011, p. 17).
2.12 Specialised and Elite Units
All three conflicts provided the ideal opportunity for specialised counter-insurgency
units to be set up and used. The Special Air Service (SAS) was certainly the most renown of
these, but not the only one as many other innovations were tried and tested in order to get
results. Contrary to popular belief the British SAS were not disbanded after the Second
World War, but continued to operate clandestinely in operations regarded as politically
sensitive by the British Government. Greece was a notable example of this (Jones, 2010, pp.
71-85).
Malaya was a difficult terrain in which to fight a counter insurgency operation. The
rubber plantations were on the edge of the dense jungle from which the insurgents were able
to launch raids, afterwards returning to their jungle hideouts (Jones, 2010, p. 138). It soon
became obvious it was necessary to penetrate the jungle and flush the Communist Terrorists
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out of their lairs. However, this required specialised forces capable of living and surviving
under extreme jungle conditions.
The first dedicated unit was the Jungle Guerrilla Force (JGF), which was used to seek
and destroy the subversive forces in the jungle and became known as Ferret force. Though,
they did not find favour with the army hierarchy, for many reasons and were quickly
disbanded, despite their success. This led to a similar type of unit made up of Chinese
policemen and called Chinese Assault Team (CAT). Interestingly this unit disguised itself as
Communist Terrorists in a pseudo- guerrilla role, although it was not made up of captured
terrorists that were turned and sent back in to betray their erstwhile comrades (Jones, 2010, p.
141). Pseudo-gangs as they became known did develop later on in Malaya, but this
forerunner could have been the genus of the idea that spawned these units that became one of
the hallmarks of all three campaigns and will be dealt with in the case studies.
Despite considerable opposition by many senior officers in the British Army, it was
realised that in the Malayan campaign the use of unconventional soldiers capable of matching
the enemy on their own terms was central to the offensive. The SAS were seen to suit this
requirement It was the officers that had served in Palestine together, that recognised the need
for unorthodox tactics and were the driving force to use the SAS again in Malaya. These
officers included General Templer, who became supreme commander of operations in
Malaya, who knew the exploits of Calvert who had been in command of the Special Air
Service Brigade until October 1945. Calvert was a member of the famous ‘Chindits’, which
had fought in the Burmese jungles against the Japanese during the Second World War.
Because of his experience he was asked to form the Malayan Scouts, which would become 22
SAS (Jones, 2010, p. 153; Mumford, 2012, pp. 33-34).
Calvert knew Briggs, who would develop the over-arching counter-insurgency plan
for Malaya, called the Briggs Plan (Smith, 2001b, p. 62).Calvert also knew Gurney (who was
Governor for a period but was assassinated in Malaya in October 1951) and Gray, who were
in Palestine together and had used what were called Special Night Squads. These squads were
controversial and used SAS members together with others to try and infiltrate the Jewish
terrorist gangs; with limited success. Gray was Inspector General of the Palestine Police and
became Commissioner of Police in Malaya until 1951(Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 119). He
appointed Richard Catling Deputy Commissioner of Police, who had served as head of
Special Branch in Palestine under him and who went on to become Commissioner of Police
in Kenya in 1954 (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 75). These men were at the vanguard of
developing special units for counter-insurgency and it should come as no surprise they took
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their experience, and those who knew what they were doing, with them when they transferred
to other conflicts involving counter-insurgency.
The other important linkage to the re-formation of the SAS was the call to Rhodesia
for volunteers to join up (Jones, 2010, p. 154). The Rhodesians were considered to have
considerable bush craft skills and would not require as much training as soldiers from other
army units; therefore, they were operationally ready for jungle warfare. A notable name
amongst their number was Reid-Daly, who went on to command the Selous Scouts in the
‘Bush War’ (Beckett, 2001, p. 140). The Selous Scouts were to master the use of pseudogangs, as part of the general operating capability with much success. Stiff (1982) posits that
as much as 68% of the insurgents killed during the ‘Bush War’ in Rhodesia can be attributed
either directly or indirectly to the Selous Scouts (p. 330).
The back bone for success in any counter-insurgency is the ability to harness and use
as many intelligence sources as is practicable. The intelligence must then be collated,
analysed and acted upon as promptly as possible before it loses its operational value.
Therefore, the ability to exploit and disseminate any unconventional sources is one that
allows the security forces a substantial advantage, when prosecuted to the full.
A much sought after tactical requirement is a comprehensive picture of the insurgents’
operational status. The ability to determine how the insurgents are dealing with the conflict,
including their setbacks, their overall harmony and continuing affinity with the political
dimensions of the struggle is of great value. Moreover, whether or not they might be
wavering and losing heart for the fight are also essential pieces of the intelligence jigsaw. The
ability to infiltrate your opponent’s camps and assess these underlying signs would be major
coup for the security forces. The information gathered is then used to build up strategies for
psychological warfare too. Demoralising the opposition is an important aspect; hence letting
them know that they are losing their men to the enemy has a very disheartening effect on the
morale of the insurgent gangs.
2.12.1 Pseudo Gangs
Gaining intelligence, by infiltrating opponent’s camps is very much sought after tactic
within conflicts and using spies to accomplish this has been much publicised over the
centuries to achieve this goal. However, another method, which has been used in many
guises, but never formalised, has been the use of ‘turning’ ex-captured gang members so that
they return to their erstwhile colleagues and deceive them in to believing that they are still on
their side; when in fact they have changed sides. This tactic has been labelled ‘pseudo gangs’.
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The Colonial Police Special Branch was the dominant unit behind the implementation of this
ploy in both Kenya and Malaya, at around the same time in the early 1950’s, with Kenya the
leading advocate in its development (Comber, 2008; Lovatt-Smith, 2005; Parker, 2009a). The
Rhodesian Special Branch went on to adopt and perfect this tactic too, with operational
assistance and direction from those who had used it both in Kenya and Malaya (Flower,
1987).
The use of Pseudo Gangs was quickly seen by all the security forces that used them,
to fulfil a number of very useful extra functions in addition to providing invaluable
intelligence. The demoralising effect on the enemy was very important, especially when they
realised they were losing fighters to the government forces. Furthermore, the levels of
support for the government forces gradually increased as the general population learnt of the
defections. The tactic was cheap and easy to deploy, which is why it was seen as such a
useful tool in the arsenal of counter-insurgency (Cline, 2005; Kitson, 1960; Parker, 2009b;
Parker, 2006; Reid-Daly, 1982; Stiff, 1982).
2.12.2 Indigenous Forces
Using Indigenous tribes’ people has been mentioned as it fulfils a central bulwark to
the ability of the Colonial forces to fight in terrains that were basically alien to them;
although many became adept at fighting in these conditions. The British in Malaya imported
from nearby North Borneo and Sarawak a number of Dyak and Iban tribesmen, and used
them as trackers and scouts. These indigenous tribesmen or irregulars provided needed skills
to the government forces to avoid being ambushed, and to close with and destroy insurgents
(Gregorian, 1994; Hack, 1999b; Hughes & Tripodi, 2009). The same was true in both Kenya
and Rhodesia. In Rhodesia the use of tracker units based upon the ‘flechas’; a Portuguese
indigenous unit used in both Angola and Mozambique with great success and the forerunner
of Selous Scouts, were very effective (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 61).
The development of the Home Guard, meaning a locally recruited defence force, in all
three conflicts was a crucial step as was the resettlement programmes (Hughes & Tripodi,
2009, p. 4; Paget, 1967, p. 157; Randazzo, 2011). Basically, the concept was one of a
volunteer local defence force to protect their own and other villages. In many places this was
supplemented by additional trained men from other districts who were armed with no more
than pitch forks. In Malaya they became the bulwark of the security forces to cover the
villages in outlying rubber plantations. The security forces did not have sufficient manpower
to protect all the isolated rubber plantations; without these additional unpaid, for the most
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part, volunteer-defence forces (Komer, 1972, p. 40). The total number raised in Malaya was
more than 250,000 Home Guard; predominately Malays but Chinese were also recruited to
counter act the effect of Chinese Communist insurgents (Hack, 2009, p. 385; Mumford, 2012,
p. 37).
In Kenya, the ability to recruit what were termed as ‘Loyalist’ tribesmen from the

main Kikuyu tribe into the Home Guard can be argued was central to the ability of splitting
any allegiance many had to the Mau Mau and turned the tide in favour of the Colonial
government in Kenya (Maloba, 1993, p. 89). Although termed as ‘loyalists’, this can be
misleading as loyalty was based on such things as self preservation, support for the old
traditional order or to protect their Christian faith and not necessarily because they supported
the government (Maloba, 1993, p. 88).The Home Guard formed what was a resistance
movement, “and was to make an important contribution to eventual victory (Majdalany,
1962, p. 111). Another significant fact is that the highest number of casualties came from this
so called ‘loyalist’ section of society; as they were hated by the insurgents turning the conflict
into a civil war between the Kikuyu (Majdalany, 1962, p. 188; Maloba, 1993, p. 83). The
death toll between the two forces, the Home Guard and the Tribal Police, “accounted for
4,686 or 42 per cent of Mau Mau killed” (Majdalany, 1962, p. 221). The same is true in
Rhodesia; local tribe’s people who formed their own defence forces took a heavy toll from
retribution, intimidation and punishment for supporting the Government.
2.12.3 Internal Affairs
The Rhodesians had developed a more sophisticated structure to manage and
administer the various Districts as they were known; this included a Para-military Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Intaf). They represented the Government throughout the country in urban
and rural areas, providing a direct connection to the people. From this unit the Home Guard
or Guard Force was formed in August 1975, with its commander Brigadier W. Godwin, who
had severed in Malaya; (once again a linkage to earlier campaigns is established through
those that had served there). The intention of forming this new unit was to take over
protection and manning of the Protected Villages, which required round the clock defence to
be effective (Wall, 2007). They unit was deployed in some very isolated areas and probably
lost more men than any other unit during the Bush War (Wall, 2012).
2.12.4 Police Special Units
Other specialised units including the Mobile Police Units (MPU), General Service
Units (GSU), Police Anti-Terrorist Units (PATU) Tracker Units, Dog and Horse Units. The
44

later were very effective in both Kenya and Rhodesia, but because of the jungle terrain were
of little value in Malaya. Each in their own way contributed to the overall structure of the
forces opposed to the rebels. Aspects will be discussed were appropriate based upon the
responses from the interviewees.
2.13 Propaganda
Propaganda was an important tool in the armoury of the Government; the concept of
‘hearts and minds’ very much falls under this umbrella. As modern methods of
communication were evolving, so were the many methods used to influence the population.
Propaganda evolved with every conflict, particularly as support of the general masses was
seen as fundamental to the overall counter-insurgency effort. Convincing the troops not to be
brutal to the population was one of many changes that were instigated (Beckett, 2001, p. 94).
General Templer in Malaya recognised the importance of being able to influence the
populace by setting up a new psychological warfare section for this role in 1954 (Beckett,
2001, p. 101).Using the vernacular press, especially Chinese, radio broadcast in local dialects,
pamphlets and especially short films shown in the villages were of great value. Pamphlets
were so effective that if anybody was caught by the terrorist with one, they were executed by
the insurgents (Nagl, 2002, p. 94).
Propaganda was a one sided weapon for the insurgents too. “The insurgent, having no
responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not
obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises not what he does” (Galula, 1964/2006, p.
9). However, this is not the case for the Government, which is held responsible for its actions,
at all times, regardless of the causes. In a guerrilla war the government is on the defensive
and has to protect all its assets at all times (Taber, 1970, p. 22). A progressive strategy is
required to infiltrate all aspects of the populations’ lives to convince them that quality of life
is improving for them and will continue to improve; any bad publicity counts against this
strategy very quickly. Separating the insurgent from the population is as much using a
physical barrier as a mental one. Until the population is convinced the insurgency will not
win, they will continue to hedge their bets. Overcoming this by any means is the function of
the propaganda machine. There is a need to undermine the insurgents and thwart their
political objectives by pushing an alternative view point that destroys their arguments
(Brown, 1997, p. 136).
Carruthers (1995a) states that in Kenya it was important to point out the achievements
that had been made despite the Mau Mau. In that it was essential to portray developments as
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having been archived regardless of what the rebels were doing. A positive spin was sought to
portray the virtues of the government’s work rather than as a knee-jerk reaction (p. 165). It
was imperative that any developments were not seen as the result of the actions taken by the
insurgents forcing the authorities to act.
Developing a functioning propaganda apparatus was considered essential to the
counter-insurgency efforts, which evolved over time. Psy-Ops, as it is often called, dealt with
propaganda and psychological warfare to undermine the morale of the insurgents. Working
closely with the Intelligence gathering apparatus, assessments and appreciations needed to be
made concerning the direction to be taken with policy objectives. Once this has been done it
had to be converted into the multiplicity of means: newspapers, tracts, pamphlets, news
broadcasts and films to disseminate it (Kitson, 1971, p. 77).
2.14 Colonial Administration
An area that appears to be rarely dealt with when discussing the Colonial counter
insurgency campaigns is the role of the Colonial Administrator. The apparatus that drove the
whole structure and maintained the civil side of imperial dominance is often described as the
Thin White Line (Kirk-Greene, 1980). The term is short hand for the European Colonial
Administration describing how few there were to administer large sections of territory.
However, it appears “that the 'Thin White Line' was exiguous to the point of disbelief may be
held now to have been unequivocally proved. Yet that line, however slender, was rarely in
danger of being imperceptible or ineffective.” (1980, p. 38). It is important to realise that the
judicial system was part of this civil structure too and presented the official face of the
colonial government in operation; it was this aspect that held the composition of effective law
and order in place. The machinery of the colonial government was one that sought to utilise
the existing power structures to their own advantage consequently:
The vital consideration for colonial rulers was to establish a claim to authority and to
uphold the colonial 'peace'. 'Customary' law was intended to sustain 'traditional'
hierarchies endorsed by the colonial authorities. Thus the law imposed over much of
British colonial Africa was largely designed to underpin the colonial presence
(Killingray, 1986, p. 413).
Without the capabilities of the civil administration, few if any of the core aspects
associated with ‘hearts and minds’ strategies could ever have been put in place. The security
forces may have been the hard face of the might of Colonial power, but the civil
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administration was the proof of the benefits that were to be found under a structured
government, capable of handing out largesse as well as coercive power. The district
magistrate’s influence and power within this structure, controlling his area were considerable
(Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 77). In addition, prior to the ‘Emergences’ the police were more
perfunctory than a mighty dominant force,
the salient fact in the use of the police to maintain that framework of law and order in
which alone any social or economic development could be initiated and implemented,
was that the police were less a presence than an earnest. (Kirk-Greene, 1980, p. 40)
Understanding how such authority over thousands of inhabitants operated in practice
or in theory is not part of this study, but what is important to understand is how powerful the
sway the District Commissioners (DC) was over their indigenous charges. It could be said
“his word was law: Pisi makubwa ni Serikali (Swahili)” (1980, p. 42). Furthermore, this
sway, influence or authority, is not to be dismissed lightly and plays out as a significant factor
in the support the security forces obtained by the power welded by the DC.
The ability of the colonial administration to rule with so few must in some way be
attributed to many more factors than just having a white skin. “Colonial rule was maintained,
after the initial conquest, with astonishingly small amounts of force, many of the forces
themselves being locally recruited” (Clapham, 1985, p. 18). Why so many were prepared to
support the security forces, and in some instances turn against their erstwhile comrades to
join the pseudo gangs and become informers, to become so called collaborators, needs a more
enlightened explanation. The case studies for Rhodesia and Kenya will look at the role spirit
mediums, sorcery, oaths and soothsayers played in the whole process (Fields, 1982; Keen,
2006; Leakey, 1954; Middleton & Winter, 1963; Ranger, 1985; Sithole, 1987).
2.15 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths
The failure of many Europeans to understand the complex role witchcraft, sorcery and
tribal beliefs plays in the cultural structure of African society could be a failure to grasp a
significant reason why events unfolded the way they did in both the insurgencies in Kenya
and Rhodesia (Ciekawy & Geschiere, 1998; Crawford, 1967; Fields, 1982; Geschiere, 1988;
Lan, 1985; Mbiti, 1969; Middleton & Winter, 1963; Ranger, 1985).
The work of Malinowski (2004/1948) and Mbiti (1969) sought to illuminate the
central role witchcraft, sorcery and tribal beliefs played in primitive societies and show how
much it underpinned their whole cultural structure. It is the belief that there is an essential
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nexus between magic and objects which, “it is a primeval possession of man to be known
only through tradition and affirming man’s autonomist power of creating desired ends”
(2004/1948, p. 56). Only by taking this aspect into consideration can the power of tradition be
understood in relation to magic ritual and cult as supreme to the tribe (p. 55). In Africa, tribal
traditions were (and still are) core to the structure and power within society, “whereas magic,
sorcery and witchcraft are universally regarded as the main causes of individual diseases”
(Mbiti, 1969, p. 44).
“Witchcraft is a mystical and innate power, which can be used by its possessor to
harm other people” (Middleton & Winter, 1963, p. 3).The “sorcerers are the most feared and
hated members of their communities (Mbiti, 1969)“In both Kenya and Rhodesia sorcery and
witchcraft played a very important role for the insurgents, of which little has been written
about in relation to understanding the physiological power this held over the people.
For example, in Rhodesia “there was an effective guerrilla war but it was a war in
which spirit mediums became more significant than ever. Peasant religion formed an
indispensible part of the composite ideology of the war.” (Ranger, 1985, p. 188). Ranger
(Ranger, 1985) goes on to argue that the relationship that the African peasantry has with the
land is uniquely tied to the sprits that are part of the land. The spirit mediums were the
conduit to ensure this relationship worked to improve the agricultural outcomes. The
Mediums were therefore the “articulators of radical consciousness” which allowed the
guerrillas to convert the peasantry to their side by harnessing the Mediums. But in order to
accomplish this they had to adopt the beliefs inherent in tribal cultural tradition. Thus tribal
religion formed part of the “composite ideology of the war” (Ranger, 1985, p. 189). “It was
only after they ascertained that the mediums held the respect of the peasantry that the
guerrillas made attempts to win them to their side”(David Lan as quoted in Ranger, 1985, p.
190).
Access to land was an underlying grievance in both Rhodesia and Kenya. The white
settlers wanted the prime areas and the African peasantry resented this greatly. “The
consequent shortage of land for peasant cultivation was the single most significant incentive
of the struggle” (David Lan as quoted in Ranger, 1985, p. 199). This quote could as easily be
attributed to the struggle of the Mau Mau as it does for the peasantry in Rhodesia.
Interestingly enough the Colonial authorities were well aware of the central role the spirit
mediums played in the affairs of the tribe. “Though opposed to each other in every other way,
the guerrillas and the government forces were united in the seriousness with which they
regarded the ancestors and their mediums” (Lan, 1985, p. 8). The authorities also attempted
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to harness support offering “recognition and subsidy to mediums who were prepared to speak
out against ‘trouble makers’ and to report to the District Commissioner when strangers
entered the Tribal Trust Lands”(Ranger, 1985, p. 201). Even though some mediums did
support the Government administering counter oaths as in Kenya, others were keen not to be
tainted (Corfield, 1959, pp. 134, 152; Ranger, 1985, p. 201).
The relationship between the spirit mediums and the guerrillas in the Rhodesian
conflict is important, “ from the earliest penetration of the guerrillas in the north-east, spirit
mediums began to play an important role” (Ranger, 1985, p. 204). The spirit mediums
indicated “if the guerrillas obey the ritual prohibitions that the mediums impose, they will be
safe and the war they are fighting will meet with success” (Lan, 1985).
Sorcery and witchcraft lie at the very essence of the Kikuyu and hence their use by the
Mau Mau, “through which violence related to supernatural beliefs and practices challenged
the ability of the colonial state to maintain law and order” (Luongo, 2011, p. 160). The
oathing rituals were a composite of tribal beliefs that were used to bind all who took them to
secrecy, on pain of horrendous death, were drawn from the depths of Kikuyu tribal religion
and used as engine of colonial resistance. The Mau Mau distorted the normal oaths and
substituted “more barbarous and orgiastic elements of the old sacrifices” (Bewes, 1953, p.
23), making them more compelling. It needs to be understood this is why the oaths were so
potent in their ability; forcing the adherents to obey through their beliefs that the oaths had a
power greater than any human force if broken (Leakey, 1954; Osborne, 2010).
The Kenyan Government tried counter-oathing (Luongo, 2011, p. 161). The Christian
churches were also very supportive of this action, as they too were being attacked by the Mau
Mau; they were extremely active in trying to combat what was considered as a rival religion
(Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 128). The District Commissioners of the areas involved requested that
the Athamaki (tribal elders) conduct a counter oathing ceremony “after much deliberation the
Athamaki unanimously recommended that a thenge oath should be invoked to cleanse their
people, and to expose the trouble makers” (Corfield, 1959, pp. 134-135). According to the
Corfield report these ceremonies met with some success and were arranged in mass public
gatherings (1959, p. 135).
In Kikuyu society the mundu mugo is the good medicine man whereas the murogi is
the worker of black magic. “Everyone is afraid of the murogi...his are the powers of life and
death. Hidden fear, springing out of the darkness is not strange to the Kikuyu” (Bewes, 1953,
p. 25). The fusion of political grievances and the use of pagan witchcraft lies at the core of
the Mau Mau Movement (p. 43). The oathing encompassed the wives and children in an
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effort to bind everyone to the movement. In addition those who had not been oathed were
shunned by the rest of the group in an effort to force each person to join. A large number of
staunch Christian Kikuyu stood against this practice and reported it to the authorities. It was
these reluctant Kikuyu that formed the back bone of the Home Guard and led the fight against
the perversions that the Mau Mau proffered (Leakey, 1952, p. 100).
It is within context of tribal beliefs and the power of the spirits that needs to be
recognised if any further understanding of why Africans were swayed so easily from one side
to the other. Sacrifice played a great part in the oathing ceremony, but this was a distortion
from established practices. Consequently, the oath is very powerful and cannot be treated
lightly (Bewes, 1953, p. 22). From a Western perspective this is difficult to comprehend, but
it will form part of an argument proposed in an attempt to recognise the seamless ease with
which captured insurgents were prepared to change sides and become ‘pseudos’ attacking
their erstwhile comrades. Once captured many would believe the magic that they had thought
protected them had been defeated by a greater magic. Thus when they were offered the
opportunity to join forces with what they would now consider superior magic, they often
quickly acquiesced.
In addition the physiological control wheeled by the insurgents though the sprit
mediums, was capable of coercing the population to support the rebels. More support for both
these lines of argument will be presented in the case study analysis, as it is considered to have
been an important factor in the African insurgencies.
2.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan
An overall plan that encompasses a combination of strategy, tactics and policy needs
to be developed. Lieutenant General Briggs produced such a plan in Malaya in 1950, which
became the backbone of strategy for prosecuting the insurgency against the Communist
inspired rebels. By recognising that this had to include a direct political element, which was
comprehensible to all the population, made his plan acceptable gaining wide support. The
promise of Independence to Malaya swung the Malays firmly behind the British forces and
their actions (Hack, 2009). The basic outline of the plan was as follows:
5. Comprehensive resettlement of over 500,000 squatters, and re-groupment of up to
600,000 estate labourers. Started in June, this was mostly complete by the end of
1951, after which the emphasis shifted from movement to qualitative issues.
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6. Resettlement areas (later rebranded as ‘New Villages’) were brought under
government administration, with resettlement officers and the intention of extending
services to them.
7. Civilian-military committees were introduced from District (District War Executive
Committees, DWECs) to a Federal War Executive Committee. These brought
together army, police, civil administration and Special Branch, and overrode
bureaucratic sclerosis.
8. A military framework was established, with a particular unit attached to each specific
area, allowing small unit patrols and a build-up of intelligence and security. The
police were redirected back to normal, rather than paramilitary, duties.
9. The remaining forces would be concentrated as ‘striking forces’ to destroy
communist forces, rolling the communists up state by state from south to north.
(Hack, 2009, p. 388)
The Plan was fundamentally expounded a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to regaining
control of the country from the subversive elements. The Briggs Plan can be summed up
simplistically by saying it gave the populace and the insurgent supports a decision to make:
either fight against the government and starve, or comply with the regulations then you can
eat and live in peace. Food control and the re-settlement of compliant villagers was core to
this Plan. Elements such as surrender for amnesty, usually for money, were also part of the
carrot and stick approach (Hamby, 2002).
Due to the transfer of expertise from Malaya to Kenya, many of the principles of the
Briggs Plan were utilised again in Kenya to remedy the many problems that had beset the
conflict from the start. The appointment of Lt-General Sir George Erskine in May 1953, saw
a dramatic change in the way the overall management of operations and strategy was
harmonised (Melshen, 2007, p. 675). The use of a manual called ‘Handbook of Anti Mau
Mau Operations’ was very much borrowed from an earlier version used in Malaya the ‘Anti
Terrorist Operations in Malaya’ and was always referred to by its acronym (ATOMS)
(Beckett, 2001, p. 103; Mumford, 2012, pp. 56-57).
This manual, ATOMS, used for operations is another clear example of the transfer of
expertise from one campaign on to another. Although, the Briggs Plan was not totally
implemented in the same way in Kenya, for instance there was no promise of independence
(Mumford, 2012, p. 70); much of its structure was used such as: creating new villages, food
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control, using the police to reinforce law and order and structuring a more interactive
intelligence gathering operation.
Rhodesia appears to have learnt from these lessons and implemented a series of
similar policies and objectives to create its own structured approach to fighting their Bush
War: new villages together with segregated tribal areas; food control and restricted
movement. In comparing this policy with the Malaya Emergency one could possibly argue
that the Rhodesians ‘borrowed’ the best bits of Britain's strategy.
Protected Villages (PV) was one of these ideas; it was however, extremely unpopular
with the African tribes’ people and in many ways was counter-productive from a hearts and
minds point of view too. “Whole communities were uprooted and put behind the wire.
Although militarily effective it was a propaganda gift to the insurgents” (Moorcraft &
McLaughlin, 2011, p. 38). Whilst the resettlement idea was embraced in Malaya as land
ownership came as part of the carrot, this was not so in Africa. Over 240,000 “were dumped
into protected or ‘consolidated’ villages. Like the experiments in Mozambique, Angola,
Algeria and Vietnam, the system produced only patchy results” (2011, p. 39)
Therefore when considering the many aspects that go towards a successful strategic
plan the following would seem to be the most pertinent:
The structure that allows for ‘population control’;
Persuasion, or ‘winning hearts and minds’ through using minimum force; political
concessions, and social provision;
command, unified and dynamic leadership;
The need for security forces to become effective ‘learning organisations’. (Hack,
2009, p. 392)
In summary the Plan should be based upon “an approach centred on resettlement,
measured coercion and good civil-military coordination, but ameliorated by political, civil
and military 'hearts and minds' measures” (Hack, 1999b, p. 231). Keeping the population safe
so they will support you and provide good intelligence was the main aim. The progressive
destruction of the insurgent’s political and social infrastructure was the objective. However,
the aim should have been balanced against the negative outcomes that can be produced when
a population is herded together (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 39).
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2.17 Significant Actors
One of the key things that has been noticeable in this study are the number of
personalities involved from the same back ground and experiences who bring their expertise
in other campaigns to the fore, three of these are: William Gray, Henry Gurney and Richard
Catling. All three served in the Palestine conflict (1936-48) learning from the bitter lessons of
poor intelligence, which contributed to the failure to defeat the Zionists (Newsinger, 2002, p.
16). They all went on to Malaya playing substantial roles in the development of Special
Branch together with General Templer. Richard Catling subsequently became Commissioner
of Police in Kenya from 1954- 63 and instigated to re-structuring of the intelligence
capabilities during the Mau Mau Emergency (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 75; Jeffery, 1987,
p. 125; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 160).
With regard to the Rhodesian campaign there was Lieutenant General Peter Walls
who had commanded the Rhodesian SAS ‘D’ squadron in the Malayan Emergency (Stiff,
1982, p. 12). Quite a number a number of his officers had also severed in Malaya ,
particularly Ron Reid Daly (Stiff, 1999, p. 219); who formed the Selous Scouts at the behest
of Walls, which used pseudo operations as their hall mark. Ken Flower, who headed the
Central Intelligence Organisation in Rhodesia, had been in Kenya during the Emergency
(Flower, 1987, p. 9) and was also influential in bringing former Colonial Police officers to
support his operations, most notable of these was Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police.
Henderson, had helped set up and run the pseudo operations in Kenya and later became an
advisor for similar operations in Rhodesia with Reid Daly (Stiff, 1999, p. 218). (See
Appendix B for a collective list
2.18 Underlying Theory
Underlying the three insurgencies being studied, is a complex series of socio-political
conflicts taking place in tandem, which can be traced to strong and contested theories such as
conflict, rebellion and social stresses put forward by authors such as Marx (1867/1999;
1969/1848) and Simmel (1950; 1955), Williams (1947, 1970), Mack and Snyder (1957),
Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962), Horton (1966) and Blalock (1967).
These social conflicts are multifaceted and interrelated to several upheavals taking
place in the society at the same time and within the same event. The insurgency itself is a
revolt against the existing order and follows the arguments put forward by Marx on conflict,
rebellion and class in his noted works (Boswell & Dixon, 1993; Marx, 1867; Marx & Engels,
1969/1848; Padover, 1977/1850, pp. 51-52). Added to this, the social and political structures
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of all those involved were undergoing change at many levels. Turner (1975) articulated that,
“although social systems reveal interdependence of units, these interrelations always reveal
conflicts of interest” (p. 619). He goes further, by stating that conflicts are based upon the
unequal distribution of resources, especially of power and the quest for power within the
society eventuating in “overt and violent conflict among social groupings” (p. 619). The
conflict over who holds the power, which is normally a small group, leads to a reorganisation of power relations of the groups within the social system and the groups. A
variant of the standards: order or conflict (Horton, 1966, p. 701).
In the case of the three conflicts under scrutiny in this study, there were multiple
players that had to be considered:
1. Firstly, the indigenous population of the countries, both the rebel movement and the
forces that opposed them in the form of the ‘Home Guard’.
2. Secondly, the colonial forces and settlers who were undergoing extraordinary political
and social changes at this time.
3. Thirdly, the many forces, although predominately British, that were brought in to aid
the counter-insurgency, who were also undergoing similar political and social changes
within their own social and political structures.
The post war period saw significant socio-political transformations and cleavages
taking place in all echelons of society, including those considered to be highly evolved
western social orders. In colonised countries, sections of the indigenous society sought
political and social structural modifications though direct conflict and at another level, the
colonisers themselves were experiencing substantial upheavals too, based upon an alternative
interpretation of their own goals and aspirations. Conflict, can therefore be argued, is a
method to bring about change, at all levels.
Simmel (1950; 1955) sees conflict as one where men either drawn together or apart
from the social groups within which they have found themselves. Conflict theorists Marx
(Marx, 1974, 1977), Weber (Roth & Wittich, 1968; Weber, 1981/1923, 2002/1864; Zollschan
& Hirsch, 1964) and Lockwood (Lockwood, 1966, 1982) emphasized the importance of
interests; as argued by Thomas Hobbes as far back as 1691 (2010/1691), that all action as is
based upon self preservation, which is predominately materialistic in nature. In this sense,
the idea of what is normative is crucial to the understandings of social interaction; the basic
tenets of accepted society, what can be considered as shared, common or characteristic.
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However, it is the pursuit of these interests that create ‘conflict’ rather than any other abstract
notion of change.
The basic argument put forward by Marx, (Turner, 1991, p. 186), is that class
divisions caused by the means of production will result in inevitable conflict. This is taken
further by Weber (1981/1923) who posits that it is their economic position in society that puts
groups in direct conflict seeking to obtain that which is most desirable. Thus, the classic
definition of the Marxian theory and capitalist society: those that have against those who do
not: the owners of production against those who have to work for the owners; or are being
exploited. However, western developed society is made up of a number of complex
relationships, each seeking to survive, prosper or dominate. When this is analysed in the
Colonial setting, in which these conflicts took place, then further levels of social strata are
added to the mix including tribal structures.
The Colonial conflicts become typical cases that conform to the notion of conflict
theory, which when combined with cultural theory start to form a method of analysis offering
a greater understanding of the underlying dynamics. Cultural theory has developed out of the
past sociological works to be “a typology of five ways of life-egalitarianism, fatalism,
individualism, hierarchy, and autonomy-to serve as an analytic tool in examining people,
culture, and politics.” (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 296). The multifaceted nature
of society: societal tiers, social conservatism, diversity, ethnicity plus tradition and religion
incorporating tribalism make this extremely complex. Cultural theory is therefore an attempt
to engage with all of these issues in an effort to allow insight into what makes up the nature
and notion of societies (Williams, 2001, p. 133).
According to Zollschan and Hirch (Zollschan & Hirsch, 1964), in their summation of
writers such as Ralf Dahrendorf (1958; Dahrendorf, 1959; 1968) David Lockwood and John
Rex (1961), cultural theory refers to social integration as the accepted principles by which
individuals relate to one another in a society; whereas system integration refers to the social
system. Despite the use of the word integration there is no assumption that the relationships
are harmonious. The terms social integration and system integration can embrace both order
and conflict.
However, this model would be too simplistic if it did not incorporate the work of
Emile Durkheim in 1893 (1964/1893), on the ‘ division of labour; whereby the move from
primitive societies to more industrialised, or in this case colonial societies, was fraught with
conflict and anomie theory as developed by Merton (1938).This ‘anomie’ manifests itself in
‘cultural malintegration’ thus “there develops a tradition-bound society, sacred society
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characterized by neophobia” (Merton, 1938, p. 673). A concept expressed as ‘deviant theory’
as developed by Cohen from Merton, whereby a subculture is developed to neutralise and
shield the deviant behaviour from conventional society (Cohen, 1965, p. 8) .
Although the use of anomie could be used to analyse the insurgents as undertaking a
‘deviant act’ by the use of subversion against the sovereign power, this stretches the
understanding of this theory into a more complex and torrid interpretations, which do not fall
within the confines of this research. However, if the social complexities of the relationships
found within the Colonial social structures: police, army and the administration are to be
analysed, then anomie is better suited as it deals with “the ways in which cultural goals and
opportunities for realizing them within the limits of the institutional norms are distributed”
(Cohen, 1965, p. 5). Understanding that there was a struggle within the excepted social norms
of British society, and therefore Colonial society, which were driving the actions of those
involved in counter-insurgency to act in particular ways, surfaces from the research for this
study. Accepting the ‘status quo’ was no longer an option, as this was being challenged by all
those involved in the conflict at every level and not just at a insurgency conflict level, but at
every juncture within the societies.
The theory that has evolved from anomie is general strain theory, whereby
relationships are ‘strained’, which lead to deviant acts or crimes. Predominately the literature
associated with these theories is concerned with criminology. Merton (1938) is credited with
the development of strain theory, but its roots are clearly within the Marxian analysis of class
conflict. The general thrust provided by Merton encompasses many groups within which his
theory of ‘deviant’ behaviour exists but it is not presented as a theoretical principle
(Rosenfeld, 1989, p. 454). Agnew (2001; Agnew & White, 1992). On the other hand Agnew
(2010) has attempted to develop a more complex analysis of strain theory and his work in
relation to terrorism provides an avenue of analysis insurgency as well .
A condensed précis of what constitutes conflict theory is taken from Boulding (1962)
where he questions if the theory of conflict is generally applicable. The response he
concludes is yes, although he accepts that there are many differences and digressions to be
accounted for in the model he proposes (p. 2). Boulding’s (1962) definition sets out the basic
requirements involved in a conflict which includes the presence of two ‘parties’. The ‘party’
is the ‘behavioural unit’ necessary for the conflict to take place in the ‘behavioural space’.
The second aspect is competition, whereby the units, or parties, are incompatible with each
other and wish to exclude the other from ownership, hence a conflict of interests. Based upon
these factors a definition of conflict is established:
56

Conflict may be defined as a situation of completion in which the parties are aware of
the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to
occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other (Boulding, p. 5).
Interpreting this concept, Boulding (1962) uses the term ‘value ordering’, which
indicates a restructuring of positions in an effort to exclude one or more of the parties from
the preferred position; the preferred position being the most sought after. The process can be
termed as dynamic, as it results in a new order based upon the conflict. Because of the
complexities associated with this theory there are many spin offs that have been developed.
One of these is ‘game theory’ where the parties involved are attempting to gain payoff from
assuming positions that may or may not be beneficial. By developing a ‘playoff matrix’, as an
analytical tool, Boulding contends it is possible to clarify variables within the conflict in
terms of gain or loss (p. 57). A further series of models are also discussed in relation to the
basic model of conflict, such as party, group or organisation as ‘conflict units’, as well as
economic, international and ideological conflicts.
A further area that requires attention is the concept of ideology linked to the
consciousness of identity, as represented in the form of nationalism. This concept also needs
to be understood, as this evolves into conflicts in search of these ideals (Ormsbee, 2004 ). In
many ways this too falls within classic Marxist theory as these relationships are what were in
conflict. Therefore, whether it is called conflict theory or cultural theory, strain theory or
anomie; these same structural dynamics are at work and need to be analysed in relation to the
findings.
2.19 Conclusion
By placing the study within its historical perspective, this chapter has sought to
develop a thematic framework for analysis. A series of themes have been presented based
essentially upon seminal works that underpin contemporary appreciation of the character of
insurgency and how to combat it. The evolution and nature of insurgencies during this time
period has been examined to elicit these essential themes. Discussion is varied concerning the
methods for achieving success, but tends to agree that no two insurgencies are the same. Each
has its own set of circumstances, which make it unique. However, what became apparent
from these reviews is how comparable some of the circumstances were and how similar the
methods eventually used were to prosecute the insurgency. Many of these methods were
drawn from the past; consequently they may still be applicable again today. Furthermore, it
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appears that often the errors of the past are repeated again, before they are bitterly re-learnt.
Only then is action taken to rectify these errors and implement a new doctrine, which in
effect is based on the past anyway.
Decolonisation was a bitter contest fought through the prism of dramatic change in
the world order. Power to control the subsequent aftermath was part of this upheaval, as
much as were the grievances of many concerning land issues and the right own the land.
Whether this was in Malaya, where the Communists harnessed the landless and stateless
Chinese squatters under their umbrella to fight Colonialism; or the landless Kikuyu squatters
in Kenya who felt aggrieved by Colonial settlers occupying what they considered as their
land; or the complexity of the situation in Rhodesia where the Colonialists were not only in
dispute with the British Government over their illegitimate Independence, but also the
Communist inspired rebels fighting them too; the issue was land and the control of that land.
Malaya has been chosen as a case study, because it has been one of the most
discussed and debated of the past counter-insurgencies. Often held up as an example of how
to fight and win an insurgency (Cassidy, 2008, p. 90; Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 130),
but it was unique because of world events, such as Korea and the threat of Communist
expansion. Malaya became an important economic asset because of tin and rubber needed to
fight the war, which meant it worthy of extra attention to ensure it stayed friendly to Western
interests. From a counter-insurgency perspective the strategies, tactics and methods used reappear in other conflicts.
One such strategy was ‘hearts and minds’. Almost synonymous with fighting
insurgents in today’s parlance. Another strategy is the use of local forces to supplement the
main force, using their local skills against the insurgents. These forces were a vital
supplement to the hard pressed police and military to defend their communities, who would
have been greatly outnumbered without them. Understanding their structures, commitment
and raison d’être for supporting the Colonial Government needs to be analysed.
Kenya and Rhodesia were two African conflicts that were similar in so many ways,
especially when compared to the French Colonial experience in Africa. Much appears to have
been related, in particular the end results: neither country was defeated militarily, but they
lost politically; due to the realities of the end of empire. Minority rule could not be sustained
without massive coercion, which was no longer politically acceptable internationally.
Conflict is at the core of survival and drives all aspects of human behaviour, in one
way or another. Theories to explain how and why this occurs have been developed by many
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philosophers. Aligning the theories to the work undertaken here, allows the outcomes to be
understood from a philosophical framework, as well as an empirical historical aspect.
A review of the literature has been used to construct a working thematic framework as
method of analysis for looking at counter-insurgency and how it operated during the three
selected campaigns. The research questions were drawn from this framework, which will be
used in each of the case studies to compare the similarities and differences. Analysis of the
responses from all the participants in this study will also be based upon the framework
developed here. The next chapter presents the study design used to accomplish the required
objectives.

59

Chapter 3
METHODS AND MATERIALS
3.1

Introduction
This chapter will deal with how the study was designed, conducted and what methods

were used. A qualitative approach was used adopting a case study method. The case study
research design was considered an appropriate methodology to deal with the objectives of
this study, because it involved multiple sources of data requiring detailed and intense analysis
(Yin, 2009, p. 18). In order to strengthen the design further a comparative approach was
adopted (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 173). Accordingly, three cases were produced from a
series of semi-structured interviews from respondents selected by criterion sampling. The
findings were based upon the responses from the research questions then compared and
analysed to generate an outcome based upon the findings to provide a conclusion.
A pilot study preceded the full data collection and was used after the first three semistructured interviews to test the robustness of the study design; with the necessary changes
being implemented before proceeding with the full data collection. The three cases were
developed from the narratives provide by the respondents together with data accumulated
from multiple sources including newspapers, video clips, government reports, letters, and
diaries together with the semi-structured interviews with selected participants.
The next step involved content analysis by coding, identifying and categorizing the
primary patterns and themes (Patton, 1980, p. 381). “When the predominant research strategy
is qualitative, a case study tends to take an inductive approach to the relationship between
theory and research” (Bryman, 2012, p. 69). Inductive analysis was the chief method used to
allow the themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data, which was supported by
logical analysis to elicit further patterns through cross-classification. The final results were a
cumulative interpretation of the outputs from not only the three case studies, but also from a
comparative analysis of the results drawing on all aspects of the data accumulated for this
study. Bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the validity of the data collection
and the analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407). The overall robustness and reliability of
the study was improved by adopting this approach.
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3.2

Methodology overview
The case study method has been used in this study to consider what was the role

played by the Colonial Forces in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959),
Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980). The purpose was to analyse whether the
Colonial States had a substantive advantage over modern day counter-insurgencies operations
because of their control over the levers of power. Furthermore, to consider the role of the
Colonial forces in the prosecution of the conflicts, particularly the police force, by analysing
the strategy and tactics to ascertain what was effective and why. Included in this analysis,
was the role played by the concept of ‘hearts and minds ‘in each of the conflicts. Lastly,
could any of these strategies and tactics be transferable to modern day counter insurgencies?
The methodology used in this project is primarily qualitative (Cohen, Manion, &
Morrison, 2007), using what can be termed as an interpretative approach to data collection
and analysis because, “different genres of interpretive research have also demonstrated (even
to their critics) that they are as rigorous as positivist science even though their rigor
necessarily needs to be judged by criteria that are markedly different” (Prasad & Prasad,
2002, p. 4). Although there is often confusion between the terms qualitative and
interpretative, they are not synonymous. For the purposes of this study the term is used as a
process akin to the revised interpretations of hermeneutic research as defined by Prasad
(2002):
For hermeneutic research, history serves as an important part of context. In other
words, hermeneutic research conceptualizes context both synchronically as well as
diachronically. In methodological terms, therefore, hermeneutic inquiry requires the
organizational researcher to develop a thorough familiarity with the historical aspects
of the phenomenon of interest.(Prasad, 2002, p. 24)
As this study is historical, the definition above is apt, as it describes how important it
has been to understand the whole context of the case studies, rather than interpreting them
solely based upon the specifics.
In order to make sure validity was maintained, research tasks have been done
sequentially with the advantage that it allowed a far more comprehensive assessment of the
methods used (Bergman, 2008, p. 15). Lack of validity is one of the common criticisms of
qualitative research, (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Prasad &
Prasad, 2002). Consequently, attention has been paid throughout the study to guard against
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lack of validity by incorporating a variety of controls as suggested by Kumar (1996, pp. 137143).
3.2.1

Criterion Sampling

Selected participants were chosen, using Criterion sampling from those who had taken
part in the conflicts and were still available to be interviewed. Criterion or Purpose sampling
is “extremely useful when you want to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon”
(Kumar, 1996, p. 162), to create a case study. The interviews were carried out using a semistructured approach to allow for greater flexibility when dealing with the respondents.
When designing the data collection process the following four aspects were
considered to allow the narrative to develop rather than being imposed:
The choice of participants and their selection was considered logical in relation to the
study;
The research objectives were consistent with the methods used for data collection;
A broad data collection process has been ensured throughout to sustain the results;
To support the analysed findings the use of numerous sources was used to assist with
the validity of the end results (Giacomini & Cook, 2000).
Each of the conflicts were conceptualised into case studies, which incorporated the
research questions, the interview data, the analysis from the literature together interpretative
data extracted from the semi-structured interviews. Reflective notes were taken throughout
the process. The recorded interview data was analysed by using a narrative coding system
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147), to determine what the common rudiments of the three
campaigns were, according to the firsthand accounts from the respondents. Finally, the data
was filtered and layered to ensure that all meanings were captured and could be
comparatively analysed (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147). Whilst at the same time
bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the validity of the data collection and the
analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407). As the case studies are historical, it is important to
use tools that can support such a requirement. Historiography (Lustick, 1996; Megill, 1989),
has been used to interpret, analyse and put into perspective the narratives obtained from the
semi-structured interviews with the historical facts.
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Figure 3.1 Study Design for this study
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Figure 3.1 is a simple flowchart of the process followed to design this study beginning
with the first decision phase to present the proposal and then undertaking the pilot study to
test the study design before confirming its use. The data collection process included the semistructured interviews with the respondents together with accessing additional secondary data,
such as newspapers, reports and books written at that time. Case studies were then
constructed for all three conflicts before the data could be coded into themes ready for
analysis. The last stage was synthesis of the outcomes to produce a series of theoretical
recommendations and a conclusion.
The study design needed to consider what was being studied, what type of evidence
was required and how this would support the investigation. Therefore, would the questions
actually provide the desired results that could then be interpreted effectively enough to
provide a satisfactory outcome, together with an accepted validity? Reliability, replication
and validity remain the criteria required for assessing the quality of the research. “In
qualitative research, issues of instrument validity and reliability ride largely with the skills of
the researcher” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38).
From the potential research designs, the case study approach was considered the most
appropriate for this study (Bryman, 2012, p. 45; Kumar, 1996, p. 99). However, using a case
study method would also require an interpretation of the results based on a more
philosophical approach to the concluding outcomes. As a result, a sound knowledge of
philosophy was beneficial when utilising research designs to avoid making critical errors that
could cause unsubstantiated results and thus a discounted theory.
There are a number of philosophical positions (Table 3.1) that have found acceptance
in qualitative research, but many are contested and debated. In simplistic terms these can be
divided into either constructivism or positivism, which have become stereotyped. Each
position can be associated with certain defined traditions but not with any one philosopher
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2004, p. 28).
Positivism holds that “the social world exists externally, and that its properties should
be measured through objective measures, rather than inferred subjectively through sensation,
reflection or intuition” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 28). Conversely, constructivism or
social constructivism, “focuses on the ways that people make sense of the world especially
through sharing their experiences with others via the medium of language” (Easterby-Smith,
et al., 2004, p. 29), often referred to as Interpretative methods.
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Table 3.1 Contrasting essential elements of positivism and constructivism

(Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 29)
The value of highlighting the differences between the two approaches is especially
important as this study has combined elements from both, as it has used the case study
approach to interpreting the data. Nevertheless, as noted by Table 3.1, it does not correspond
that because of this, the project has been based solely on social constructivism, when many
aspects of post positivism have also been used where appropriate (Noor, 2008, p. 1602).
Additionally, critical realism as a philosophical approach has been used for the epistemology
required in this study (Yeung, 1997). Aspects of constructivism have been used when this
appeared to allow for a greater understanding of the replies in relation to the research
questions. “Researchers are interested in insight, discovery, and interpretation rather than
hypothesis testing”(Noor, 2008, p. 1602). Merriam considers this can be accomplished using
the case study approach (Merriam, 1988, pp. 4-25).
3.3

Case Study
The use of multiple case studies formed the core of the method used as this is an

“empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real
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life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The case study approach is used when there are many
variables of interest looking for one result (Creswell, 2007, p. 62).
A case study can be defined in a variety of ways, the central tenet being the need to
explore an event or phenomenon in depth and in its natural context. It is for this reason
sometimes referred to as a "naturalistic" design; this is in contrast to an "experimental" design
(such as a randomised controlled trial) in which the investigator seeks to exert control over
and manipulate the variable(s) of interest. (Crowe et al., 2011, p. 62)
As a research strategy, the use of case studies is beneficial as it allows multiple focus
on understanding the dynamics found in particular settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Given, 2008).
Numerous levels of analysis can thus be performed within the same study (Yin, 2009).
Furthermore, “triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides
stronger substantiation of the constructs and hypotheses” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 538), making
the outcomes substantially stronger. The case is designed to meet the research objectives
using sufficient material as is necessary (Naumes & Naumes, 2006, p. 4). This approach
required being as comprehensive and systematic as feasible in the data collection, to ensure
the case was as complete as possible before classifying and conducting content analysis
(Patton, 1980, p. 384). A case study can be considered as “an analysis of a social phenomena
specific to time and place” (Ragin & Becker, 1992, p. 2).The case study inquiry:
copes with the technically distinctive situations in which there will be many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result;
riles on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in triangulating
fashion, and as another result;
benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide the data
collection and analysis. (Yin, 2009, p. 18)
The advantage in this approach, as argued by Glaser and Strauss (1989), “it is the
intimate connection with empirical reality that permits the development of a testable,
relevant, and valid theory” (as cited in Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532). Too often a theory is
proposed that is not based sufficiently upon the verifiable data. Therefore, using a case study
approach should reduce this tendency and sequentially allow a theory to come out of the case
study itself (Gillham, 2000, p. 2). “The advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on
real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in

66

practice.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235). Furthermore, case studies can be considered the
preferred form for reporting alternative approaches (Lincoln & Guba, 1990).
Case study as a research paradigm fits comfortably in the midst of the nexus between
two main schools of quantitative versus qualitative and often overlaps, as can be seen in
Figure 3.2. The substantive arguments that Gill (2011) pus forward in his book in support of
the Case methods underpin its longevity and rigor when dealing with multiple inputs of data.
Gill (2011) further asserts, “where substantial complexity is present in the system being
studied, the case method is a valid approach-and possibly the most valid approach availablefor exploring and learning about it” (p. 49).

Figure 3.2 Positioning case study as a research method
(Gill, 2011, p. 18)
Denzin and Lincoln (1998) outline a variety of approaches to methods of inquiry,
including case studies. Stake’s (1998) deals with this explicitly and indicates that “case
content evolves in the act of writing itself” (p. 93). Stake (cited in Creswell, 2007) believed
that “naturalistic, ethnographic case materials, to some extent, parallel natural experience,
feeding into the most fundamental processes of awareness and experience” (p. 94).In contrast
Merriam (cited in Creswell, 2007, p. 186) states, “there is no standard format for reporting
case study research” which indicates case studies can achieve varying results including
theories, general descriptions of events, analytical in single or multiple case compressions
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that “undoubtedly shapes the larger structure of the written narrative” (p. 186). With this in
mind, it was apparent that a strict framework had to be applied across the case studies to
ensure the end result was robust.
Most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a
myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by
personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with
verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit
rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate
to the understanding of the case. (Stake, 1978, p. 7)
3.3.1

How the Case Study was used in this Research

The sequential process followed for this study was: selection of the cases, the
evolution of research questions, data gathering, analysis, interpretation, the role of the
researcher, and writing of the final results. A Pilot Study was used after the first three semistructured interviews to test the robustness of the study design; with the necessary changes
being implemented before proceeding with the data collection.
Once the three cases had been developed, the data formed part of a comprehensive
accumulation of information from multiple sources. It was then necessary to begin the
process of content analysis by coding, identifying and categorizing the primary patterns and
themes (Patton, 1980, p. 381). Inductive analysis was the chief method used to allow the
themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data, rather than being imposed. Once the
dimensions had been constructed, predominately by evaluator-generated constructions rather
more than participant-generated constructions, they were cross-classified in order to look for
patterns that may not have been obvious in the initial stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.
147). This process is termed logical analysis whereby a new typology surfaces from the data
analysis, which may not have been apparent at the onset of the process. By moving between
the constructions, additional patterns can be thus be recognised enhancing the outcomes of
the study (Patton, 1980, p. 411).
Inherent in using a case study approach, is the researcher’s bias in the selection of the
data to be used. It is therefore beholden on the researcher to recognise this potential and
mitigate as far as possible, or at least account for it when presenting the findings (Ahern,
1999). Based upon the literature review, which positioned the study, a series of semi
structured interviews took place with the selected participants using criterion sampling from
the three campaigns. A working framework was thus developed from the themes indentified
68

from the literature review that became the outline for the case analysis. Subsequently, by
analysing these themes across the cases it was possible to compare, contrast and interpret the
themes to provide a more acceptable, generalisable outcome (Creswell, 2007, p. 64).
3.3.2

Case Study Building Process

In order to build the case studies primary data was obtained from individuals that took
part in the conflicts being studied. By using the narrative, as developed by the semi-structured
interviews, the case studies were constructed around the themes identified at the literature
review stage and subsequently through the coding of the narratives. The interpretation of
personal experiences, versions of the actions undertaken by the respondents provided a fuller
understanding of the events through their personal stories. The collection of the primary data
was conducted using in-depth interviews, which enable the participant to provide a full, rich
account and allow the researcher considerable flexibility in probing interesting areas which
may emerge (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed
verbatim and subjected to detailed qualitative analysis, attempting to elicit experiential
themes in the participant’s narrative.
3.3.3

Hermeneutics within the process

Qualitative research that uses the narrative approach will, even at a subconscious
level, have elements of hermeneutics within the process (Hein & Austin, 2001; Laverty,
2008). Hermeneutics has been considered an interpretive methodology for understanding
ancient texts:
Hermeneutics is a much broader interpretive genre that has expanded the very
meaning of the term text. In brief, texts now refer not only to documents and the like but also
to social, organizational, and institutional structures and processes; cultures and cultural
artifacts (sic); and so on. (Prasad & Prasad, 2002, p. 7)
The evolution of this form of interpretation has been gaining ground within the social
sciences, although at times its value has been over emphasised it is nonetheless a process that
needs to be understood as evolving (Bell, 2011). The meaning of hermeneutics has become
much broader, as the quote above states, to include,” social, organizational, and institutional
structures and processes; cultures and cultural artifacts; and so on”(Prasad & Prasad, 2002,
pp. 7-8).
Essentially we seek meaning from the themes within the narrative that can be
interpreted. Therefore, each of the respondents has their own story, which in turn forms part
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of a greater story that has to be interpreted within the context of the research. Thus the end
result will be the sum total of all its parts, but only as told by this study. “The author’s
intention is not the final arbiter of a text’s meaning, but it may cast light on meaning” (Bell,
2011, p. 535). Hermeneutics permeates the research process, whether or not it has been
chosen as a distinct methodology or not. Therefore, although there may be a degree of
hermeneutics in all qualitative research methodologies simply by default, this process needs
to be understood within its context and not shunned but accepted that is part of a tacit process
taking place regardless of choice. “Hermeneutics is about creating meaning, not simply
reporting it” (Hultgren, 1994, p. 12).
3.3.4

Heuristic Inquiry

Although personal narratives are being used, they can be interpreted in several ways,
either as phenomenological experiences or alternatively heuristically to understand the
meaning. “Heuristic Inquiry[sic].... seek[s] to discover the nature and meaning of phenomena
themselves and to illuminate then through direct first-person accounts of individuals who
have directly encountered the phenomena in experience” (Moustakas, 2001, p. 263). In much
the same way as ‘Hermeneutics’ underlies the thinking and interpreting process so does the
use of a heuristic approach which looks for patterns of meaning as part of the discovery
process:
For any proposition there is always some sufficiently narrow interpretation of its
terms, such that it turns out true and some sufficiently wide interpretation such that it
turns out false. Which interpretation is intended and which is unintended depends of
course on our intentions. (Lakatos, 1976, p. 99)
Essentially, the goal is to seek for understanding and meaning from the narratives, as
expressed by Moustakas (1990), and again in the later addition of the work:
The crucial processes in heuristics (once one understands the values, beliefs, and
knowledge inherent in the heuristic paradigm) are: concentrated gazing on something
that attracts or compels one into a search for meaning: focus on a topic or formulation
of the question; and methods of preparing, collecting, organizing, analysing, and
synthesizing data. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 38)
However, it is necessary to explain the association between events and the narrative
focusing on trying to make sense of what has happened and what does that mean in relation
70

to the events (Smith, et al., 2009). The Duquesne school focus on a situation in which the
experience investigated occurs, seeks descriptions to construct structures of the experience
and ends with a general structural description (Moustakas, 1994, p. 22). Triangulation is
achieved through the use of further qualitative data collection methods i.e. diaries,
newspapers, monographs or personal accounts (Smith, et al., 2009); a process that has been
followed in this study.
3.3.5

Narrative

The use of narrative has been used because of its attention to the structure of the story
as given by the participants in the case studies, which will be sections of discourse. Although,
this does mean a more hermeneutic or poststructuralist methodological approach rather than a
positivistic one (Pranee & Douglas, 2005).
Scientific rationality is built out of logical, well-formed arguments that are designed to
convince of truth through reference to repeatable, scientifically constructed empirical
tests. The aim is to produce general laws that can be applied to particular events to
explain why things happen. These laws are usually abstract and context free. (Pranee
& Douglas, 2005, p. 125)
This approach has been preferred, as the participants find it easier to respond by
placing themselves in the total situation, which in many cases requires justifying why they
took a particular course of action rather than another. If the questions are exclusively
directed, then this restricts the respondents desire to respond in a meaningful way, as they
often feel that they may be exposing themselves in some way (Chase, 1995, p. 4).
Consequently, by allowing the participants to tell their stories, with subtle guidance, allows a
more truthful version to emerge. The stories have then been deconstructed and interpreted
within the context of the events of the time, adding triangulation, wherever and whenever
necessary, as well as using empirical data to verify the narratives. A process often termed
‘methodological triangulation’(Stake, 1995, p. 114).
Bruner (1990) proposes that in order to understand the meaning of the narrative there
are two components that have to be considered: a configuring plot and secondly, the
succession of events that will shape the story itself. Only when the two are in tandem can the
narrative be fully understood (Pranee & Douglas, 2005).
Based upon the proceeding argument, a thematic analysis “helps to unravel the
themes or ‘experiential structures of experience’...which asks what is essential or revealed in
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the text/data source”(Van Manen, 1990, p. 79). The ability to examine the concrete
descriptions of the lived experience correlating it with the empirical data that references it to
a specified time and place is an accepted mythological approach to conducting research.
3.4

Two Stage Study: Pilot Study First
It was recognised that by conducting a pilot study, before proceeding with the full

study would be beneficial to the research project and increase the robustness of the final
outcomes. The ability to test the research questions on a selected number of participants was
seen as a useful tool in assessing how they would respond to verify if the questions met the
overall requirements of the study. The data collected could then be processed through the full
case study approach to test the suitability of the methods chosen.
In order to run the pilot study, three participants were interviewed and the outcomes
were analysed to check the results and validity. The major outcome was the realisation that
the use of only two case studies would not produce sufficient data to develop a sustainable
theory nor allow for a suitable comparative analysis. It was also realised that one of the
research sub-questions would prove to be too problematical to achieve, because of the
difficulty in being able to trace and interview ex-insurgents. The question dealing with “their
opponent’s perspective” was therefore dropped from the design. In addition, some of the
tertiary questions were found to be too mundane to elicit any worthwhile primary research
responses therefore; they too were dropped from the study design.
Using a pilot study to validate the research design was seen as a useful tool, which
had net benefits to the next stage of the data collection process and consequently improved
the overall design of the project. This approach was especially important as extensive travel
was required to South Africa, Kenya, Malaysia, France and the United Kingdom to conduct
the interviews. It was seen as highly unlikely this amount of travel could be repeated again
should there have been a major fault in the study design, or the collection of the data.
3.5

Population and Sampling
There is a distinct difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches to

sampling; with both attempting to deal with the threats to validity and the ability to apply the
results as generalisable. However, the process differs, as the aims of qualitative case study are
to “capture the frame of reference and definition of the situation of a given informant or
participant and thus avoid instrumentation artefacts of standardized measurement procedures”
(McClintock, Brannon, & Maynard-Moody, 1979, p. 612). Case studies, using idiographic
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research principles, are an accepted method but this means that causality cannot be
definitively demonstrated because of the limitations of the sample size and the way the
sample has been selected. It is acknowledged that by using non-probability samples that N of
1 outcomes are confounded, therefore it is important not to draw cause an effect conclusions
or apply generalisability as the results are not statistically reliable (McClintock, et al., 1979;
Pierce, 2008, p. 91).
For the purposes of this research study, the population units chosen were based on
non-probability methods, as is common with the majority of qualitative studies. Seale
(1999)has pointed out, as the samples are based upon non-probability they are often
considered not to be representative. This is common criticism of most social science studies
where probability is achieved rarely due to the nature of the phenomenon being analysed,
“because in social science we look at the social significance of the study rather than the
statistical logic” (Seale, 1999, p. 436). However, to achieve what is termed representativeness
of samples, a suitable number of cases needed to be included to a point where an
interpretation is acceptable (Patton, 1990, p. 184). This can be attained by the use of
theoretical sampling, a term coined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and often referred to in
other sources as criterion sampling or purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 169).
“Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a sample which is meaningful
theoretically because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and
test your theory and explanation”(Mason as cited in Seale, 1999, p. 446). Lastly,
generalisation is dependent on the variance noted in the topic that show an acceptable
outcome from the phenomenon “not a standard or automatic algorithm of a statistical rule”
(Seale, 1999, p. 453).
Due to the nature of the research questions, it was considered appropriate to use
criterion sampling. Samples are selected purposely rather than through probability methods,
because they can offer a research project insight into a particular experience, that is they
‘represent’ a perspective (Smith, et al., 2009). Paton describes the majority of sampling in
qualitative research as ‘purposeful’ including criterion sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 16) . They
all illustrate information rich cases “that is, cases that are selected purposefully to fit the
study” (Coyne, 1997, p. 627).There is however a problem with this method, as it is hard to
replicate for other researchers at a later date (Kitson et al., 1982). Coyne is clear to make the
distinction between what is termed theoretical sampling and purpose sampling, although at
times used interchangeably they are not considered the same.

73

The major difficulty, with respect to undertaking primary interviews with those that
had participated was the amount of time that had passed since the conflicts. Their average age
was early 80s for those from Malaya and Kenya, plus there were not many survivors from
this time period who were ready, willing and able to participate. The other difficulty was the
geographical spread of those that took part as they have retired in different parts of the world.
Consequently, it was necessary to travel extensively in order to interview these subjects in
their own homes in Kenya, South Africa, Australia, Malaysia, France and the United
Kingdom.
3.6

Research Instrument
The ability of the researcher is paramount to achieving an acceptable result, as “the

researcher is the instrument” and the methods used are part of the process (Britten, 1995, p.
418; Myburgh & Poggenpoel, 2003, pp. 418-421; Patton, 2002, p. 14) ; a stark reminder of
the importance of academic experience to get it right (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38).
Furthermore, validity is dependent on careful construction of the instrument; in this case the
semi-structured interviews, to ensure they are administered to measure what they set out to
measure. It was important to clearly define the research questions, within the structure of the
case study approach; as a primary objective to building a sustainable theory. “The rationale
for defining the research question is the same as in hypothesis-testing research. Without a
research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data”(Eisenhardt, 1989, p.
536). By creating a focus, this has assisted with the research design through the use of
instruments together with the use of the empirical data supporting the emergent theory.
Eisenhardt (1989) pointed out the advantages of early identification of the research
question together with potential constructs does have its benefits, but that it must also be
accepted as only tentative.“ No construct is guaranteed a place in the resultant theory, no
matter how well measured. Also the research question may shift during the research” (p.
536). During the pilot study two cases were found to be insufficient to respond to the
Research Questions. Furthermore, that the proposed objective of being able to interview
former insurgents was not achievable. Therefore, an additional case study was added and
some of the objectives were amended to incorporate these necessary revisions.
The initial literature review assisted with the development of the most appropriate
questions. A good deal of preparation was required in formulating which questions were best
suited to the case study approach in order to construct a validated theory. “ A literature
review is therefore a means to an end, and not-as many people have been taught to think-an
74

end in itself” (Yin, 2009, p. 14).The nature of this study has necessitated an ongoing
approach to the literature review, which is often the case in qualitative work (Patton, 1990, p.
163).
3.7

Interviews
The interview is one of the most, if not the most, commonly used research tool in

social and political science (King, 2004).”In fact, it is estimated that ‘90% of all social
science investigations’ use interviews of some sort “ (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 1). A
large amount of knowledge is gained through the use of interview, therefore it is important to
get it right (Morris, 2009). “The published account is not an objective rendering of ‘reality’,
but it is the researcher’s interpretation of the facts that is published for public view” (Morris,
2009, p. 214).
There are four types of accepted interview techniques in academic research: structured
interviews, semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews and non-directive interviews.
Each one of these has its place within the research process, but will largely depend on the
nature of the study together with the applied methodology. It would be difficult to argue that
one method is superior to another as each has its merits, but the choice should be made on the
type of research design with regard to desired outcomes.
This research adopted the use of the semi- structured interview technique (Bryman,
2012, p. 471). The use of a semi-structured interview allowed for a flexible approach when
interviewing, as each respondent does not interpret the questions asked in the same way nor
do they give the same data:
In contrast, the opportunity to change the words but not the meaning of questions
provided by a semi-structured interview schedule acknowledges that not every word
has the same meaning to every respondent and not every respondent uses the same
vocabulary. (Barriball & While, 1994, p. 330)
Hoyle (2002) comments that interview questions have “dual goals of motivating the
respondent to give full and precise replies while avoiding biases stemming from social
desirability, conformity, or other constructs of disinterest.”(p. 144). It was important not to
use closed questions but rather to allow the respondents to paint in the canvas. Rosenthal
(2004, p. 50) sets out a sequence for the interviews in narrative analysis:
During the main narration period:
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1. Interviewer-initial narrative question
2. Participant-main narration or self presentation
3. Interviewer- active listening and taking notes during the questioning period:
4. Internal narrative questions
5. External narrative questions
The use of interviews is not as straight forward as many people might think and the
many considerations that have to be borne in mind are discussed in paper by Barriball
(Barriball & While, 1994) Every effort should be made to ensure the interview is conducted
in a harmonious and acceptable manner. Informed consent prior to the interview process was
necessary, together with an overall agreement over the proposed structure for the interview.
Consideration was given to the general welfare of the participants when conducting long
interviews. The later has been important for this research project, as nearly all the participants
have been elderly.
The ability to listen was very important to the whole process. Seidman (1998)
proposes that there are three levels of listening. The first being an attentive approach,
followed by the use of the ‘inner voice’ allowing a connection with the speaker and lastly the
interviewer “must listen while remaining aware of the process as well as the substance” (p.
65). The whole approach requires a good deal more concentration than that which is normally
associated with general conversation. There is also a need to have a complete picture of
where the interview needs to go. The use of a template on a clipboard can be distracting to
the respondent; therefore, it is preferable to have the sequence of questions firmly fixed in
one’s mind. This ability facilitates flexibility, as a strand can be followed without losing sight
of the general direction that the interview needs to take, to fulfil the requirements of the
questions.
Recording the interview allows for a greater empathy with the respondent, as one is
able to maintain eye contact, although taking additional notes not only aids the later
interpretation process but it also gives the interviewee confidence that what is being said is of
importance (Barriball & While, 1994; Gorden, 1975; Seidman, 1998). If there is any
ambiguity then this should be clarified at the time as should follow up questions that allow
stories to be told. This style will produce data rich responses that elucidate the interpretation
of events for write up. Sometimes the chronology can become blurred and this too needs to
be clarified with additional questions at the time.
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A further aspect, is not to probe without understanding the sensitivity of many of the
issues involved, as this could cause offence, but rather explore the experience together; the art
of listening rather than interrogating (Gorden, 1975). With older people is important to keep
them focussed on the topic rather than let them digress to other memories (Seidman, 1998, p.
74), which was the case for some of the participants in this study.
A valid criticism is that of interviewer bias, failing to be subjective enough or
accepting what is being presented as correct. Such bias can prejudice much of the findings if
caution is not properly exercised (Cohen, et al., 2007). This can often occur when the
interviewer feels they have a greater knowledge of the events than that of the respondent.
This aspect was pertinent to this study, because of the age of the participants. It was
important not to overpower them or them to overpower the researcher with their experience
either.
There can also be a tendency for self-serving bias and recall error by the interviewee
(Patton, 1990, p. 245). A further area to be considered was that of misinterpretation of events,
often called selective memory (Tafarodi, Tam, & Milne, 2001). Selective memory can
manifest itself in a number of ways from wanting to appear more important in a previous
event than was actually the case, or merely reporting an event, as if one had been present, to
forgetting the involvement of others. All of these aspects must be measured and accounted
for by validation from other sources. Therefore multiple interpretations must be considered as
well as the principle of suspicion (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 77). “Examine the influences that
the social context has upon the actions under study by seeking out and documenting multiple
view points along with the reasons for them” (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 77).
All the interviews were transcribed with further analysis taking place using multiple
methods predominately using the NVivo software to identify sequences, patterns and
structures of the responses given. Once these trends were identified they were then compared
to the existing literature through Historiographical analysis as part of the triangulation
process to assist validity.
3.8

Research Quality Criteria and Reliability
The importance of quality in the study needs to be addressed, as “transparency of

research methodology; clearly based on and adding to the relevant literature in terms of
insight and conceptualisation” makes it important to highlight this more than may have been
the case in the past (Bryman, Becker, & Sempik, 2008, p. 267). Transparency is a major
consideration to ensure acceptable methods have been used in the research.
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Commonly there are four accepted research quality criteria: construct validity,
internal validity, external validity and reliability. These four dictate the universal credence of
the results from the research undertaken and need to be incorporated throughout the entire
process. The validity of the research confirms the accuracy and usefulness of the data
collected through the use of the selected instrument (Pandit, 1996). These terms are not
exclusive and many authors propose alternative interpretivist positions (Seale, 1999) such as
Altheide and Johnson’s (1994) review on validity identifies “successor validity, catalytic
validity, interrogated validity, trans- gressive validity, imperial validity, simulacra/ironic
validity, situated validity, and voluptuous validity” (p. 488).The use of so many terms can be
bewildering according the Seale, because of the “difficulty in regulating and constraining an
endeavour whose guiding philosophy often stresses creativity, exploration, conceptual
flexibility and freedom of spirit” (Seale, 1999, p. 467). The importance is to ensure that the
methods chosen demonstrate credibility and are dependable (Yin, 2009, p. 40).
Construct validity accepts that some findings have no definite criterion measure of
quality with which they can be checked against, and therefore, will require indirect measures
to be used to achieve the required level of validation (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 14). The
more measures that can be used the greater the validity outcomes. Yin (2009) also points out
that one of the most frequent criticisms levelled against the use of case studies is to do with
construct validity and that ‘subjective’ judgements’ predominate the collection of data.
Avoiding this pitfall has been difficult, because choosing the respondents has been dictated
predominately by those who have been available. Yin (2009) suggests that “multiple sources
of evidence” are useful to maintain a “chain of evidence”, which is beneficial too (2009, p.
42).
Internal validity on the other hand asks whether the study has achieved the desired
outcome as intended and whether or not the bias of the researcher has influenced the findings.
Internal validity is threatened when credible and challengeable explanations cannot be
eliminated (Onwuegbuzie & McLean, 2003). As with construct validity, the more variables
that can be used to validate the data the more confident one can be of the results from the
research. It is also important to fully explain how the results were achieved. Basically, are the
study results credible and has this been adequately demonstrated.
External validity considers in what context can the results be applied or transferred to
other situations or have generalisations crept into the findings because the type of sample
used i.e. that is was not representative enough or was idiosyncratic. As this research has used
criterion sampling it has been important to recognise this potential bias. Although the sample
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was restricted in its selection, because of the nature of the research question and the conflicts
that were studied, the use of additional data from other sources has been used to limit the
threat that might have been caused by any weakness in this approach.
Lastly the question of reliability or dependability needs to be addressed: can the study
be repeated or replicated and obtain the same results. Fundamentally, are the results
trustworthy, which can be a subjective judgement anyway? Once again, an open approach as
to how the study was conducted and how the context may have changed throughout is an
important aspect to be addressed.
The reliability or validity of the evidence is one that is always raised when using
interviews. This is highlighted in Cohen et al (2007) where they highlight several areas which
could construe bias:
The attitudes, opinions and expectations of the interviewer;
A tendency for the interviewer to see the respondents in his or her own image;
A tendency for the interviewer to seek answers that support preconceived notions;
Misperceptions on the part of the interviewer of what the respondents are saying;
Misunderstanding on the part of the respondent of what is being asked. (p. 150)
Therefore, it is the validity of the responses rather than the reliability of the
respondents that is core to a robust outcome. The outcome requires that the concepts are well
defined before any attempt is made to measure them, taking into account all the threats to
validity that could occur.
Careful formulation of the questions was essential in an effort to minimise bias; in
particularly during the interview stage. However, it must be recognised that the interview is
more than a one side episode, it is a shared experience which in turn is part of a power status,
perhaps even a struggle, between the two individuals (Cohen, et al., 2007, p. 151). Lee (1993)
goes further and states that there needs to be an understanding of the power asymmetries with
either the interviewer having dominance in the situation, or the interviewee not feeling
comfortable with the potentially lower status of the interviewer . Such a potential conflict
could cause problems with the responses given by those interviewed and needs to be given
careful consideration. This approach forms part of reflective process as being the:
recognition of the influence the researcher brings to the research process. It highlights
the potential power relationships between the researcher and the research participant ...
It also acknowledges how a researcher’s [characteristics] ... influence the choices
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made within the study, such as the research question itself and the methods of data
collection. (Kuper, Lingard., & Levinson, 2008, p. 689)
The implications this brings needs to be judged in relation to what effect this may
have on outcomes of the research. A continual reflection of how each additional piece of data
has impacted or moderated the overall study has taken place. In addition a comprehensive
account of how the research has been conducted will assist in allaying fears that it could not
be replicated. It is this later part that underpins reliability, could the case study be conducted
again, not replicated but undertaken using the same methods (Yin, 2009, p. 44). Consequently
even “positivist methodologists accept that case studies [sic] have a strong comparative
advantage with respect to the “depth” of the analysis, where depth can be understood as
empirical completeness and natural wholeness or as conceptual richness and theoretical
consistency” (Given, 2008). Furthermore:
Case method research has the potential of being far stronger in all three areas
(reliability, construct validity and internal validity) than its statistical counterparts
under conditions of complexity. The problem is that of weighing objective and
subjective evidence (....). What the case method offers is the ability to employ many
different types of evidence to support construct convergence. This evidence will likely
include the ideas of the participants themselves. (Gill, 2011, pp. 154,156)
A basic reasoning for using the case study method has been that it allowed for an
intense examination of the data collected from multiple sources. The data generated provides
the support for the theoretical arguments as presented. However, as Bryman (2012) asks, “
the crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to a wider universe but
how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings” (p. 71). Furthermore, by using
comparative analysis of more than one study, has assisted in reinforcing triangulation by
using more than one specific type of interpretation to support critical realism.
The process of triangulation was used to increase reliability (Gillham, 2000, p. 13). A
central mathematical concept that is the basis of navigation, whereby three points are
indentified and the angles between calculated to ascertain the exact position. When
triangulation is used in research, the quest is to attempt to verify aspects of the data to certify
they are validated with other separate sources and thus corroborate the data collected. This
correlation ensures that what is said by the interviewee is cross checked to other primary and
secondary sources such as: diaries, records, documents, newspapers and books, as part of the
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verification and reliability process. “The demands of rigor typically require us to consider
evidence from as many sources as possible” (Gill, 2011, p. 158). Eisenhardt (1989) argues
that “the triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses” (p. 538). Bryman (2012) adds ,“by comparing
to or more cases, the researcher is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which
theory will or will not hold” (p. 74). Therefore, using the multiple comparative case study
approach should have assisted with achieving this objective.
3.9

Historiography
As this thesis deals with events that took place in the past it has been necessary to

interpret what are known as historical facts, “this process contextualises the issues being
studied and gives shape to the parameters of the understanding which is being offered”
(O’Brien, Remenyi, & Keaney, 2004, p. 135). However, this may not be as simple as it
seems. Carr (as cited in Moran, 1959, p. 11) argued that the facts speak for themselves only
when they are called upon to do so. It is the historian that decides which facts to use and
which ones to omit. The judgement used by the writer will always be open to criticism of
bias. Whether it is possible to avoid this challenge is hard to say, but it is necessary to ensure
as much academic rigour as possible is present in an attempt to avoid it. Marwick (2001)
emphasises that he does “not believe that historians ‘reconstruct’ or ‘craft’ anything; what
they do is contribute to historical knowledge, that is knowledge about the past”(p. 3).
Following this interpretation has been the objective of this thesis:
Historiography is an empirical research paradigm using interpretative or qualitative
approach which focuses on a chronology over a substantial period of time in order to
obtain a fuller and richer understanding of a situation or set of circumstances.
(O’Brien, et al., 2004, p. 117)
Therefore, the process of interpreting the events through the case study approach has
its benefits. These events have been placed in a chronological order to ascertain whether
there was an implicit understanding by the men on the ground as to what the hierarchy may
or may not have understood to be the guiding direction of the conflict; namely, whether or
not ‘hearts and minds’ was the over-arching policy being used to fight the conflicts. The need
to look at three conflicts sequentially has been adopted to determine the stated hypotheses,
although technically the conflicts in Malay and Kenya were taking place virtually
simultaneously.
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Coupled with this approach is the need to be cognisant of the debate dealing with
what is called historical distance. Two approaches are recognised: that of the “minimizers”
and the “maximizers,” whereby the first sees,:
The past and present as separated by an (ontological) gap that ought to be bridged
(cognitively) in order to achieve historical understanding. In other words, although the
object of study is given, the problem for these minimizers is how to represent this
object accurately, given the distance that separates them from their object of study.
(Den Hollander, Paul, & Peters, 2011, p. 5)
But for those called “maximizers”,
argue along opposite lines. For them, clear distinctions between past and present do
not exist, if only because the present is so much a result of the past that it is hard to
say where “the past” stops and “the present” begins. For these maximizers, then,
historical understanding is all about creating distance, that is to say, about distinctions
between past and present that allow an idea, a text, or an image to appear as a
historical object of study. (Den Hollander, et al., 2011, p. 5)
The undertaking that is then required by those studying historical events is:
Neither to project themselves in the past nor to bring the past to the present; their task
is rather to engage in dialogue with the past so as to develop a conversational situation
where both past and present are transformed. (Den Hollander, et al., 2011, p. 7)
When this is assimilated into the methodology being used to conduct this study, the
use of case studies would seem appropriate, as would the use of narrative analysis to ensure
the events have been placed in their historical context together with the narratives of the
respondents. The interviews taken from the men who participated in the conflicts has formed
part of the case study as primary source material. In addition, historical documents written at
the time, such as books, have been part of the process of interpretation. The books or
government documents can be classed as primary material; “Primary sources are sources
generated within the period being studied. at the time”(Marwick, 2001, p. 156). These still
require care when being interpreted as they too could contain secondary sources that will
need to be verified (Marwick, 2001, p. 157).
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Whilst accepting that the understanding of distance as hereby argued, it is also a
necessary component of historiography research to understand there are a further four
dimensions of representation, as they relate to the problem of mediating distance:
1. The genres, media, and vocabularies that shape the history's formal structures of
representation;
2. The affective claims made by the historical account, including the emotional
experiences it promises or withholds;
3. The work's implications for action, whether of a political or moral nature; and
4. The modes of understanding on which the history's intelligibility depends.
These overlapping, but distinctive, distances—formal, affective, ideological, and
conceptual—provide an analytic framework for examining changing modes of
historical representation. (Phillips, 2011, p. 16)
Where this becomes important is within the debate of attempting apply revisionist
tendencies to the events that took place in the past. By this we tend to mean go over again
with a view to improving, amending or correcting the version of history or imposing a current
philosophical interpretation that suits modern day thinking (Foster, 1986; McPherson, 2003).
The modern acceptance of replacing or adjusting the interpretation of the facts, thus revising
the particulars of the event, is fraught with complexities, which can be argued are unethical.
That is to say unethical because the morality of ethics is an ever evolving concept which
should not be applied retrospectively. The debate regarding revisionism is argued admirably
in the paper by Gorman (2007). Therefore, bearing this in mind the narratives given by the
respondents regarding their experiences need to be assessed within the framework of what
was or was not acceptable at that time and place. They should not be interpreted within the
framework of what is considered ethical today.
3.10 Ethical Issues
Edith Cowan University (ECU) requires a strict adherence to the regulations
regarding ethical conduct of research and ensures that all candidates are fully aware of the
guide lines. This project has followed these guide lines at all times to ensure compliance and
has dealt with the risks identified at the proposal stage. As stated.
A key ethical imperative is that the respondent’s identity be safeguarded at all times
and to this end respondents have all been informed that their participation would remain
anonymous. The participants were all given a letter to sign outlining the procedures and that
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the study was voluntary. Prior to each interview they were informed that it would be recorded
so the data could be transcribed; to ensure a true record of the proceedings. In some cases
participants preferred not to be recorded and this was respected. Furthermore, the material
would not be released to any other person and would only remain on a secure file for the
required period under ECU regulations
3.11 Study limitations
A number of limitations have been pointed out in this chapter and these will now be
highlighted, together with any mitigation measures that have been used in the research.
Foremost is the ability of the researcher, who is in fact the instrument (Patton, 1990, p. 14).
This concept identifies that even if the instruments used are exceptional, they will fail if the
researcher does not have the required qualifications and skills to apply them correctly. Poor
technique, badly drafted or applied research questions could also reduce the reliability of the
outcomes. Furthermore, “there are times when all researchers are going to be interpretative,
holistic, naturalistic, and uninterested in cause, and then, by definition, they will be
qualitative inquirers” (Stake, 1995, p. 46). It is the failure to understand that this occurs that
may compromise the outcomes.
The supervisors have maintained a continual overview of the study, ensuing that as
many of the potential failings have been mitigated as possible. The use of a pilot study was
one such mitigation measure, as this allowed the study to be tested first and analysed prior to
embarking on the full study. A number of probable problems were indentified and remedied
before conducting the full study making it more reliable and robust. Other recommendations
and comments have been incorporated where appropriate.
The issue related to criterion sampling and potential bias was recognised. Although
the sample was necessarily restricted in its selection, the use of additional data from other
sources has been maintained to limit the threat to validity that might have been caused by this
approach. Ultimately the end result with be based upon the analysis of the data that was
collected and its interpretation by the researcher. A continual process of analysis was
performed to maintain a grasp of what the end result will achieve and when to call a halt to
the overall process and stop. Recognition that collection process could continue ad infinitum
was an important aspect that had to be dealt with.(Merriam, 1988, pp. 124-125).
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3.12 Conclusion
This chapter presented the study design, population, research instrumentation,
research methodology, study limitations and the ethical considerations. Study design
discussed the merits of selecting the case study approach to deal the perceived research
problem, as it provided a method for undertaking comparative analysis. The use of a pilot
study was highlighted as a method to test and improve the overall study design.
Population explained why criterion sampling was justified for this study and the
limitations that this would have on the ability to generalise the final results. In addition, the
advantages of using semi-structured interviewing techniques were expounded as a benefit
when dealing participants over a certain age, as was required by this study.
Study limitations were considered, together with the mitigation measures appropriate
for dealing with perceived bias. A further limitation was the requirement to work within the
limitations of the study and not to stray in to other areas: a problem that could easily occur
when using three case studies over such a time frame. To conclude the chapter, the
importances of ethical considerations were presented.
The next chapter discusses the pilot study and how it was conducted in order to test
the study design. Although this chapter has discussed the Methods and Materials, Chapter 4
expounds the procedure involved to achieve the outcomes already discussed, in order to
display transparency in the overall process.
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Chapter 4
PILOT STUDY
4.1

Introduction
This chapter deals with the pilot study, which was conducted after the first three

interviews had been conducted, prior to the main data collection process. The reasons for
undertaking a pilot study are discussed, the process used and finally the changes made based
upon the outcomes obtained. The proposed research methodology, instruments and research
questions to be used were also tested; to ensure they met the requirements of the study
proposal. Although, the previous chapter stated how the study was conducted, the pilot
chapter describes the process involved in confirming the study design, in an effort to
demonstrate transparency.
The interviews are analysed relative to the literature, by assessing the data obtained
from three respondents. By using the responses, it has been possible to identify trends
together with potential shortcomings that were present in the original formulation of the
questions. A number of changes and modifications were found to be necessary to improve the
design of the study and these are reviewed, with reasons for the modifications explained. In
addition, the overall validity is assessed, together with any limitations found during the use of
the pilot study.
The data collected from the semi-structured interviews has been transferred to the
main case study on the Kenya Emergency; once it had been assessed in relation to the study
design. The other main reason was the scarcity of respondents for this study, necessitating the
use of all the primary data collected to build the case studies.
4.2

Why use a Pilot Study?
There are a number of significant reasons why a pilot study should be undertaken; not

least of these is the significance of maintaining transparency throughout the process if
validity is to be preserved.
It is often recommended to conduct what is commonly called a ‘pilot study’, which is
mostly done prior to the final formulation of the proposal stage of the PhD. “A trial study
carried out before a research design is finalised in order to assist in defining the research
question or to test the feasibility, reliability and validity of the proposed study design”
(Cambridge Institute for Research, 2004). In this study it has been carried out at the start of
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the data collection process. This course of action can also be called a trial run of the research
instruments, or a vanguard study. Many researchers (Baker, 1994; Polit-O'Hara & Hungler,
1997; Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001; Thabane, 2010) point to the value of using the pilot after
the first stage of the data collection process to assess the internal validity of the whole process
and a verification on any potential problems that might arise because of failings or errors in
the study design. The pilot study performs the following:


Developing and testing adequacy of research instruments;



Administer the questions in the same was as for the main study;



Collecting preliminary data;



Establishing whether sampling frame and technique are appropriate:



Ask subjects for feedback to indentify ambiguities and difficult questions;



Discard unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions;



Establish that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is
required;



Re-word or re-scale any questions that are not answered as expected;



Re-assess the methodology to ensure it will deliver the required outcome’



Assessing the proposed data analysis techniques to uncover potential
problems;



Determining what resources are needed for the main study.(adjusted from
Peat, Mellis, & Williams, 2002, p. 123)

Whether this is called a pilot study, trail run, vanguard study or a preliminary review
of the first stage of data collection is immaterial, as it still serves an important function as
demonstrated by the bullet points just mentioned. This function is often misunderstood or
ignored by social science and humanities researchers, particularly the benefits of this type of
approach, especially with regard to subjectively. The pilot allows the researcher a valuable
chance to evaluate the data outcomes based on the first series of interviews to establish
whether or not they have achieved the desired outcomes. If it is found that the interviews
have not achieved the anticipated outcome, then steps can be taken to rectify this problem
before proceeding any further with the data gathering. The role of a pilot study is to reduce
the risk of getting it wrong (Lancaster, Dodd, & Williamson, 2004; Rodney Turner, 2005).
Furthermore as Lancaster (2004) points out the pilot study is valid endeavour that is worthy
of publishing in its own right; as every effort should be made to publish research endeavours.
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As discussed in the Materials and Methods chapter, data collection is often done
through participant observation, interviews and questionnaires and a large proportion of
ethnographic type studies prefer an even more reflexive approach when conducting social
science research. Progressively, more and more researchers report not just what they have
found from a piece of research, but how they have actually gone about doing it (Sampson,
2004, p. 383). Transparency and thus validity are improved. Sampson (2004) considers the
“importance of pilot work in undertaking qualitative and ethnographic studies, prior to
researcher immersion in the ‘field’[sic]”(p. 383), as a vital component of the whole research
process to ensure the adequacy of the research instruments. While the benefits of doing pilot
work are not new to ethnographers, they are “under-discussed and to some extent underutilized” (p. 383).
While pilot studies can be used to refine research instruments, such as questionnaires
and the structure of the interview process to ensure better reliability and validity, they have
greater use in ethnographic approaches to data collection in foreshadowing research
problems. This process includes: highlighting potential gaps and wastage in data collection;
as well as considering broader and highly significant issues, such as research validity, ethics,
representation and researcher health and safety (De Vaus, 1993; Lancaster, et al., 2004;
Rodney Turner, 2005; Sampson, 2004; Van Teijlingen, Rennie, Hundley, & Graham, 2001).
Subsequent to discussions with the supervisors, it was agreed to use a pilot study at
the very start of the data collection process; to assess the validity of the research instruments
and to ensure that the structure of the questions would achieve the desired outcomes.
Therefore, the data collected was assessed, together with the methodology used and this was
conducted after the first three semi-structured interviews:
While ethnography is frequently portrayed as involving ongoing analysis and
adjustment in its conduct, this is not always the case with some researchers choosing
to apply an analytic framework only at the writing-up stage during which process they
feel sufficiently distanced to begin to ‘take a wider view’.(Cassell, 1988, p. 99)
Based upon these comments, it would seem a pilot study is a wise process to utilise in
an effort to ensure that the data collection process will achieve the desired results, as set out
in the proposal. Fortunately, a series of unique and some unexpected themes have surfaced
from the first series of interviews. These themes have highlighted the rich source of primary
material that has been uncovered by using non probability criterion sampling, i.e. selecting
participants for the study who are perceived to be capable of providing a unique insight into
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the case studies being analysed (Sandelowski, 2000). It is for this reason that the data
collected still formed part of the body of research and not be discarded, as is sometimes the
case in ‘pilot studies’. Furthermore, as Sampson has pointed out, it may be beneficial to reinterview the original participants with the amended series of questions, to ensure the data
collection process remains the same for all participants (Sampson, 2004).
4.3

Research Process and Design
The original proposal for this study was to analyse what took place in the counter-

insurgency campaigns conducted in Kenya and Malaya, with a view to identifying what
actions and tactics worked during the prosecution of these insurgencies. The sub-set of
questions set out to identify how far the participants were also aware of any political
objectives that might have been part of the general strategy. This political objective has now
become known more widely as ‘hearts and minds’ and is now considered to be a primary
counter-insurgency strategy, which is based upon the concepts as devised by General during
the “Emergency’ in Malaya (1948-1960) (Barber, 1972; Carruthers, 1995a; Fall, 1998).
Due to the specific nature of the case studies to be researched, it was therefore
considered appropriate to use criterion sampling. Samples are selected purposely rather than
through probability methods, because they can offer a research project insight into a
particular experience, that is they ‘represent’ a perspective (Smith, et al., 2009). The first case
study dealt with Emergency in Kenya from 1952 until 1960, which required interviews with
respondents who took part in this conflict, as members of the colonial forces at the time.
Narrative analysis was then used to analyse the responses. The reasons for this approach have
been discussed in the Chapter on Materials and Methods.
4.4

Population and Sample
The target population for this study was those members of the security forces who had

participated in conflicts that involved countering the insurgency; these were former Kenya
police officers for the purpose of this pilot study. Criterion sampling was used to select the
participants, as this allows for selection of data rich subjects although it does not conform to
non probability sampling. This is an accepted form of collecting data for research in
qualitative studies. However, the pool for selection was limited due to the age of any
potential respondents (mostly in their 80s), as was the geographical dispersal of these men
subsequent to their retirement from active service
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The participants once interviewed remain anonymous; as per the research guidelines
laid out by Edith Cowan University. In accordance with this requirement a coding system has
been developed to ensure this occurs. All those who were in Kenya will be designated
KENA, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts. The status of the participants
will be reflected by the designation such as P, for police, or M for military, where
appropriate. KENA-P- 2 would be a Kenya policeman and be the second person interviewed.
Table 4.2 indicates how these respondents will be referred to in the study and the date the
interview with them took place as an identifier.
Table 4.1 Participants in this pilot study

4.5

Primary Research Questions
The primary research question was “What was the role played by the colonial forces

in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 to 1959) and Malaya (1947-1960)”.
4.5.1

Sub-Questions

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces success in the insurgency
campaigns of Kenya and Malaya?
2. Were those involved in the counter insurgency aware of any explicit policy
objectives?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and
practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be reason for their success?
5. Can these ‘lessons’ be applied to modern counter insurgency strategies?
4.6

Interpretative Outcomes
Following a series of personal interviews with three former Kenyan policemen, using

the template developed from the research questions for conducting the semi-structured
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interviews, the results were analysed and an interpretation attained. The following discussion
highlights this process that was followed during the pilot study..
The response sought from the primary research question was how critical was the role
played by the Colonial Police Forces in countering the Emergency in Kenya and Malaya.
Deflem (1994) articulates their unique position within the campaign structure, especially
under the indirect rule concept adopted by the Colonial office. Sinclair (2006) describes how
they were more of a Para-military force in defence of the colonial settlers than as a police
force as understood back in the Britain .The Kenyan Police, together with the Kenya
Regiment, were crucial to counter insurgency tactics (Deflem, 1994, p. 47; Kitson, 1960;
Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 175). Beckett (1985) develops this theme further, pointing out how
important their detailed knowledge was in the overall strategy of the campaign.
Bennett (2007) also deals with ‘use of force’ elements, and the criticality of command
and control of forces on the ground. When all these factors are considered they indicate the
important role the Colonial Police played in being able to dominate the counter insurgency
due to their local knowledge of language, terrain and customs.
Therefore, based upon the responses to the primary question would need to be
supported by additional questions in order to elicit any worthwhile additional data regarding
the role played by Colonial Forces and particularly the Kenya Police Force.
The responses given by the three participants in the pilot study indicated that a rich
source of interesting material was potentially available and that this line of questioning need
to concentrate on specific aspects of strategy and tactics. It was important to ensure that the
sub-questions would be capable of following this theme whilst conducting the main data
collection in the future.
A further aspect associated to the research questions 2 & 3, tries to deal with the now
well-known “hearts and minds” phrase used by General Templer, in the Malayan insurgency
(Barber, 1972). It is often quoted to convey the necessity of having a political aspect as a
fundamental part of the counter-insurgency tactics, one that compliments the operational
military strategy , or as Galula (1964) states, "revolutionary war is 80 percent political action
and only 20 percent military” (Galula, 1964/2006, p. 63).
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4.7

Methodology
Qualitative methods were used for this study, using a case study approach and

analysing the data collect by using the case study approach. The full explanation of the use of
this methodology has already been discussed in the Materials and Methods chapter.
4.8

Outcomes from the Pilot Study
The central outcome from the pilot study has been the limitations of dealing solely

with Kenya and Malaya. It was therefore considered essential to revert to the original
proposal and add Rhodesia as a case study. One of the main reasons behind this decision lies
in the dearth of potential respondents that have been located to take part in the research. The
paltry number of potential respondents became very clear as those being interviewed from the
campaign in Kenya were well into their 80s. Gaining access to any that had taken part in the
Malaya campaign proved even more difficult with virtually no respondents at all to the first
casting of the net to the various Associations. This result was obviously not satisfactory and
following discussions with the supervisors it was agreed that Rhodesia should be reincorporated into the research study because this was a later conflict, which would increase
the number of potential respondents for the study.
There were a number of important of additional reasons why the inclusion Rhodesia
was essential to the study as a whole; not least of these was the transition of many who had
fought in both Kenya and Malaya over to the Rhodesian conflict. The incorporation of
Rhodesia would also assist in demonstrating the exchange of tactics, between the conflicts,
similar back grounds and the use of personnel that that had been in these campaigns.
A further aspect has evolved from the pilot study, was how far was the political
objectives were present in the operational objectives. Regardless of any favourable military
outcomes, all successful counter insurgencies require an ultimate political outcome
(Kilcullen, 2006c), but the question was how was this achieved? From the perspective of the
research the ability to tie the successful tactics, used in prosecuting the counter-insurgency, to
those that achieved the political outcome were part of the research.

4.8.1

Research Design Changes

The changes in the research design process were as follows:
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1. Accepted that it was not possible to get sufficient, if any, of required participants for
the Malayan campaign to construct an acceptable case study. Therefore this would
become a critique of the material based upon the literature, archive footage and
commentary from recognised professionals in the field.
2. Addition of Rhodesia as a case study for the purposes of comparative analysis.
3. Amended the series of tertiary questions to ensure they provided potentially greater
depth of data from the respondents, discarding those found to be deficient in this
regard.
4. Modified the methodology to include empirical as part of the Interpretative
phenomenological Analysis
5. Indentified that Historiographical analysis is core to this research process.
Other than adding a further case study, which in essence is to compensate for the
scarcity of respondents to interview from the Malayan campaign and to ensure a comparative
analysis can be performed, there has been very little change to the process outlined in the
accepted proposal. Although Malaya will now only be predominately a critique of the
campaign; any potential respondents found during the field research in the UK or Malaysia
will be interviewed to assist in building the case study for the Malayan conflict.
4.8.2

Trial run of the Subsidiary Questions

The other notable change was amongst the series of tertiary questions developed to
use as a template guide for the structured interviews. It was noted that many of the questions
appeared mundane and did not elicit any worthwhile responses. The responses appeared
ordinary, although they could be constructed as having been necessary to put the subjects at
ease; it was still felt that there needed to be more direction in the questions to draw out
further information of more consequence.
Respondent KENA-P-3, who was quite happy to move away from the direction of the
questioning on to other matters, which were of little value in relation to this research. This
problem identified how important it was to keep to the script and ensure that not only were
the respondents answering the same or similar questions as each other, but that they remained
as close as possible to a response that answered the question set. Failure to follow this strict
line would only generate large amounts of worthless transcript material, which would make it
more difficult to identify a trend in the data that could then be subsequently followed through
will further interviews.
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However, some rich trends appeared from the first three interviews and these were
thought worthy of pursing at a later stage. Consequently, two of the original respondents were
used later to verify data after the primary collection had been completed. Sampson (2004) ,
highlighted the benefits or returning to respondents used in the pilot study at a later stage,
using them to reconfirm details raised by the other respondents and as part of the
triangulation process..
The pilot study identified a series of trends not recognised during the first literature
review. These trends were then pursued throughout the remainder of the data collection
process. It was considered this benefited this research, producing a series of papers, which
assisted in validating the findings.
Table 4.1 indicated what areas needed to be addressed to strengthen the research
design. One of the points was “Ask the subjects for feedback to identify ambiguities and
difficult questions” this process was conducted during the pilot stage, which helped identify a
series of tertiary questions that needed to be changed, amended or dropped completely:
Table 4.2 Changes to the original questions

Table 4.3 sets out whey certain questions were dropped to improve the study design.
Further points taken from table 4.1, have also been used to improve the study such as:
1. Discard all unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions
2. Assess whether each question gives an adequate range of responses
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3. Establish that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is
required. (Peat, et al., 2002, p. 123)
The pilot study outcomes recognised that some of the questions presented in table 5,
which were taken from the original proposal, did not fulfil the required purpose and have
either been revised or discarded completely. By using the guide laid out in table 4, a
structural analysis has been conducted, which has resulted in a more targeted series of tertiary
questions.
4.9

Pilot Study: Reliability and Validity
Improvements were made to the validity and reliability of the research methodology

and instruments. They were improved upon to ensure that the primary study would progress
as required; notably the semi- structured interview process has been modified based upon the
pilot results. “Ideally, tests for validity and reliability should be made at the pilot stage of the
investigation, before the main phase of data collection” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 135).

“Validity measures the extent to which the research is accurate and the extent to
which truth-claims can be made, based on the research – i.e., that it measures what is
intended” (Curtis Bruce & Cate, 2011). Primarily a check whether the results from the
instrument are plausible such as in “convergent validity: confirmation by comparing the
instrument with other independent measurement procedures” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p.
134). Ensuring the “method of data collection possesses the quality of being sound or true as far
as can be judged.” (Pierce, 2008, p. 74). Rose (1982). suggests there are three important stages to
be assessed: internal empirical validity; internal theoretical validity and external validity (p. 104).
Firstly, evaluate whether the conclusions are reasonably drawn. Secondly, “whether the stated
concepts are fairly drawn from the chosen theory and whether the stated concepts are fairly
represented” and lastly the ‘strength of the relationship between the research, the wider literature
and the ‘real world’ (p. 102)

4.10 Study Modifications
The major change from this proposal based upon the analysis of the initial review has
been the addition of Rhodesia to the case studies. The trial run concluded that there would be
insufficient data collected using solely Kenya and Malaya; particularly Malaya, which proved
to be singularly difficult in obtaining sufficient potential respondents. This is mainly because
there are few survivors that meet the criterion selection process, particularly any that are
living in Australia.
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4.11 Primary Research Questions
What was the role played by the colonial forces in counter insurgency campaigns in
Kenya (1952 to 1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980) and how can the
lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today?
4.11.1 Sub-Questions Modified
1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces success in the insurgency
campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Were those involved in the counter insurgency aware of any explicit policy
objectives?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and
practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be reason for their success?
Once the second stage was begun, by interviewing three ex Kenya policemen who
took part in the Mau Mau Emergency, it became apparent from the direction of the interviews
that some excellent primary material was being divulged. When this was researched further,
through the associated literature, a trend started to develop indentifying Pseudo Gangs as
formidable part of the tactics developed during the Emergency to fight the insurgency.
The completion, analysis and interpretation of the pilot study resulted in a number of
amendments to the research methodology and supporting survey instruments. The research
methodology using case studies proved to be both valid and reliable, requiring minimal
changes.
4.12 Pilot Study Limitations
The purpose of conducting a pilot study was to expose and possible limitations or
weaknesses in the study design at an early stage of the research process. By exposing these
limitations and addressing them the study was improved and made more robust. For example,
the use of only two case studies was considered insufficient to support the comparative
analysis process required by multiple case study methodology. Consequently, Rhodesia was
added as an additional case study.
Criterion sampling does provide a rich data source but it also limits the number of
respondents capable of taking part in the research. The time elapsed since the conflicts took
place reduced the pool of potential candidates, this in itself poses problems to generalisations
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based upon the data collected. The limited number of respondents required caution with
general applicability of the results when developing a final theory.
The age of the respondents require careful caution, especially by not giving general
acceptance to the replies given. The problems related to selective memory has been discussed
in the Materials and Methods chapter. Furthermore, the tendency to repeat what they might
have read subsequent to their experiences, rather than actually having lived them should not
be discounted. Nevertheless, the pilot study did test the appropriateness of the study’s
methodology and its general robustness compared to similar studies.
4.13 Ethical considerations
The pilot study was conducted under the Ethical guidelines as agreed in the
application to conduct the research for this study and as required by Edith Cowan University
in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research
(Australian Government, 2009).
4.14 Conclusions
This chapter has dealt with the results obtained from the use of the pilot study,
including primary analysis of the research questions, resulting outcomes, reliability and
validity testing, as well as exposing any study limitations. By “conducting a pilot prior to the
main study can enhance the likelihood of success of the main study and potentially help to
avoid doomed main studies” (Thabane, 2010, p. 9).The pilot study allowed the research
methodology to be tested and improved, leading to a number of changes in the study design.
The foremost change has been the addition of a further case study to improve the comparative
analysis component and aid validity to the main study. A number of the minor questions that
were used during the pilot to put the respondents at their ease have been found to be
superficial and not necessary. These have either been amended or eliminated.
The outcome from the pilot study demonstrated that the full research study was
valuable, as it had exposed some aspects that have not been developed in other studies; as far
as can be ascertained by the literature review. Another important aspect identified was the
need to increase the number of case studies in order to provide more distinctive data for
comparative analysis. Having only two case studies could not fulfil this requirement. In
addition, by adding Rhodesia as a case study, this would allow two African conflicts to be
assessed proving greater synergy of results. Subsequent analysis has proved this was a valid
approach.
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These preliminary outcomes supported the viability of the research and the
justification for this study. Therefore, based upon these results it was appropriate to continue
with the main study whilst making the modifications as discussed (Lancaster, et al., 2004).
The collected primary data from the respondents has been transferred to the main case study
on the ‘Emergency’ in Kenya.
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Chapter 5
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960: A
CASE STUDY
5.1

Introduction
This chapter presents the findings from the participants obtained during the semi-

structured interviews from the data collection process. The examination of their responses
situates them in relation to the themes identified through the literature review across the
course of the campaigns. As identified in the study design, the conflicts in Malaya, Kenya
and Rhodesia will be studied using the case study approach. Malaya is the first case study and
was used as a yard stick to gauge the other two conflicts, because this conflict has become
one of the most discussed due to a number of innovations and developments that took place
during its prosecution. Considered by many to represent what should be done to combat an
insurgency, it has therefore been claimed that it was a success for the sovereign government
against the Communist inspired subversion that took place in Malaya (Barber, 1972;
Clutterbuck, 1966; Jackson, 2008; 1972, p. 52; Nagl, 2002).
An overview of the conflict is presented first using supporting literature to position
this case study within context based upon the themes that were identified in the literature
review. The Malayan Emergency has been well documented with a number of contradictory
claims being made as to how successful this was as counter-insurgency campaign (Bennett,
2009; Markel, 2006; Ramakrishna, 2002a; Reis, 2011). The main crux of the research relates
to what took place that was effective from a colonial perspective and how this linked into the
overall strategic thinking that has been part of the on-going development of counter
insurgency strategy and doctrine at that time. The thrust of the research was to assess whether
or not the Colonial authorities had a substantial advantage over modern counter-insurgency
operations by reviewing the past conflicts through primary research with some of those that
had taken part.
5.2

Thematic Approach
The themes as developed in the headings in the literature review have formed the

basis of the structure for analysing the case studies. To this end, the interviews are presented
in each case study based upon the coding developed from the themes and applied to
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responses of the participants. Any free codes developed through the additional themes from
the respondents have been clustered under the established parent nodes to ensure they remain
consist with aims and objectives of the study.
Table 5.1 Themes identified from the Literature Review Chapter 2

Within each of these themes in 5.1 are numerous sub-themes, some of which are more
important than others, but they all combine to produce the process that took place to conduct,
combat and produce an acceptable result for the campaigns studied. In some instances the
theme may be elaborated upon more than the others; if the responses indicate this was seen as
more significant than perhaps the others. Where appropriate the findings are supported by the
relevant literature.
Sub-heading 2.6, the French influence on counter-insurgency has been used as a tool
for analysing and summarising the strategies used by the Colonial Government against the
insurgents. It appears at the end of each case study chapter to aid the summary of the conflict.
5.3

Population and Sample
The target population for main study was primarily those members of the security

forces who had participated in conflict that involved countering the insurgency. A cross
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section of participants has been used including a military historian, a rubber planter and a
journalist. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, “the logic of criterion
sampling is to review and study all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of
importance” (Patton, 1990, p. 176). However, the pool for selection was limited due to the
age of any potential respondents (mostly in their 80s), as was the geographical dispersal of
these men subsequent to their retirement.

Table 5.2 Population sample details of participants in this case study
The participants remain anonymous; as per the research guidelines laid out by Edith
Cowan University. In accordance with this requirement a coding system was developed to
ensure this occured. All those in this case study are designated with the initial M, for Malaya
reduced to MALA, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts. The status of the
participants will be reflected by the designation such as P, for Police, M for Military and J for
journalist, where appropriate. Thus MALA-P- 2 would be a Malayan Policeman and be the
second person interviewed. The code will be used to indicate a “Personal Communication”
tother with the date of the interview e.g. MALA-J-6; 20/03/2011.
Eight semi-structured interviews were conducted, for this case study, transcribed and
then coded. The coding was primarily based upon the themes already identified, although it
was recognised that more topics were identified than had been considered by the literature
themes. Consequently, a further series of codes were developed to cover these new avenues
of research, “noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples of those phenomena; and
analysing those phenomena in order to ﬁnd commonalities, differences, patterns and
structures” by employing this method a researcher “ is able to question, evaluate and balance
the data with a view to developing a further usable date “drop categories and to make a
hierarchical order” (Basit, 2003, p. 144). Although, as pointed out by Basit, this cannot be
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created “in isolation from the other categories we want to use in the analysis” (p. 144).
Therefore, any new codes used were grouped back to the core themes, ensuring they
corresponded to the areas identified for analysis
What follows is a presentation of the findings in relation to the themes placing them
into a contextual structure that can be subsequently analysed. The same structure will be used
for all three case studies in order to better create a comparative matrix capable of visually
representing the similarities and the differences found from the research. It is always
important to identify differences when undertaking analysis of historical works.
5.4

Malaya 1948-1960: The Emergency
Malaya was a further step along the path forced upon the British during the retreat

from Empire post World War II. By 1970 most of the Colonies had gained their
Independence, some of them through considerable conflict: Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya and
Aden. Ignominious as the withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 had been for the British, there
were a large number of lessons learnt that were put into place during the campaign in Malaya.
However, the early losses in Malaya indicated that a radical change of approach was required
by the British military establishment. Perhaps the most important was the transfer of officers
with tactical experience ( such as from Palestine) to the operational side of the counterinsurgency campaign, developing the three required principals: minimum force, civil-military
cooperation and tactical flexibility” (Nagl, 2002, p. 42).
The start of the conflict had not gone well, with the Chinese Communist insurgents
seizing the initial offensive thus undermining the Colonial government and its limited
security forces. The Government was forced to bring in additional forces. In addition radical
changes were needed by the authorities in order to counter the insurgency. Furthermore, a
series of far reaching changes were also made to formulate a strategy that encompassed major
policy changes needed to gain the support of the majority Malay population and ensure they
did not defect to the Communist insurgents’ side. The promise of independence was central
to the many policy changes. Considered to be one of the most far reaching adjustments was
the appointment of General Briggs, who formulated an all encompassing counter-insurgency
blue print, known as the ‘Briggs Plan’. A radical departure from the unstructured approach
that had characterised the early campaign, the strategic initiative brought together the
military, civil and police under one command supported by a large number of tactics
designed to support the Plan. Primarily these were legislative amendments, including the
Emergency Regulations (Comber, 2008, p. 38; Smith, 2001b).
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Figure 5.1 is a map of Malaya during the Emergency. The highlighted areas are
elevated sections which were dense jungle at this time and very difficult to penetrate. The
other important aspect to note is that there was only one border and that was with Thailand in
the north. Singapore is in the south and there was very little conflict taking place here as this
was a major British base for the Far East.

Figure 5.1 Malaya Colony
(Jackson, 1991, p.viii)
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5.5

The Conflict Begins
Malaya was a British colony that had been re-gained at the end of World War II from

Japanese occupation with the assistance of Communist inspired local forces, these were
predominately Chinese. However, the general situation post war was very difficult with poor
economic conditions, which resulted in general unrest and agitation led by Malayan
Communist Party (MCP). The rubber plantations and tin mines were vital to Britain’s post
war economic strategies for recovery, especially for supporting the war efforts in Korea. The
plantations and mines became the hot spots for the ensuing conflict. (Ghows, 2006, p. 35).
Following the deaths of three rubber planters by the MCP, the ‘Emergency’, as it was termed;
to avoid being called a war, was finally declared in June 1948 (Barber, 1972, p. 11;
Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 37; Deery, 2003, p. 237). In 1948 there were Communist insurgencies
in Burma, Indonesia, India and the Philippines: a situation that perturbed western strategists
(Williams, 1973).
A further characteristic of note, was that the insurgents were almost totally ethnic
Chinese, ‘Nanyang’ (Overseas), as they called themselves, and not ethnic Malays, who now
supported the British in defence of their country. It is difficult to understand why the MCP
thought they could overcome a country in which they were not indigenous, other than at the
behest of the international Communist movement (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 76; Mackay, 1997, p.
29; Pye, 1956, p. 84; Thompson, 1966, p. 28). Some recent historians dispute this
interpretation that it was an international Communist conspiracy from Moscow to instigate
insurrection across Asia (Edwards & Pemberton, 1992, pp. 29-30; Stockwell, 2006, p. 284) .
Although this opinion may be acceptable to some, the involvement of the Maoists in China
has been less documented and further research should elicit more understanding of their
involvement in Malaya (Carruthers, 1995b, pp. 302-305; Deery, 2003; Edwards &
Pemberton, 1992, pp. 29-37; Pye, 1956).
The MCP strategy of attacking Britain’s economic interests, the rubber plantations
and the tin mines that were to become vital in the war effort in Korea against the Communists
supported by China, would seem to indicate that there was more external support involved
than had it been just an internal conflict in Malaya (White, 1998, p. 151). It is certainly true
that by alienating the native Malays from the offset their strategy appeared flawed, unless
they expected outside support (Barber, 1972, p. 39; Comber, 2008, p. 11; Stewart, 2004, p.
iv). However, this oversight proved fortuitous for the British Government as it was able to
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divide the population. The allure of full independence was promised early on and soon
became official policy in order to garner the Malays fully behind counter-insurgency efforts.
The initial response by the British Government was inept, with much fumbling over
how to deal with the situation (Brendon, 2007, pp. 459-460). The police were grossly under
strength for such an encounter as were the few military units stationed in Malaya. There was
little equipment, few experienced personnel and the government structure needed to combat
the terrorist acts of the insurgents was not in place. Whereas the strength of the Malayan
Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA), the military wing of the MCP, was estimated at 5,000
operational fighters with a further 250,000 civilian supports, called the Min Yuen. Pitted
against them were 4,000 troops of mixed abilities and 10,223 police (Barber, 1972, pp. 4348). The MRLA terrorists, or Communist Terrorists (CT’s) as they were called, held the
upper hand and sowed dread amongst the local population by committing atrocities in order
to intimidate them for extortion purposes (Mackay, 1997, p. 68). Operating from their jungle
hideouts they needed supplies, which they extracted from terrified villagers. It is estimated
the number of guerrillas in the jungle had risen to 8,000 men by 1951. A ratio of 10: 1 forces
to counter the insurgency is sometimes quoted as necessary, but this was never achieved in
Malaya with a combined strength of 2:1 for both the army and the police (Clutterbuck, 1966,
p. 43).
Essential to the understanding of the way the counter-insurgency was conducted was
that at no time was the country placed under martial law. Special laws called the Emergency
Regulations 1948, amended in 1949 and 1953, laid out all the powers available to tackle the
subversion (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 36-37). At all times the army was acting in support of the
civilian power, which was an accepted principal held by British throughout the 20 th century
for dealing with ‘Imperial Policing’ duties as they were termed in the colonies. The document
‘Notes on Imperial Policing 1934’ “provided guidance on operations to maintain or restore
internal security within a colonial or mandated territory under British rule, that was
threatened by widespread organised internal disorder” (Moreman, 1996, p. 110). It is
necessary to understand that the police held the primary role for combating the insurgency,
regardless of whether they could actually achieve this outcome until they were re-enforced.
Army units were brought into to supplement their capabilities, but the police were required to
ensure operations were conducted according to the law. A document prepared for Emergency
operations The conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOMS), formed the basis
and guidelines for undertaking these activities and was based upon previous experiences
(Reis, 2011, p. 254).
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What is noteworthy was the approach taken by the British Government: a composite
strategy of combining the civil authorities with the police, military and intelligence under a
determined rule of law, whilst enticing the population to support the government through
welfare programmes. The carrot was independence, through gradual process of local self
government, thus undermining any promises the Communist insurgents might make. A series
of structure measures were progressively introduced to support the strategy. The combined
approach is one that was put forward by Galula (1964/2006) in which he summaries that
counter–insurgency is a combination of military, political and social actions under a strong
control of a single authority.
Appointing General Briggs as an over-arching supremo and Director of Operations in
1950, with executive “authority over all the security forces-army, police and air force-and the
power to coordinate actions of civil departments that affected the war”, was one of the most
important actions taken to ensure that every one pulled together (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 5657). Briggs went on to develop his ‘Plan’, which became the blue print for prosecuting the
counter-insurgency efforts against the Communist Terrorists (CT’s). But it was General
Templer that ensured the ‘Plan’ was carried through (Cloake, 1985 ch 9 ).
5.6

Counter-insurgency
“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be

imperilled in a hundred battles”(Tzu, 2011/ 6th Century BC, p. 14 ch III). Therefore, the
fundamental starting point in preparing a counter-insurgency strategy must be who are your
foes? Building up a clear understanding of the insurgents’ aims and objectives, unpinned by a
clear appreciation as to where they are getting their support and how, is a basic requirement
to developing a strategy. A substantial and comprehensive intelligence capability is requisite
to build up the picture. Generalising at this early stage is fraught with problems. Errors may
allow many insurgents to flee the net that needs to be cast to round them up, detain them and
gain more valuable insights into the actual numbers and composition. Unfortunately this was
the case in Malaya, the authorities ignored the early warnings and their initial actions were
inept and fumbling, allowing a large section of the Communist insurgents to escape capture
by heading into the deep jungle (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 74).
The insurgents in Malaya were overwhelming made up of Chinese Communists,
many of whom had fought with, and been trained by, the British during World War II to
defeat the Japanese. The Chinese, approximately two and half million, were predominately
squatters in Malaya with few rights and still considered China to be their home. Considered
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to be a clannish people, the Chinese settlers accept peer pressure readily and when coerced to
support the insurrection against the renewed British colonial rule joined the movement to set
up a Communist country by force of arms (Carnell, 1953, p. 106). In addition the secret
societies, collectively called Triads, dominated the social structure by using coercive methods
and deep seated family ties to control their compatriots (BNR, 1949, pp. 484-485). The
tactics of the Triads were adopted by the Communists to intimidate and terrorise the Chinese
squatter population (Carnell, 1953, p. 106). Post war the administration in Malaya had broken
down and the Chinese peasants could see little value in supporting it. Whereas Communism
promised them much and that allure saw the majority supporting the insurrection, whether
they wanted to or not. However, the British:
Saw bureaucracy as a politically neutral mechanism for transmitting polices to the
villages. The communists (sic) saw bureaucracy as an organizational weapon by which
to cut villages away from the government in order to build an alternative power
structure. (Grinter, 1975, p. 1127)
The Malays, also approximately two and a half million, saw the country as rightful
theirs and did not consider that either the Indians or the Chinese were any more than ‘guest
workers’ with no right to vote or remain in their country. Furthermore, the Malays were
Muslims, an additional aspect that alienated them from the Chinese; despite “contrived bandit
propaganda, designed to prove that the tenets of communism are not incompatible with those
of Islam”, which failed (Carnell, 1953, p. 106).
In addition, in 1948 there were a further two ethnic groups to be considered, the
Indians, imported to work on the plantations and tin mines; of which there were
approximately 570,000 (Mackay, 1997, p. 9); this equates to roughly 10 percent of the
population. The other group was the Europeans; representing less than one percent (Miller,
1972, p. 27).
Discontentment became rife with the return of the British after the War, who resumed
their social positions dominating the society; as they had done prior to the Japanese invasion.
However, they were no longer held in high regard; as they had failed to stem the Japanese
invasion and lost their status of awe and deference they had had prior to the War (Mackay,
1997, p. 11). When all these points are taken into consideration it can be seen why the
country was ripe for revolution.
The Colonial administration was ill prepared for such a task as combating
international Communism, either financially, militarily or politically. The police were ill
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equipped, under resourced and lacked the capabilities to deal with an insurrection. The
military were in much the same dilemma with a garrison of “half trained Ghurkhas whose
Government insisted as a condition of allowing recruitment in Nepal that they should not be
used in aid of the Civil Power” (Mackay, 1997, p. 30). The Governor, Ghent, was loathed to
declare an ‘Emergency’ despite the growing terror and bloodshed. This reluctance to deal
with the insurgency head on lost the authorities much time and loss of life before they were
able to harness the resources necessary to combat the rebels. It took the Colonial government
almost four years before it moved from the defensive to the offensive, but a further eight
years to complete the task (Miller, 1972, p. 15). A point emphasised by MALA-M-4:
The sad thing is that the British Armed forces don’t seem to learn from the lessons of
the past. They should be reading the books that were written by army officers and
others who were involved in these counter insurgency campaigns and carefully
recording why things went wrong and making damned sure they didn’t make the same
mistakes again, but they don’t seem to do that, they don’t consult the records of past
campaigns. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)
One of the most discussed aspects that has emerged from conflict in Malaya was the
development of an all encompassing strategy that became known as ‘Hearts and minds’.
Accordingly, it figures prominently in discussions of counter-insurgency and is an important
part of this study.
5.7

Hearts and Minds
It is generally accepted that the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ was one that was

perfected during the Malayan Emergency. It may have been used in many guises in other
conflicts, but the holistic approach that was used in Malaya allowed the Director of
Operations to harness all the elements necessary to put such a strategy into effect. General
Templer is often credited with this achievement (Hack, 1999a). Harnessing all the resources
in concert, especially the political and administrative ones together with the blunt power of
the security forces allowed the foremost law that Galula (1964/2006) has emphasised to take
place: control of the population through their support.
One of the key research questions sought to try and elicit responses that dealt with this
aspect of ‘hearts and minds ‘and ascertain how far those on the ground understood and
applied this concept. Or, was this more of a post event interpretation that has since been cast
over the counter-insurgency efforts, when in reality it was far more of an over arching
concept that has caught the imagination of historians in an effort to explain why Malaya was

108

a success story. With this view in mind it was important to try and establish whether or not
the participants had a different perspective.
The question put posed asked if they had heard of the term ‘hearts and minds’. The
responses appeared to support that they had but were more in a reflective tone rather than one
that was in common currency back in the days when they were in Malaya. As one participant
commented:
The term hearts and minds evolved from there and I think it was the first real attempt to
gain the support of the local people in a productive way, not just in terms of sentiment
but getting, reporting information and taking active measures in support. (MALA-M-1;
20/03/2011)
‘Hearts and minds’ also developed into meaning civic support for the population in
the form of aid both financial and technical with the “provision of amenities such as schools,
hospitals, roads, new industries, food and welfare”(Paget, 1967, p. 178). In Malaya, the
police were ordered to take part in ‘Operation Service’ in 1952 by the Commissioner of
Police, Colonel Young, to offer every assistance and kindness where possible to the people.
Reports indicate this was very effective in gaining the support of the everyday citizens
(Paget, 1967, p. 67). The reply given by MALA-P-3 backed this up and mentions the emblem
worn and that was placed outside each police post,

Figure 5.2 The badge worn by the police denoting 'service'
Young launched ‘Operation Service’ with signs outside ever post with a pair of hands
clasped hands and the word “service” in the appropriate language, (Figure 5.2). Apparently
this, “boosted police morale as they saw themselves more as friends to the villagers, a change
in concept from previous aggressive approaches by the police (Cloake, 1985, p. 233;
Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 84).
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Hearts and minds, it’s very important. Templer was the man who turned it all around.
He arrived in February 1952 and he left in June 1954. And in that time he instituted
hearts and minds, which meant [long pause], in that it meant you had to, we wore a
thing on our, or the police Specials, the full blown police used to wear a thing called
[hesitates] the badge was known as Bersedia Berkhidmat. It was a black oval shaped
badge worn on the sleeve of the khaki drill shirt of members of the Regular Federation
of Malaya Police force. It was meant to represent the hoped for cooperation between
the police and the Malay people. I think probably Templer turned it around simply and
solely by that device, hearts and minds. (MALA-P-3, 03/03/2011)
MALA-P-3 goes on to say that this was a strategy that brought them over to the side
of the British,
He [Templer] had to get the people off the fence. They weren’t committed. In 1952
they didn’t know who was going to win, and they weren’t going to chance their arm. So
he had to convince them that the British were going to be winning and giving them
independence. And once they knew they’d get their independence they were on our
side. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)
The mass bombing of the jungle did little to further the goals of ‘hearts and minds’.
Consequently indiscriminate bombing of the jungle stopped after 1952; as up until then
hundreds tons were dropped each month. It was realised this was counterproductive and
certainly did not endear the Government to the local population (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 161).
Especially when this hearts and minds business came about, they tried two methods,
one was to put the existing plantation groups of villages into compounds, which they
did, and secondly was to go and come face to face with the people who lived off the
beaten track you might say. And in the end that is what worked plus of course there was
the business of what they were doing with the people who were executed whilst on
patrol. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)
When he was asked if ‘hearts and minds’ made any difference, the point brought up
was it was necessary:
To go and make contact with the indigenous people, things that they hadn’t done before
and it narrows it down to two factors that were used with great success, and continue to
this day is trust and information. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)
Trust and information are therefore the two keys components. If the people trust you,
and that is in a far wider sense, then they will impart information back that is of use to further
operations. Although, it was not always something that the average soldier was happy about
doing as can be seen by this comment, from MALA-M-2:
It was hearts and minds and I would think the average solider didn’t really, not say
understand it, they thought ‘god I have got to walk seven miles through the jungle
carrying a jerry can full of kerosene, or paraffin or petrol so that somebody could light a
bloody lamp that I’m never going to see’, that is putting it rather crudely but true but
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that side of it. But when they came in contact with the villages and saw the poverty that
they were living in then the inevitable British spirit came out, well lets share things
with them, and out came the cigarettes, or the sweets that you never ate.(MALA-M-2;
10/03/2011)
It was important to look at this theme carefully as it forms one of the research
questions and has always been portrayed as being the reason for the success of the counterinsurgency in Malaya. Katagiri (2011), contends this has to be tempered with reservations as
groups may use the dilemma of the authorities to gain their own political advantage, by
undermining the campaign. Although Britain was able to extricate itself from Malaya, there
was a complex political legacy in its wake, which he argues was caused by the certain groups
taking advantage of the concept of hearts and minds to ensure they benefited (pp. 171-173).
5.8

Strategies
The development of a comprehensive strategy was essential, if the insurgency was to

be overcome. It has been noted how unprepared the British Government was at the start of
the revolt, delaying the declaration of an “Emergency’, which would have allowed the
measures necessary to behave been taken, and bringing in the resources and expertise to
counter the rising break down of law and order. The Briggs Plan went into effect on the 1 st of
June 1950 and was the product of a concerted effort to create a wide-ranging strategy capable
of harnessing all the resources at the disposal of the authorities.
The Plan set out to institute appropriate administrative control in Malaya, requiring:


General resettlement of squatters into ‘ New Villages’ under surveillance of Special
Constables and Home Guard



Widening the recruitment of the Home guard to the Chinese as well as the Malays and
Indians



Collective punishment, with strict food control of all villages



Securing the workforce of the rubber plantations and tin mines in camps



Considerable recruitment, training and redeployment of the police back to civil duties



Splitting Special Branch from criminal investigation and increasing their numbers



Centralising Intelligence under Special Branch



Ensuring that military intelligence worked with Special Branch



Increasing the level of troops throughout the country to support police and create
smaller specialised units for targeted operations



Police and army operating jointly with closer operational integration
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Clearing and maintaining areas free from insurgent activity; designated as ‘white
‘areas



A further aspect related to population control was the strict enforcement of identity
documents, which had been brought in 1948 to some areas and extended to the whole
country



Empowering local government and increasing public works Civilian-military
committees were introduced from District (District War Executive Committees,
DWECs) to a Federal War Executive Committee. These brought together army,
police, civil administration and Special Branch, and overrode bureaucratic sclerosis
(Hack, 2009, p. 388).
There were three important stages: one was the Briggs plan, two, was the appointment

of Templer; who provided the dynamic leadership to apply the Plan. The third was the move
towards self-government ensuring that the Malay people supported it politically, which was
the role of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister and subsequently the first Prime
Minister, supporting the transition process. The strategies all depended on gaining the support
of the population and the declaration by Templer that the “policy of the British Government
is that Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing nation” (as cited in
Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 80). The objective was applying good government to the people so they
could see the real benefits to be gained by supporting the authorities. Temper applied
collective punishments to villages that continued to support the rebels: the Emergency
regulations allowed this to take place. A good example was the village of Tanjong Malim,
which would become a noted success story with up to 3,500 people joining the Home Guard
at the end of the punishment period. (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 82). MALA-M-1 endorsees, this:
The point about all these various initiatives which we used during the emergency is that
they were able to take them to their natural conclusion, there was nothing standing in
the way saying you can’t do that so it became to a half baked solution, they pushed it
through until they had achieved success. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
There was a further important feature to gaining the support of the population, which
allocated colours to the status of these villages according to how well they had progressed
towards supporting the government. The attainment of ‘white’ was highly sought after rather
than grey or black, as it came with considerable benefits for the villagers (Sepp, 2005, p. 9).
A rural development and industrial authority was set up in 1950 with the aim of providing
material benefits to those areas that supported the government, including “roads, bridges,
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piped water, electricity, health clinics and schools” (Ghows, 2006, p. 85). Again this is
endorsed by one of the respondents:
It was part of the benefit of bringing together of minds during the emergency, which
enabled the British army to evolve from general war into a limited war with a particular
application towards self government really, dependence, we also forget that was the
background, and once the independence had been achieved in 1957 of course the CTs
no longer had a platform, among most bright thinking people because that platform had
been completely pulled away from their feet. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
The Briggs Plan had a series of measures to deprive the terrorist of succour. In
essence the ‘Plan’ was a means of population control, which sought to move those Chinese
squatters that were living near the jungle into what were called ‘New Villages’. By the end of
1951 over half a million Chinese had been resettled into these fortified and defended areas to
prevent intimidation from the MLNA (Stockwell, 1984, p. 82).
The resettlement villages were considered to be one of the core strategies that had a
considerable effect on breaking the supply lines between the insurgents hiding in the jungle
and the Min Yuen; denying them access to recruits and military supplies. Furthermore, it
allowed Special Branch to infiltrate the camps with spies and informers thus gaining access to
valuable intelligence (Markel, 2006, p. 36). Separating the villagers away from the insurgents
was denying them access to food as growing it in the jungle would have given their camps
away and it took time too. Strict controls were put in place to ensure those in the protected
villages did not smuggle food out with them each day when they went to tend their crops.
There were harsh punishments for anybody caught attempting to do this (Pennycuick, 1954,
p. 125). Central cooking was also established across the country by 1954, ensuring that no
food was getting to the jungle camps, as cooked food had a very limited shelf life in humid
conditions (Ghows, 2006, p. 103). MALA-M-7, emphasises this as, “we had to check
everybody leaving the camps to see if they were smuggling any food out. We caught this one
Chinese chap with rice in the frame of his bicycle” (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)
The policy of giving areas colours according to their threat status was brought in by
Templer in 1953. “ Once an area was declared as ‘white’ then all Emergency regulations
were removed including “food control, rationing, curfews, gate searches, and shops would be
open all day” (Ghows, 2006, p. 297). Highlighting this approach, MALA-J- explained:
The government tried to create areas which had been cleansed of CTs, they called these
by colours and a white area was free. When this happened, the area, or village, used to
get bonuses from the Government so this made the locals act to get the money which
they were promised. When they were black they had penalties and massive restrictions
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on the inhabitants, so becoming white was a major goal. The idea helped the police
catch Many CTs as informers were keen to get the rewards. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)
Gradually the strategy started to work. A Communist document came to the attention
of Special Branch in 1952 that indicated that the tactics being used by the CT’s needed to
change. It confirmed that the strategy used by the Government, through the Briggs Plan, had
forced a recognition by the insurgents that the terror tactics were counterproductive and
turning the population against them. A series of instructions were issued to change the attacks
so as not to target the masses, but concentrate on the security and government forces (Miller,
1972, p. 104). In addition the respondents noted other consequences:
As the Briggs Plan started to have effect the Min Yuen found it difficult to obtain
supplies from the rural population for their comrades in the jungle. The Communist
armed units began to look more and more to the jungle to provide their food; either by
cultivating their own crops or persuading the aboriginal jungle communities to supply
them. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)
The cumulative effect started to bring more and more support for the authorities, with
the obvious benefits this brought to intelligence. Progressively the surrender programme
influenced many more insurgents and their families as they realised that the tide was against
them so better get a monetary advantage now and cut their losses. Actions taken by the
Government did not always meet with general approval as MALA-J-6 explains:
They were always dropping stuff to them, telling them how to surrender, why they
should surrender, telling them about the good life they would get including monetary
rewards for weapons surrendered,. They told them they could come back and be
citizens again or even promising them to send them back to China. They promised a lot
which upset a lot of Malays who thought they should not [be] given anything as they
had tried to take over the country. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)
Population control was an effective method of achieving several aims. One, it
restricted the movement of known sympathisers separating them from collaboration and
collusion. Two, it deprived the insurgents of recruits, military supplies and food. Three, it
was more simple to find informers in the resettlement villages than it would have been if they
were widely dispersed. Lastly, it gave those in the protected areas a chance to turn away from
the intimidation, making them more amenable to support the government. The last point is
one that was highlighted by Galula’s (Galula, 1964/2006) strategy regarding the need to get
the population on to your side .
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5.9

The Colonial Police in Malaya
“The government must function in accordance with law” according to Thompson’s

(1966) principles for countering an insurgency (p. 52). Under the colonial structure the
military would only be brought in as an aid to the civil power (Huntington, 1981; Moreman,
1996, p. 125). Therefore, it was the police that led the counter-insurgency efforts with strong
support from the military units brought in to support them in the early stages (Stockwell,
1992). Despite the heavy demands made upon the limited resources of the police force, their
primary role still demanded that they upheld the law. Protecting the government from
subversion and violence was also required but this was beyond their capabilities,
consequently the majority of policemen were ill equipped to fight a counter-insurgency
campaign as well (Hutchinson, 1969, pp. 56-57). For this reason, the death toll amongst the
police together with the Home Guard attests to the heavy cost they both bore during the
conflict, 1,346 police, whereas the t army only had 519.(Comber, 2008, p. 6). “The Malay
Police field teams were very effective. In fact the Malay did a very good job and took a lot of
casualties.” (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011).
“Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in
close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). At times the two might not be
working in harmony as MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011, remembered: “Because the army would lay
on their operations, and you’d take your patrol out but you wouldn’t be aware of where their
operations had been laid on.” An important strategy of the Emergency Regulations was the
imposition of an Identify Card regime (Komer, 1972, p. 34). Enforcing the ID regime by the
police was vital measure to restrict unlawful movement as the document was required to get
food and live in a village (Dewar, 1984, p. 31). Although, it was violently resited by the
insurgents; as they realised this would hamper all their activities (Ghows, 2006, p. 82).
Therefore, the identity checks were coupled with stringent verification of all movements,
especially in vehicles. The power to arrest and detain without trial, regulation 17 D, overcame
the difficulties of witnesses refusing to testify even though they had identified the CT’s
(Dewar, 1984, pp. 31-32).
However the limited strength of the police restricted their abilities to work effectively.
In 1948 there was less than one policeman for every hundred potential guerrillas but this rose
to one policeman or Home Guard to between every five to nineteen guerrillas (Clutterbuck,
1966, p. 44). MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011, virtually endorsees this:
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Well I was left entirely on my own to do what I liked, and then from time to time
they’d say “We want you to go on a ten day operation and sort out some men to go and
some rations to take with you. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)
The other important factor was that the training for the police was very rudimentary in
the early days, according to MALA-P-3:
You we had no training whatever, as Police Lieutenant. We were just chucked into the
jungle...You were acting on your own instincts really, wherever you went in the jungle.
You couldn’t tell, to begin with you couldn’t tell what was safe and what was not.
(MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)
The lack of Chinese officers in the early stages was certainly a major handicap; in
1948 there were none (Comber, 2008, p. 60). “Some Cantonese speaking British officers”
were transferred from the Royal Hong Kong Police to assist Special Branch (Comber, 2008,
p. 114). It was the recruitment of local Chinese officers that were to make a substantial
contribution to the defeat of the CT’s as they had the ability to understand their mind set.
There was large recruitment of disbanded Palestine police men into the Malayan Force,
totalling 495, including Colonel Gray who became Commissioner of Police (Comber, 2008,
p. 60). By 1952 there were 100,000 regular and auxiliary police, 189,000 Home Guards and
45,000 Kampong Guards (Sinclair, 2006, p. 166)
Gray, as Commissioner of Police had been unable to bring about the necessary
changes required to fight an insurgency; he was replaced by Arthur Young of the City of
London Police. The force was effectively spilt, with operational support units working with
the army and general police duties the other. The emphasis went back to service as opposed
to ‘force’ in an effort to gain the support of the population, together with the recruitment of
more Chinese officers (Mackay, 1997, pp. 131-132). The other major change was splitting
Special Branch from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), to become the combined
intelligence service, which Templer brought about soon after his arrival (Cloake, 1985, pp.
228-230). Plus Templer continued with the structure of using a Director of Operations, with a
totally integrated team comprising of the police, military, civil and intelligence personnel all
in unison to form the triumvirate of civil-military-police with the intelligence.
The CT’s were forced to change their tactics, as they were losing more and more of
their men and women, so they moved to using smaller units of 20 to 30. Consequently when
they attacked isolated police posts they did not have the necessary fire power; therefore the
police were able to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The police losses dropped from 100
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a month to around 20 by the middle of 1952, this was a similar case with civilians which also
dropped from 90 a month to 15 (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 64; Moran, 1959, pp. 101-105).
The police formed one of the most important aspects to the strategy to defeat the
insurgency (Corum, 2006, pp. 36-37). It was important that the police gained the respect of
the population. Consequently, it was necessary to get them to accept their roles and
responsibilities seriously, as well as sourcing intelligence and upholding the law at the same
time. Reforming the police service was a pre-requisite to achieving the long term goals of
Independence with the necessary security intact as well (Sinclair, 2011).
5.10 Intelligence
Templer had been a former Director of Military Intelligence; consequently he had a
particular interest and understanding of how important the gathering of intelligence was to
the overall capabilities to counter the insurgency. He brought in a British expert, Jack Morton
of Military Intelligence 5 (MI5). Morton’s major recommendation was to split “Special
Branch from the Criminal Investigation Department, thereby allowing the former to
concentrate solely on counter-insurgency” (Smith, 2001b, p. 72).
Integral to the survival of the administration, was the use of sound intelligence. The
Colonial intelligence gathering system was also broader and encompassed not only Special
Branch, but also information acquired in the course of day-to-day administration. This
political intelligence was important not only in providing warnings, but also in effective in
linking the administration to the population (Cormac, 2010, p. 804). It also had to function
within a psychological domain as well, if it was to be effective. MALA-M-1 put this
succinctly when asked about intelligence:
Well I think the overarching success was psychological operations, without that you
know had it been purely a military solution, I think it would have taken much longer,
the fact is that there was a very successful defection program organised by psy-ops, a
mixture of threats, inducements and Chinese predilection for money so they put large
rewards for people who came out and told their story and I think towards the end,
when we are talking about 1957 onwards, a large number on the successful operations
were based entirely on information received from people who had defected. (MALAM-1; 20/03/2011)
Two important pieces of information come out of this response. One, that a purely
military solution was unlikely to be successful. Two, an alternative approach had to be used
to convince the insurgents who were wavering to come over to the government side and
supply vital intelligence (Komer, 1972, pp. 72-74). Buying information was developed into a
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thriving tactic that worked well. However, the information needed to be treated with caution
as there was always an element of doubt as highlighted by MALA-M-2:
There was always an element of doubt in what we were being told as sometimes they
met the locals, had a chat, tried to find out what was happening and then as they left the
other side they were ambushed so that put a great deal of doubt in...[what was said].
(MALA-M-2; 10/03/20112)
The line of questioning brought forth the other important aspect, which was how
necessary it was to deal directly with the local people:
It was interesting how they went about it, because for the first time on a large scale an
army was deciding that the way forward wasn’t tallest out, shortest to the left, single
rank advance, but to go and make contact with the indigenous people, things that they
hadn’t done before and it narrows it down to two factors that were used with great
success, and continue to this day is trust and information. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)
The quote has been used previously but used again to emphasise this point when
working with people: trust. However, it can be seen that developing this strategy changed
making the troops get out and gather intelligence, which also seems to have been linked very
much to the ‘hearts and minds’ direction that was being promoted. A point brought out by the
next comment by MALA-M-2:
The idea in Malaya was obviously involved with the indigenous people who simply
wanted change of government. Communism as opposed to democracy and they found
that when they first went there, they merely through a battalion into an area, put them
in a nice barracks but they never left the road. Especially when this hearts and minds
business came about, they tried two methods, one was to put the existing plantation
groups of villages into compounds and secondly was to go and come face to face with
the people who lived off the beaten track you might say. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)
A significant aspect connected with intelligence was the issue of verification,
especially of killed insurgents. If the overall picture was to be corroborated then identification
had to take place, which could be by finger prints, if they had them on file or by sight.
Bringing a dead body back through the jungle was not a task many would relish therefore,
“the wonderful Dayak habit of cutting heads off was a lot easier than carrying a 10 stone
man” was a viable alternative (MALA-M-2; 10/03/20112).
Cutting off heads was standard practice to facilitate identification of known CT’s
(Durkin, 2011, p. 77).The intelligence gathered by the forces in the field was processed too,
as this built up the picture further for the Special Branch analysts. The inter-related
relationships are brought out in the next response:
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We had a local Malaya interpreter with us and of course Iban trackers, they were very
good....Intelligence was passed to us and our officer passed back what we gathered. We
did not much work with the police on our patrols, but other squads did. (MALA-M-7;
05/02/2012)
The main objective of intelligence was to find and destroy the enemy. In order to
achieve this, the information had to be checked to ensure that is was valid, as has been
pointed out, it could well be a trap:
Information went through the system and eventually came back to us. So that we would
get to know that a particular Kam Fong had been fortified but there were movements
and so forth and on the basis of that information we would then go and have a look see
and on the basis of the look see we would mount an operation if it was advantageous.
(MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
Aircraft played an important role in this verification process, “Canberra’s were used
extensively for photo reconnaissance” according to MALA-M-1. They were also used for resupplying the troops in the jungle so that they could remain there for far longer periods.
Dakotas were also used extensively for deploying troops, evacuating casualties and resupply
(Jackson, 2008, p. 44). The problem of clearing the emphasised by MALA-M-7:
If we were given an old zone then we could get supplies dropped by Dakotas, if not
then we had to cut an area so they could drop them to us Not that that was easy either,
as you had to have clearing where they could drop them or else you would never find
anything in that jungle.(MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012.)
5.11 Special Branch
“The intelligence system which the Special Branch created in 1952 basically won the
war, and some of the methods and operations used still remain on the classified list”(Miller,
1972, p. 90). A statement that sums up the importance of their role, but fails to recognise how
inept they had been before they were given the tools by General Templer to accomplish this
success story. Formed out of the discredited Malayan Secret Service in 1948, but as part of
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), it was not given the resources or the authority
to act until 1952; four years after the declaration of the Emergency (Sinclair, 2011) Although
its shortcomings had been recognised by Briggs, who called it inadequate with few
capabilities to deal with the situation, he was only able to make limited changes drastically
needed.
The Commissioner of Police, Gray, was a stumbling block until Templer arrived and
decreed the changes required. As a former Director of Military intelligence he understood the
essentiality of intelligence in the grand strategy of fighting an insurgency; although he
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ensured that the military intelligence officers worked with, and not separately from Special
Branch (Miller, 1972, pp. 91-92). Bringing in expertise from MI5, in the form of Percy
Sillitoe, to assist in the re-organisation was an important factor in the creation of a unit that
subsequently worked effectively. Sillitoe would also be brought into Kenya to re-organise
their Special Branch too (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 197-198).
Another key improvement, was the formation of training school tasked to teach the
requirements of intelligence gathering and dissemination. The inclusion of Asian officers was
critical to the eventual success of Special Branch, as it was they who could infiltrate and deal
with their compatriots, not the Europeans. Understanding the operational structure of the
CT’s was crucial to their capabilities, if they were to provide the information related to “local
units, their leaders, the supply and exchange points, the sites of ‘letter-boxes’ and of food and
ammunition dumps, and the identities of Min Yuen contacts and their sources of supplies and
funds” (Miller, 1972, p. 94) to nullify them.
5.11.1 Surrendered Enemy Personnel
Key to the intelligence campaign was the ability to utilise every communist guerrilla
that was captured or surrendered, therefore each Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP’s) was
considered as a very prized asset (Pye, 1956, pp. 115-127). The financial incentives and
inducements used to facilitate this were very successful. “All surrendered and captured
guerrillas were thoroughly debriefed and, in some cases, employed on jungle operations
against their erstwhile comrades as part of Special Operations Volunteer Force (SOVF)
(Comber, 2008, p. 4). Special Branch not only used this information to great effect but also
became very adept at ‘turning’ the insurgents and using them for what were called ‘Q’
operations, or pseudo operations (Bailey, 2010; Short, 1975, pp. 490-491). The name ‘Q’
comes from the First World War when decoy ships were used to trap German U-Boats and
was the code name for Queenstown in Ireland, where they were built. The designation
referred to special operations and was used in other conflicts, notably Rhodesia, to describe
secret operations (Beyer, 1999, p. xix).
Considered to be a speciality of the Special Branch (SB) was the ability to ‘turn’ Min
Yuen to work for them against the erstwhile comrades. Based upon a number of techniques,
but usually consisted in presenting them with the evidence of their activities obtained by
other informers and surveillance. SB was then able to convince them that changing sides
would allow them to avoid harsh punishment that awaited them if they did not agree to work
for them. When this offer was coupled with large monetary rewards the process was
120

accomplished relatively easily. Well rewarded for each terrorist captured, surrendered or
killed, based upon their information, they were even offered the opportunity of a new life
elsewhere (Miller, 1972, p. 95).
Turned insurgents divulged information on the whereabouts of their comrades and in
many cases lead the Special Branch Chinese officers back to their recent hide-out. In some
instances the SB officers would impersonate the enemy and infiltrate their groups. A tactic
developed in Kenya called pseudo operations, that had been running with great effect in the
Kenya Emergency (Kitson, 1977, pp. 30-41). It was critical that the insurgent was turned
immediately before his operational value diminished or it became known that he had defected
and his fellows scattered (Miller, 1972, pp. 96-97).
5.11.2 Running an Operation
Developing an operation was a complex and highly coordinated affair requiring much
planning before it could take place: weeks months or even years. It was this detailed planning
that was crucial to the success of failure of these operations. Normally divided into three
phases, the primary phase required extensive ground work to build up a picture of the
targeted CT group. Using all its resources, especially informers and turned agents, the plan
was developed. Phase two, involved the security forces to surround and cordon the village or
villages targeted. No one was allowed out without being searched to ensure that no food was
being smuggled out. Food deprivation was at the core of the strategic planning to cow the
CT’s into submission, forcing them to take chances to get it and therefore was taken very
seriously (Miller, 1972, pp. 99-100) . MALA-P-3 explains how they conducted searches:
So you would put your men on either side of those gates, two of them on each side of
the gates, and you’d search everyone who came through. They couldn’t take anything
out that would, aid the bandit. No medicine or bandages. All tins were punctured, and
little did we know that in the bottom of their buckets of the night soil there were tins of
rice. So who’s going to put their arm down inside that mess and hike out a tin of rice?
And that was the only way they could get food past us, in those…pails [of night soil]
and that was one of the crucial things that broke the back of the bandits . (MALA-P-3;
03/03/2011)
MALA-P-3 continued:
And we used to set ambushes for the tappers taking food into the jungle.... Oh yes, you
couldn’t take any food out to work with you at all. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)
The objective was to squeeze the insurgents out of their hiding places as they became
more and more desperate to obtain food. Ambushes were set around the potential food areas
and as can be seen by the comments made by MALA-P-3, this was a serious, and when asked
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what would happen to them he replied “Well I took them back to, well I, yes, took them back
to the police station, the nearest one to us and then they’d be charged. And then they’d be
either fined or put in prison.”
Phase there required using turned rubber tappers. Special Branch would set up
ambushes where they suddenly relaxed the food controls and let it slip out that food was
available-honey traps- hungry CT’s came for the food and fell into the ambush. As they
eliminated or captured more and more CT’s the ‘hot’ intelligence increased and allowed a full
scale assault to be made against those left in the jungle, this was the last phase of the
operation. It was essential that close cooperation took place between Special Branch, the
police and the military at all stages to ensure success (Miller, 1972, p. 101) .The importance
of restricting food is highlighted by the next conversation:
Food control was ever important...As the Briggs plan started to have effect the Min
Yuen found it difficult to obtain supplies from the rural population for their comrades
in the jungle. The Communist armed units began to look more and more to the jungle to
provide their food; either by cultivating their own crops or persuading the aboriginal
jungle communities to supply them. To stop the CTs getting food from the tribe’s
people, in early 1954, the Federal Govt. passed the Aboriginal Peoples Act. (MALA-J6; 18/03/2011)
Supporting the food control programme was the strict enforcement of the use of
Identification Documents (ID), as MALA-J- 6 indicated:
The creation of ID documents was really important. This stopped the CT’s from getting
into town to get supplies. They hated it. There were checks everywhere. The British
could do what they like as they were in charge, people may not have liked it but they
had to accept it. (MALA-J- 6; 18/03/2011)
5.12 Specialised and Elite Units
The military command recognised that operating in large numbers was
counterproductive. A large concentration of troops was noisy in the jungle and easily avoided
by the insurgents. The chances of engaging a similar number of enemy forces was not the
strategy matched by the Communists, who were fighting according to the rules laid out by
Mao Tse Tung for guerrilla warfare (Mao Tse-tung, 1954, 1961). Realisation by the hierarchy
was slow, but after several fruitless large scale deployments, with nil results the support for
smaller specialised units started to take place. Units such as had been used earlier in the
campaign, like the “Ferret Force’ started to gain wider acceptance (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 52;
Jardine, 2012, p. 643). Operating in the jungle was not an easy task as explained by MALAM-7:
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We had to walk in carrying our supplies for a week, plus ammo and such like, which
was bloody tough in those conditions. Later they started dropping supplies by Dakotas.
Not that that was easy either, as you had to have clearing where they could drop them
or else you would never find anything in that jungle. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2011)
The use of indigenous trackers: Ibans from Sawark or Dyaks from Indonesia or the
Malayan aboriginals ‘Orang Asli’, who were courted through the “hearts and minds
campaign” (Ghows, 2006, pp. 184, 212), improved the ability of the military forces to operate
more effectively in the jungle environment.“We had Ibans with us, and an interpreter. Not
that we found many terrorists, other units had better luck but it was not easy” (MALA-M-7;
05/02/2011)
Not only were Ibans and Dyaks used as trackers but some of the indigenous tribes
were formed into their own unit in 1954 under the command of the police, called the ‘Senoi
Praaq’, who operated in the deep jungle areas (Ghows, 2006, p. 239). In addition the Police
Field Force manned the jungle forts; up to 3,000 of them in the aboriginal areas (Clutterbuck,
1966, p. 43).The racism of the Chinese insurgents deprived them of valuable support from the
local tribes people whom they seemed to despise.
5.12.1 Home Guard
The concept of using a Home Guard was not a new one to British operations it had
been used in Palestine with limited success (Corum, 2006; Hughes & Tripodi, 2009, p. 11). In
Malaya they had a force of around 40,000 on duty at any one time (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 44)
with a total strength of around 250,000 (Thompson, 1966, p. 48). They came under the
control of the police. Village police posts would typically have ten to twelve men, normally
Malays, although a large number of Chinse were recruited as the conflict progressed
according to MALA-J-6:
Special Constables were set up. They asked for volunteers from the Malays at first.
These formed the Home Guard. It was to give a sense of belonging to make sure people
understood it was their country they were defending. It was not being defended by the
British; no it was the Malays and later the Indians that joined up too that formed the
Home Guard. Control of the minds was what the British tried to achieve. (MALA-J-6;
18/03/2011)
A point confirmed by MALA-M-1:
Malay troops were used mainly for key point defence, static defence, rather than
patrolling in the jungle. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
Nonetheless, in some areas the posts may not have worked as well as could be
expected as pointed out by MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011 when asked if they worked alone:
123

Not really because people have got to be supervised, I’m sure that there were plenty of
villages where the communal guard were fine, fine outstanding members of the
community, who would protect the community for no other reason than they felt that
was their duty to protect their fellow villagers but there were certainly instances of
people using it to their own ends because that is human nature. (MALA-M-4;
04/03/2011)
5.12.2 Malayan Scouts-SAS
The Special Air Service (SAS) was given a new lease of life after almost being
disbanded at the end of World War Two. They were reborn under the name Malayan Scouts
SAS, commanded by Calvert, who took part in the setting up of the new unit for deep jungle
penetration (Jones, 2010, pp. 137-156). The SAS replaced ‘Ferret Force’, which had been
developed early in the campaign but had been disbanded; as it was seen to be too unorthodox,
mainly as it was basically a police unit (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b; note 33). The army sought
to control military operations in the early days of the campaign and only succumbed to a
greater role to be played by other forces as the realisation occurred they did not have the
knowhow or man power to do it all themselves (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 74).
For the purposes of this research a series of key elements emerged. One, that the main
body of the SAS was made up of Rhodesian soldiers as they were considered to be ‘jungle
ready’ and would not need intensive training (Durkin, 2011, p. 36). From this recruitment two
individuals would return to Rhodesia and have a major impact on the ‘Bush War’ there:
Colonel Peter Walls who went on to become overall commander of the Rhodesian army and
Ron Reid-Daly who would asked to set up the Selous Scouts (Reid-Daly, 1982; Reid-Daly,
1999). Two, these men would take notable lessons from this conflict transferring them to
their own country; the use of Pseudo gangs and the use of strike units to penetrate deep into
enemy territory. The New Zealanders sent a squadron of reserve SAS to Malaya in 1955
following the deployment of an infantry battalion (2RAR) from Australia (Dennis & Grey,
1966); leading to the creation of the Australian SAS in 1957 based upon the effectiveness of
the parent unit in Malaya (Edwards & Pemberton, 1992, p. 178; Horner, 1989, pp. 30-31)
5.12.3 Tracker Units
The expertise the SAS and other jungle penetration units learnt from the indigenous
tribes who were used as tracker units to find the CT’s. The Ibans and Dyaks “were expert
trackers and had been, until recently, head-hunters” (Jones, 2010, p. 140). Because of their
intricate knowledge of the jungle, they taught the security forces valuable lessons (Jackson,
2009, p. 66). Important intelligence was gained as trust developed between the two. Tracker
units were to be also used in both Kenya and Rhodesia with great effect. The Rhodesian
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African Rifles were also deployed in Malaya and their men made excellent trackers (ReidDaly, 1999).
The other tracking technique used in Malaya was the use of dogs (Oldfield, 1953, pp.
107-108). The jungle was to prove to be a very difficult terrain for them to work in as there
are so many smells and spoors to disorientate the dog when following a trail. MALA-M-2;
10/03/2011, put forward the following “there are two basic methods of tracking as you know,
one is the obviously a visual scout and the second is the dog team. Both have their drawbacks
and both have their limitations.” Although MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012, pointed out another
problem, “we did use dogs but they did not seem to do too well when it was wet, much better
with trackers. Of course with the dogs we had to carry their food as well as ours, but they
made a change to have around.” A further problem was highlighted too:
when we took the dogs out and we were flogging away and this dog said to itself, “I’ve
had enough” and then turned around to his handler and said “I’m not going any further
so we carried the dog for 3 days, have you tried carrying a Labrador?[laughs]. (MALAM-2; 10/03/2011)
The Ghurkhas because of their capabilities must be counted amongst the specialised
units. They were considered an extremely effective fighting unit in the jungle and seemed to
be able to adapt far quicker than most other Commonwealth troops brought in to support the
police. MALA-M-7 remembers that he:
Worked a lot with the Ghurkhas who were very good troops in the jungle, that is for
sure. They were so tenacious, much more than us and did not seem to mind how hard it
was to live in the jungle. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)
5.13 Propaganda
Propaganda became highly developed during this campaign with both sides vying to
gain influence over the population in general (Ramakrishna, 2002b). The Government went
to great lengths to prevent the CT’s from producing any as explained in this comment:
The Bandits had printing presses which were smuggled into the jungle. They knew
they had to get their message out to the people if they were ever to have any success.
Anybody found without an official printing press was arrested. Propaganda was important to
both sides but the Government tried to ensure that the Communists could not produce any.
That is why the printing presses were strictly controlled. Controlling the news was important.
(MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)
From a Government perspective it was important to try and counter the ideas that
Communists were portraying. It was important to convince the public that it was the
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government that was wining the counter-insurgency. Propaganda is directed at dislocation of
the enemy’s physiological and physical balance.
The Government tried to get their version to the CT’s using leaflet drops from aircraft
and voice broadcasts, also, generally, from the air, leaflets. There were always dropping
stuff to them, telling them how to surrender, why they should surrender, telling them
about the good life they would get, including monetary rewards for weapons
surrendered. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)
5.14 Colonial Administration
According to Thompson (1966), “there are three main forces which influence the
people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, material wellbeing and progress” (p. 64). The machinery of government, it is what the people see and
conceive; therefore it must represent their ideals and aspirations if it is to gain their support.
Support will based on the ability to deliver on promises encompassing rule of law,
construction of infrastructure and an efficient administration (Thompson, 1966, p. 66).
Creating the effective link through local councils to the people becomes central to the overall
plan, if it is to succeed, plus ensuring the economic support of forthcoming too. The
appointments of suitably adept and competent provincial civil servants capable of
administering the region are crucial to the counter-insurgency efforts.
The administration is therefore concerned with civic well being, ensuring that services
reach the population. The creation of ‘New Villages’ had to be scrutinised to see that
corruption did not stifle the objectives of the Plan, and fail to deliver. The Civil Service was
equally as important as the army, the police and the judiciary. The overall coordination of the
counter-insurgency came under the National War Council. It was this combined structure that
made such a difference in Malaya (Thompson, 1966, pp. 70-79).
5.15 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths
The Chinese people follow what is can be called their own religious practices
‘Chinese religion’. Compared to Christianity and Islam, Chinese Religion worshipers are
more concerned with material welfare than life after death. Funeral rites are performed not
only for the deceased but also for the prosperity and general welfare of the living. “This is not
a case of man serving the supernatural as much as it is of the supernatural serving man....
When Chinese worshipers give offerings to deities, they expect them to reciprocate by
protecting them and fulfilling their requests”(Tan, 1983, p. 242).
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The understanding that bad fung sui can be caused by any number of wrongful acts
underpins the way of life for the Chinese, the supernatural is a constant and needs to be
addressed continually. Conversely, there has been very little of consequence written by other
historians of the role that Islam played in the conflict. The Malays were Muslims, whereas
the Chinese were not, this must have been another factor that estranged the two ethnic
groups. Communism was a secular, even an anti religious ideology according to Karl Marx
(1969/1848), which was completely at odds with that of Islam. MALA-J-6 articulates this
further:
The Malays did not support Communism as it went against their religion, they were
Muslims. Communism was against Muslims. The CT’s were very brutal and this turned
the people against them. This made it easy for the British to show how violent the
bandits were. The CT’s were their own worst enemies as they turned people against
them. (MALA –J-6; 18/03/2011)
5.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan
The Malayan Emergency highlighted the need to have an over-arching plan that could
be understood by all those involved. The initial failings demonstrated that fighting a counterinsurgency in a piece meal fashion was counter-productive. There were too many vested
interests pulling in separate directions. Once this changed and a comprehensive ‘Plan’ was
put into practice this changed. It could be argued that this was the fault with the Vietnam
conflict, a lack of a comprehensive acceptable plan (Busch, 2002).
It was not until Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in
1950 did any structure become apparent to produce an overall plan. The Plan became known
as the Briggs Plan (1950) .Briggs sought to cut off the supplies to the insurgents by a series
of measures, one of which was building new villages to keep the inhabitants away from being
intimidated or supporting the rebels (Hack, 2009, pp. 387-388).
The overall plan was a summary of the strategy used to accomplish stability based
upon three key factors: control, morale and supply (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 76). Each of
these factors contributes to a sense of well being, which is reflected in support for the main
objective of the government; a return to a stable, viable and confident country, free from fear
and repression. If the government is to succeed, means it must demonstrate it can win
(Thompson, 1966, p. 69).
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5.17 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency
It has been recognised during the literature review process that the French were facing
similar insurgencies in their colonies. They too failed to apply many of the lessons they had
learnt during their own previous campaigns, in much the same way as the British had done.
Nonetheless, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, the French authors Galula (1964/2006)
and Trinquier (Trinquier, 1964), produced a series of conceptual frameworks required to
conduct a successful campaign and these provide a useful outline for assessment of the
Malayan Emergency.
Galula (1964/2006) , lays out the framework for conducting a counter-insurgency
operation and lists four laws, sub-divided into seven principles, which align with the
objectives of the research questions used for this study. All four laws indicate how important
the population is to the whole effort:


The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.



Support is gained through an active minority.



Support from the population is conditional.



Intensity of Efforts and vastness of means are essential (Galula, 1964/2006, pp. 52-55).
Unfortunately, for the British this took some time and only occurred once the Briggs
Plan was put into operation, coupled with the arrival of General Templer who galvanised the
actions against the MLCP. It is evident that both Briggs and Templer recognised the
importance of the population and ensured that this remained the primary focus of all actions
to counter act the Communists. The principles drawn for the laws laid out will now be
assessed in relation to the Malayan conflict.
Galula’s (1964/2006) first law indicating that the support of the population is as
necessary for both sides, was one that was certainly taking place in Malaya . The Briggs plan
sought to ensure that the population not only took an active part in their own defence, thus
adhering to the second law proposed by Galula, but also devised a vast strategy to keep the
CT’s away from their sources of sustenance; both physical and ideological. The construction
of ‘New Villages’, which housed over half a million Chinese keeping them safe and secure
from intimidation as well as proving them with welfare services, was fundamental to this
approach (Ucko, 2010, p. 16). Coupling this with controlling only areas of territory that could
be well defended and not lost back to the insurgents was also essential; so as not to lose the
support of the population once they had supported the Government side. Improved
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administration, economic management and education were further tools to aid this process
(Rid, 2010, p. 750).
Table 5.3 has extracted the main elements as proposed by the French theorist and then
indicates how this was applied in the Malayan Emergency. The first element quadrillage,
which involved having the whole operational area divided into sections, was used with
difficulty in Malaya. The jungle terrain made it almost impossible to search every sector
entirely, therefore the second element, ratissage or search, was difficult to perform
effectively. However, regroupment or gathering together, formed the backbone of the Briggs
Plan and that was placing as many of the population into new villages as possible.
Additionally, the tache d’huile principle of gradually enlarging the areas under government
control outwards, from the well defended and secured area first. A series of colours were
used to denote the change in status from black to grey and finally white, was used with great
success.
Table 5.3 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Malaya

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)
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5.18 Summary
The important elements that have been identified by the findings have been condensed
and placed into the Table.5.4.
Table 5.4 Summary of elements from findings
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The table assists in visualising the wide and complex nature of rudiments that need to
be considered when prosecuting a counter-insurgency. Each case study will have a similar
table complied in order to conduct a comparative analysis and an interpretation in chapter 8.
As a consequence no further explanation will be performed at this point.
Particular regard has been given to developments of strategies, methods and tactics
used to counter the Chinese Communist insurgents. Initial failures by the Colonial authorities
in Malaya, required a substantial re-evaluation of capabilities linked to objectives.
Eventually, this led to the development of a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy
encompassing a multi-dimensional approach. A unified command structure, coupled with the
dynamic leadership provided by General Templar, was the formula necessary before the tide
was turned and the authorities started to make inroads into defeating the insurgency. The
‘Briggs Plan’, provided the blue-print which set out the objectives, which emphasised
persuasion, or ‘winning hearts and minds’ through using less blunt force and more political
concessions, increasing the social provisions thereby gaining the support of the population.
The Plan also set out to divide the insurgents from their support base and deprive them of
resources. The creation of ‘New Villages’ ensured the protection of the population, as well as
providing them with a stake in the country.
5.19 Significant and Influential Actors
The research process has noted a number of personalities that have taken part in more
than one theatre of operations connected with this study. Accordingly the transfer of tactics,
expertise and strategy would have been part of this process. Therefore, it has been considered
important to highlight these people together with the conflicts and influences they brought to
bear on the development of operational counter-insurgency doctrine. Palestine has been
incorporated into this assessment, as it had a significant influence on the campaigns in both
Malay and Kenya and therefore by association Rhodesia. The involvement of Commonwealth
troops in Malaya meant expertise was imported back to both Kenya and Rhodesia, as both
countries sent troops to the Emergency.
A matrix is presented in the appendix, which highlights the significant Actors
involved and their linkages to other conflicts. (See appendix B).
5.20 Conclusion
The use of Malaya as a starting point to assess the next two counter-insurgencies has
been important: many significant developments took place that went on to characterise the
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way in which other conflicts have been prosecuted. However, applying a single template to
any other conflict will undoubtedly be problematic, as no two conflicts are the same.
Nonetheless, the etymology for counter-insurgency doctrine was certainly formalised in this
campaign, incorporating: political, social, economic, administrative, military, psychological,
civil and the intelligence capabilities into a combined approach, rather than a diverse one.
Particular regard has been given to developments of strategies, methods and tactics
used to counter the Chinese Communist insurgents. Initial failures by the Colonial authorities
in Malaya, required a substantial re-evaluation of capabilities linked to objectives.
Eventually, this led to the development of a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy
encompassing a multi-dimensional approach.
A unified command structure, coupled with the dynamic leadership provided by
General Templar, was the formula necessary before the tide was turned and the authorities
started to make inroads into defeating the insurgency. The ‘Briggs Plan’, provided the blueprint which set out the objectives, which emphasised persuasion, or ‘winning hearts and
minds’ through using less blunt force and more political concessions, increasing the social
provisions thereby gaining the support of the population. The Plan also set out to divide the
insurgents from their support base and deprive them of resources. The creation of ‘New
Villages’ ensured the protection of the population, as well as providing them with a stake in
the country.
Legislation was used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives of the Plan and
the military brought in as an aid to civil power. The ability of the Colonial Government to
enact legislation was substantial advantage as the police and the military were then acting
lawfully in support of the legitimate authority. The rule of law was thus used as a tool to
achieve the desired aim of over-powering the insurgents (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 16)
Furthermore, the British army had to undergo a series of mind changes moving away
from the idea that they would be able to engage the enemy in an all out confrontation
whereby superior numbers and fire power would overwhelm them. The jungle ensured
limited the ability to use large forces making it necessary to reduce the large scale numbers
down to effective fighting units that matched the enemy in ability to survive in the jungle.
The development of highly specialised units, most notably the SAS, coupled with local
indigenous forces was one of the features of this campaign. Helicopters capable of re-supply
and evacuation also turned the tide in favour of the British, together with improvements in
radio communications and the building of roads.
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A wholesale restructuring of the police, especially Special Branch, was the vital
change needed to overcome the insurgents. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of
indigenous forces, including the creation of a’ Home Guard’ was instrumental in gaining the
upper hand and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The
increased degree of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference.
In addition, a change in the mind set was needed for security forces to become
effective ‘learning organisations’ (Hack, 2009, p. 392). Resources for major offensives were
not available, it was now necessary to harness multiple assets to accomplish the task in hand.
The’ end of empire’ had impoverished the military supremacy that had enabled Britain to
control her colonies and possessions in the past (Brendon, 2007; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a;
Kiernan, 1998; Lapping, 1985).
On the political side, the formalisation of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ certainly
occurred in Malaya; allowing the authorities to garner support for their thrust to counter
Communism in Malaya. However, limited evidence from these findings indicates that it was
not a commonly understood concept at the lower echelons of the security forces. They did
what they were told to do, but they were not privy to the overall concept and dealt with the
difficulties of being in the field in the best way that they could. If they were able to extend a
few benefits and sweeteners to the general public then all well and good, but this was
probably no more than they would have done anyway. In addition, the administration has to
function effectively and implement the civil and social programmes to ensure the continued
support of the population for the Government. As has been argued, it is the population that
are key to a successful outcome of a counter-insurgency effort.
The next chapter will present the findings taken from the Emergency in Kenya
aligning them in similar fashion to the themes already identified. By maintaining a
comparable structure to that used in this chapter, it is hoped this will allow for greater
comparison to assist in indentifying trends in the way in which the conflicts were conducted.
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Chapter 6
THE KENYAN EMERGENCY 1952-1960: A CASE
STUDY
6.1

Introduction
The second case study deals with the ‘Emergency’ in Kenya, declared in 1952, four

years after that of Malaya. Consequently the evolution of counter-insurgency doctrine and
strategy can be traced by assessing this conflict. Changing world events, together with
ideological competition during the Cold War and the demand from African colonies for
decolonisation make this an important conflict to study from a historical and counterinsurgency perspective. An overview of the conflict is presented first, using supporting
literature to position this case study.
The ‘Emergency’ in Kenya has not been as well documented as the Malayan
Emergency, although recently there have been a number of contradictory claims being made
as to how this conflict was prosecuted. Notable amongst the detractors are Elkins and
Anderson (Anderson, 2005; Elkins, 2005a, 2005b). Nonetheless, the main crux of this
research relates to countering-the-insurgency by assessing what took place that was effective;
rather than an analysis of the whole Emergency. Accordingly, core aspects have been
identified from the findings in support of the themes identified in the Literature Review and
placed under subheadings; maintaining uniformity with all three case studies. Furthermore,
the review identified the low level of research dealing with counter-insurgency from the
police perspective. In an effort to remedy this deficiency, it was seen as important to
interview former Kenyan policemen to gain a greater understanding as to what took place
based upon their experiences.
6.2

Thematic Approach
The themes used in the previous case study have formed the basis of the structure for

analysing this case study. To this end, the findings are presented using the same coding
already developed from the themes and applied to responses of the participants. Any free
codes developed from additional themes from the respondents have been clustered under the
established parent nodes to ensure they remain consistent with aims and objectives of the
whole study. To this end, fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted, transcribed
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and then coded. The coding was primarily based upon the themes already indentified in Table
5.1.
6.3

Population and Sample
The target population for the main study was primarily those members of the security

forces who had participated in the ‘Emergency ‘in Kenya. Criterion sampling was used to
select the participants, as per the previous case study. As per the Malayan case study the
participants remain anonymous. All those in this case study are designated as KENA short for
Kenya, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts and a date for the interview. The
status of the participants will be reflected by the designation such as P, for Police and M for
Military, where appropriate. Thus KENA-P- 2 would be a Kenyan Policeman and be the
second person interviewed. The interviews took place over a period of two years and were
conducted in Australia, South Africa, Kenya, Malaysia, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom
(UK). Table 6.1 sets out the participants, their designation and when they were interviewed.
Table 6.1 Population sample details of participants in this case study
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Fourteen semi-structured interviews took place with former officers of the Kenya
Police. These interviews were then coded, according to the same themes identified by the
literature review and these have then been used to develop the narrative for this case study.
What follows is a presentation of the findings in relation to the themes, placing them into a
contextual structure that can be subsequently analysed

Figure 6.1 Map of Kenya Colony 1952
(Gordon-Brown, 1954)
6.4

Kenya: The Emergency 1952-1960
The ‘Emergency’ in Kenya, formally declared on the 20th October 1952, has its roots

in the past and has to be assessed as part of the ‘winds of change’ that swept the continent of
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Africa clamouring for decolonization (Brendon, 2007, p. 550). Although the rebels in Kenya
were not aligned to any other external movement, such as Communism, nor did they receive
any outside assistance either, the ideals of self government were a common thread in most
African countries at this time. Furthermore, common ideals espoused by Communism were
present amongst the Trade Union agitators, that were part of the reactionary movement that
led the revolt (Agnew, 2001) Although no formal links to outside Communist movements
have ever been substantiated (Corfield, 1959, p. 220). Figure 6.1 shows the position of Kenya
as a Colony in 1952 and its borders, which were porous at that time and could have facilitated
outside support had there ever been any.
Decolonisation was more than economic and political emancipation; it was an attempt
at cultural renewal to reverse the social imperialism that accompanied colonisation. Central to
this argument was the need for economic freedom, shedding the dominance of western
interests and control (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 12). Therefore, the central grievances that
underpinned the rebellion were land and freedom; this was to become the name they would
call themselves: The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), not Mau Mau as they would
become known.
Furedi (1989) expounds the origins of the conflict back t to the start of the 20 th
century, with the appropriation of land by the European settlers under the misapprehension
that they were able to purchase and own this land (Berman, 1992, pp. 56-57). The tribe most
affected by this was the Kikuyu, as they lived in the most arable lands high on the Rift Valley
and the Highlands of Kenya. A contorted history of grievances accompanied the steady
growth of the tribe; culminated in large numbers of Kikuyu without land they could call their
own (Furedi, 1989, pp. 9-13). The revolutionary movement calling for the restoration of land
produced the ‘Land and Freedom’ movement; under many guises since the early 1920s
(Anderson, 2005, pp. 21-42). This movement morphed into what has become known as the
‘Mau Mau’ and was the violent manifestation of what became the insurgency: a full scale
assault on the organs of power in an attempt to subvert the Colonial Government by force of
arms.
The Mau Mau, as the insurgency has become known, has a contested origin (Berman,
1976; Kennedy, 1992; Lonsdale, 1990; Throup, 1987; Uskalis, 1997). At the offset this was
not the name the military wing of the KLFA would call themselves, although the Mau Mau
movement itself was banned by Ordinance as early as 1950 (Corfield, 1959, p. 56). Kariuki
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(2004b) argues it was in fact the word Uma Uma ‘go go’ said as an anagram to hide its
original meaning (p. 19). Nonetheless,
Mau Mau did become the name used by one and all, including the Kikuyu themselves who
were involved in its activities. Leakey (2004/1954) describes the organisation as a pseudo
religious one, set up to replace the imposition of Christianity upon the Kikuyu (p. 42).
A further definition has been offered over the contested meaning, that it was mistaken
in the court proceedings to denote the organisation when used by a defendant, when in fact he
had repeated the words ‘those’ twice, in his statement, “Ndingikwira maundu mau mau
nderirwo ndikoige ni kima” meaning “I cannot tell you those, those things I was told not to
tell you by the Movement (sic)” (Agnew, 2001, p. xiv). Although this may have been the first
time it was reported in the press as a ‘movement’ called the Mau Mau, the word was in vogue
prior to 1950; as it was used to in a letter to the Governor in 1949 commenting on:
An outbreak of violence against Europeans, involving murders on a large scale under
the direction of a secret society in existence called the ‘Maw Maw’, (sic) whose
influence in the tribe is rapidly growing and whose oaths, taken in the utmost secrecy,
are binding on those who are compelled to take them (Corfield, 1959, p. 81).
Whatever derivations are correct, the word Mau Mau has come to represent the
insurgents in this Emergency; even by Kenyans today (Newsinger, 1981, p. 168).
Similar to Malaya, the insurgency in Kenya was instigated by only a section of the
population; in this case the main protagonists were the Kikuyu tribe, with some support from
the Embu and Meru; offshoots of the Kikuyu (Scott & Turner, 1965, p. 127). Consequently,
the region affected by conflict was limited to what were called the ‘White Highlands ’and
areas around Nairobi. At its height it is estimated the hard core of the movement reached
between 12,000 to 15,000; although varying numbers have been quoted (Edgerton, 1989, p.
73; Orrù, 1989, p. 349). However, as in Malaya with the Min Yuen supporters of the
Communist Terrorists, there was a substantial support base amongst the Kikuyu tribe as a
whole. The Mau Mau movement brought together disparate groups, such as the unemployed,
the disposed squatters and the youth led by a political elite thirsting for greater power.
(Newsinger, 1990, p. 63; Throup, 1987)
There is however a dichotomy in this portrayal, as a large number, including some of
the older generation of the tribe, fought against the Mau Mau usurpers and became what were
know as ‘Loyalists’; who fought on the side of the Government. To explain this paradox, the
underlying theory of this research related to revolution must be invoked, as the Mau Mau was
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also “directed against the Kikuyu establishment as well as against colonial rule, and to a
limited extent had the character of a civil war”(Furedi, 1989, p. 6). It pitted the affluent
against the deprived, “the Christian missions against the adherents of the independent
churches. The old against the young”(Throup, 1987, p. 250).Therefore, to depict this conflict
as solely the Kikuyu tribe against the European colonialists could be argued as too simplistic.
It can however be described as a revolutionary movement that revolted against the status quo
and the Colonial Government. The Mau Mau:
Was fundamentally a Kikuyu tribal subversive [organisation]....Mau Mau had virtually
no connexion with Communism, but was developed by Kenyatta as an atavistic tribal
rising against western civilization and technology and in particular against
Government and the Europeans as symbols of progress. (Corfield, 1959, pp. 219-220)
The complex make up of those that joined the Mau Mau, either readily or were forced
to join and take the ‘oaths’; became the hall mark of organisation and can only be touched
upon in this case study. It has also been asserted that wide spread discontentment was
influenced by the returning soldiers that had fought in Burma as soldiers in the Kings Africa
Rifles (KAR) during the Second World War (Parsons, 2000). These men expected far more
upon their return only to find unemployment and lack of opportunity. It is alleged many saw
Mau Mau as a way of regaining status and acquiring spoils from their exploits (Atieno
Odhiambo & Lonsdale, 2003, p. 53). The point was confirmed by KENA-P-2 when asked
about the makeup of the Mau Mau:
One of the great moving forces, I would have thought, were the number of ex-military
people who had served with the British forces in Burma and in North Africa, and when
they came back to Kenya after the war, they found that there was literally no
employment for them. And they thought that if they could do the same work as a
British soldier, than they were entitled to have the same say in the legislative council as
any other British or ex-British soldier that was living in Kenya. (KENA-P-2;
02/03/2010)
When asked if he thought they formed the backbone of the organisation “I think you
could say that it was the backbone, a very small backbone, but definitely a backbone of
people who had military experience”, which highlighted that the organisation was a mixture.
KENA-P-2 highlights that many may have been opportunists, but had a grudge too:
I think when they came back, because they had no employment, they drifted into the
suburbs of Nairobi itself, where they mixed up, because they had nothing else to do,
where they got mixed up in criminal activities. And they found that criminal activities,
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not only kept them occupied, but gave them a reasonable standard of living. (KENA-P2; 02/03/2010).
KENA-P-5 made the comment that several Kikuyu were bitter about the promises
they had been made by the British Government and not kept:
They were promised all sorts of monetary rewards or British government had quite a lot
of land available, and then they would get farms and all this sort of stuff and about
1946/47, [they] said when is all this, when is it going to come? you know the British
government let us down they used me and lots of other black men to do a lot of the
dirty work, up in the north Africa and in Malaya and places like that, and they promised
us all sorts of fancy things when we came out and you know nothing happened.
(KENA-P-5; 23/02/2011)
The other important factor was the conflict between Christianity and the Mau Mau
organisation. A large proportion of the Kikuyu identified themselves as Christians; as it
closely resembled their own tribal beliefs (Mbiti, 1969). But others deeply opposed
Christianity’s demands for an end to female circumcision as being contrary to the old ways
(Branch, 2009, p. 211; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 11). KENA-P-7 endorsed this view
“remember the Mau Mau were very anti Christian, of all denominations, and come to that
anti Muslims too, but that didn’t really enter into matter”. In many ways the divisions proved
to be fortuitous, as it allowed the Government to apply a divide and return to rule approach;
just as they had done in Malaya between the Chinese and the Malays.
6.5

The Conflict Begins to Intensify
Comparable to the Emergency in Malaya, in many ways, the Government in Kenya

was unprepared for the escalation of killings and atrocities that caused such consternation
amongst the settler population. The situation had been deteriorating for the previous five
years prior to the invoking of the state of Emergency 1952. However, 1947 is the date
claimed to be the “key year” (Throup, 1987, p. 248). The previous Governor, Mitchell had
been loathed to invoke Emergency powers; as that would have meant a loss of face that he
and his administration were unable to deal with the situation (Majdalany, 1962, p. 103).
Following the death of a European woman settler on the 3rd of October and also chief
Waruhiu wa Kungu, a prominent supporter of the Government, on the 9th of October 1952,
there was a clamour for more action against the rebels (Elkins, 2005a, p. 32). Evelyn Baring,
the new Governor declared a state of Emergency on the 20th of October, with a swift arrest of
all those suspected of being the leaders of the movement; this was operation ‘Jock Scott’
(Clayton, 2006, p. 21; Edgerton, 1989, p. 67). KENA -P-2 was one of those that helped with
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the arrests of those suspected, and disputes the figures given by Edgerton (1989, p. 67) and
Maloba (1993, p. 77), where they cite 187 arrests were made by the 21 October :
I think 120 arrest dossiers were prepared with around 99 or so being arrested that night,
with others to follow over the next few days. This was called operation ‘Jock Scott' and
was supposed to cut the head off the snake, but it did not, in fact it allowed the hot
heads to take over running the shop and made it even more radical. Blidad Kaggia and
Kenyatta were arrested though. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
Kenyatta was always suspected and later tried as being the ring leader of the
organisation. Many have argued that he was swept along by events and had little real control
over the movement being more of puppet than the leader (Anderson, 2005, pp. 30-43; LovattSmith, 2005, pp. 111-117; Majdalany, 1962, pp. 270-285; Maloba, 1993, pp. 71-76).
However, KENA-2-P goes on to dispute this interpretation and contends:
Well, there's no doubt in my mind that Jomo Kenyatta was the leading light. Although
some people will refute that, but I was intimately involved in the jailing ultimately, of
Kenyatta. I met him several times. He was always a gentleman. He had an English
degree, and he had an English wife at one stage. There's no doubt in my mind that he
was the boss. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
A sentiment shared by KENA-P-7, when asked if he thought he was the leader:
initially he certainly was, he always denied it right through to the end but he was
regarded rightly or wrongly as the apex of the system, regarded from below and he was
unquestionably the leader in later years .(KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
KENA-P-1 picks up the story with the declaration of a state of Emergency:
Having declared a State of Emergency the response to the uprising was swift and in
many respects brutal by today’s standards. Area’s where the Mau Mau were thought to
be hiding or had camps were declared ‘Prohibited Area’s. This meant that anyone
found in them could be shot on sight. The areas were also bombed from the air. People
living on the edges of such area’s were moved from their land and re settled in
‘Protected Villages’ which were guarded by loyal Kikuyu who formed an African
‘Home Guard’ This was done in an effort to restrict food, firearms, ammunition and
information concerning the movement of the Government security forces. Large
numbers of Kikuyu were moved from the European settled areas back to their home
villages in the Kikuyu reserve. Many more Kikuyu men were arrested and held in
‘Detention Camps’ pending a decision as to if they were implicated in Mau Mau.
(KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)
An explanation needs to be given as there appears to be a contradiction in this
summary, whereby villages were being protected by Kikuyu forming the Home Guard on one
hand and on the other large numbers of Kikuyu being detained as well. At first sight this
appears incongruous, but it confirms that there was a major split within the Kikuyu tribe; with
141

a large number being counted as loyal and recruited to guard their tribe’s people. The other
section of the tribe was considered hostile and detained pending further evidence, usual
accomplished through screening (Branch, 2009, pp. 82-83). According to KENA-P-1:
Screening teams of believed to be loyal Kikuyu, who had information concerning the
members of Mau Mau gangs were used to screen the inmates and pick out those who
they thought or knew had been members of gangs or were assisting the gangs in the
forests. These screen teams were later joined by ex members of the Mau Mau gangs
who had been ‘Turned’ by the Pseudo gangs and could easily recognize fellow
terrorists. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)
Core to the understanding of how this counter-insurgency was conducted is an
understanding of the role played by the Home Guard, a force claimed to have reached
100,000 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 42). The vanguard against the Mau Mau became the
‘loyal ‘Kikuyu themselves, their own kith and kin; as this became a tribal war. Those that
formed the Home Guard were the eventual winners; as they divided the spoils of war taken
from the Mau Mau (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 41).
The Kikuyu is not one tribe it is a number of very closely related tribes, but there are
family tribes in side of all of that were the relationship is even stronger right. And so
what you have is a kind of combat between the closer relations and the peripheral
relations and the ultimate peripheral relation is the tribe. And so you find that intertribal rivalry started sometimes they wear the Mau Mau hats and the other buggers
wore home guard hats. (KENA-P-11; 15/04/2012)
It is important to understand that this was a complex conflict with an intra-tribal war
going on at the same time; it was a war of the Kikuyu against the Kikuyu, according to
KENA-P-11.
Nonetheless, it can be seen by the argot used to describe the Mau Mau that the police
did not at first take them seriously. KENA-P-2 observed, “at first the so-called terrorist
movement, in fact we never called them Mau Mau we called them Mickey Mouse. [However]
we soon came to realise that, we were dealing with more than little local gangs”. The term
‘Mickey Mouse’ would tend to indicate they thought it was a joke, but KENA-P-2 highlights
how wrong they were when they thought they had managed to stifle the uprising:
We thought we'd lop of the head of Mau Mau by incarcerating that mob. But in fact we
precipitated things, which quite surprised us. It then became very violent and very
bloody almost straight away. And we thought they had no backup, no organization
behind that 120 who we detaine—dor we arranged to be detained. We wrote the
dossiers. Our little branch wrote all the dossiers, and the Governor signed them. And
we thought that would be the end of the matter, but it wasn't, it was the beginning. It
became very brutal after that. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
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A tacit acknowledgement by KENA-P-2 that the authorities had not only
underestimated the size of the rebellion, but also had failed to quell it with their actions
either. It is also important to note the reaction of those not detained; they stuck back very
violently against the public using atrocities that were promulgated by the international press.
The notoriety of the conflict became front page news (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 128).
6.6

Counter-Insurgency
Fortunately for the British, the Kikuyu were concentrated in a very defined area of

Kenya, although this did include the capital city Nairobi. Furthermore, as the Mau Mau was
almost wholly concentrated in a single tribe, intense efforts were made to ensure that other
tribes did not rally to the support of the Kikuyu rebels. Figure 6.2 indicates the limited area
within which there was Mau Mau activity as well as the defined area in relation to the rest of
the Colony. The Kamba, Kalenjin, Nandi, Luo and Massai tribes had also been agitating over
land issues as well. Much effort was made by the authorities at remedying their concerns to
forestall any spill over from these tribes (Osborne, 2010, p. 61). The Nandi, together with the
Kalenjin, formed the bulk of the KAR and therefore were important to the fight against the
Mau Mau by African Kenyans (Hilbert, 1989, p. 95).
Retrospectively it is difficult to understand why it was so difficult to overcome a
single tribe concentrated in such a defined area, as shown in Figure 6.2. However, this area
was very mountainous, with Mount Kenya, the highest peak in Kenya and the second highest
in Africa, plus it was very heavily forested and difficult to penetrate. In the early days of the
‘Emergency’ the Mau Mau were able to maximise their advantage and use these harsh
conditions to their advantage, creating forest camps deep inside the forests. Estimated to have
been around 15,000 rebels hiding in the forests by 1953; these camps were well constructed
and had all the requirements, including workshops for making guns, storerooms for supplies
and even vegetable patches and hospitals (Edgerton, 1989, pp. 112-113).
Eventually, this geographical advantage would become the downfall for the Mau
Mau, as the Security Forces would eventually seal off access to the forests and in
consequence the camps, creating ‘Prohibited’ and ‘Restricted Areas, (see section 6.7.4 ), thus
restricting food and supplies from reaching the insurgents. The Mau Mau would be forced to
attempt to cross the containment lines in order to get access to food and supplies. Ambushes
were set up around the forests ready for any such sorties. Attempts were also made to bomb
the insurgents out of the forest into the ambushes, but this was found to be ineffective and
subsequently discontinued.
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Figure 6.2 Main areas of Mau Mau activity
(Lovatt-Smith, 2000, p. 8)
Kenya was unable to construct an overall supremo to coordinate civil, police and
military power; such as Templer was doing in Malaya. General George Erskine was
appointed Commander-in Chief East Africa in May 1953. He attempted to replicate
Templer’s position in Malaya, but this was denied by the British Government; as the situation
was confined to a small area of the country and therefore not deemed necessary (LovattSmith, 2005, p. 132). Consequently, in Kenya, it appears there was a very limited over
arching structure capable of achieving the desired results. The arrival of General Erskine was
however, considered the turning point, whereby the momentum changed and the Mau Mau
were gradually forced back into more restricted areas such as the forests (Majdalany, 1962,
pp. 148-153).
Operation ‘Jock Scott’ was the first concerted attempt at trying to seize the initiative
by arresting what were considered the ring leaders; as soon as a State of Emergency had been
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declared in October 1952 (Corfield, 1959, pp. 160-161). KENA-P-2, contended “we thought
that would be the end of the matter, but it wasn't, it was the beginning” consequently it failed
in its desired objectives but it did bring the insurgency to a head (Parker, 2009a, p. 142).
KENA-P-2 was a member of Special Branch (SB) team that arranged for the arrests, so he
was in a very privileged position to know what did happen at the start.
The next important phase was Operation Anvil in January 1954, overseen by General
Erskine. Anvil was considered by many to have been the major turning point in the
Emergency (Anderson, 2005, pp. 200-206; Brendon, 2007, p. 564), others are not so sure and
would only concede that is was important:
Well, it scattered those who weren’t arrested and locked others up in detention camps
which of course put them out of action, those who weren’t arrested scattered into the
four winds which reduced a lot of the Mau Mau supply routes, cash, and stolen
weapons and ammunition and things like that, so by and large I think that probably was
the turning point and difficult to say, it was such a long time ago. (KENA-P-7;
05/02/2011)
Anvil virtually locked down Nairobi, with over 20,000 troops deployed to seal of the
city. Around 24,000 were arrested and sent to detention camps, “which destroyed much of the
central Mau Mau organisation and dealt a crushing blow to the revolt” (Brendon, 2007, p.
564). According to Wachanga (1975) this operation more than any other hurt the
organisation badly and forced it underground. The supplies from the cities to the forest rebels
dwindled and intensive policing continued to arrest further supporters (p. 55).
6.7

Hearts and Minds
One of the key components of this research was to investigate the role played by the

policy that has become known as ‘hearts and minds’, trying to ascertain whether it was
commonly understood as strategy and applied as such. ‘Hearts and minds’ as a model, was
certainly developed during the Malayan Emergency, but whether this concept was transported
to Kenya is more debatable. Difficulties arise when it is supposed that this was a universal
approach to counter-insurgency at this time; the 1950s (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 11-18). Most
of the respondents profess not to have heard of the term when they were involved, and only
seem to recognise it from modern literature. When asked “do you think the average European
policeman had an idea that hearts and minds was part of what he should be doing?” replies
varied, but were mostly consistent in the negative, “I think he had to get on with his job you
know, which was hard enough at the best of times, there were murders, nasty murders going
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on all the time all over the place.” KENA-P-7, when pressed further expressed it more in a
form of reflection rather than an actual memory:
I think it had to be yes, I think it did, the only trouble was that there was so many
political overtones, you know, that didn’t always come up, take for example
agriculture, a lot of things which the government proposed like land consolidation was
not popular but when finally it was accepted, it was accepted in whole measure, and I
think that was a good example of hearts and minds exercise, but it went through an
awful lot of trouble to get there. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
Another respondent KENA-P- 6 answered when asked if he had heard of ‘hearts and
minds’, “Yes of course one’s heard that, very much so recently and, but I certainly never
heard of that expression in Kenya”. He then went on to add:
I think everyone’s got to realise how many different tribes there were in Kenya, there
were at least 40 different tribes with 40 different languages and we are really talking
only about three tribes here, The Embu, Meru and the Kikuyu. Are we trying to win the
Kikuyu hearts and minds, possibly they were but it certainly never ever occurred to me
or anybody that was the case. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
A further indication from KENA-P-12 supporting this lack of knowledge concerning
the term, “I never heard the phrase ‘‘hearts and minds’’ used.” KENA-P-13 stated very much
the same thing, “I was never involved or heard of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in those
words” He did go on to expound that what he had been doing could be construed as such a
policy, but that it was never called ‘hearts and minds’:
That’s not to say we didn’t practice it, as it was widely recognized as being necessary to
encourage the local population to cooperate and side with us, which they did. I was
involved in many sweeps and hundreds of searches. We did not bust our way in and
break things unless a fugitive was known to be hiding in a hut. I don’t remember over
many years civilians ever being shot or beaten up, it wasn’t necessary as they were
docile and cooperative as well as frightened by authority and the sight of weapons. It
was more often than not done with a lot of humour and joking, as we all spoke Swahili
at some level or another. (KENA-P-13; 20/07/2012)
Effectively, he is describing his service as being more inclusive in its application,
which could be construed as an intrinsic application of ‘heats and minds’, rather than a direct
application as if he had been ordered to do so.
6.8

Strategies
Creating a series of effective strategies is the requirement of leadership. “Erskine had

no power to direct the Kenya Regiment, the KPR, the police or the Kikuyu Home Guard in
their approaches to COIN [sic]. According to the command structure, he only had limited
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‘operational control’ over them” (Thornton, 2009, p. 220). However, Military and police
action only form one arm of this required thrust according to the French theorists such as
Galula (1964/2006) and Trinquier (1964); the other must be a civil-legal framework that
harnessed the support of the population. More often than not these measures proved to be
unpopular, but their aim was to coerce the inhabitants to a point whereby they accepted that
the Government was improving their welfare and their security. To this end, the Emergency
Regulations were brought in between January and April 1953.
These included provisions for communal punishment, curfews, the control of the
individual and mass movements of people, the confiscation of property and land, the
imposition of special taxes, the issuance of special documentation and passes, the
censorship and banning of publications, the disbanding of all African political
organisations, the control and disposition of labor (sic), the suspension of due process,
and detention without trial. (Elkins, 2005b, p. 55)
“Detention without trial was a controversial, but widely practised by the Government”
with between 76,000 and 80,000 detained; as it was reminiscent of concentration camps used
by the British in the Boer War (Parker, 2009a, p. 174). Mass detention was aimed cutting the
rebel forces off from their support base and preventing them from terrorising others; this was
not the same as ‘villagisation’ or protected villages. The extended settlements were all
brought together in to a fortified protected village. “By October 1955 more than a million
people had been concentrated into 854 villages” (Orrù, 1989, p. 366). KENA-P-2 explains
how this was done:
This was villagisation. The idea was to protect the villagers. When the villagers were in
the reserve, scattered all over the place, one hut there, another hut there, they were very
vulnerable to attack by Mau Mau. Now the Mau Mau had to capture the minds of their
own people. The idea was to herd them together into villages where they would be
protected and safe at night. By day they could go back to their plots and work their
plots, but by night they were protected, they were in a palisade, they had look out posts,
protected by Home Guard. That was the idea. (KENA-P-2; 09/05/2010)
Asked whether this was an idea that originated in Kenya, the reply from KENA-P-7
was:
I think it was borrowed from Malaysia, Templar’s ideas and the idea was to keep the
Mau Mau out and to deprive them of food and support and in that it largely helped. It
didn’t solve the whole problem because they still got a fair amount of support from
people that weren’t in villages, if there were any and in the towns and they had free
movement. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
147

The programme of villagisation was not without its problems; especially amongst a
tribe that was already disgruntled by issues of land in the first place. It could easily have
turned those that were supportive of the Government against them:
It wasn’t popular certainly but that raises another story. Having been brought into
villages they then had reasonable central medical attention, primary schools and things
for the kids, and better administration and that led in turn to land consolidation
program. It might have come from Malaya, I don't know. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
Herding together disparate members of the tribe was certainly not popular, especially
as their land was taken and property looted by the Kikuyu Home Guard; who were used to
contain them in 850 fortified villages (Brendon, 2007, p. 564). Nonetheless, as has been
argued by Bennett (2007), it may well have been unpopular but in the end it was central to
effectiveness of the combined strategy and increased the amount of intelligence gained (pp.
147-148). It has been propounded by Berman (1992) that it became a valuable tool of the
administration in the reconstruction of Kikuyu society around a stable consolidation of land ,
recognising individual land rights (pp. 366-367).
Conversely, Berman (1992) also argues that much of the land redistribution was
brought about by the confiscation of land and property under the Emergency regulations as a
means of rewarding those that had joined the Kikuyu Home Guard. Berman (1992) claims
“the objective of official action was not only to reward the loyalist and punish the supports of
the forest fighters, but also to demonstrate to the latter the positive material benefits of
cooperating with the government” (p. 365).
Food control was the other important aspect behind villagisation; as has been stated
by KENA-P7 earlier, “and to deprive them of food and support and in that it largely helped”.
Restricting food forced the insurgents to leave the forests in much the same was as happened
in Malaya, making them vulnerable.
A further deterrent was to dig a “great ditch, which extended for fifty miles” around
large sections of the forest areas to prevent the Mau Mau from sneaking out to obtain food
supplies. It was filled with “thousands of sharpened stakes and these were augmented by
miles of barbed wire which had been bobby trapped. At half-mile intervals there were police
posts and the half-mile between them was continuously patrolled” (Majdalany, 1962, p. 216).
As with Malaya, one of the key strategies was to deprive the rebels of food and sustenance,
by restricting their abilities to access supplies as KENA-P-9 “was just saying they were just
being hunted and they just disappeared further and further into the forest and you can’t live
on next to nothing in the forest.”
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A further strict measure was the control of weapons. Heavy fines were imposed on
any settlers that lost their weapons or were careless. According to KENA-P-9 this restricted
the ability of the Mau Mau to mount a serious threat:
Well, I think first of all they were not able to get any proper weapons to fight,
obviously the forces managed to keep any weapons out of their reach, I think they did
once attack a police station to try to get some weapons but from where I was they never
had anything which was really useful and of course I would say most of the Africans
were against them, you see when they were out there to recruit they almost forced
Kikuyu to join them, but the other tribes they never joined them. (KENA-P-9;
08/08/2011)
The second point he makes here backs up the earlier review of the literature that states
the rebellion was largely only amongst a single tribe “ the Mau Mau revolt was tribal”
(Malinowski & Redfield, 2004/1948, p. xvii). The authorities went to great pains to ensure
other tribes did not align themselves with the Kikuyu dissidents. The respondents all agreed
that they did not see the Mau Mau insurrection as an organised national rebellion within the
colony of Kenya, more of a sectarian uprising by a section of Kikuyu society. Furthermore,
only a few members of other tribes such as Meru and Emberu ever joined the insurgents, so it
could hardly be called a national rebellion in any sense of the word. (Respondents: KENA-P1, KENA-P-2 and KENA-P-3).
I think, because a number of the Kikuyu decided that they were wasting their time with
trying to obtain change by merely obtaining more political power and more seats in the
legislative council, as it was then. And they felt that something else needed to be done.
And they thought that, perhaps, this would be a form of putting pressure on the
government, to enable them to obtain more seats in legislative council. (KENA-P-1;
02/03/2010)
The respondents clearly considered the Mau Mau to be an identifiable group based
predominately on one tribe, the Kikuyu. They all seem to agree that this was not an organised
rebellion in Kenya but was based upon grievances that many felt they had over the land rights
issue. This interpretation agrees with the work of Furedi (1989) who considers the problems
related to lack of available land for a growing population, together with the increases in
taxation place upon the Kikuyu, was at the heart of the insurrection (pp. 129-143).
6.8.1

British Army in Support of Civil Authority

It was clear that the police were not prepared sufficiently to deal with the Emergency;
they were ill-equipped and lacked the manpower required to carry out normal policing duties,
protect the population and fight the insurgents (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 154-155). The Kings
African Rifles (KAR) was mobilised numbering nearly 6000, including the Kenya Regiment,
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which included 4,786 white settlers (Edgerton, 1989, p. 67; Sinclair, 2006, p. 159). A number
of British army units were brought in to act in support of the civil power, but there were
heavy demands on the British army from elsewhere in the world (Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p.
131). Consequently, the majority of the personnel were national servicemen:
The army never wanted to be there, the army did not like being aides to civil authority.
And they told me in words of one syllable often enough that we don't like being here.
The army were an embarrassment, the British Army. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
KENA-P-2 went on to add a story about the problems the army caused even between
themselves:
I think they caused more problems than they solved. The Skins [Royal Enniskillen
Fusiliers]and the Black Watch have always been at daggers drawn. And the amount of
trouble they caused. I was in charge of CID and a lot of my time I was investigating
cases which had been originated by the British Army. (KENA-P- 2; 19/05/2010).
It does appear that they served a role, certainly on large scale sweeps which the police
did not have the manpower to conduct operations according to KENA-P-7:
Well they were effective in large scale operations in particular and patrolling in the
forest and that sort of thing. Even if they had a target they could plot it but they all had
to have, and they did have, [um] local guides. It could have been more like KPR or
Kenya regiment. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
The local person with them could have been a European or an African according to
KENA-P-7. The consensus amongst the respondents was that the British Army was not very
effective and did not really know what they were doing:
I think they were new, new[emphasises] to the area, [um] inclined to clod-hop their
way around the area a bit and they didn’t use a great deal of stealth, I always got the
impression they would be far more at home fighting a more conventional enemy.
(KENA-P-6, 05/02/2011)
He emphasised how much the army relied on the police as, “We acted as guides for
the army and certainly without us, when I say us I mean any of the local police or even local
settlers, they would have been almost ineffective I think(KENA-P-6, 05/02/2011)”.
Continuing in this vein he explained the shortcomings further:
Probably we weren’t getting enough out of, out of the army as we might of done had
the army had more training before they went on operations. I went on a tracker course
with the army, which was actually run by the army, but with, obviously with local
trackers and watching the locals on the course and watching the army guys on the same
course, the sort of stealth that we had become accustomed to using and as opposed to
the rather blundering way the army went around in the bundu [bush], there was a great
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need for further training for the army before they should have been let loose as it were.
(KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
When asked how important was the African contingent was to combating the Mau
Mau as opposed to just being part of the forces? The reply from KENA-P-7 was, “oh very
much so I think” but he also indicated that the Kikuyu were not considered very good troops
and consequently not many were used except to form the Kikuyu Guard (Wolf, 1973, p. 410).
KENA-P-7 explains:
There was not at that time that many Kikuyu in the security forces, because they
weren’t regarded as good troops. Even during the war there were not many recruited
except as clerks and signal people; things like that, because they were regarded as not
quite reliable. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
The security forces comprised of a number of units and were not homogenous: the
British army units, the KAR, the Kenya Regiment; the Kenya Police and the Reserve, plus
the Kikuyu Home Guard (Thornton, 2009, pp. 216-217).
KENA-P-6 was enthusiastic about the Kenyan Regiment:
They were very good, they were local, local lads [repeats], and um [sic] you know
they’d been around and most of them, probably 80 percent could speak certainly
Swahili and probably 50 percent could speak a tribal language. (KENA-P-6;
23/02/2011)
The importance of being able to speak the local language has permeated the findings
and conversely the inability to converse with the local population has been seen to be
counterproductive. The use of the local language is therefore very important and is placed
into the overall table as a key component to support the assertion that the Colonial forces had
substantial advantages. The ability to speak the language was certainly one of them.
6.8.2

The British Air Force

The use of air support was an important factor, as it provided additional surveillance
capabilities as well as logistical support; although the use of bombers was more controversial
(Parker, 2009a, pp. 164-165). The army was backed up by the Royal Air Force (RAF), that
was able to conduct bombing raids on the forests and also provide valuable intelligence
(Burton & Cullen, 1992, pp. 65-69), as KENA-P-7 explains:
Another thing they didn’t like was the bombing, they didn’t like the bombing because
the Royal Air Force using Lincolns, they had photo reconnaissance and as I understand
it the photo reconnaissance was able to show up cut foliage, it came up in certain, in a
certain way if it was treated right, so they could work out where people had been
cutting down bush to make huts and things and they would go and bomb it. And what
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they didn’t like about the bombs was the prospect about being buried under mountains
of earth, (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
An alternative view was put forward by KENA-P-6 concerning the effectiveness of
using the RAF:
No, complete and utter waste of time. Probably great using up old ammunition and
teaching rear gunners how to fire their guns out of the back out of the aeroplane, but
other than that it was a complete waste of time except that it shot up a lot of animals
and made the whole area dangerous for those operating on the ground. (KENA-P-6;
23/02/2011)
6.8.3

Spotter Planes

The use of light planes of the Police Air Wing to over fly the forests, noting any
movements on the ground or areas where the vegetation had been cut back to make camps
(Clayton, 2006, p. 34 note 66).”Yes, the ability to follow up with spotter planes was very
good. On a couple of occasions a spotter plane assisted in following us up and dropping the
odd supply of food; and dogs” according to KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011.
6.8.4

Prohibited Areas

Two types of restricted areas were created: Special Areas and Prohibited Areas. The
latter created ‘no go zones’, where anybody who was found within was shot on sight
(Majdalany, 1962, pp. 161-162). KENA-P-7 describes how this worked:
A patrol in the forest if they saw a stranger he was shot and he would have been a Mau
Mau there’s no question about it, because nobody else would have had the stupidity to
go there, nobody else would have gone there. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
Although this may well have been very effective for maintaining a cordon sanitaire,
allowing the army carte blanche, there have been questions raised as to the legality of such
measures under the laws of war (Bennett, 2007, p. 149). The Special Areas operated more as
restricted movement and were the domain of the police and the Kikuyu Home Guard. A
further measure that generated considerable controversy concerned the use of deadly force in
certain proscribed areas (Majdalany, 1962, pp. 162-163).
6.8.5

Screening

The use of screening teams was very prevalent and was used to identify suspects.
Following sweeps of areas suspects were detained and then processed. Either an informer or a
captured insurgent would be used to point out potential Mau Mau. They would have hood
placed over their head, to avoid recognition, and then asked to identify a line up (Edgerton,
1989, p. 178). Kena-P-7 describes how the process worked:
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The screening team consisted of its control; who would have been a British former,
certainly a British officer of some kind, could have been KPR, could have been police
or administration. The team was made up of Kikuyu loyalist, possibly Christians, well
largely Christians and possibly some, certainly in the later days, some turned ex Mau
Mau and they would sit down and talk with the subject of the exercise, who would be a
captured Mau Mau probably. And they would go through it and eventually come to the
conclusion whether he was or was not, or if he was whether he was converted or not or
whatever and this would be looked at very carefully by the officer concerned and he
would make a final decision. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/201)
Screening was widely used to identify potential suspects by the Kenya Police. Often
‘Loyal’ Kikuyu would be used in the identification process, which could lead to settling old
scores (Anderson, 2005, p. 297; Elkins, 2005b, pp. 63-69).
6.9

The Colonial Police
Under the colonial structure the military would only be brought in as an aid to the

civil power: the Kenya Police (Agnew & White, 1992, p. 383; Huntington, 1981; LovattSmith, 2005, p. 132). A concept that had developed throughout the colonial era, consequently
the police operated as a paramilitary organisation to deal with civil unrest (Harlan Jr &
McDowell, 1981, p. 21). The army was only required if they could not deal with the problem.
“Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close
cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9).
The police force was made up of African askaris and led by Europeans. It appears that
the force in Kenya was ill-prepared for the demands that were to be made of it to deal with
the Emergency according to KENA-P-2:
At the beginning we were pathetic. We were still living in the [sighs] it was a pleasant
place to be, Kenya. [laughs] When I joined there were 183 Europeans in the force, 183
and my number was 181. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
KENA-P-2, joined in 1948 after serving in Palestine and was one of a number of
police recruited to bolster the under strength force. KENA-P-12, confirms this situation:
The Colonial Police were under manned, under paid and under resourced. It was
fortunate in the makeup of the force that the number of Kikuyu police officers was
limited. It was not until after the war that the administration allowed police officers and
police Stations into the native reserves. For the ‘Emergency’ there was a rapid
expansion and half trained contract inspectors were used in the reserves more as
soldiers than policeman. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)
Similar to what occurred in Malaya, a large number of contract police were brought in
to bolster the numbers, very often with rudimentary training at best and little knowledge of
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the language, the country and its population (Clayton, 2006, p. 18) . KENA-P-7 reiterated this
point “local knowledge was all important I think, because you bring in the British army, they
didn’t have a clue”.
Next it was important to identify whether or not the Kikuyu formed part of the
security establishment, as native Africans were generally recruited into military service units.
KENA-P-2 was dismissive of their abilities:
We had very few Kikuyu natives in the police, because by and large they weren't
trusted. We tended not to recruit Kikuyus into the Kenya Police. They were more
intelligent, they'd had closer contact with the white man than any of the other tribes,
and we didn't trust them. There were some, but very, very few. (KENA-P-2;
19/05/2010)
However, in order to bolster the ranks of the security forces additional manpower was
recruited and this took the form of a volunteer force. Additionally, the police started to recruit
more Kikuyu in order to police their own communities. By 1956 the police force was
considerably larger “1,341 Europeans, 106 Asians and 11,045 Africans” (Anderson &
Killingray, 1992, p. 149).
6.9.1

Police Reservists

As with the Kenya Regiment, the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) played a significant
role during the Emergency (Parker, 2009a, p. 167). They were used mainly in support but
also undertook their own operations, as they had local expertise (Parker, 2009a, p. 366). The
inspectorate numbered 8,603; which predominately came from the white settler community
(Parker, 2009a, p. 164) KENA-P-7 was asked what role the KPR played:
During the emergency the Reservists of course became part of the whole Police Force,
you know they would go in, but again depending on their individual abilities they
would be put were they were most use. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/201)
Indicating that they served many purposes even though most had not be police trained
they may have been unorthodox, but performed vital roles when used. Due to the lack of
trained police Officers, a special unit was formed using Kenya Regiment Officers seconded
to become policemen and lead local constables; this unit was known as ‘Ray Force’(Parker,
2009a, p. 166). A further indication of the innovative methods used to overcome shortfalls in
manpower.
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6.10 Intelligence
The role of intelligence is central to conducting a counter-insurgency campaign
(Kilcullen, 2010, p. 32). Both Kenya and Malaya were deficient in this domain at the start of
the Emergencies and it has been argued this deficiency contributed to the insurgency in the
first place. Clayton (2006) argues that the intelligence was available, but the ability to process
it was not. In addition the actual set up was “quite inadequate for an extensive counterinsurgency campaign” (p. 33). The nature of the support for the insurgency needs to be fully
understood before a comprehensive strategy can be developed (Joes, 2004, p. 238). To this
end the re-organisation of Special Branch to become more effective was undertaken in both
countries. Sir Percy Sillitoe from MI5 was brought in to ensure this occurred in both Kenya
and Malaya (Sinclair, 2006, p. 197).
Integral to the survival of the regime, colonial intelligence was also broader and
encompassed not only Special Branch, but also information acquired in the course of day-today administration. This political intelligence was important not only in providing warnings,
but also in effective monitoring and linking the administration to the population (Cormac,
2010, p. 804). KENA-P-7 describes how this process with informers worked:
The contacts with the gangs would have been surreptitious and highly secretive, and
their contacts would probably be scampering up into the forest, and they would come
down out of the forest edge to meet their contacts, that sort of thing, and it was a matter
of getting the information back, getting it out, which wasn’t always available. (KENAP-7; 05/02/2011)
The ability to source these networks became more and more important (Parker, 2009a,
p. 286). Notwithstanding this description from a Special Branch officer, it would appear that
those in the field had less access to this intelligence than might be presumed. KENA-P-9
suggested when asked if informers constituted the main source for intelligence, indicated “the
only information we ever received was from the farmers themselves. If they thought
something was going on they would let us know”. KENA-P-6 backs this observation up:
The intelligence capabilities were really from the local farmers, we would contact the
local farmer, rancher, more often than not, um who would have probably gathered some
intelligence from their local employees, which they would pass on to us and then we
would act on that intelligence.... our following up ability was a lot greater because once
you did get on the tracks you could go faster. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
Although when it came to dealing with more specialised intelligence, this was handed
over to Special Branch to deal with, as KENA-P-6 explains:
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it was really a very specialised field that that sort of handing on of information would
really have been handled by Special Branch with what they call tame, tame terrorists
who were collaborating with the special branch and you would have needed Kikuyu to
extract the information. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
Questions were put to the respondents to see if they had adopted what was called in
Rhodesia ‘Ground-Coverage’, which required a comprehensive picture of every village to be
built up documenting the movements of all personnel, together with their personal habits and
affiliations:
I don’t think it quite went to that depth no. I mean one had, every local Special Branch
officer and policeman had informers, as many as possible, it probably had the same
effect but it wasn’t so rigidly structured no. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
The next problem appears to be the number of levels of command indicating the
general set up was somewhat dysfunctional; as eluded to by KENA-P-12:
The Administration through their D.C’s [District Commissioners] and D.O’s [District
Officers] ran their own intelligence system separate from the Police. Where the D.O
and the local police officer were friends the intelligence would be discussed between
them and the monthly Police intelligence report which each Police Station and D.O.
submitted would be similar as the D’O’s report. These reports would go to Divisional
HQ in the case of the Police or the Area D.C in the case of the Administration. There
they would be condensed and pushed further up the line. Neither the local DC: or
Police Divisional Superintendent would like to admit there was anything wrong in their
area so in many cases hard intelligence would be classified as rumour. (KENA-P-12;
20/04/2012)
Based upon these remarks it would tend to support how necessary it had been to bring
in outside expertise to restructure the way in which intelligence and especially how Special
Branch operated (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 240; Randall, 1990, p. 64).
6.11 Special Branch
Considered to have been core to the ability to combat the insurgency in Malaya,
Kenya was not as well structured at first. It took a lot of re-organisation to get Special Branch
up to scratch (Majdalany, 1962, p. 98; Parker, 2009a, p. 166). KENA-P-12 confirms this:
Special Branch was separate from the CID. It was very small and relied on intelligence
from the monthly intelligence submitted by each Police Division. There were a small
number of African officers who did sterling work against great difficulties and risk to
their own life and that of their families. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)
Although, KENA-P-12 is supportive of the African officers this was not the case,
especially when it came to the Kikuyu whom were working in Special Branch:
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I'm quite convinced that Githieya {name of policemen] was a double agent; quite
convinced. But you wouldn't say that, because he was virtually Henderson's right hand
man. He was the only Kikuyu; he was the only Kikuyu with the Branch. (KENA-P-2:
19/05/2010)
Henderson was the Special Branch officer charged with tracking down Dedan
Kimathi and had virtual carte blanche to operate how he wanted to. He was Kenya born and
spoke fluent Kikuyu (Anderson, 2005, p. 232). Henderson was instrumental in capturing
Dedan Kimathi, considered to be one of the principal leaders of the Mau Mau (Litchfield,
1992, p. 90). He had eluded his captors for years and was only captured after a dedicated unit
led by Chief Inspector Henderson managed to infiltrate his hideout using intelligence gained
from pseudo operations he had been managing (Dahrendorf, 1968).
It also appears that Special Branch were not short of funds, but not too good on results
as KENA-P-2 explains:
And then, of course, us six were brought in to Special Branch to form this Special
Bureau. That was the brief. ‘Beat Mau Mau’. So we were centred on Nyeri, our little
team. We had unlimited money; we all had brand new Land Rovers with civvy number
plates. And we were trying all sorts of things ...and we weren't getting anywhere at all.
(KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
A general sentiment that was confirmed by other respondents that “Special Branch
was a very small unit based over the top of a shop in central Nairobi at the start of the
Emergency” according to KENA-P-12. Although, Corfield (1959) highlights that the work
they produced was commendable, Special Branch had no structure outside of Nairobi, except
Mombasa. A deficiency; as a lot of critical intelligence was not appreciated until too late (pp.
36, 132). Catling’s appointment in 1954, as Commissioner of Police, set about rectifying
structural deficiencies implementing the report from Sillitoe, head of MI5 (Majdalany, 1962,
p. 111; Sinclair, 2006, p. 198).
6.12 Specialised and Elite Units
Malaya was notable for the use of specialised army units such as the SAS, the
Ghurkhas and the Jungle squads. Neither of the former were used in Kenya, although a
version of the Jungle squads was developed, the Combat Tracker units. The other important
development was the creation of pseudo gangs. It was the police together with the Kenya
Regiment and the Kenya Police Reserve that took the lead in countering the Mau Mau,
developing several important units to accomplish this The creation of Pseudo Gangs was an
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important development and is often credited with bringing the Emergency to an end (Parker,
2009a, pp. 335-346).
6.12.1 Mounted Units
The creation of a Police Horse Unit from the KPR Mounted Section, as horses could
cover so much more ground and carry supplies too (Parker, 2009a, p. 337). KENA-P-6 was
from the British Military Police mounted division and subsequently joined this unit in 1954.
He was asked about the strategy and replied:
The strategy was really, when the Mau Mau at times moved from, more or less, the
Emergency areas where the action was, to resting camps, they would be in the
Aberdare’s and various other places or even on the plains up in the Liakipia area and
we would do patrols, trying to intercept the gangs going from one area to another.
(KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
KENA-P-6 was then asked if he considered them to be more effective. “The mounted
sections I think were more effective because at that time there was more to be effective
against”. These units were also made up of members of the Kenya Police Reserve and the
KAR (Sinclair, 2006, p. 159).
6.12.2 Dogs
The use of dogs was widespread by the army and the police. The handbook on antiMau Mau operations devotes a chapter on their use and welfare (Erskine, 1954, p. Ch VII).
The army had two types of dog, the tracker dog and the patrol dog. The combat teams had a
tracker dog capable of following a scent. Whereas the patrol dogs were there to alert the
patrol to the presence of outsiders and had not been trained to follow a scent; acting more like
an additional sentry. Dogs were in common use with farmers using their own to track
suspects:
No, these were his lion dogs, he had a pack of lion dogs and it was just like something
out of some novel. He arrived with, must of had 12 dogs at least, all baying and being
handled by two dogs at a time by their handlers, great big sort of thick set ridgebacks’
and that type of dog and obviously well trained to a certain extent and they got on the
track of the gang and off we all went. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
The lion dogs he talks of are Rhodesian Ridgebacks bred for hunting. The tracker
dogs used by the police were predominately Doberman pincers, whereas those used by the
army were in most cases Alsatians, according to KENA-P-12. Dogs had their limitations as
was indicated by KENA-P-9:
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Well they seemed to lose the track. I mean I went out with him once on something or
other and he had the dogs in front of us and he said they’ve lost it and that was the only
time I went out with them. I wasn’t very impressed anyway. (KENA-P-9; 08/08/2011)
But it appears the dogs on this occasion were not always up to tracking the suspects as
he has highlighted, nonetheless they were used extensively (Erskine, 1956).
6.12.3 General Service Units
“Formed after the start of the Emergency from the Emergency Company, this unit was
primarily used to deal with civil disorder, such as riots and was based in Nairobi”, KENA-P12; 20/04/2012), (Sinclair, 2006, p. 153). They formed the nucleus of other initiatives, such
as the Combat tracker teams and the Pseudo gangs, as the men were well trained and
disciplined. “But there was always a sort of special unit, the GSU, a sort of strong arm unit if
you like, which was designed and trained to cope with riots and that sort of thing” (KENA-P1; 02/03/2010).
6.12.4 Tracker Units
The Combat Tracker units were used to follow up attacks on farms, following the
spoor with dogs and African trackers led by a European; either police or KAR. These units
used their bush-craft skills in much the same way as the jungle squads in Malaya did
(Franklin, 1996, pp. 99-100). KENA-P-13 explains that there was a difference between
Tracker teams and Combat Tracker teams:
The Combat teams were different. These were uniformed in jungle green same as used
in Malaya and did not disguise themselves. There were tracker teams as you describe,
but the combat teams were different. Their task was to seek and eliminate the enemy.
The officer leading them usually had prior army service. Police reservists often led
tracker teams because they were local farmers who hunted and often brought their black
trackers with them. The combat teams were more rigid and disciplined and trained
continuously between patrols. They had radios and were sometimes directed to a
contact from spotter plane. (KENA-P-13; 20/07/2012)
What is of interest from this reply is that it tends to support the literature regarding the
formation of what became known as the Pseudo gangs (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 156-158).
6.12.5 Pseudo Gangs
It is considered by many that the development of the use of Pseudo Gangs was one of
the most important tactical innovations that occurred in this campaign (Bailey, 2010; Cline,
2005; Dahrendorf, 1968; Franklin, 1996; Kitson, 1960; Parker, 2009a). According to Sinclair
(2006) the combat tracker units were used to follow up attacks on farms, following the spoor
with dogs and African trackers led by a European, either police or KAR. These units used
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indigenous tribesmen because of their bush-craft skills in much the same way as the ‘Jungle
Squads’ did in Malaya. Sinclair (2006) further contends this led to the development of the
pseudo gang concept; as the use of disguise evolved to imitate the Mau Mau gangs and
eventually infiltrate them (pp. 156-158). Although the process described by Parker (2009a), is
far more comprehensive and instructive (pp. 288-314). It should be noted that pseudo
operations had official sanction and authorisation (Hewit, 2001, pp. 338-340).
KENA-P-6 expounds the use of pseudos, but at the same time indicates that there
were a small section of the security forces:
We weren’t involved with the pseudo gangs as such except that we would possibly give
them support, the pseudo gangs were managed by people like Ian Henderson, Special
Branch and again you would have probably 2 white men, officers let’s call them, who
would be disguised as Kikuyu, as Mau Mau, blackened faces, kept in the background,
they could speak Kikuyu many of them. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
When asked whether or not other police units were running pseudo gangs unofficially
for themselves, the reply from KENA-P-7 was:
Yes, [um] well it was meant to be thoroughly controlled, I don’t know in Central, it was
meant to be coordinated so that you didn’t get cases of pseudo gangs shooting each
other up but that did happen in a few instances I think, I can’t bring to mind any in
particular, but I’m sure it did happen. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
Following through on who actually set this idea up, as many have made claims that it
was Captain Kitson, KENA-P-7 who was in Special Branch at the time states, “Firstly
Henderson I think. Mostly, and he had a small team of people” but he goes on to develop a
line that states this had been used in reverse in the past and would have been a format for use:
Well I mean basically it was straight forward police work because before all this
happened you know where there were problems on farms we would dress up an
informer as a policeman and take him out with us so he could point people out or point
out situations that sort of thing... But of course, it’s a slight reversal, it wasn’t a pseudo
gang, it was an informer dressed as a policeman but the principal applied. (KENA-P-7;
05/02/2010)
KENA-P-6 had a similar response when asked who thought of the idea to set them up
“I would have thought it was an initiative by Ian Henderson”. Then he was asked where he
thought they were operating:
They operated all over, I was only stationed in the Rift Valley province and to my
knowledge they would operate almost anywhere, where there was a tip off, where there
was a likelihood of bumping into a gang. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011
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Further evidence to support the theory that it was an evolutionary process is put
forward by Parker (2009a, p. 294) and this interpretation was supported by KENA-P-6:
‘I’

Force under Nev (sic) Cooper certainly incorporated Mau Mau prisoners into its
ranks as trackers very early on-January 1953.These turned Mau Mau were then
completely loyal to their units. They functioned primarily as soldiers and not pseudos.
(KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011
The question was then put “How would these Pseudo Gangs have operated? The reply
was:
Well the basic members of the gang were in fact Kikuyu, they were terrorist who had
been caught, and brainwashed, let’s say for want of a better word, and brought over to
the crown side shall we say. So they were like the enemy within as far as the Mau Mau
were concerned, a typical operation would be a gang would, a pseudo gang would
arrive and they would know where, more or less, where their old comrades were
operating, and they would arrive and say we have just come from Mt Kenya and we
have been told by Dedan Kimathi or whoever it may be that a new oath must be taken
and um, one by one, you must strip down and you must come with us and you must
take this oath, and they would take them one by one into the bush and promptly kill
them, and maybe take one or two at the end and take them back to form the basis of
another pseudo gang. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
Asked to explain why they would have changed sides so readily, the explanation
given was, “I would say he would have been caught and he would probably have two options:
ether change sides or face the noose” (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011).
Unfortunately, things did go wrong and people got killed; as in this case where one of
the Pseudo gangs was mistaken for a Mau Mau gang:
David Bellingham’s death was the one I mentioned who was tracked and his entire unit
killed, He was in turn tracking a Mau Mau gang when they were mowed down. The
findings were that he was ‘killed in action” and no-one was held responsible. The
combat team’s role was “seek and eliminate” and as Bellingham was inside the
‘Prohibited- No –Go’ area, which separated the forest from the settled area, where
lethal force could be used without warning, they did just that. (KENA-P-13;
20/07/2012)
Not only were the Pseudo Gangs effective for tracking and eliminating Mau Mau
gangs but they also played a wider role in the propaganda domain unsettling them. Mistrust
crept into the minds of each of them (Parker, 2009a, p. 311).
6.13 Propaganda
Those questioned did not have much of an opinion on aspects of propaganda,
probably as they were more concerned with operational matters. Propaganda was not
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generally part of the role of the police; consequently not much was said by the respondents on
this aspect. One of the most comprehensive works on the propaganda war has been conducted
by Carruthers (1995a, 2005). Overall the strategy was not as comprehensive internally as that
used in Malaya, according to KENA-P-6:
Occasionally they had leaflet raids, which advised the gangs to come in, advised the
gangs to come in and presumably offered them some sort of deal. Those were dropped
in the forest and right towards the end when there was a big operation about Lake
Naivasha, there were leaflets dropped all around there, where there was a gang
supposed to be holed up in the papyrus rim of the late. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
The idea was to try and entice the Mau Mau to give themselves up, something that
had been widely used in Malaya:
Propaganda was limited to leaflet dropping giving gang members safe passage if the
surrendered with the leaflet. Loud speakers in light aircraft were used in the forest
areas. ‘Baraza’s or meetings were used by the local D.O.’s to encourage them to pass
the word back that they should give themselves up. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
Conversely, according to KENA-P-2 the Mau Mau were also producing their own
propaganda through their newspapers, “Henry Moria, who was one of the top lieutenants, he
was the editor of Kikuyu newspaper. He [Moria], was disseminating more propaganda than
anybody else through his Kikuyu newspapers” (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010).
6.14 Colonial Administration
As has been expounded, counter-insurgency requires much more than just a militarypolice response, it was “basically a civil problem” which could only be ‘permanently
resolved by civil measures”(Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 354) . Therefore, without a civilpolitical element to the strategy there is little or no chance of ensuring the general population
will continue to support the Government. It is also important to note that the administration
had a longer term view as it expected to overcome the rebellion and move forward, this was
supported by KENA-P-7:
The basic idea was initially to impose law and order and prevent terrorism and
everybody was so tied up with that it really, the higher levels of government obviously,
the district commissioner was probably thinking 5-10 years ahead for his district,
Provincial Commissioner was thinking in terms of 10, 20, 30 years ahead for his
district, and the governor was thinking more in terms of 50 years ahead you see.
(KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
Kitson (1971) endorses this approach by the government in that it needs “an overall
programme designed to achieve its aim of regaining and retaining the allegiance of the
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population” (p. 50). As formulated by Galula (1964/2006) the support of the population
remains the key objective that requires social measures to underpin the government’s
strategy:
But you see, the Kenya Police were never allowed in native reserves. The Colonial
Administration, the Kenya Administration ran the reserves, the district offices and the
district commissioners. They had their own police force, what they call a Tribal Police.,
which were made up of people of the same tribe; therefore they were all biased in
favour. They're not going to police their own people because of course they're going to
get beaten up or done in afterwards by their own people. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
Reflecting on these remarks it appears as if there were numerous divisions within the
colonial structure that prevented it from dealing with the problems in a concerted approach;
even to the point of operating separate police forces. KENA-P-2 reiterated this point:
So as I say, the Kenya police weren't allowed into reserves. If I went, if I was pursuing
something, before the emergency, and it was necessary for me to go into reserve, I had
to get permission from the DC first. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)
Under the Colonial system it was the District Commissioner (DC) that ran his own
area. It was he that made the decisions about the welfare and the way to manage the tribes
under his control. It was very paternalistic in nature(Berman, 1992, pp. 80-88). But it also
caused complications when it came to actually dealing with things once they had gone wrong;
as many of the DC’s still wanted to run the operation their way:
The DC was the boss, the army was there in aid of the civil power, who was the police
and the police was subject to the directions of the DC normally speaking, and he was
the representative of government in the district. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
Clarification was asked as to whether the DC’s had their own forces, which were not
part of the Kenya police:
He had his own, what was known as Tribal Police, but they were, in those days, they
were recruited locally for use in that district in that tribal area. They were recruited
purely to operate for the DCs purposes and it wasn’t until pretty well after World War
Two, the Kenya police moved in to all the tribal areas, where previously they hadn’t
operated except in case of serious crime, for example if it was a murder or something,
the DC might call in the police to deal with it, well he’d have to call in the police to
deal with it, but petty theft and stuff would be dealt with by the travel police and put
probably before the DC’s court or the elders, the African native courts and apart from
the usual disagreements that you might get between officials everywhere and anywhere,
I don’t think there was anything certainly unusual, I don’t think there was any severe
disagreement as to policy, I mean the army had to do what they were told and the police
more or less had to do what they were told within reason, and the DC had to do what he
was told by the PC and the Governor. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
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Understanding how the Colonial administration operated, with its stick demarcation
of responsibilities, allows for a greater understanding regarding the difficulties that were
faced at the onset of major hostilities. There were also the restrictions in place to deal with
multiple jurisdictions. It should also be noted that as the fighting was only taking place in
limited areas, other DC’s were loathed to relinquish any authority they held over their own
fiefdoms, as KENA-P-7 said “the DC was the boss”.
6.15 Public Works
In Malaya an important feature of the Briggs Plan was the Government public works
programme; this appears not to have been the case in Kenya. “Very little public works were
carried out in the Central Province during the Emergency owing to the risk of attacks on the
workers by terrorists” according to KENA-P-12. Nonetheless, the building of roads into the
forest was a major strategy to allow the security forces greater access (Majdalany, 1962, p.
164). There was also an allocation of funds for development and reconstruction of “water
projects, the construction of schools, community centres, village halls, hospitals, urban
housing and a new airport for Nairobi” (Percox, 1998, p. 65).
6.16 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths
The taking of an oath was fundamental to the essence of the Mau Mau, although it
was actually a distortion of their tribal religious customs; nonetheless it held sway over those
that had taken the oath (Green, 1990; Lovatt-Smith, 2005, pp. 137-158; Rosberg &
Nottingham, 1966, p. 248). The oathing rituals formed a key character in the initiation
ceremonies; many were forced to take the ceremony upon pain of death. The oaths also
promised death to anyone of them that divulged the oath to an outsider. These ‘oathings’
became more and more gruesome and involved what was considered despicable acts that
went against the taboos of the Kikuyu (Dahrendorf, 1968, p. 17).
The oaths were also very much anti-Christian in context; intended to de-cleanse the
subject of his Christianity and to accept the ‘new religion’ that was the Mau Mau. “It
is sufficient to state the accepted fact that the Kikuyu’s complete belief in the power of
magic, white and black, was a fundamental factor which regulated his whole life
(Corfield, 1959, p. 163).
It is not easy to draw a dividing line between religion and magic in Kikuyu society,
nor between white magic, which is beneficial, and black magic or witchcraft, which is anti164

social. The Kikuyu methods of administering an oath are intimately connected with the belief
in magic and witchcraft and some understanding of the effects of oaths is essential if we are
to fathom the methods which have been so successfully used by the Mau Mau. (Leakey,
2004/1954, p. 47)
The oath was very serious whether it had been taken voluntarily or forced, KENA-P-2
emphasises this aspect:
I mean the oath. Once they've been oathed, the oath is binding. And you never knew
who'd been oathed and hadn't been oathed. The oath is binding. So you never really
knew whether the fellow you were dealing with could be trusted or not. (KENA-P-2;
19/05/2011)
A further interpretation of the oath was given by KENA-P-11 when asked why he
thought they had been forced to take it “because they had been duped, almightily duped, by a
very well educated small group of westernised trickeries and they believed everything they
were told”. Understanding the role played by oaths is central to the comprehension of the
Mau Mau phenomenon. Its importance should not be underestimated; as it was used to ensure
as many of the Kikuyu as possible should be bound by the oath (Maloba, 1993, p. 68).
Consequently, when there was a mass refusal to acquiesce, as happen in the village of Lari in
1953, retribution was brutal; wiping out the whole village and the committing of various
atrocities (Anderson, 2005, pp. 125-127; Furedi, 1989, p. 122). The Lari massacre, as it was
termed, gained worldwide notoriety and influenced many about the nature of Mau Mau
insurrection (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 136-138; Newsinger, 1981, p. 170).
6.16.1 De-oathing
A key part of the strategy played by the Government in combating the insurgency was
the programme to de-oath as many of the Kikuyu population as possible (Clayton, 2006, p.
4). The oath held incredible sway over the minds of those involved, and this aspect is difficult
for many to grasp; nonetheless it was realised that it must be confronted head on to maintain
the momentum against the Mau Mau (Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 156). Basically the process
involved using respected tribal leaders and witchdoctors ‘mganga’ to administer the counteroath:
The use of oaths by the terrorists to bind the local population to their cause was wide
spread. The Kikuyu normally used oaths to bind a normal contract. The oaths given by
the terrorists were in most cases abhorrent to the average Kikuyu. A further oath given
by a ‘Mganga’ could absolve the original oath is considered stronger. (KENA-P-12;
20/04/2012)
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KENA-P-7 explains further what this de-oathing involved:
What it boiled down to was [heavy pause] a lot of deep, dark, mysterious tribal
ceremonies, where the elders would de-oathed them, because they firmly believed that
the oath would kill them if they went against the Mau Mau. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
Importantly when pressed if this was necessary, especially with the use of ‘turned’
insurgents who became pseudo gang members, then KENA-P-7 was adamant, “I think so,
pretty well yes, 99 %, probably if not 100%”. When KENA-P 12 was asked if thought the
aspect of sorcery by the medicine men had a lasting effect on the Kikuyu that came through
the detention clearance system, the reply given was:
Yes totally. It’s rather like asking the question in the year 1100 did the power of
religion have any effect on the behaviour of the people. Total, absolute, there was no
question; it was a non-question as to whether in fact you would snuff it. (KENA-P-12;
20/04/2012)
When pressed to answer whether de-oathing was effective the reply was “anybody
that was Kikuyu and had taken the oath was under the influence of the oath they had taken
and anything they were promised wasn’t strong enough to overcome that”. Nonetheless, deoathing was seen as a necessary tool to stop the spread of the Mau Mau and try to regain
public support for the Government (Corfield, 1959, pp. 132-135).
6.17 A Counter-Insurgency Plan
Unlike Malaya, there was not one single ‘Plan’ that can be held up as the blue print
that led to the ending of the insurgency in Kenya. Notwithstanding, there were a series of
measures that can be seen to have achieved much the same result: a series of plans by Baring
from 1953 (Furedi, 1990, pp. 75-76), the Swynnerton plan, the Carpenter Committee report,
the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and the Lennox-Boyd proposed Constitution of 1957
(Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 48). The Lyttelton proposals opened the way forward for African
and Asian participation in the government by opening up the electoral system (Rex, 1961, pp.
278-279). Followed by Lennox-Boyd proposals of 1957 and 1958 resulting in the elections,
which would lead on to the Lancaster House agreements of 1960 and full independence by
1963 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, pp. 61-65). Effectively, these were the political measures that
guaranteed the’ loyal’ support for the Government based upon the emancipation of the
African population and the ending of colonial status. (Orrù, 1989, pp. 395-400; Thompson, et
al., 1990, p. 367).
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The strategy behind the Villagisation process was to cut the supplies off from the
insurgents in the forests. Restricting access to food was central to this objective. Erskine
cleared the areas around the forests of crops, bananas and sugar cane, extending roads for
greater access as well as building a fosse around the fringes. Harsh collective punishments
were inflicted on those that contravened the regulations. There was also detention for any
suspects considered to be Mau Mau. The rule of law required that they be prosecuted, but
until they could bring the large numbers to court and face trail they were detained pending
their appearance in court (Brendon, 2007, p. 564).
Collective punishment appears to have been a concept that had developed through-out
the British colonies as a means to bring errant transgressors to heel; it was used in both
Malaya and Kenya. Forced re-settlement of the population, mass detention and the
destruction of their previous villages was very much part of this policy (Bennett, 2007, p.
151). Although, KENA-P-2 states “I was never aware of collective punishment” But there
were collective fines (Clayton, 2006, p. 4).
Although the definition of success in terms of counter-insurgency is difficult to
define; as there are so many variables that need to be taken into account, before such an
assertion can be made. Nonetheless, the question needed to be asked whether the respondents
considered it successful from their perspective. KENA-P-7 replied, “Yes, it was. The whole
concept of war is to defeat your enemy in the field and no matter which way you look at it
that ultimately happened”. However, when asked if there an alternative to the political one
that created an independent Kenya, the reply by KENA-P-7 was:
Well another option was they could of just carried on, but it would have cost too much.
HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] couldn’t afford the money basically and this did not
just apply to Kenya this was worked out by, who was the Prime Minister of the day,
Harold MacMillan, he worked out that it was just not feasible to keep the Empire going.
(KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)
The question was put whether he thought it could have been done any differently his
reply was, “so you know it had to be resolved one way or the other and ultimately what
happened was the only feasibly option I think, I don’t see how else they could have done”.
He then continued:
But by and large they were all united in the aim of driving the Europeans out and taking
all their land. What they wanted, well in actual fact they didn’t bother much about
where the Europeans would end up, all they wanted was their land if they could get it.
(KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
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The majority of the replies endorsed this response, which was fatalistic and must be
assessed based on the time elapsed since the conflict, and the memories those dark days
would invoke The consensus appears to have been that they defeated the Mau Mau, by using
a series of effective measures as KENA-P-6 contended:
It became obvious to us that the Pseudo Gangs were becoming probably the most
important arm in defeating the Mau Mau and it got to a stage where the gangs really
weren’t sure who was friend and who was foe. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)
“The hunger for land was the driving force behind the rebellion and this was very
anti-Colonial, ultimately a political solution had to be found” as KENA-P-7.summed up.
Land reform may have formed part of the strategy to ensure other tribes did not join the
rebellion (Percox, 1998, p. 65). However, de-colonisation was that solution as far as the
British Government was concerned, and from 1960 onwards they gradually moved towards
this outcome (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 63).
6.18 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency
As discussed in the literature review the French had an influence on the strategy used
and this is presented in a summarised form in Table 6.2 As indicated in the previous chapter,
the table outlines how the key aspects of the theory were applied in Kenya. Each case study
has shown how much these aspects formed an integral part of the tactics for dealing with
subversion and had found common currency.
Table 6.3 has extracted the main elements as proposed by the French theorist and then
indicates how this was applied in the Kenyan Emergency. The first element quadrillage,
which involved having the whole operational area divided into sections, was used with the
desired effect in Kenya as it was not too difficult to seal off areas ( See Figure 6.2).
Ratissage or sweeps were conducted routinely using the British Army units supported
by elements of the Home Guard and the Kenya Police Reserve; often the Mounted Units. The
restricted area in which the Mau Mau were hiding made it easier to use sweeps.
Regroupment or gathering of the population to divide them from the Mau Mau and
their supply chain was used, but not as effectively as in Malaya. But in Kenya, mass
detention was conducted that had the same effect. Additionally, the tache d’huile principle of
gradually enlarging the areas under government control outwards, from the well defended
cleared area and keeping the area secured was used. Extensive use of armed militias, in the
guise of the Home Guard, was employed, with great success
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Table 6.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Kenya

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)
6.19 Summary
The general interpretation gleaned from these findings appears to be how much more
piecemeal the approach to counter-insurgency was in Kenya when compared to Malaya, even
though the insurgents were geographically contained and not receiving external support. The
ability of the Mau Mau was gradually curtailed as they found it harder and harder to operate
outside of their forest hide-aways. “Contacts or information became more and more scarce.
They seemed to be fewer, fewer of the enemy on the ground” according to KENA-P-6;
‘contacts’ being the term used for military engagements with the enemy.
There are a number of points that have been raised in the findings that are considered
to be important in assessing the capabilities of the security forces in combating the
insurgency. These elements have been condensed and placed into Table 6.3. The majority of
which have been discussed at length in the case study.
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Table 6.3 Summary of elements from the findings

The significance of placing the extracted elements into a table allows one to see how
many aspects are involved in countering an insurgency. Controlling all these aspects is a
formidable task for planners and strategists, as is the logistical support to keep all of the units
operational. Furthermore, there needs to be an overview of exactly where each of the units
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are, as mistakes can occur and people can get shot by their own troops. An event described in
this case study. For example you may have a road gang working in an area and then suddenly
it is in the line of a hot pursuit. The requirement would be to inform the commander of what
other activities are in his area. Obviously with poor radio communications in those days, this
was not an easy task. Therefore, the table assists with understanding how complex and interrelated all the activities were during the campaigns; a factor that is often over looked by many
books on the subject
The other features that stand out are the points related to administration and
legislation. Although this has been discussed, there were the Emergency Powers, such as
restricted areas, identification documents, restricted movements, curfews and such like, as
well as population control by enforcing the protected village’s policy. The understandable
difficulty was the ability to inter-lock all of these aspects together, which is why the argument
has been made for an over arching supremo, capable of authorising the supporting legislation
and enforcing the edicts.
These further findings will then be added to the Table 8.1, in Chapter 8, displaying the
combined elements used in each campaign to combat the insurgency, which assists with the
comparative analysis. The combined elements are also in Appendix C.
6.20 Significant and Influential Actors
There have been a number of significant and influential actors that have had a direct
and powerful authority over the way in which counter-insurgency developed. Some of these
have transferred their knowledge and expertise from one conflict theatre to another. It would
be remiss of a comparative research project not to note these. Consequently, they have been
placed into a table for visual clarity. These include: Catling, Sillitoe, Erskine, Henderson,
Kitson and Bleazard. (See Appendix B).
6.21 Conclusion
A number of important aspects have been identified through the findings and these
have been added to those already identified in Chapter 5 for Malaya in table 12. The creation
of this comparative table allows for greater clarity and assists in recognising trends in the
data, which will be used in Chapter 8 analysis and interpretation.
Many of the elements developed in Malaya were transferred over to Kenya and were
used effectively; although the unified command structure was not replicated, despite calls by
General Erskine to have similar powers to those used by General Templar in Malaya. In
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addition, no central Plan similar to that set up by General Briggs was set up although a
number of the recommendations were used, especially the separation of the vulnerable
population into protected villages, the creation of a Home Guard and increased social
provisions. Ensuring the other tribes did not join the insurrection was an important
consideration for the authorities.
Legislation was also used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives and the
military were brought in as an aid to civil power; as they were in Malaya. The ability of the
Colonial Government to enact legislation was substantial advantage as the police and the
military were then acting lawfully in support of the legitimate authority. The rule of law was
thus used as a tool to achieve the desired aim of over-powering the insurgents. But as in
Malaya, in order to ensure the loyalty of the majority of the population a political decision
was taken by the British Government to grant independence to Kenya once the insurgency
had been overcome.
The police required substantial enlargement and restructuring, especially Special
Branch’s ability to source actionable intelligence. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of
indigenous forces, including the creation of a’ Home Guard’ was instrumental in gaining the
upper hand and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The
increased degree of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference.
The army played more of a supporting role and less of a front line role in Kenya. There was
not the same use of specialised elite forces, but there was the development of innovative units
to counter the Mau Mau in the field; such as Tracker Units and Pseudo Gangs.
The use of ‘hearts and minds’ was less formalised than in Malaya and was not
understood by those involved as part of their strategy. However, limited evidence from these
findings indicates that it was part of normal policing activities anyway, even if it was not
stated as official policy. As has been argued, it is the population that are key to a successful
outcome of a counter-insurgency effort and this aspect formed part of the overall strategy.
The next chapter presents the case study based upon the ‘Bush War’ in Rhodesia.
Consistency will be maintained by using a similar format as the tow previous case studies.
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Chapter 7
THE RHODESIAN BUSH WAR 1964-1980: A
CASE STUDY
7.1

Introduction
The third case study to be dealt with in this study was the insurgency in Rhodesia,

often called the ‘Bush War’. Using the same format as the two previous chapters, the
participants have been used to develop the narrative, with supporting evidence from the
literature. In addition, the direction of the research has continued in the same vein and utilised
ex- members of the security forces as participants. In this case study predominately former
members of the British South Africa Police (BSAP), Special Branch and other special units
An overview of the conflict is presented; once again to position the study within its
historical dimension using supporting literature. The conflict was far more complex than that
of the two previous studies: Kenya and Malaya; essentially as it took place after the other two
conflicts had been brought to a conclusion. Consequently, there were more factors at play that
needed to be considered: the accelerated end of colonialism, changing world expectations, the
Cold War, Communist expansion and the use of proxies by the predominant powers to fight
wars in Africa. All of these factors had a major influence on the struggle to maintain white
dominance in Rhodesia (Henriksen, 1978, p. 31).
The other important clarification is that connected with the word ‘Colonial’. Although
Rhodesia declared itself unilaterally independent of the United Kingdom (UK), in November
1965, it remained technically a self governing colony “to which only the United Kingdom
Parliament can grant independence” (Dore, 1980, p. 32). The Lancaster House agreements of
1979, setting out the requirements for full independence, substantiate its status as a colony
under international jurisdiction of the UK (Marshall, 1968, p. 1022). Further to this
understanding, those that formed the bulk of the security forces can be considered as
‘colonial type forces’, even though they were designated as being Rhodesian. Much of the
structure and deployment was based upon those used in other colonial possessions, such as
the use of African combatants to bolster the security forces. Perhaps the proviso should be
that majority of white settlers had been ‘born and bred’ in Rhodesia and had a greater affinity
to their concept of nationhood and land, than possibility experienced in either Kenya or
Malaya.
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7.1.1

Thematic Approach

The themes remain consistent with the two preceding chapters. To this end, the
findings are also presented so that they continue to align with the coding developed and
applied to responses of the earlier participants. As far as possible, the treatment also remains
consistent; in an effort to minimize bias through interpretation in an effort to maintain
trustworthiness.
7.1.2

Population and Sample

The target population for main study was primarily those members of the security
forces who had participated in conflict that involved countering the insurgency;
predominately police Special Branch. Table 7.1 details the participants involved in this case
study. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, to maintain consistency.
As per the two previous case studies, the participants remain anonymous. All those in
this case study are designated with the initial R, for Rhodesia reduced to RODA, followed by
a number to link this to their transcripts. The standing of the participant is reflected by the
designation such as P, for Police or M for Military and I for Internal Affairs, where
appropriate. Thus RODA-P- 2 would be a Rhodesian Policeman and be the second person
interviewed. Fifteen semi-structured interviews took place and have been dealt with in a
similar fashion to the earlier case studies, including similar themes for coding purposes
Table 7.1 Population sample breakdown details
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7.2

Rhodesia: the Stage is Set
In 1964, Rhodesia, was a well established colony with around 250,000 white settlers

and approximately four million black Africans (Birmingham, 1995, p. 74; Steinberg, 1964,
pp. 473-480). The breakdown of the ethnic groups was Shone 77%, Ndebele 19%, European
3% and others one percent (Melson, 2005, p. 57). There was a well structured economy based
around coal, copper and farming; the country had been self governing since 1923, but as
stated, had been continually refused independence by Britain. Growing dissatisfaction at
Britain’s reluctance on this front, saw the Rhodesians take matters into their own hands and
to declare a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on the 11 th of November 1965
(Young, 1967, p. 286). The international response was to impose sanctions on the country,
but these only had a serious effect after the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974;
after the coup d’état. Until this date both Portugal and South Africa had continued to funnel
resources to an embattled Rhodesia (Mtshali, 1967, p. 175). After this date, Moçambique was
granted independence and became hostile territory for Rhodesia, with the Front for the
Liberation of Moçambique (FRELIMO) supporting the insurgents (Guelke, 1980, p. 655)
Unrest had been brewing in Rhodesia for a number of years, but most military
historians pin point the start of the ‘bush war’ in 1965, following the declaration of UDI
(Baxter, 2011; Evans, 2007; Mills & Wilson, 2007; Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011). At this
time there was wide clamour for Independence in a number of African countries; with armed
rebellion and insurrection taking place in the neighbouring countries: Angola, South Africa,
South-West Africa, Moçambique and the Belgian Congo (McCarthy, 1994, pp. 85-88). In
addition to these external threats, Zambia and Tanzania gained their independence from
Britain and became very supportive of the aspirations of the Zimbabwean Communist
political movements (Young, 1967, p. 291). In effect, Rhodesia was surrounded by hostile
neighbours, with even the South Africans labouring to contain the military wing of the
African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), from operating with the antiRhodesian insurgents (Johnson & Martin, 1981, p. 10). South Africa bolstered Rhodesian
military operations with weapons, troops and logistical supplies (Mandela, 1994, pp. 424425; Sibanda, 2005, pp. 128-129).
Besides these pressures, international Communism was increasing its support for
African revolutionary movements, supplying them with training, logistical support and
ideological fervour (Hargreaves, 1988, pp. 116, 209-211). The ‘winds of change’ speech
made by the British Prime Minister, Macmillan in 1960,(Porter, 1976, pp. 337-343; Watts,
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2005) heralded the decolonisation process by Britain, thus blocking any support for
governments that were seen not to be representative of the majority: Rhodesia was seen as
not representative (Davidson, 1994, pp. 152-153; McDougal & Reisman, 1968). The
political, social and national consequences of this approach were to have a deadly toll on the
country as it attempted to defend the status quo. The complexities associated with this
conflict make it difficult to understand in isolation to world events, or the general belief held
by white population they were fighting for survival against the destructive forces of
Communism (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 121) . In addition, the role played by South
Africa is a contradictory one: on one side supportive with logistics, armed forces and moral
support; on the other hostility towards the Rhodesian Front government’s policies and the
“paramount need to restore South African international legitimacy and regional
authority”(Onslow, 2006, p. 125).
7.3

Rhodesia 1965: The ‘Bush War’ Begins
From a military perspective, the war can be divided into three distinct phases. Phase

one, from 1964 until 1968, marked by a series of incursions and incidents. Phase two, low
level and a lull until the war began in earnest in 1972. Phase three, saw an internationalisation
and intensification of the conflict until the ceasefire agreement of 1979 (Johnson & Martin,
1981, p. 9). It could be argued there were actually four phases, as in 1975, Moçambique
gained independence and this allowed insurgents to operate more freely from its territory.
Zambia too was allowed insurgent bases in its territory; as did Botswana (McLaughlin, 1978,
p. 179).
The two main protagonists against the Rhodesian Government were the Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army, (ZANLA) the military wing of Robert Mugabe's
Zimbabwe African National Union; and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union: both organisations were
Communist inspired, however, ZIPRA was Soviet backed and ZANLA was Maoist and
supported by the Chinese (Evans, 2007, p. 185; Kiernan, 1998, p. 223; Sibanda, 2005, p. x).
These ideological differences, together with the tribal cleavages-ZANLA were Shona
speaking and ZIPRA were Ndebele- caused major fighting between the two tribes during the
years of the conflict (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 41; Reed, 1993; Watts, 2006, pp.
445, note).
These two armies harboured deep suspicions of one another. At the height of the war,
they were based in different countries, and were backed by different superpowers. . . . They
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had contrasting military strategies and, inside Zimbabwe, they fought in different regions of
the country, ZIPRA focusing predominantly on the Ndebele-speaking regions of
Matabeleland. When they met in the field, they often fought (Alexander & McGregor, 2004,
p. 81).
From a strategic perspective, this was of great importance as it allowed the security
forces to utilise these weakness to their advantage. RODA-P-6 expounds further the
cleavages between the two revolutionary movements pitted against the Rhodesian security
forces:
The first incursions were by ZIPRA and ZAPU in the Matabeleland area, they were
disasters, they were wiped out almost to a man. The insurgency changed when ZANU
came in from the Moçambique side. They came in with a totally different policy to
ZAPU, ZAPU came in with an ultimate long term objective of conventional warfare,
ZIPRA, that’s ZIPRA the army of ZAPU were going to be conventional, their advanced
guard was Guerrilla but the ultimate aim was conventional. ZANLA, ZANU on the
other hand came in as a communist hearts and minds proper structured guerrilla
operation, they went out of their way to terrorise the farmers and to indoctrinate the
local population, ZAPU did not do that, so that is the difference between the two and
there was a very distinct line of their operation, one was operating from Mozambique
and the others were operating from Zambia. So there were two separate, totally
separate enemies facing us, two separate political organisations. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011)
The first major confrontation occurred on the 28 April 1966, with an attack on farms.
This date is considered by the present day government of Zimbabwe, to be the celebration of
the what is known as Chimurenga Day, a name given to the first war against the settlers
in1896-97 (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 29). According to RODA-10, the war started
earlier:
So the symbolic start of the war was certainly where white blood was spilt and it was
spilt in a definitely terrorist inspired act so if you are looking at that then I can say that
was the start of the war, July 1964 and shortly followed up by another murder outside
another town in Mashonaland called Hartley, where the Viljoens were murdered in their
farmhouse just north of Hartley, so the blow had been struck (RODA-10; 27/01/2010)
For many, the actual start of hostilities begun in 1964. The attacks could no longer be
termed as just criminal, but targeted against the settler population. RODA-P-2 confirms this:
It was not coincidental that a year later [1964], the first terrorist killing against a white
was committed right on his doorstep, which was inspired by none other than our friend,
Ndabaningi Sithole using Ndau tribesmen who had been trained in China, to come over
here and assassinate Petrus Johannes Oberholzer. It was always an area that had
potential for trouble, and that's how it turned out. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2010)

177

In addition there is another important point here, the confirmations of the involvement
of China in the training of insurgents; once trained were sent back in to the country to commit
terrorist acts (Clark, 1985, p. 15; Johnson & Martin, 1981, p. 12). “Everyone called them
‘Terrs’, short for terrorists, or CTs, Charlie Tango’s, they were also called Gooks” (RODA-P10; 27/-1/2011).
Chimurenga is a Shona word for 'revolutionary struggle', which aligns the movement
with the underlying theory of class conflict and revolution running through this research;
especially as this was ideologically bound to the teachings of Marx and Lenin. However,
according to Marxist teachings a peasantry cannot rebel successfully without outside
leadership (Miller & Aya, 1971, p. 59). Outside support and leadership were crucial in this
insurgency in order for it to prevail and both China and the Soviets were providing this
support (Reed, 1993, p. 36).
In line with the reasons given for the conflict in Kenya, the rebellion in Rhodesia was
also firmly tied to land issues. Ranger (1985) conducted a comparative analysis of the two
agrarian struggles and poses the question, “why did a “Mau Mau” not happen earlier in
Rhodesia “if some 100,000 Africans were evicted in Kenya and some 425,000 were evicted
in Rhodesia, the uprising should have taken place in [Rhodesia rather than Kenya]”(p. 103).
The evictions were in the 1940s and resentment was rife. Ranger (1985) argues that because
it did not happen in Rhodesia, this allowed the nationalist movement to expand outside of the
Ndebele tribe, who were the most affected, into a more diverse struggle in the 1970s (p. 131).
He goes on to assert that Shona tribe identified with these grievances, giving rise to a mass
peasant radicalism expressed as African nationalism culminating in guerrilla action in pursuit
of restoration of land (Ranger, 1985, p. 137).
The security forces comprised of at least five separate entities. The British South
Africa Police (BSAP, uniformed and plain clothes Central Investigation Department (CID),
plus Special Branch. There was the Army, the Air Force, the Internal Affairs (Intaf)
department and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO); all were directly involved in the
counterinsurgency campaign. Conscription of whites increased progressively as the war
intensified, but not for black Africans (White, 2004a, p. 109). The large number of black
Africans that were in the security forces were all volunteers (p. 118). In addition there was
the involvement of South Africa, who sent members of its police force up to Rhodesia as
support units (Godwin & Hancock, 1993, p. 89; Raeburn, 1978, p. 7).
A number of assumptions have been made over the years of the strength of the army.
According to Beckett (1985) “the great majority of the personnel of the Security Forces
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remained black....to around 70 per cent. Approximately 75 per cent of the BSAP were also
black” (p. 174). However, Wall (1980) indicates that in 1978 actual strength of the army was
actually 5,027, considerably less than has been often supposed. “The figure in respect of the
soldiery are interesting in that in March 1976 it was stated there were 1.5 black soldiers for
every white” (Wall & Van Tonder, 1980, p. 179). He goes on to state the actual composition
was:
Officers -555
Women’s Service -275
White soldiers –2,264
Black soldiers –1,933. (Wall & Van Tonder, 1980, p. 179)
These figures indicate that black Africans were not in the majority. Figures for the
British South Africa Police (BSAP) indicate that they had approximately 5,000 full time with
“35,000 predominately white BSAP reservists” (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 180). Stapleton (2011)
states the strength at the height of the war was “approximately 2,000 white and 6,000 black
full-time police (2012, p. 5).
One of the principal weapons used in an insurgency was intimidation; this took a
number of forms as RODA-P-2 stated, “Murders, tortures, assaults, burning huts, whatever;
and witchcraft.” The last element mentioned was witchcraft that was prevalent during this
conflict and consequently has a later section 7.15, dealing with it more fully. When asked
what could be done about countering intimidation, RODA-P-2 described how important it
was to support the local population, “to continuously be with the people, not in a guarding
capacity, but be there, to talk to them, sleep with them and eat with them.”
1965 may have been when the conflict was considered serious enough to call it a war,
but it was 1972 when this became a fully fledged confrontation and accelerated, as RODA-P3 conforms when asked when he thought it had changed, “'72, I was in Bulawayo”. He went
on to describe why he though this:
Ja, absolutely. The intensity, absolutely, Ja, because of the fronts. There were new
fronts being opened up all the time. So I mean, how the thing really got going around
about that period, and that of course, now you're talking about ZANLA, ZANLA's
intensity. ZIPRA had already commenced their operations into Matabeleland in the
'60s. Operation Nickel; I think was their major one, which incorporated the South
African ANC. So that was in the late '60s, and then the intensity commenced after.
(RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
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It is important to note this second major stage in the war, as a number of external
events changed its tenor particularly from 1975 when Mozambique gained Independence
(McLaughlin, 1978, p. 179). Up until 1972 it could be argued that the Rhodesians were able
to control the insurgency; certainly from a military perspective (Hoffman, Taw, & Arnold,
1991, p. 11). A good indicator of the increase in tempo of the conflict can be gained from
considering the figures for the insurgents. By the Security Forces’ own estimates, the number
of guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia grew from 350 or 400 in July 1974 to 700 by March
1976, 2350 by April 1977, 5598 by November 1977, 6456 by March 1978, to 11,183 by
January 1979 and as many as 12,500 by the end of the war. (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 179)
7.4

Counter-Insurgency
The development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary and learning

process. The Rhodesians were mindful of other conflicts, particularly Kenya:
Counter-insurgency training for all Rhodesian Security Forces was adapted according
to the lessons learnt in Kenya.... everything that could be learnt about the causes,
consequences and handling of the Mau Mau insurgency was recorded, and a series of lectures
and training demonstrations was prepared for delivery throughout Southern Rhodesia.
(Flower, 1987, p. 10)
In addition to these comments another important source of experience came from
those who had served in Malaya:
The Malayan conflict had a major impact on Rhodesian counter-insurgency tactics
initially, thanks to the fact that many of the officers of the rank of major and above in
the mid-1960s served in Malaya with the federal Army units that were deployed there.
These included what was to become C Sqn SAS, from the Rhodesian Unit the Malayan
Scouts, the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. I am not
sure if 1 and 2 KAR also served in Malaya that was before my time! When I joined the
Rhodesian Army in 1965 our contact and counter-ambush drills were text-book
Malaya. (RODA-M-8; 17/01/2011)
Counter-insurgency requires a comprehensive, strategic and organised approach that
needs to be clearly defined and then articulated. Part of this requirement was the allocation of
resources and identification of threats. Based upon these factors, which required detailed
intelligence, the operational imperatives could be assessed and defined for action. Figure 7.1
displays the operational areas together with those of their opponents.
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Figure 7.1 Operational areas in Rhodesia
(Wall, 2012)
Figure 7.1 indicates the number of borders that Rhodesia was trying to defend and
how the country was divided into sectors for operational efficiency in order to achieve this. In
addition this use of sectors fits with the provisions suggested in Table 7.2 by the French for
the use of quadrillage.
7.5

Hearts and Minds
“It was the dictates of political ideology that led Rhodesia’s security forces into the

classical dilemma of all counterinsurgents: victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla
forces in the field, but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of
the population” (Evans, 2007, p. 176).
The respondents were asked their impressions of ‘hearts and minds’ and whether it
was commonly understood. The reply by RODA-P-3 was “No, we understood it, actually
hearts and minds was a big issue. There was a big push to try and convert, to get to hearts and
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minds”. He was pressed to consider when this came into the strategy, “It was late. It was too
late [emphasis]” he continued:
You know, at this stage I mean it was almost full on war. I don't think there was too
much support. No. I think Internal Affairs were probably [involved], because they were
involved in it as well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
RODA-P-4 was not supportive of the idea either, “Ja I did, first of all I didn’t, I still
think it was a waste of time, lets, when I say I thought it was quite a good concept but I
changed my mind” and gave the impression that being soft on the population would not stop
them from supporting the insurgents as they used brutal intimidation tactics:
I am a believer of fight fire with fire, but we could never be as gruesome as the gooks
[insurgents], ... you know like cutting off peoples lips and noses and things like that,
that was their speciality the gooks, we could never match that brutality so I think their
hearts and minds worked much better than giving some vitamins some juju sweets.
(RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)
RODA-P-5 gives a similar view point when responding:
We couldn’t give a shit for that [hearts and minds], it was a load of crap the people
working on it, it was a load of crap, ... the fellows working on the hearts and minds they
were hopeless cases, it didn’t really work out so ja, that hearts and minds didn’t work
up there, they had it going in the middle of the war but it and towards the end but it
didn’t really work at all. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
Nevertheless, he also makes another point comparing the approach they got from the
villagers when they pretended not to be with the security forces but with the insurgents:
Well we did that ourselves, we would supply villages but again we would try it as
security force soldiers and then we’d try it as ZANLA terrorists or ZIPRA terrorists and
we got a far better reception as ZANLA or ZIPRA terrorists, simple as that. (RODA-P5; 26/01/2011)
Rather than attempting to provide the rural African with more facilities, there was a
tendency to concentrate on broadening the representation of the African in government,
however, this meant little to the average African and rarely offered a viable alternative to
guerrilla intimidation. Moreover, with the Security Forces intent on eliminating guerrillas
rather than winning hearts and minds, the latter tended to consist of a ‘carrot and stick’
approach (Beckett, 2007, p. 2). The stick was used for non cooperation with restrictions and
punishments.
Collective fines were introduced in January 1973 if the presence of guerrillas was not
reported within 72 hours, the fine being extracted in the form of livestock or, as in the case of
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Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, in the form of enforced closure of African grinding mills and
stores. Death sentences were introduced for harbouring guerrillas in September 1973 and the
two pieces of legislation providing the legal basis for the enforcement of anti-terrorist
measures-the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act-were
constantly updated (Beckett, 2007, p. 2).
A summary given by RODA-P-6 is perhaps the best indication of the difficulties that
beset the Rhodesians:
The police were the main people responsible for the insurgency to keep law and order
but internal affairs, the District Commissioner were actually the people responsible,
because all the rural areas fell under them. So between, Internal Affairs and the police
and the Military they decided to try a hearts and minds campaign based on the old
Kenya and the old Mau Mau and Malaya. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
RODA-P-6 went on to describe how they tried to set up Protected Villages (PVs) but
indicated that intimidation was still rife:
The theory was right, but in reality in never really worked because the people were
more terrified of the guerrillas then they were of the Government, the people were more
on the side of the guerrillas than the side of the Government so it was unsuccessful,
very unsuccessful. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
A number of very important points are expressed in this summary and are dealt with
subsequently. Although the police were at the forefront of dealing with the insurgency it was
the Districts Commissioners that implemented the measures. These were similar to those that
had been used elsewhere in the colonies, such as protective villages and food control; with
varying degrees of success. The last point regarding intimidation is a very important one, as
the respondent points out that ‘hearts and minds’ will not work, if the population are more
terrified of the insurgents than they are of the Government and its promises.
7.5.1

Intimidation

Although, the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ is usually perceived as a gentle approach
it can be achieved by harsh measures too; as this description by RODA-P-5 elucidates:
To ensure that the locals did not pass on information, the Mugabe forces entered in the
North East, would accuse an old man, usually too senile to even talk, of being an
informer. A rock placed on his head and the kraal [villages] dwellers were forced to
jump on the rock until we had what became known as a 'flathead'. Security forces,
frustrated by not being called in the first place, would react to the scene and at times
slap a few locals because they did not come forward with the information. Meanwhile,
the flathead perpetrators had returned to Mozambique, only to return when the Security
Forces had departed. They would again accuse the locals of being informants and
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another flathead. Soon the locals were deadly silent and no one reported the presence of
Terrs [to the Security Forces]. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
It can be seen from this account that the use of violence and intimidation would
ensure the minds of the population remained firmly in support of the insurgents, even if their
hearts thought otherwise (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179). Endorsing this
description was the comment from RODA-P-2 about how much intimidation was taking
place “Absolute, all over, absolute total intimidation, 90% of the time”. The process of
indoctrination though intimidation was a definite strategy according to RODA-P-6:
ZANLA and ZANU got more entrenched and succeeded in indoctrinating the local
population their influence spread like a plague as they went ahead because of their
political indoctrination they were extremely successful in infiltrating large numbers of
people, and the campaign spread rapidly through the country, they made a lot of ground
because of their tactics that they used to indoctrinate the locals, terrify the locals, attack
the local farmers. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
RODA-P-6 went on to describe what further form the process to control the minds of
the population took:
Because they used political indoctrination they were taught by the Chinese, very
successful, holding meetings of the locals, forcing them to sing, killing zealots, killing
government representatives, chiefs, counsellors that sort of thing, ZIPRA never did that
and by that way they terrified the local population, and they subjugated them, and they
involved them in the struggle, ZAPU never involved the locals in the struggle. (RODAP-6; 23/01/2011)
Once again the difference between the two revolutionary movements has been
highlighted and is considered a significant factor when analysing the varying strategies.
Understanding your enemy’s strategy is a central part of developing a counter-insurgency
capability. Unfortunately, the ability to counter violent intimidation is very difficult, without
extensive resources.
7.6

Strategies
The need to separate the population from the insurgents has been laid out as a critical

strategy progressively throughout this study. Forced resettlement of the population into
Protected Villages (PVs), or ‘Villagisation’ as is sometimes referred to, was used in Rhodesia
as well:
I believe that the Rhodesian senior command looked at the Briggs Plan as there were
Rhodesian units (RAR and SAS) deployed in Malaya and were involved in its
implementation there. Some elements of the plan were used in the Protected Village
(PV) concept in Rhodesia. Having said that, I also know that the Rhodesian senior
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command studied a similar tactic used by the Portuguese in Mozambique, which also
had limited success... In comparing this with the Malaya Emergency one could possibly
argue that the Rhodesians borrowed the best bits of Britain's strategy. (RODA-I-15;
30/06/2012)
RODA-I-15 goes on to describe how this was managed by the Department of Internal
Affairs, which had become a paramilitary arm of the administration:
The key to the success of any such concept will always be the civilian population and
their attitude, who [sic] are being placed in the villages. From a Rhodesian view point
they looked at the enemy in detail and realised that there was merit in the idea. They
also determined that the responsibility for the PVs should be in the hands of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs [Intaf] and this is where Intaf became a paramilitary force.
(RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)
A tacit agreement that the Rhodesians were adopting and using ideas used in other
insurgencies, as RODA-M-14 indicated earlier, “the Rhodesians borrowed the best bits of
Britain's strategy.” As he was in INTAF, he was in a good position to comment on its record:
Obviously there were some Intaf members and others including the elements of the
BSAP and army who were against the Para-militarisation of the Ministry, but the
necessities of the war negated their protests. Towards the end of the war, Intaf had the
widest coverage of the country and the BSAP, army and air force were so stretched that
many parts of the country were under partial guerrilla control, and only Intaf was left to
try and do something about it. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)
Perhaps, this clearly puts into perspective how stretched the Rhodesian forces were
towards the end of the war and why they were forced to the negotiating table at Lancaster
House (Preston, 2004, p. 67):
The Protected Village scheme was much more unpopular with the enemy that with the
local civvies. It was a direct Intaf responsibility and was based on the statement of Mao
concerning the fish and water. If you take the water away from the fish they die! This
was a major problem for the enemy as they were being deprived of food, intelligence,
and home comforts. This was why so many of the PVs were regularly attacked during
the war. This was also why Guard Force was raised, initially under command of Intaf,
to take over the guarding [and] protection of PVs. The focus of Guard Force was soon
diverted to rail and farm protection because of the deteriorating situation and Intaf
continued to look after the PVs in their entirety. (RODA-M-14; 30/06/2012)
It appears these PV’s were also called ‘Keeps or ‘Povos”:
In the Beitbridge area specifically we had a number of Keeps. So that all the locals
where actually confined to these Keeps to try and minimize the support from the
ground. What we called a Povo. What they called a Povo for the ZANLA. (RODA-P-3;
25/01/2011)
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These appear more like overnight defensive potions than actual villages, which would
have been protected at night but during the day the locals would return to their normal
activities. Too often the Security Forces had forcibly removed the Africans to PVs and it is a
measure of the failure of resettlement in Rhodesia that some 70 PVs in areas such as Mtoko,
Mrewa and Mudsi had all restrictions lifted in September 1978 in the wake of the internal
settlement. In almost every case the security situation immediately deteriorated, indicating
how far the authorities had failed to win over the population (Beckett, 2007, p. 2).
RODA-P-11 was not supportive of the concept of PV’s either and asserted that he felt
they were counter-productive and badly placed:
I personally was not in favour of the PV concept in Rhodesia. It might of worked
elsewhere, but in our case the PV's were first created in the rural north east of the
country. Elsewhere, where they were created from a solid, well protected area and
moved outwards. This meant that protection and logistics were far away. It also meant
that terrorists, in order to have contact with locals had to move inward more quickly, in
other words they were being brought closer to towns and farms, because without local
support, forced or otherwise, they could not feed themselves. It also meant that our
ability to gain intelligence was hampered. The protection of the PV's was suspect and
the plan that locals from within [the PV] would assist in the protection did not really
come about. Some months later, it took the Terrs just one night to remove the locals
from the PV. (RODA-P-11; 24/01/2011)
RODA-P-4 was also dismissive of the idea when asked if they worked:
They also didn’t work, I think it was from right in the beginning they were talking
about [them]you see the Portuguese had these Aldeiamentos, which was a protected
village, they didn’t even work 50% of the time”. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)
A implication that PVs were not effective due to the lack of the necessary protection,
made them very vulnerable to attack, as he stated in the last sentence “it took the Terrs just
one night to remove [eliminate] the locals from the PV”. Although a model taken from the
Malayan Emergency, it appears that application was as erratic, as it had been in Kenya, and
loosely linked to an overall concept of ‘hearts and minds’; thus making it piecemeal rather
than a concerted integrated strategy (Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-99). A pilot scheme for PVs had
been tried in 1973, but the “main scheme then commenced with Operation ‘Overload’ in July
1974....Estimates of the total population of PVs range from 350,000 to 750,000 Africans”
(Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 180).
It also appears that the other aspect of food control, associated with PVs, was not
working either:
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Invariably you would have a protected village in that area so that tended to be a bit of a
fuck up. They didn’t achieve much at all and no I think it was just feeding bins for the
gooks. As you give the money to the people in the stockade there out it goes that night
to the gooks. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
Collective punishment, summary arrest and food control formed part of the strategy;
as they had done in other campaigns. Although criticised by Evans (2007), as a failure to
apply ‘hearts and minds’ as a constructive strategy, he also indicates that the PV’s were less
about protecting the population and more about creating free zones for the army to operate
within (p. 186). A similar interpretation is given by Beckett (1985) too, “PV’s were regarded
purely as a means of population control rather than a basis for winning ‘heart and minds”(p.
180). It would appear that “protected villages proved to be counter-productive” (Ellert, 1989,
p. 27).
7.6.1

Incentives

Incentives were used to encourage captures or kills according to RODA-P-5:
That’s right, because we paid them well, and then we had this bonus system okay for
the Selous Scouts and the SAS only, every gook{insurgent] you killed you got 50 rand
[Rhodesian dollars]or 100 rand, if you killed 20 gooks total that by 100 rand. (RODAP-5; 26/01/201)
Asked how were the ‘kills’ verified? “I would go on the ground and count the
bodies”. He also confirmed that they did not cut off ears as they had done in Malaya:
I would go on the ground and count but a lot of the time it wasn’t necessary, because
that came one of the captures we said well how many of them were you, well there
were 10 of us well we killed 6 and maimed them and where was the other. The
intelligence was very good, coming from the likes of Pete [removed], you know Pete,
he actually had every single gook named right up towards the end of the war until all
the field boys joined in and then you just lost control there. If you picked up one fellow,
Pete would interrogate him for two weeks and you know he went to he’d go from
where you were born, you went to school, you did this you did that, you joined that
cadre, who was your commander, who taught you this, in depth stuff. (RODA-P-5;
26/01/201)
The second part of his response deals with two important aspects connected with
intelligence. One is the level at which the Special Branch were operating, down to the point
where they could actually identify dead bodies correctly, verifying the finger-prints. The
other is how intensive intelligence gathering was to the overall process. The latter linked back
to what was called ‘Ground Coverage’.
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7.7

The Rhodesian Police: The British South Africa Police (BSAP)
As in both Kenya and Malaya, the police formed not only the backbone of the

counter-insurgency effort but they also continued to play a major role in maintaining law and
order; as well as obtaining intelligence (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, pp. 50-51). The
BSAP had approximately 5,000 with “35,000 predominately White BSAP reservists”
(McLaughlin, 1978, p. 180). At the height of the war the numbers increased to 2,000 whites
and 6,000 blacks in the regular police (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 50): The important
role the black policemen played within the BSAP should not be underestimated, especially
their knowledge of local languages and cultures (Stapleton, 2011, p. 236). In addition was the
role of the reservists according to RODA-P-9:
The number of police reservists was substantial for a small country and did a fantastic
job manning stations, providing radio support around the clock and indeed taking part
in military type operations. Most farmers were members of the reserve and most were
fantastic shots. Some were outstanding bush trackers. (RODA-P-9; 24/01/2011)
RODA-P-9, went on to say how important the reservists were to the overall structure
of the force as they provided well needed expertise as well as their time and energy, “Some of
the best operational planners that I met were not members of the regular forces, but non
regulars; like 2 and 6 Battalion of Bulawayo - who in civvy street were doctors, lawyers,
farmers, businessmen”. These statements align with those given by the Kenya Police
respondents where the Kenya Police Reserve played a similar role, as does this comment
regarding the air support:
There was a Police Reserve Air Wing that played a very important part in the conflict.
The reason for my comment is that as the war progressed, our Air Force was involved
in many external operations in support of the SAS, Scouts and RLI, and internally the
PRAW [Police Reconnaissance Air Wing] members were assisting wherever possible,
often assisted in bringing injured members of the SF back to base, landing on farm
strips and on one occasion the main road between Beit Bridge and Gwanda;
transporting security personnel from one base to another. (RODA-P-9; 24/01/201)
7.7.1

Ground-Coverage

The Rhodesian Police force had developed an extensive intelligence network based on
daily police duties in the field, which was termed ‘Ground-Coverage’. A comprehensive
picture of what was happening in the local villages was built up continually by policemen
when they were patrolling:
This include the names of all those from the village, what they were doing, where they
were going, how they made their living, in fact everything that assisted in maintaining a
comprehensive intelligence image of each village. Each constable would have his own
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informants and these would be paid for their information on degree of ‘usefulness’.
This was then sent back to Special Branch teams who would collate the intelligence in
to District reports, which allowed them to indentify insurgent activity and direct the
Security forces to those areas where they had the best chance of obtaining good results.
(RODA-P-12; 10/01/2011)
Confirmation of how this worked in practice was given by RODA-P-2:
I'd be doing patrolling. They'd be doing patrolling. We would patrol together [white and
black policemen]. We'd collected it [intelligence]. We had special forms we had to fill
in or type in. Can't remember if it was weekly or monthly or daily? We'd send that
through to Special Branch, to our Special Branch runners. They would sift from it and
send it up to Special Branch Headquarters. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)
He went on to elucidate further, as this was a major contribution to the overall
intelligence capability of the Rhodesian forces:
Well we were the only people based in an area who had knowledge of that area. We
were always in that area we were always patrolling from that area. We always had
information as to what was going on in that area. We ran our sources and if we required
any military assistance, army I'm talking about or air force we would call it. (RODA-P2; 27/01/2011)
7.7.2

Operations

The importance of being able to speak the local language fluently allowed the police
to operate more effectively, as they did not have to use interpreters as RODA-P-2 describes a
typical operation:
He gave me a hell of a lot of information. And I went on my own. He would say to me,
"Don't come tonight, the boys are in the area," or "Come tomorrow," or whatever. And
I used to go on my own. We used to visit guys down the village on a mission in
Shobani; we used to travel on our own. Yourself and one of your black guys and in hot
[dangerous], hot areas. We had a Land Rover pickup. I used to pull the wires out of the
one headlight and go down with one headlight, and come back and plug the wires in the
two headlights and put a tin over the exhaust, so it looked like a different vehicle
coming backwards and forwards. Little things like that. So Ja, we used to do a lot on
our own. And you'd be better if you could speak the local lingo. (RODA-P-2;
27/01/2011)
The problems for non Rhodesian born expatriates was raised to see if those not born
and raised in Rhodesia could be effective without the language skills:
They did well. They got good information. But what I'm saying, it was hard for them.
They were restricted in doing what we could do, because we knew the custom, we
knew the language, knew the people, respected the people; which we did. We respected
the fact that they had a hierarchy of control whatever. We'd go through those channels
if necessary. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)
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Knowledge of the local language and customs was beneficial for all aspects associated
with dealing with the population. The importance of this aspect to the Security Forces, has
been raised in all three case studies, as it has been recognised as one of significant factors for
the Colonial authorities: even more so for the Rhodesians.
7.7.3

Police Anti-Terrorist Unit

The police had a number of specialist units including the police Anti-Terrorist Unit
(PATU) established in 1960. Bailey, who served with the Long Range Desert Group in World
War Two-forerunner to the SAS-set this unit up with personnel drawn from the Rural Police
Reserve. Credited with being more successful “than the rest of the Services put together”
(Flower, 1987, p. 123) Other police units included the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
teams for urban incidents; A police Field Force support unit also known colloquially as the
“Black Boots”, an Urban Emergency Unit, as well as the mounted division..It was important
to ascertain whether PATU was just a duplicate of similar army units:
It was more independent. They were able to operate on their own more efficiently.
Also, guys from that particular area that were members of PATU so they knew the area,
they knew the roads, they knew the koppies [hills] and the caves and that sort of thing. I
was a member of PATU for many years. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)
RODA-P-4 was able to add more details about the unit:
It started off as for additional training. . . . I mean we had instructors and they were
good blokes, you know Bill Bailey he was ex long range desert group; and he was
original SAS, but I mean their concept was with dessert war fighting, you know. So we
had no real instructors on terrorist warfare. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)
Indications are that in the police developed their tactics incrementally with additional
support from the army. “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment
functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). With regard to
Rhodesia it could be argued this was the case, as all units worked closely with each other. As
a result the transfer of intelligence and operational know-how between the security forces
units was extremely good. Once again this highlights another important advantage the
Colonial forces had between all their security apparatus.
7.8

Intelligence
The previous two chapters have identified intelligence to be a central requirement in

order to prosecute a counter-insurgency campaign (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 32). It can be argued
that the Rhodesians understood the importance of this dimension through the way they linked
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their intelligence gathering agencies under one organisation: the Central Intelligence
Organisation (CIO). In 1963, the CIO was formed consisting of eleven branches, including
Special Branch and all its separate divisions: internal, external, military, government
telecommunications, close security and government protective security (Flower, 1987, p. 17).
The incorporation of Special Branch was to make the difference, as it had its ‘finger-on-thepulse’ in a way that Military Intelligence could never achieve. In essence an insurgency is a
civil war and the population hold the information required, which can be accessed through
the abilities of the police force linking back to Special Branch (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 9).
It was seen as a Special Branch task to patiently piece together the ever-increasing
jigsaw pieces of day-to-day information. Who were the insurgents? What were they up
to? Where were they being trained? Who was training them? Who was supplying
them? Where were their supply routes? Who were the known sympathisers? And so
on ad infinitum. (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 10)
Meshing intelligence into an effective outcome saw the development of a joint
operation between the Army and Special Branch, using a technique that had been used in
both Kenya and Malaya to great effective: Pseudo Gangs. The new unit was called the Selous
Scouts and was formed in 1973, “it was a union which was to have far-reaching effects on the
war in the future” (Stiff, 1982, p. 47). The evolution of the development in Rhodesia will be
dealt with in section 7.12 Special Branch and in section 7.13 Special Units.
Special Branch had also penetrated deep into the various insurgent groups:
We also worked with political sources/contacts, deep cover, and those worked very
very well for us okay. So we had deep cover stuff in ZANLA and ZIPRA and the
Government right the way through until Mugabe took over. They were turned, they
were primed earlier on, they were primed later, they were primed at that time and then
proved to be very, very good that sort of thing. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
Asked if he thought the information was reliable, “Oh 100% because you would pick
up very quickly if he was talking shit”. In addition, was he able to ascertain this though his
knowledge of the local language?
Not only my knowledge of the language, but my knowledge of the Takawira sector
where I had been working for a year and a half, or my knowledge of that particular
gang of gooks or whatever you know. You would very quickly find out if he was
talking nonsense. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
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The constant gathering of intelligence was critical as the Rhodesians did not have the
manpower to cover the country, with a white population of 250, 000, in a country the size of
France:
The only way they could counter that was to try and build up a very comprehensive
intelligence picture of how the structures worked and then to select certain areas and
when an area became too saturated they would take a whole Fire-Force and go in there
and try and eradicate as quick as possible when they knew from intelligence there were
big groups of guerrillas that could be easily countered. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
7.9

Special Branch
The majority of the respondents were former members of Special Branch; therefore

this case study is predominately a reflection of their views. It is important to emphasise that
Special Branch played a central role in this conflict, predominately based upon the positive
developments from other conflicts, chiefly Malaya and Kenya. Special Branch adopted many
of the strategies and tactics, in particularly the use of pseudo operations from Kenya (Parker,
2006, p. 27):
Obviously our major responsibility was intelligence gathering. But at that stage, there
was more emphasis on the internal operations, in terms of nationalism; also, tradeunionism, all those sort of things, and the European desk. There was a European desk
as well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
RODA-P-3 was asked to clarify why they would have a European desk, as ‘European’
was the word used in Southern Africa for whites:
Well, when I say European desk, it was white activists. There were a lot of white
activists. But then the emphasis obviously started changing, once the infiltrations were
starting to become effective. Then they started setting up these various desks of
ZANLA, ZIPRA, and so it carried on. We started getting far more involved in the
actual internal and external intelligence gathering, specifically on nationalism and of
course their military rank. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/201)
Special Branch also ran operations in Rhodesia and these were very effective.
7.9.1

Selous Scouts and Special Branch

It was then important to clarify how Special Branch (SB) changed over the course of
the war particularly with its relationships with other units:
As things went along they sort of formed these joint operational commands and
obviously we've started working far closer with the army with the military. And in
particular what actually happened was with the Scouts. They setup liaison officers at
the various what they called forts, they were liaison directly between ourselves and the
Scouts. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
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‘Scouts’ is a reference to the Selous Scouts that were formed especially as a
counterinsurgency and intelligence gathering unit; their formation came out of what was
called ‘Z’ desk in SB, according to RODA-P-5. He goes on to add “we started off pseudo
operations, Z desk operations at Red-Bricks, it was so successful that they then formed the
Selous scouts, that’s where Uncle Ron comes in”. His reference to Uncle Ron; is to Ron
Reid-Daley, who became head of the Scouts:
Then the unit formed the Selous Scouts got bigger and bigger and then they ended up
being part of the biggest kill rate in the war but they still remained the same, they still
did pseudo stuff all the way through. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
The development of a dedicated unit using pseudo operational tactics was very
significant, as the next statement added:
So the Scouts went across there [outside of Rhodesia]as well, and then the Scouts from
doing pseudo ground operations in Rhodesia then did flying column operations into
Mozambique and Zambia, but again still pseudo, always dressed as the opposition.
(RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
The use of ‘flying columns’ was considered a major development; as this indicates
that the realm of operations had increased into neighbouring countries. There were also other
important units “you had the Selous Scouts working internal and external, you had the SAS
working only external, and then you had the RLI killing machine and that was a brilliant
killing machine” (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011). RODA-P-5 was asked why it worked so well:
You had the two units combined so it was actually brilliant because you had your
intelligence from Z desk and CIO okay, and then you had the fire power and the man
power from the army and the aircraft as well. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
The link between Special Branch and the Selous Scouts was an important one:
For them to operate they were very reliant on our, [pause] not control but our
involvement. They had to have our involvement because it involved freezing of areas;
making sure that there was co-ordination between the various other services. And of
course, we were the ones that were ultimately getting the intelligence out of these
blokes handing them back to them for continued operations etc. so, they were very
reliant on us. It was more of a closely working liaison with it, very difficult. (RODA-P3; 25/01/2011)
The other important point mentioned here is the use of Joint Operational Command; a
particular feature that evolved during this campaign. The other was the pivotal role that
Special Branch played in turning captured insurgents, collating information and providing an
operational framework for all units to use when formulating their plans.
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RODA-P-3 indicates that using already turned insurgents to convince newly captured
ones was part of this process, “We also used some of the captured guys to turn people. The
turning of a capture [insurgent] wasn't a difficult task”. When asked why he thought it was
not difficult to turn ‘captures’, he replied, “Because I think they had had enough out there.
They had had enough. They had seen what we could do. Some of them were very lucky to be
alive; very lucky to be alive”. An indication that changing sides did not trouble them as he
added:
No, not at all, not at all[emphasis], and in fact, I can't recall, certainly from our little
unit that we had there, we didn't have one desertion. Not one desertion. They lived
within Beitbridge, within the compounds of Beitbridge. They had their weapons. There
was no problem. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2012)
Confirmation was provided from another respondent RODA-P-5, who had been a
member of SB:
I think out of the whole war three went sour. One fellow just turned around in the
middle of the night and killed the whole call sign [stick]; another one killed two or
three of a call sign, so we only had three that went sour which is bloody good in a 10
year war. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
RODA-M- 13 also confirmed this statement:
The reason for the Terrs changing sides was quite simple - they were not that politically
motivated and many did not want to leave the country for training, but were forced to
do so. Whilst in Gwanda in the later 70's we had 10-12 captured Terrs at our base, three
ZIPRA and the remainder ZANLA. In almost all instances they turned within a very
short time after capture, some the same day. None were tortured. All were asked
individually at some point in time if they wanted to go home and all declined, including
one member of the ZANLA General Staff, in other words, a field General. (RODA-M13; 29/07/2012)
Clarifying the development of the pseudo operations indicates that it had been running
in Special Branch first, before it became a total concept involving the army as well:
They were running off pseudo operations on a test, on a testing basis and I got involved
with that so I was working with the pseudo operators before the Selous scouts were
formed. I think it was towards the end of 73. RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011
It is considered significant that Special Branch were running their own pseudo
operations before the Army became involved through the Selous Scouts. As RODA-P-3
stated, “as I said to you, we had our own little unit that we had developed from captures. The
original pseudo operation started early in the '70s”. He was when asked to clarify who
actually ran these units, “Originally, Special Branch, originally, until the army got involved
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and then I think Walls. General Walls”. Asked which section of SB he replied, “Well we had
the Branch One and Branch Two, Branch One did that”. RODA-P-3 then provided an
interesting aside, “they had the black Special Branch members as well”, which was important
to show how much the security forces were integrated, especially the police. Having black
Africans allowed them to fit into the local populace:
It was unconventional and of course it wasn't a conventional war we were fighting. We
were fighting a terrorist warfare, bush war. And they had to fit in; they had to melt in
with the local populace. And it worked. It worked. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
The overall coordination of the pseudo operations was undertaken by SB, “It was such
a delicate operation. You had to have the coordination. You know, areas were frozen. Who
could freeze an area? It had to be coordinated, so that's where the Special Branch came in
too” added RODA-p-3. The ability to freeze an area meant that no other security forces could
enter during the operation to prevent inadvertently killing your own forces.
In Kenya, witchcraft appears to have played an important role in the ability to sway
captured insurgents that the power of the spell had been broken by their arrest. It was
significant to ascertain from RODA-P-3 if this was the case in Rhodesia, “No, not in that
area. But I think up in the Mashonaland area, very much so, very much so”. Unfortunately he
could not confirm how far it was an influence ‘Look, I never operated up there, so I can't, I
think so, yes, definitely, from what I've read anyway, ja”. However, RODA-P-4 confirmed
that there was a connection to Kenya through the early trail runs of Pseudo Operations:
Mike Powell and I remember talking to him and he had done Pseudo work in Kenya
and I think, but I think he was killed in one of those Viscounts that were shot down and
they had also done experimental, but under Special Branch. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)
Sometimes disguise was used just for patrols although it appears that more
surreptitious operations were being conducted outside of Rhodesia:
You had your pseudo gangs operating within the borders of Rhodesia and anyone who
operated external were more clandestine, although they dressed as gooks it was just to
blend in and maybe patrol it was just a disguise, but there were no pseudo operations as
such carried out. Ja. Because the whole idea was to get in amongst the locals and take
out groups, ultimately try and control an area. . (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)
7.10 Specialised and Elite Units
Rhodesia developed a number of specialised units during the Bush war (Hoffman, et
al., 1991, pp. 23-24). The formation of the Selous Scouts and the close relationship with
Special Branch has already been discussed. The importance of this combined effort needs to
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be emphasised, as its capabilities have been well documented (Croukamp, 2006; Parker,
2006; Reid-Daly, 1999; Stiff, 1982). The other is the development of what was termed ‘FireForce’ concept, using the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) to be an air mobile attack unit,
acting on intelligence. The following units will be discussed:









Fire-Force
Dogs
Mounted Units
Grey Scouts
Rhodesian SAS
Tracker Units
Selous Scouts
Psychological Action Unit

7.11 Fire-Force
Fire-Force would be called in following up on the active-intelligence obtained by the
Selous Scouts or the BSAP and passed back through the chain. Using helicopters, which were
in short supply due to sanctions, the troops would be brought straight to the zone of insurgent
operations and confront them (Cocks, 1998; Stiff, 1982, pp. 86-87). Dakotas were also used
dropping Para-borne troops from the RLI and using a helicopter gun ship as a support. The
success of this tactic required expansion of the unit; as the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR)
was already trained and available they were integrated quickly. RAR was a predominately
black African unit by apparently, “there was no shortage of Black volunteers” to join FireForce (Croukamp, 2006, p. 182).
7.11.1 Dogs
Dogs were an integral part of all aspects of the security forces operations. Even the
Grey Scouts, who operated on horseback, had tracker dogs as part of the patrol (Onoszko,
1991, p. 17):
The BSAP deployed with dogs that were trained to follow human beings as well as for
detecting explosives. The Rhodesian Engineers also used dogs to detect explosives and
there was at least one female dog handler who was extremely good at finding and
lifting mines! The Rhodesian Air Force used dogs for airfield protection and had a
number of handlers based at that major air bases at New Sarum, Salisbury and at
Thornhill in Gwelo. The Prison Service also used dogs for security purposes at the
different jails. Another little known unit was the Rhodesia Railways Security Unit who
were responsible for all railway lines and stations. They had their own dog training and
handlers and deployed at the major centres of Rhodesia. (RODA-I-15; 20/06/2012)

196

7.11.2 Mounted Units
Mounted Units formed an important component of operations against the insurgents,
for all the reason already identified in the two previous case studies. There was a historical
precedent for the use of horses as the BSAP was formed as mounted force (McLaughlin,
1978, p. 179). “The BSAP had one troop of mounted men attached to Black Boots who were
used for tracking purposes, ground coverage ops in support of Black Boot operations”
according to RODA-P-2. The army also saw the merits of using horses and formed the Grey
Scouts in 1976.
7.11.3 Grey Scouts
After a successful trail run with the Mounted Infantry Unit, the Grey Scouts were
formed. The benefit of using horses was seen as a viable way to compensate for the lack of
helicopters for getting forces to a ‘contact’. Furthermore, there was a shortage of fuel for
vehicles, coupled the ability of the horse to cross rugged terrain and the benefits are obvious
(Onoszko, 1991). “Horses were less vulnerable to mines and ambushes than vehicles.
Additionally, horse-mounted troops were better able to detect insurgent groups in the bush
than helicopter borne troops” (p. 16).
7.11.4 Rhodesian SAS
The SAS were formed as part of the reformed parent unit and joined them in the
Malayan Emergency. They returned to Rhodesia post Emergency although disbanded before
being reformed in 1961.Orginally trained in Hereford, Britain, with the remnants of those
from the Malayan Emergency, becoming ‘C’ squadron SAS. The trained ‘cadre’ returned to
Rhodesia and became the instructors for the build up of the unit from 1962 onwards (Cole,
1984, pp. 18-20). Principally used for external operations, primarily intelligence gathering,
they were a highly effective unit (Hoffman, et al., 1991, pp. 77-87). The numbers of men in
the SAS went up to approximately 250 when in June 1978 "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special
Air Service became 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment until the creation of
Zimbabwe in 1980, when it then disbanded (The Rhodesian SAS, 2012).
7.11.5 Tracker Units
There was the Army Tracker Combat Unit (TCU), which was used to train all other
units and operated in support of all others units as well. With the formation of the Selous
Scouts the TCU was transferred to operate directly with the Selous (Stiff, 1982, p. 82). The
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unique feature of the Rhodesian security forces were the large number of trackers, both white
and black, available to undertake tracking operations (Croukamp, 2006; Parker, 2006).
7.11.6 Selous Scouts
Developed from the success of pseudo operations run by Special Branch this unit
became the primary combat-intelligence gathering component of the Security Forces. It also
became used for external combat operations, as its capabilities were exploited due to
shortages of manpower (Hoffman, et al., 1991, pp. 87-90). “A full sixty eight percent of all
insurgent fatalities inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the Selous Scouts”(Cilliers, 1985, p.
133). The other aspect that is associated with these pseudo operations is the ability to sow
distrust and suspicion amongst different insurgent groups (Cilliers, 1985, p. 128).
Psychological warfare was also central to the efforts used by the regime in an effort to
undermine support for the insurgent’s minds (Melson, 2005, p. 63). The army also had
specialised unit called the Psychological Action Unit (PsyAc).
7.11.7 Psychological Action Unit
In addition to this unit a psychological warfare section was set up in 1977 to try and
influence the general falling support for the war. Indications are that it had more effect on the
white population than majority black and had poor results (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011,
p. 129). Conceptually bound to the phrase ‘Hearts and Minds’; yet at the offset did not even
have any black Africans on its staff. The implications for an effective strategy, or more likely
ineffective, are obvious (Stiff, 1982, pp. 280-281). Although it can be argued that aspects of
the psychological approach were apparent in other areas, particularly Intaf, generally the
realisation of its importance came too late to be successful as a strategy (Cilliers, 1985, p.
148). Confirmation of this came from RODA-I-15:
The Rhodesians were a bit slow in realising the importance of this and in an effort to
close the gap they introduced additional PsyOps [psychological operations] tactics over
and above the PV concept. This was possibly the wrong way around! The other
PsyOps measures included Interface Operations which were designed to get the locals
outside of the PVs on sides. It was implemented by both the army and Intaf units as
Operation Split-shot. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)
‘Split-Shot’ was similar to the approach taken in Kenya, dispersing leaflets from the
air in an effort to convince the population that they should support the Government. Closely
related to all aspects of psychological operations is the use of propaganda.
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7.12 Propaganda
Propaganda played an important role for all sides in this conflict: the insurgents and
the Government. Each side wished to show the other in a bad light and used ever trick and
nuance that they could to achieve this goal.
There was regularly fighting having a go at each other, killing each other. Because
obviously ZANLA were encroaching on ZIPRA territory Matabeleland belonged to
Nkomo; and ZANLA had this particular front and they were coming through. And in
fact towards the end they were pouring through. There were just sheer numbers. So
there was a lot of conflict. And obviously we used Scouts to ferment the situation,
absolutely and it worked magic. It worked very well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)
Part of the role played by the pseudo operations was destabilisation which tried to sow
discontentment and delusion amongst the differing factions of ZIPRA and ZANLA.RODA-P5 was asked, how much was his section of Special Branch used in destabilisation between the
two?
Heavily, heavily involved there, very heavily involved, Ja. It was an important element,
it was done through CIO [Central Intelligence Organisation] and externally, we got
them fighting each other externally, which was excellent; before they even sent the
troops in [to Rhodesia]”. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
7.13 Rhodesian Administration
The Department of Internal Affairs (Intaf) was created out of the old Native
Department with the use of District substituted in appointment titles. There were fifty-four
districts throughout Rhodesia and each was led by a District Commissioner (DC) (Wall,
2012). The following comments were made by RODA-P-2 and P-3:
Once again, Internal Affairs was like a legacy of the old colonial regime. We had the
District Commissioners and the tea-timers [derogatory] and all that crap. Some of the
DC's were indigenous white Rhodesians who were good at the job. But again, it was a
civilian organization becoming involved in a military campaign. (RODA-P-2;
27/01/2011)
Internal Affairs had good knowledge of the area. Internal Affairs did good things prior
to the war hitting your specific area. Dipping and dog vaccinations and patrolling the
areas and stuff like that. So they had good knowledge of the people. So in that respect it
was good but when they became involved in the conflict side they weren't all that good.
(RODA- P-3; 25/01/2011)
Intaf also provided valuable assistance with informer networks, guides, information
on the general area and logistical support for operations (Wall, 2007). Theextent of the role
played by Intaf is often underrated, which as the comments have shown is not deserved.
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The Protective Villages (PV) was the responsibility of Intaf, “Internal Affairs. They
were inside. They were part of the tribal authorities. They were the guards. Ja. And it
subsequently grew into a thing called Guard Force” (RODA-P-10; 27/01/2011).
As the war escalated and more PV's were built, the strain on the Ministry of Internal
Affairs to provide the required personal became prohibitive. It was argued that National
Servicemen were required to guard the people and patrol the area. The police were stretched
as was the Army. This eventually led to the formation of the Guard Force (Wall, 2007).
7.13.1 Legal Measures
Legal measures were in place as in other conflicts: Emergency Powers Act, the Law
and Order (Maintenance) Act 1964 amended 1974 and the Indemnity Compensation Act of
1975 (Hassan, 1984). However, Martial Law itself was not instituted until 1978, used
progressively to include more and more areas until by the end of the war it covered almost
90% of the country (Preston, 2004, p. 76). According to figures reported in the Boyd Report
(Boyd as cited Delap, 1979, p. 434) there were only 232 persons detained under the
Emergency Powers Acts, but this does not include statistics for Martial Law. Another
effective piece of legislation was the use of the curfew to restrict movement after day light
hours (Mushonga, 2005, p. 172).The legal measures are part of a suite of measures to
counter:
Intimidation, sabotage, violence, incitement, the carrying of weapons, and acts of
terrorism, the Act gives the police and the Minister of Home Affairs arbitrary powers
to control suspected or potential foes, and to criminalise ordinary political activity. It
provides for the prohibition of public meetings, processions, publications, the wearing
of certain uniforms, boycotting, passive resistance to the law, the making of
'subversive statements' broadly defined, and other forms of political protest and
opposition. (Weitzer, 1984, p. 532)
Rhodesia continued to uphold the rule of law as promulgated by the legislature. The
measures may well have been draconian, but no more so than had been applied in both Kenya
and Malaya, with the exception of Martial Law (Martin, 2006). The evidence of the use of the
judicial system to prosecute and try those arrested confirms the continued application of the
rule of law during the insurgency (Kirk, 1975, pp. 28-38).

200

7.14 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Spirit Mediums
In both Kenya and Rhodesia, tribal religion, witchcraft, sorcery and belief in ancestral
worship played a significant part in the conflicts. RODA-I-15 who served with Internal
Affairs (Intaf) explained further:
The Shona and Ndebele people have always practiced ancestral worship. They believe
that the spirit of individual ancestors will always settle in the individual bodies of the
living. There are specific ceremonies that take place to formalise this "process". The
individual who oversees this process is known as a "spirit medium". All black Africans
in sub Saharan Africa understand and believe this as being true ,even those who profess
to be Christians, even the likes of Mugabe and South Africa's Mandela. They also
believe that there are good and evil spirits and that an evil spirit can and will take
possession of a person’s body if it suits their purpose. A further belief is that a "witch
doctor" can encourage or get an evil spirit to possess a person and do his / her will. The
business of African religion and witch craft is a study in its own right. (RODA-I-15;
30/06/2012)
RODA-I-15 then went on to elucidate further:
In Intaf we were obliged to study African Customs and Customary Law and to write
exams on them. This also applied to African languages. Suffice to say we knew where
all the spirit mediums lived as did the locals and the enemy. The enemy did try to get
the spirit mediums to support them through intimidation or popularity. When a terrorist
gang moved into an area the first thing they did was to make contact with the spirit
mediums to get their "blessing" and their protection. If they did not then the spirits
would be angry and do them a disservice! The enemy believed that they could be and
were anointed with "medicine" to make them bullet proof etc. In my unit I was often
the only white person and most of my blokes all believed in the spiritual world.
(RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)
The Rhodesian authorities understood the importance that the tribal religion played
amongst the African population. The concept was not scoffed at by the Europeans, on the
contrary they went to great lengths to understand it and utilise it, as RODA-I-15 has outlined.
A considerable amount of research in support of this aspect of African society is available
(Gelfand, 1967; Lan, 1985; Ranger, 1985). Instructions to District Commissioners in the
1960s indicated that they needed to be more cognisant of the importance of the mediums and
their role in tribal loyalties towards the administration (Ranger, 1982, p. 365).
It was important to clarify whether oaths had been used as part of the binding process
in Rhodesia, as they had been in amongst the Mau Mau in Kenya; as both conflicts involved
Bantu tribes. RODA-P-11 explains:
I too don't think oaths were used, but Spirit Mediums, especially for ZANLA forces.
The main spirit medium is one that is always called/titled Mbuya Nehanda. The Brits
executed her in 1890, due to the number of witchcraft murders in the country, but a
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new one will always arise and seen as the authentic link with the fore-fathers. She
played a part during and after our war. (RODA-P-11; 24/01/2010)
The power of the spirit medium Nehanda should not be underestimated (Clark, 1985,
p. 119). Johnson (1981) also endorses the importance for the guerrilla leaders of
communicating with the first spirit leader Nehanda on all aspects of their plans (p. 75). Spirit
mediums played a crucial role in developing counter-guerrilla strategies (Evans, 2007, p. 185;
Johnson & Martin, 1981, pp. 75-78) The indoctrination and night time rallies held in the
villages, called pungwes, always included incantations to the great spirits (Ranger, 1985, p.
205).
It has been important to recognise the unique position tribal religion plays in African
culture (Mbiti, 1969, p. 1). Consequently, it was an important factor to deal with when
analysing the conflicts in Africa.
7.15 A Counter-Insurgency Plan
Developing a counter-insurgency plan requires considerable appreciation of the end
game, that is to say what are the ultimate objectives:
The objectives from the Rhodesians did change for the simple reason that as the
insurgency spread and became more country wide and more overpowering and
overwhelming, they decided at higher level that perhaps the best way to do it was to
attack them at their launching point in the countries surrounding the country deeper and
deeper and then eventually towards the end of the war to actually attack those countries.
That was the overall plan. (RODA-P-5; 23/01/2011)
Therefore, the plan evolved as the tempo of the war changed in line with tactics the
opposition were using:
The Rhodesian forces understood that, they understood the tactics used by both sides,
the tactics and fighting both sides were different, the strategy to attack or to counter
both sides was different, it was understood by the defence, the Rhodesian forces, it was
very well understood, it was understood. (RODA-P-6, 23/01/2011)
7.15.1 Joint Operations Centre
The creation of a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) was an important aspect that was
copied from the British in Malaya bringing together all arms of the Security Forces. High
ranked officers formed the Centre, so that command decisions could be made without
recourse to another layer of decision making. In addition they had oversight of all operations
to avoid conflicts with other operations (Hoffman, et al., 1991, p. vi). To further enhance the
system sub-JOCs were set up in major operational areas to coordinate activities. The JOC
held daily meetings to discuss operations and arrive at consensual command decisions.
202

Although JOCs worked well at the tactical level, the Rhodesians discovered that the system
was not effective at the senior command level, where ultimate authority had to be exercised
by a single ‘supreme’ commander; not created until 1977 when Lieutenant General Walls
became Commander of Combined Operations, but he too was still answerable to the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 61). Combined Ops linked
directly with the War Council, which was highest level of ministerial and operational control
for all sensitive operations (Melson, 2005, pp. 65-66). Walls remained answerable to the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which often hindered tactical requirements to fall in line with
national strategy and political exigencies (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 190).
7.15.2 What Worked
Asked what aspects of strategy and tactics worked best, the replies were, “Covert
operations, obviously, intelligence in conjunction with covert operations. It's the only thing
that can work” was the reply from RODA-P-3. RODA-P-4 comment was, “to be quite honest
the Fire-Force, that was the thing that worked well”, but he expounded that most ideas were
good, “I think most ideas were good it was just we didn’t have the man power, you know to,
because some areas they became no-go areas for security forces”. A common thread
throughout the testimonies and literature was the lack of manpower in relation to the forces
the insurgents could call upon. The admission that there were also ‘no-go’ areas was quite
startling too:
They were never publicised as no-go areas but it was; the gooks [insurgents] had it.
You know the security forces wouldn’t go into that area and that was Taboo, those
areas the Scouts [Selous Scouts] couldn’t operate because they had such a good security
system going on so they were liberated areas. (ROD-P-4; 26/01/2011)
RODA-P-4 continued when asked what should have been done differently, “Fought
the war externally, the whole emphasis would [sic] have been external”. What aspect would
he have targeted, “Obviously, roots would be one, the camps for sure. Those were the most
successful operations we had, external”. A number of operations had been conducted outside
of the borders of Rhodesia and raised a lot of controversy not least from South Africa
(Barratt, 1976, p. 157). RODA-P-3 too seems to feel that there should have been “greater
emphasis on external operations, Ja. I think they came too late. Had we started it earlier and
nipped it in the bud”, he felt they could have been more successful.
In addition the lack of airpower, due to international restrictions hampered the
operational efficiently of many units, “air power. We could have done with a lot more air

203

power; particularly helicopters. I mean that ‘Fire-Force’ concept in that situation was
unbeatable. They proved themselves time and time again that was the answer” (RODA-P-3;
25/01/2011). The lack of airpower , particularly helicopters, which were vital to the ‘FireForce’ concept of indentify insurgents then bring in the troops by air to eliminate, was
severely hampered by sanctions against the country (Preston, 2004, p. 76).
Growing desperation with the lack of resources and manpower is re-enforced by this
comment from RODA-P-5, “In fact towards the end of the war they recruited youngest age
16, 17; that young Ja, 16, 17 not even 18 hey”. There also appeared to be an element of the
inevitable in their reflections when asked if a political settlement was the only way it could
have been ultimately resolved:
Absolutely. Look, I think, going back I think if Smith [Prime Minister] had have gotten
Nkomo [on side] then they had have signed up earlier, I'm not sure. But I think it was
inevitable really it would end up the way we did. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
Ron Reid Daley (1999) summed up the general situation in Rhodesia near the end in
1978, when the heart had gone out of the Security Forces:
The situation in Rhodesia was crumbling. It has been crumbling visibly for at least a
year. The stink of political defeat, which in practical terms always pre-empts a
military defeat, even though the formations in the field might be intact and undefeated,
had begun to seep like blood-poisoning into the veins of the security forces, and even
visibly, into the veins of Rhodesia itself. (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 480)
These sentiments are reiterated by Flower (1987) Head of the Rhodesian Intelligence
Organisation, when he describes in detail the last days of the Smith government and the
warnings given by the military commanders of the failing situation (pp. 194-209). However,
it is important to note:
At the end of the war the Rhodesian Security Forces had surrendered no city or major
communications route and the BSAP had closed no police station, even along the
Mozambique frontier. The guerrillas had not succeeded in establishing any ‘liberated
zones’, although clearly large parts of Rhodesia were being contested. (Beckett &
Pimlott, 1985, p. 186)
Nonetheless, as RODA-P-6 sums up:
The South Africans had decided ‘Detente’ was the way to go. They cut off our
ammunition, we were down to our last ammunition, they put pressure on us to make
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peace, and they were under pressure from the Americans and the British. So it was the
British, the Americans and the South Africans that we had no more friends, our friends
had walked away from us. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
7.16 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency
As discussed in the previous case studies, a number of strategies have been used that
align with French thinking on counter insurgency; as laid out in Table 7.2. The main
strategies in Rhodesia were consistent with those used in both Kenya and Malaya.
In the case of Rhodesia all the elements were used in an effort to curb the activities of
the insurgents. However, due to the shortage of manpower many of them were not used as
effectively as they should have been. Consequently they did not have the desired outcome
they had in the other two campaigns. The use of regroupment was attempted with the use of
‘Protected Villages’ but this did not prove a great success and in many ways has been argued
was a failing, as it allowed the insurgents to intimidate and terrorise the villages which were
not protected.
Table 7.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Rhodesia

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)
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Additionally, the ability to use the oil spot principle actually seemed to have been
used more by the insurgents than the Security Forces. It was the insurgents that gradually
forced their opponents to cede ground, only in the bush areas not in any urban ones, as they
intimidated more of the rural areas, which were difficult to protect.
7.17 Summary
The Rhodesian ‘Bush War ‘was far more complex than that of either of the conflicts
in Malaya or Kenya, as it had a larger number of variables which included: the thrust of
international Communism, the clamour for decolonisation in Africa, Britain’s role, the
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, international distain for the rogue Rhodesian
regime through increased economic and political sanctions, loss of support from South Africa
and the rise of African political and social identity, to name but a few (Beckett & Pimlott,
1985, pp. 163-168). The participants responses that have formed the narrative, point to a
growing disenchantment with the enforced restraints caused by sanctions on their capabilities
to continue the conflict. The narrative also points to a versatile and flexible contingent of
people that were involved in this counter-insurgency.
A number of innovative strategies and tactics were developed during this conflict:
Fire-Force, Pseudo Operations, Combined Intelligence Organisation together with an
integration of security forces that was effective. Special Branch played a pivotal role in all
aspects of the campaign. The political dimensions were more problematic, especially with the
application of a concerted ‘Hearts and Minds’ strategy; as part of a counter-insurgency
doctrine. Intimidation was found to be difficult to combat and became an obstacle to
achieving greater support from the population; according to the respondents. Table 7.3
highlights the important elements that have merged from this case study.
The shortage of manpower directed most of the operational decisions and it can be
argued, forced a guerrilla centric approach to combating the insurgency as opposed to a
population centric approach. The charge made by Preston (2004) is that the Rhodesians
concentrated too much on the tactic of striking the insurgents and trying to wipe out their
capabilities rather than protecting the villages. Although it can be argued they had no choice
with the limited resources at their disposal. However, the Rhodesians did continue to have
police all the areas with the Internal Affairs maintaining a presence in the tribal areas
throughout the war. Therefore, the argument that there was only a counter-guerrilla doctrine
is not supported by the evidence; it was a major tactic, but there was a counter-insurgency
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doctrine supported by a political agenda. It was the political agenda that failed to gain
sufficient support to achieve an internal settlement.
A further significant factor was the relationship the Rhodesian Forces had with their
indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently, providing more
recorded data on the important role indigenous forces played, as part of the structure of
combating insurgencies, has been part of this research process. There appears to be latent
recognition of this important aspect when dealing with countering insurgencies in other lands,
“most counterinsurgency [sic] campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but by
indigenous forces”(Jones, 2008, p. 9). Although a difficult and complex area for modern
forces to adjust to and implement, it is considered almost imperative for the future of most
counter-insurgency operations (Byman, 2005; Byman, 2006; Corum, 2006).
The Rhodesians were more inter-connected than perhaps the other colonies had been
when it comes to discussing the relationship between the authorities and the Security Forces.
The majority of Rhodesians were connected by shared culture, common bonds of schooling,
farming, sports and sense of community. The territorials were the back bone of the forces,
they also had to run their farms and businesses, as well as serve in the forces. Consequently,
they were also well aware of the intimidation that was taking place amongst their African
work force, primarily because they were being informed by their idegineous colleagues and
by the workers themselves. A large amount of intelligence was gained through this close
relationship and perhaps much more so than in Kenya and Malaya.
Table 7.3 once again brings together all the elements that have been discussed in this
chapter in relation to the themes established in the Literature Review and from the process of
coding undertaken to assign alternative themes based upon responses. All three of the tables
produced in each of the case studies are combined in Chapter 8 to facilitate comparative
analysis of the elements in an effort to identify common threads.
Perhaps the most important aspect that is reflected by this table are the shortages of
resources that hampered the operational imperatives required to combat the insurgents. For
example, aircraft were in very short supply as were parts to repair any that were damaged,
because of sanctions these parts were not available. Helicopters had become core to ‘FireForce’ operations and had proved themselves to be very effective, but once again they were
in very short supply (Mills & Wilson, 2007). The same argument can be made for the ability
to police the ‘protected Villages, there was not enough manpower to accomplish this, even
though it was recognised as important to prevent intimidation.
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Table 7.3 Summary of important elements from the findings
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7.18 Significant and Influential Actors
It has been argued throughout this study that a number of significant actors greatly
enhanced the Colonial authorities’ ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations due to
their expertise and knowledge. A number had a major role on the development of tactics and
strategies within the Rhodesian conflict. General Peter Walls, head of the Army had served in
Malaya commanding the Rhodesian contingent in 1951, together with Ron Reid Daley, who
was commanding officer of the Selous Scouts (Stiff, 1982, p. 44). Bill Bailey had served with
the Long Range Desert Patrol Group (LRDPG), a fore-runner to the SAS and who ran PATU.
Mac McGuiness, a long serving Rhodesian police officer was the ‘brains’ behind the Selous
Scouts, as he was the SB controller (Stiff, 1982, p. 47). Ian Henderson, of Kenya Police fame
who ran the pseudo gangs and captured Kimathi, was brought into Rhodesia as an advisor
(Flower, 1987, p. 114). The experience these men had concerning the use of special
operations from other theatres of war cannot be underestimated.
There were a large number of troops that had served in Malaya, notably the
Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) that brought their experience back to Rhodesia. A large
number of Kenyans, who had served during the Emergency, had migrated to Rhodesia upon
the granting of Independence in 1963 (Flower, 1987, p. 28). Many BSAP officers had be sent
up to Kenya to learn from the Emergency; experience they were to use during the Bush War.
Flower, the Head of CIO was sent up to Kenya to learn about counter-insurgency as the
stirrings of unrest were unfolding in southern Africa (Flower, 1987, p. 10). (See Appendix
B).
7.19 Conclusion
Rhodesia faced a formidable series of obstacles in its efforts to overcome the
insurgency; not least of these was the support the insurgents were receiving from Communist
countries such as the Soviet Union and China (Guelke, 1980). The United States was not
prepared to support the Smith regime and sustained international sanctions applied by Britain
and the international community (Onslow, 2006; Watts, 2006). The collapse of Portugal’s
African colonies, followed by the South Africans changing their policy of supporting
Rhodesia, in the quest for more international support for the apartheid regime, sealed the fate
for Rhodesia (Evans, 2007; Preston, 2004). It managed to hold out militarily, but was unable
to fashion an internal settlement capable of gaining majority support. Britain re-established
its legitimacy over the Colony and forced elections to be held leading to an independent
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Zimbabwe in 1980 (Day, 1975; de Meneses & McNamara, 2012; Evans, 2007; Galtung,
1967; Onslow, 2009).
Rhodesia certainly utilised many of the strategies tactics and policies used in the other
two conflicts to counter the insurgency: mostly effectively. Arbuckle (1979) has argued
manpower restraints forced the military to adopt a counter-guerrilla approach as opposed to a
counter-insurgency approach. Whereby they chose to find and destroy the insurgents rather
than trying to defend the population against intimidation and terrorism (p. 29). A failure to
garner the support of the population led to a loss of political support (p. 32). The realisation
came too late to apply the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ or adopt the protective villages
strategy effectively, as was used in Malaya.
There was a unified command structure which ran a very effective campaign. The use
of innovative units such as Fire-Force, Selous Scouts, SAS, Grey Scouts and PATU served
effectively. The Security Forces recruited indigenous forces; with Internal Affairs creating
Home Guard units. The Police worked very effectively, as a multi-racial force and were
capable of sourcing a wide range of intelligence across the board. Special Branch was
particularly adept at gaining intelligence and used the Pseudo Gang technique together with
the Selous Scouts (Melson, 2005). The armed forces cooperated well together, because of
their shared goals and experiences, with the majority capable of speaking local languages.
Legislation was used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives. But unlike in
Kenya and Malaya, the Rhodesians did progressively apply Martial Law; although they did
not resort to mass detentions, as had been the case in both Kenya and Malaya.
The use of ‘hearts and minds’ was not used effectively by the Rhodesians although
they did understand the importance of trying to counter-act the physiological control the spirit
mediums held over the population (Cilliers, 1985). Intimidation was rife in the outlying areas,
with the security forces unable to combat it (Beckett, 2007). It was not until 1977 was a
Psychological Unit formed and the Directorate of Psychological Warfare not until the last
year of the was in 1979 (Preston, 2004, p. 73). An indication of its low priority in the overall
strategy this had as far as the counter-insurgency effort was concerned.
The next chapter will consider each of the case studies though comparative analysis to
draw together interpretations. In order to achieve this, each of the tables developed at the end
of chapters 5, 6 and 7 will be brought together in Chapter 8, together with the relevant
findings.
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Chapter 8
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION
8.1

Introduction
This chapter gathers the findings from the three case studies together to compare and

analyse them in relation to the research question, thus producing a comparative interpretation.
The literature review established a series of themes, which became the framework for
structuring the case studies. The participant’s responses were used to populate the framework
and create a narrative. By using this narrative, a story line has emerged of each of the
conflicts, which has been aligned to the research objectives. In order to achieve this aim, the
narratives were synthesised and considered in greater detail in order to address the research
objectives of the whole study. Therefore, each of the sub-research questions will be dealt with
sequentially, concluding with the primary question. Lastly, the underlying theory of conflict
is considered in relation to its appropriateness for this study.
8.2

The Research Problem
The intention of the this research study was to investigate three historical colonial

counter-insurgencies with a view to examining how they were pursued and whether the
particular structure that the colonies operated under had any net advantages. Moreover, the
objective sought to investigate claims that the use of a ‘hearts and minds’ was central to the
effectiveness, or otherwise, of prosecuting the campaigns. In that it not only formed part of
the strategy, but was understood by those on the ground as a necessary part of the operations.
The actual relationship between the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ and its application at the
time, has formed part of this study. Therefore, in an effort to appreciate if this was a correct
interpretation, the respondents were asked about their appreciation and understanding of the
concept from their perspectives.
The early hypothesis was that colonial forces had a substantial advantage to modern
forces based upon their local knowledge of language, terrain and customs. This supposition
has been vindicated in many ways, but tempered by evidence that in both Kenya and Malaya
this was not as dominant as had been assumed. However, in the case of Rhodesia, without
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this so called ‘advantage’ it is doubtful whether the Rhodesians would have been capable of
persevering for so long or achieving the notable tactical successes that marked this conflict.
A further hypothesis was that Special Branch was a prevailing and decisive factor
together with police support on the ground; this has been endorsed by the evidence of both
the respondents and the literature. Therefore, it is hoped that this research adds to the body of
knowledge in relation to the role of the police, particularly of Special Branch, in counterinsurgency doctrine.
The third part of the study was to assess whether the lessons can be applied to present
conflicts. Here the evidence is very much more mixed and tempered, consequently far more
subjective requiring caution and more analysis than this study is able to offer. However, one
aspect remains as pertinent today as in these conflicts studied: the support of the population is
critical to the long term objective of defeating the insurgents.
8.3

Primary Research Question
What was the role played by the Colonial forces in counter-insurgency campaigns in

Kenya (1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), and can any of lessons
learnt be applied to conflicts today?
8.3.1

Sub-Question:

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces effectiveness in the
insurgency campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Was ‘hearts and minds’ a substantial factor in the conflicts?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and
practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be effective?
Over the course of the study the questions have been refined and this is reflected in
slight changes that have been made since the Pilot Study was undertaken; changes have not
been substantial, more of an evolutionary use of language. However, the primary objective
has remained the same which was to research the role of the Colonial forces in counteringinsurgency. In line with addressing this objective, was a requirement to ascertain whether the
Colonial forces were able to develop strategies and tactics that were unique to time and place.
Furthermore, were such strategies and tactics transferable to modern day counter-insurgency
doctrine? Therefore, the sub questions will be dealt with first to build up the argument before
responding to the Primary question
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8.4

The Contributory Factors and Roles for Effectiveness
Question: What factors and roles contributed to the Security Forces effectiveness in

the insurgency campaigns of Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia? At the end of each of the case
studies, a table 5.4, 6.3 and 7.1, was presented listing a summary of the key elements that had
been identified during the research, as being core to prosecuting the counter-insurgency.
Table 8.1 combines all three of these tables together as summary of the factors which
contributed to the overall effectiveness of the security forces. The key elements will now be
discussed using supporting evidence in relation to the findings from the study.
In addition, there has to be a politically achievable objective that is widely supported
and promoted. In both Kenya and Malaya the carrot of full independence was crucial to the
eventual curtailing of the insurgency. Whereas in Rhodesia, this was never an option for the
regime, although various power sharing arrangements were offered; these all came too late to
have the desired effect. Consequently, the interpretation gleaned is that there was not a
political objective in Rhodesia capable of gaining the mass support of the population. The
majority of the literature dealing with counter-insurgency doctrine expounds the necessity of
having the population on your side and hence this could point to why ultimately the
objectives of the regime were unattainable (Dixon, 2009; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2006a;
McCuen, 1966; Mumford, 2012; Nagl, 2002; 1966; Tomes, 2004; Trinquier, 1964).
A wholesale restricting of the police, especially Special Branch, was the vital change
needed to overcome the insurgents. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of indigenous
forces, including the creation of a’ Home Guard’ was instrumental in gaining the upper hand
and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The increased degree
of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference. These factors are
considered significant and have contributed to the ability to source intelligence directly,
rather than being influenced by a translator. Problems with the use of interpreters and
translators are well known by all who have to work outside of their own language.
What is apparent from a review of Table 8.1 is the complexity of the elements
involved in countering an insurgency. Although, the elements are presented in a précis form,
they reflect the essential fundamentals; these are also interlinked. It is this aspect that has
emerged from the study: the necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure
following a defined plan under an over arching supremo. “Operational design for a
counterinsurgency campaign must integrate the political, social, military, economic, legal,
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informational, and intelligence spheres to fully pacify the population and to establish the
legitimacy of the host government” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127).
By assessing the various elements presented in Table 8.1, it is possible to draw
together the key aspects that have emerged from the study. The component parts of the
research questions are represented in the table, but require synthesizing to illuminate their
inter-relationship with each other; for it is considered this relationship forms the rudiments
required to combat an insurgency effectively. To this end, the table will be utilised during this
Chapter for reference to indicate where the synergies lie and what is required as part of
preparing a detailed counter-insurgency ‘Plan’. A number of studies have indicated the
importance of having a comprehensive counter-insurgency ‘Plan’ (Hack, 2009; Strachan,
2007).
Table 8.1 is the culmination of the comparative analysis results from using three cases
studies. The pilot study emphasised the importance of being able to compare more than two
studies. Consequently, Table 8.1 demonstrates in a visual form the similarities between the
three campaigns even though two of these were in Africa and one in Asia. Nonetheless, many
of the requirements were the same, as is indicated by the Table.
All the elements have been dealt with during the study, but it is worth highlighting a
few in order to prove the similarities. Perhaps the most important strategy of counterinsurgency is the need to separate the population from the insurgents. The creation of
‘Protected Villages’ was the main vehicle used to accomplish this objective. Although only
Malaya was able to apply the concept in a comprehensive manner, it was tried in both Kenya,
with some success, and in Rhodesia with less success Food control was part of this strategy,
which can be seen across the table to reflect the success of the ‘villagisation process’ thus
indicating only complete separation of the population was effective in achieving this
objective.
Two further examples are the recruitment of indigenous forces, which were used to
great effect by all three Security Forces and the recruitment and establishment of a ‘Home
Guard’ to protect the villages. Both were particular hallmarks of all three campaigns and
were very successful. As Rhodesia was a later campaign, the ‘Home Guard’ principal had
become an accepted strategy with the formation of Guard Force: a far more disciplined and
trained unit than in the other two colonies.
Emergency Powers is a further example of the comparative similarities that have been
identified during the study. The formidable ability of the Colonial Authorities to utilise

214

legislation in support of the counter-insurgency objectives has been discussed and can be
readily identified as common to all three campaigns.
Table 8.1 Combined list of elements involved with countering
insurgencies
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8.4.1

Significant Actors

During the research process there have been a number of actors, as they have been
termed, that continued to be mentioned as having been influential across a number of
campaigns. Recognising that specific individuals, units and regiments, have had a significant
contribution to the development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is important. Crossfertilisation of ideas was a common occurrence and was part of a knowledge transfer process
and respect for experience. Therefore, when assessing what was effective, it has been
important to recognise the important role many of these actors had on the campaigns.
It is beyond the scope of this research to map out each actor and the influence they
have exerted to the various conflicts; however, a table has been produced that indicates in
précis form where these influences have been brought to bear (See Appendix B) Within the
British Colonial context (which includes Rhodesia), it was normal to transfer individuals and
units between colonies. Therefore, an actor of consequence would be expected to use their
expertise in a number of scenarios of which Sillitoe, Thompson, Briggs, Kitson, Young,
Catling, Henderson, Walls and Reid-Daly stand out, as does the regiments of the RAR, KAR,
the Black Watch and the SAS. (See full table in Appendix B)
8.4.2

Specialised Units

Accompanying theses actors has been the development of more specialised and elite
units, which have been central to the counter-insurgency achieving notable successes. Each
case study has highlighted the more notable of these specialised units trained and adapted to
the prevailing conditions of their particular conflict: see Sections 5.9; 6.9 and 7.9.
In Malaya, Ferret Force proved to be a notable success, which precipitated the
introduction of the Malaya Scouts and the SAS. Jungle conditions required a considerable
change in mind set in order to compete with the Communist insurgents on equal footing. The
use of smaller patrols became the norm, as they were able to move through the jungle with
less attention. Tracker Units utilising local indigenous tribesmen also proved to be very
effective. A tactic used in both Kenya and Rhodesia.
In both Kenya and Rhodesia the use of mounted units proved to be very successful as
was the use of dogs in all three campaigns. The locally recruited units such as the Kenya
Regiment, Kings African Rifles and the Kenya Police Reserve played a significant role due to
their local knowledge of language customs and culture. In Rhodesia, it was the same with the
Rhodesian African Rifles, Rhodesian Regiment and the British South Africa Police.
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Pseudo Operations were used in all three campaigns; normally operated by Special
Branch but in Rhodesia there was also a joint operation with the Army, which became the
Selous Scouts. Fire-Force was the support unit for such operations manned by the Rhodesian
Light Infantry. In addition there was a Rhodesian SAS unit operating primarily outside of the
borders (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 52).
8.4.3

Indigenous Forces

In addition to specialised and elite units has been the deployment of indigenous
forces. These forces played a significant part in boosting the capability of the colonial forces
to match and compete against the local insurgents (Hack, 2009; Jeffery, 1987; Percox, 1998;
Stapleton, 2011). It could be argued that without these vital additional forces the prosecution
of the conflicts would have been extremely difficult; as it would have required substantial
forces from overseas to match the numbers of the insurgents, on the ground. In the case of
Rhodesia, they were essential to the war effort, as only the white, Indian and the Coloured
population could be conscripted. Black Africans could not be conscripted and those that
served were volunteers (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 38). Many specialised units
depended on black African forces, especially their expertise; such as the Selous Scouts and
the Tracker Units (Hughes, 2012, p. 112).
Besides providing additional and valuable numbers, indigenous forces provided “ a
significant increase in the quality of troops on the ground, troops whose knowledge of the
terrain, culture, and language generally produce an even greater and exponential
improvement in actionable intelligence on the insurgents” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127). In respect
to the police forces, they were predominately indigenous and only led by white or expatriate
officers. It is the contention of this study that without this valuable and necessary resource, it
would have been impossible to prosecute the counter-insurgencies with anything like the
accepted effectiveness without local policemen: whether they were black Africans, Indians,
Malays or Chinese. The respondents have all endorsed the capabilities of their local
policemen. RODA-P-6 when asked how well he trusted his African policemen, replied,
“100%, our black detectives were extremely loyal and extremely brave, extremely loyal
[emphasis]”. They have also provided valuable support to the army units deployed, acting as
interpreters and advisors. Support that should not be underestimated as it allowed sometimes
raw, un-acclimatised foreign troops to operate in unfamiliar surroundings. KENA-P-7
endorsed this use of indigenous forces:
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Well they were effective in large scale operations in particular and patrolling in the
forest and that sort of thing.... no the local knowledge was all important I think, because
you bring in the British army, they didn’t have a clue. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)
An aspect that was reiterated further by KENA-P-2 who stated that:
They were very important, very important [emphasis]. They lent a lot of weight to our
field intelligence officers and, as I say, were attached to all the units of the British
Army, because they didn't speak Swahili or anything like that. (KENA-p-2;
19/05/2011)
8.4.4

Actionable Intelligence

The other important aspect indigenous forces provided was good, actionable
intelligence, which is essential if the Security Forces are to have any chance at combating
them (Kitson, 1971, pp. 95-96). It has been the contention of this study that the crucial, and
one of the most important aspects required in combating an insurgency is, intelligence (see
sections 5.9; 6.9 and 7.9). Virtually all planning of operations can only be accomplished
successfully if it is based upon good, sound, and actionable intelligence.
It has been argued that both Kenya and Malaya were seriously deficient in this
domain at the start of the insurgences; even to the point that this may have been a
contributing factor in them starting in the first place (Clayton, 1976, p. 33; Miller, 1972, p.
90; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 113; Percox, 1998, pp. 53-54; Popplewell, 208; Stockwell, 1993, pp.
71-72). Conversely, the Rhodesians had learnt the lessons of their counterparts in other
conflicts and had developed a highly structured and capable intelligence gathering operation.
According to RODA-P-6, “we had absolutely no problem as Special Branch getting
information, we infiltrated all the organisations we had very good intelligence within ZAPU
and ZANU, very good both internal and external, excellent intelligence”.
One of the most important requirements to conducting a counter-insurgency campaign
is the ability to ‘know your enemy’. Accomplishing this requires a suite of capabilities,
including a wide network of spies, informers and operatives capable of interpreting events for
a central intelligence operation. Special Branch had this capability to adapt and become
indispensible in both Malaya and Kenya. The importance of intelligence to countering
insurgencies cannot be stressed sufficiently (Mumford, 2012, p. 154). Rhodesia understood
the indispensible need for intelligence and was better prepared to ensure it kept acquiring
actionable intelligence, as its very survival depended upon this capability. Special Branch
was the tool used to accomplish these demands in all three conflicts.
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8.4.5

Special Branch

A primary contention of this study has been the importance of Special Branch as the
coordinating structure that harnessed all the intelligence gathering operations in country.
Although both Kenya and Malaya, required a substantial re-structuring of their Branches,
they became very effective and it could be argued ran the counter-insurgency operations
(Comber, 2008; Jeffery, 1987, p. 125). . The Rhodesians had recognised the importance of
their Special Branch and it too was the core of the overall strategy for operations (Flower,
1987). A former member of Rhodesian Special Branch explains:
We had a very structured system, a very very good structured system. Our Special
Branch headquarters at ‘Redbricks’ was extremely efficient on the collation of
intelligence. So all intelligence fed up a pyramid to the top, from the top of special
branch headquarters it was then decided who it should be disseminated to, if it was very
sensitive to where, at local level every JOC [Joint Operations Command] there were
Special Branch, every meeting there was a Special Branch representative who was
responsible to advise the JOC at all times of local tactical intelligence. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011)
The importance of this structure cannot be over emphasised when considering the
effectiveness of the Colonial Forces, especially in Rhodesia. The support from the police and
the Military units in the field all fed back into the central collation point, which was then
presented in a useable format at the Joint Operations Command. Decisions were made based
upon these assessments. The use of a combined operations centre has also been discussed in
all three case studies: 5.14; 6.5 and 7.16.1. In Rhodesia it was called the JOC: a joined-up a
multilayered interlocking structure that combined the police, military and civil administration
to enforce rule of law using the operational tools available.
8.4.6

Over-Arching Supremo

Aligned to this requirement of having a combined operations centre, was the preferred
condition of an over-arching supremo, such as General Templer in Malaya. Unfortunately
General Erskine as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces In Kenya was never given this
over-ridding authority and only had ‘operational control’. It could be argued this hampered
the combined effort and lacked the strategic political direction of the counter-insurgency that
Templer plainly had in Malaya. There was a War Cabinet with an “Emergency Joint Staff
consisting of representatives of the Army, police and civil government who examined in
detail problems before they came to the War Cabinet” (Erskine, 1956, p. 14). In Rhodesia,
Lieutenant-General Walls was made head of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) in 1977
(see section 7.16.1), but this too was not as powerful as the position General Templer had
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held in Malaya. Walls remained answerable to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which
hampered tactical requirements often to fall in line with national strategy and political
exigencies (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 190).
Although an over-arching civil-military supremo would seem to be a default status,
the reality is Templer was the exception rather than rule. Consequently, the future requires
greater cooperation and cohesion amongst the partners involved in countering insurgencies to
achieve desired political aims, with the military acting in support (Mumford, 2012, p. 153).
8.4.7

Emergency Powers Legislation

The ability of the Colonial State to impose often draconian and all encompassing
legislation in support of the counter-insurgency efforts has been a noted feature of this study.
A number of measures have become standard practice for the control of the population today
in conflict zones, such as detention without trial, identification cards, movement restrictions
and curfews. Although much has been made by many over the use of ‘hearts and minds’, the
reality has indicated a much harsher regime is required to control the population during
conflict.
8.5

The Substantial Factor of ‘Hearts and Minds’
Question: Was ‘hearts and minds’ a substantial factor in the conflicts? Much has

been written over the years proclaiming the panacea of the ‘hearts and minds’ concept to
counter insurgencies; ostensibly developed and honed by the conflict in Malaya (Carruthers,
1995a; Dixon, 2009; Duyvesteyn, 2011; Mockaitis, 2003; Stubbs, 1989a). As explained in the
literature review, the concept has a long history, although certainly published and understood
by a wider audience based upon the success of this combined strategy in Malaya. However,
what was sought in the study, was how far was this concept a reality on the ground, or was
this more a post conflict interpretation by writers and historians? Moreover, to examine what
actions can actually be attributed directly to this term, as its meaning is perhaps far wider
than most commentators have addressed hitherto. Essentially the concept requires a
coordinated approach from all those involved with the campaign: civil, military,
administrative and legislative (Mockaitis, 1990b, p. 215).
The evidence from this study suggests that it was not a well know phrase, or in
common usage during the conflicts, although aspects associated with its concept may have
been used. Although according to Edgerton (1989) Askwith, the African Affairs Officer in
Nairobi, was told by General Templer in 1953 when he was on a fact finding mission from
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Kenya to Malaya “the only way to control the Mau Mau was by winning the ‘hearts and
minds’ of the people” (Edgerton, 1989, p. 176). Therefore, it might be fair to assert that
although less known amongst the rank and file, it was used at the highest echelons of
government.
In both Kenya and Rhodesia the approach to ‘hearts and minds’ appears to have been
far more piecemeal, and in Rhodesia, almost shunned completely as a strategy until too late
to have a positive influence on the outcome of the ‘Bush War’(Arbuckle, 1979, p. 32). For
the majority of the respondents, it was accepted wisdom that the concept, as understood
today, came from prosecuting the Emergency in Malaya:
The term hearts and minds evolved from there and I think it was the first real attempt to
gain the support of the local people in a productive way, not just in terms of sentiment
but getting, reporting information and taking active measures in support. (MALA-M-1;
20/03/2011)
It is the second part of this response that is important and often it appears to be over
looked, “not just in terms of sentiment but getting, reporting information and taking active
measures in support”. Note, it is not sentiment that drives an effective counter-insurgencystrategy; it is results. The badge known as Bersedia Berkhidmat depicting the clasped hands
in Malaya (Figure 5.2; Chapter 5), epitomised “the hoped for cooperation between the police
and the Malay people” (MALA-P-3, 03/03/2011). It can be argued that the badge was
representative of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ as a whole. In addition, the last part of the
explanation made MALA-P-3 explains even further what was expected:
He [Templer] had to get the people off the fence. They weren’t committed. In 1952
they didn’t know who was going to win, and they weren’t going to chance their arm.
So he had to convince them that the British were going to be winning and giving them
independence. And once they knew they’d get their independence they were on our
side. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)
Contained within this statement is the summary of several concepts that go towards
producing a counter-insurgency doctrine. Paramount of these concepts is that the support of
the population in the quest for overcoming the insurgency (Galula, 1964, pp. 52-55). The
population has to be convinced they are backing the side that will eventually win. Getting this
wrong has catastrophic consequences for them, especially if they show support for the
government forces and they do not win. “The phrase “hearts and minds” which comprises of
two separate components: “Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are
served by your success; “minds” means convincing them that you can protect them and that
resisting you is pointless....Calculated self interest, not emotion, is what counts”(Kilcullen,
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2006c, p. 52). However, it is insufficient to merely promise support, they have to be actually
protected from intimidation as well. Intimidation is the antithesis of ‘hearts and minds’ and
was prevalent in all three conflicts.
Trinquier (1964) a contemporary of Galula (1964), and also a noted French combatant
and military historian, succinctly identifies these critical aspects in his work Le Guerre
Moderne. Trinquier (1964) stresses the need to treat the population with consideration and
respect (p. ix) ,but also points out that the insurgents are seeking to do the same “impose its
will upon the population”; not necessarily with either consideration or respect but by
terrorising them (p. 7). Essentially he argues to combat this threat, the government forces
must use all the means at their disposal, primarily to combat terrorism: the weapon of
subversive warfare (Santos, 2011, p. 3). By identifying terrorism, Trinquier (1964) explains
how effect this weapon is against classic forces, dispiriting them and putting fear into the
general population (p. 15).
In this study, rather than using terrorism, the word intimidation has been used,
because it brings fewer connotations and explains the situation in clearer terms from an
insurgency perspective. Although terror is an instrument of intimidation; terrorism, per se,
has arguably become too emotive a word to be used without defining it, but that is outside of
the margins of this study. (Hoffman, 2006; Thornton, 1964). Notwithstanding, intimidation
has been discussed, as it forms the antithesis of ‘hearts and minds’ and was used in all three
conflicts
In Rhodesia, intimidation was rife and undermined the ability of the Security Forces
to secure the support of the population. Intimidation involved “killing zealots, killing
government representatives, chiefs, counsellors that sort of thing” according to RODA-P-6;
(23/01/2011). It can be seen from this description that the use of violence ensured the minds
of the population remained firmly in support of the insurgents, even if their hearts thought
otherwise (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179).
Understanding that both sides are vying for the support of the population is often
missed by theoretical observers. It may well be good press to promote benevolent activities
by the government forces; such as schools and clinics, but these are insufficient if the
population is being terrorised by the insurgents (Branch & Wood, 2010, p. 10). The ability to
terrorise the population was part of “their [ZANU and ZIPRA] tactics that they used to
indoctrinate the locals, terrify the locals, attack the local farmers”. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011).
In Kenya, this was mainly amongst their own tribe, the Kikuyu, whereas in Malaya it was
prevalent against all those who were not active members of the Communist insurgents.
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MALA-M-4 sums up how it is the general population that endures the worst efforts of both
sides:
Well they will always suffer, they’ll suffer because they are being intimidated and
sometimes killed by the insurgent groups and they’ll suffer by the hands of the security
forces, so really they are in a no win situation. The security forces will do sweeps
through a village and probably steal things, they may even rape the women, they
certainly be very heavy handed with the population but then the insurgents will come in
at night and threaten them if they don’t get help in the form of food or shelter, they will
also rape the women, so when you’ve got indigenous people, certainly those that are
living in remote areas, they will suffer from both ends. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)
Therefore, the conquest of the minds of the people is a constant battle undertaken by
both sides, with the population generally the losers.
8.5.1

Psychological Control

Inherent in the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ is psychological control of the
population through a variety of means: violence through intimidation being the most
misunderstood. However, gaining control of the mind, was also achieved through coercion,
applying ideological indoctrination and the use of aspects of religion; particularly tribal
religion as in Kenya and Rhodesia (see sections 6.14 and 7.15). In Malaya, it was ideological
coercion through Communist indoctrination and pressure through secret societies: the Triads
(see section 5.15).
In Kenya, psychological intimidation took its form through the use of the oath
(Corfield, 1959). The oath was very serious, whether it had been taken voluntarily or forced,
KENA-P-2 emphasises this aspect, “once they've been oathed, the oath is binding. And you
never knew who'd been oathed and hadn't been oathed. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2011).
Consequently, understanding the role played by oaths is central to understanding the
psychological hold the Mau Mau had over their tribal members. Tribal religion has a deep
significance for the African peoples; an implication not readily understood by outsiders
(Gelfand, 1967; Lan, 1985; Ranger, 1985). Its importance should not be underestimated; as it
was used to ensure as many of the Kikuyu as possible should be bound by the oath (Corfield,
1959; Maloba, 1993, p. 68). Consequently, when there was a mass refusal to comply, as
happen in the village of Lari in 1953, retribution was brutal; wiping out the whole village and
the committing of various atrocities (Anderson, 2005, pp. 125-127; Furedi, 1989, p. 122). The
Lari massacre, as it was termed, gained worldwide notoriety and influenced many about the
nature of Mau Mau insurrection (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 136-138; Newsinger, 1981, p. 170).
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Intimidation could be termed hard ‘hearts and minds’; as coercion, brute force and terror are
used to control the population.
In Rhodesia, it was the Spirit Mediums that held sway over much the African
population, thus having a psychological hold over them in much the same was as experienced
in Kenya by the use of the oath through the Mganga. The Rhodesian authorities understood
the importance that the tribal religion played amongst the African population. The concept
was not scoffed at by the Europeans, on the contrary they went to great lengths to understand
it and utilise it, as RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012, outlined “the Shona and Ndebele people have
always practiced ancestral worship... in Intaf [Internal Affairs] we were obliged to study
African Customs and Customary Law and to write exams on them”. He went on to explain
the importance of the mediums to the insurgents: “when a terrorist gang moved into an area
the first thing they did was to make contact with the spirit mediums to get their "blessing"
and their protection. If they did not then the spirits would be angry and do them a disservice!”
From a ‘hearts and minds’ perspective in counter-insurgency, the factor of witchcraft,
sorcery and oaths is one that has not been recognised or understood sufficiently with little
discussion on this aspect. By contrast this aspect has been brought out in this research as both
the Kenyan and Rhodesian authorities fully recognised its importance and took measures to
incorporate it into their strategies for regaining the minds of the people (Ranger, 1985, p.
365). A key part of the strategy played by the Kenyan Government in combating the
insurgency was the programme to de-oath as many of the Kikuyu population as possible
(Clayton, 2006, p. 4; Corfield, 1959, p. 134). Spirit mediums played a crucial role in
developing counter-guerrilla strategies in Rhodesia as well (Evans, 2007, p. 185; Johnson &
Martin, 1981, pp. 75-78).
Although in Malaya, sorcery and witchcraft were not an issue, there was a distinct
religious division between the predominately Chinese insurgents and the Malays who were
Muslims (Carnell, 1953, p. 103; Von Glahn, 2004). While the supernatural and ancestral
worship underpins a lot of Chinese beliefs, as part of their religion, there has been less
explanation as to how far this was used against them in Malaya (Tan, 1983). But there was
increased support for the building of mosques and Islamic schools by the Government to gain
the support of the Malay population, against Communist insurgents (Carnell, 1953, p. 109).
The Insurgents on the other hand, used ideological coercion in their quest for the minds of the
population. Communism was a secular, even an anti religious ideology, according to Karl
Marx (1970/1843), which was completely at odds with that of Islam. MALA-J-6 articulates
this further:
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The Malays did not support Communism as it went against their religion, they were
Muslims. Communism was against Muslims. The CT’s were very brutal and this turned
the people against them. This made it easy for the British to show how violent the
bandits were. The CT’s were their own worst enemies as they turned people against
them. (MALA –J-6; 18/03/2011)
However, an area of contention was the involvement of the Triads amongst the
Chinese. There has been little direct evidence to support the contention that Chinese Triads
were deeply involved in the manipulation of the Chinese for financial gain during the
Emergency (Carnell, 1953, p. 108; Ownby & Heidhues, 1993; Topley, 1963); other than
casual remarks made by some of the respondents; especially when asked about the
involvement of Triads and Chinese secret societies, “we always knew they were mixed up in
it, but I cannot tell how much” (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011) . Although there is much
conjecture over the relationship of Special Branch, Triads and the payment of rewards for the
surrender of CT’s: as to how far the Triads were implicated is far more convoluted (Comber,
2008, pp. 162-165; Pye, 1956; Stockwell, 1993). Suffice it to say that more research is
necessary to explore this area of interest. Nonetheless, the psychological battle fought to gain
the hearts of the population was certainly concentrated on defeating Communism and second
by “endeavouring to narrow the communal divisions between the Malays and the Chinese”
(Carnell, 1953, p. 109). Therefore, religion played its part in the ‘hearts and minds’ offensive
in Malaya as much as it did in Kenya and Rhodesia.
8.5.2

Independence and Decolonisation

Returning to the other point brought out by the statement made by MALA-P-2 was,
“they knew they’d get their independence”. The three case studies have shown that ultimately
the end result lies within the political domain, not solely on a military might, which is
unsustainable. Rhodesia was guilty of relying on the latter, to its detriment (Arbuckle, 1979,
p. 29). It is this political aspect which is brought out in the response by saying the Malays
would “get their independence”. Once this was an accepted fact, the support of the population
followed and allowed the British to gain the upper hand against the Communist led
insurgency. Although, this was not as critical in Kenya; as the insurgency was predominately
led by one tribe, the Kikuyu, nonetheless when independence was promised it ensured that
any other dissenters were out flanked. The Lancaster House agreements of 1960 assured full
independence by 1963 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, pp. 61-65). Effectively, these were the
political measures that guaranteed the’ loyal’ support for the Government based upon the
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emancipation of the African population and the ending of colonial status. (Orrù, 1989, pp.
395-400; Thompson, et al., 1990, p. 367).
In both Kenya and Rhodesia the “hunger for land was the driving force behind the
rebellion and this was very anti-Colonial, ultimately a political solution had to be found”, as
KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011, summed up (Throup, 1987, p. 250). Indicative of the influences that
were underlying the insurgencies, land was the key issue, not only ownership of the land but
also national ownership of the land too i.e. Independence. Decolonisation was ultimately the
only acceptable long-term political solution (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). In Malaya and in
Kenya this was realised and acceded to by the British Government. Consequently, Britain
considered that it should also apply in Rhodesia, regardless of what a minority might want. A
premise based upon the assertion that granting independence had solved the insurgencies in
other conflicts: Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. Therefore, the accepted wisdom of the British
was to ensure that this took place in Rhodesia, by steering the country to full independence as
quickly as possible in 1980 (Preston, 2004). Britain was unable to secure the majority of the
population against intimidation, for a number of practical reasons, consequently Mugabe and
ZANU-PF were able to come to power regardless of how democratic the process might have
been (Arbuckle, 1979; Baker, 1982, pp. 52-55; Kriger, 2005, pp. 1-5).
8.5.3

Good Governance

The importance of the political dimension is an essential element in gaining and
maintaining ‘hearts and minds’ by practical actions on the ground. Convincing the population
that their welfare and well being will improve by supporting the Government needs to be
backed up by civil actions such as extending the electoral franchise, political rights and
citizenship. These were actions that were taken in Malaya to sway the Chinese away from
Communism and to support the national identify of Malaya (Mumford, 2012, p. 10). In
Kenya, the electoral franchise together with wider political rights was gradually doled out as
was the promise of full independence in an effort to undermine the insurgency (Ogot &
Ochieng, 1995, p. 48). Recognition in these two conflicts of the importance a political
dimension was to the counter-insurgency efforts. Whereas in Rhodesia, various attempts were
made to achieve a political dimension acceptable to the general population. Internal
settlements; with extensions of the franchise and the promise of further political rights were
all offered. But essentially they all failed, as the Rhodesians failed to comprehend the real
nature of African nationalism (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, pp. 198-199). It can be

226

argued the Rhodesians failed to understand fully the concept of ‘hearts and minds’
sufficiently for them to realise it involved a political dimension, as much as a military one.
In support of the political dimension there needs to be support from the civil side of
the administration in the form of improving the infrastructure through public works, such as
schools, hospitals, clinics and agricultural improvements. In fact anything that can be done to
improve the social welfare of the population will have a strong influence on their perceptions
of how well the Government is doing in its fight against the insurgency. “The fundamental
weapon in counterinsurgency [sic] remains good governance” (Hammes, 2006, pp. 20-21).
Each of the case studies has discussed these actions (see sections 5.14; 6.13 and 7.14).
In addition Kitson (1971), endorses this approach by the Government in that it needs “an
overall programme designed to achieve its aim of regaining and retaining the allegiance of
the population” (p. 50). The importance of these actions should not be underestimated in the
practice of winning ‘hearts and minds’.
8.5.4

The Winning Aspect

Lastly, a further part of the phrase “winning hearts and minds” also needs to be
considered the word ‘winning’. It is not the aspect of winning as in ‘gaining’ hearts and
minds, but rather that the security forces need to be seen to be winning, as in being
successful; so that the population has confidence that they are backing the winners.
Obviously to achieve this objective, there needs to be a general public relations campaign
publicising the success stories and conducting a psychological drive to ensure the message is
promulgated (Alderson, 2007b, p. 9; Galula, 1964, p. 85). “The counterinsurgency needs a
convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the
means, and the ability to win. The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations
except from a position of strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side”
(Artelli, 2007, p. 33). Furthermore, the message that they are winning must be one that is
being passed on by what is called the ‘bush telegraph’. Although often made up by rumours,
it is a powerful tool and much information is obtained this way by the average person. To
ensure this occurs, the Security Forces will need to demonstrate they are obtaining good
results as well as providing evidence that it actually transpired. In Malaya this was certainly
the case:
Also there was none of this sort of lily livered sentiment against showing gory
photographs in the news, every time they had a success they lined all the bodies up
outside the police station and they took photographs and they were published in the
paper, nowadays that’s not the sort of thing to view and that is why you don’t publish
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photographs of lads dead and so on but in those days it was a powerful tool, especially
with the vernacular press. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
8.6

Understanding the Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’
Question: Was the Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ one that was commonly

understood and practiced by those involved on the ground? This question sought to ascertain
the depth of understanding for the strategy termed ‘hearts and minds’ by those actually
involved in actual operations- what is called the ‘sharp end’-in Kenya and Rhodesia, rather
than just Malaya. Those interviewed about the conflict in Malaya were generally supportive
of the idea that ‘hearts and minds’ had developed in Malaya and was part of a successful
strategy. However, in both Kenya and Rhodesia there were fewer acknowledgements by the
respondents that this was part of a concerted strategy, as they understood it. Many aspects of
the concept appeared to have been used as part of accepted practices, but the response tended
to indicate not only was it not a widely accepted term, indeed in Rhodesia they appeared to be
openly hostile to the concept. Consequently, this hostility might be considered to have
formed part of the failure to garner the majority of population fully to the side of the
Rhodesian government. Although, it is hard to fully support this as the major failure, it can be
argued that it contributed to the eventual collapse of the Smith regime (Arbuckle, 1979, p.
32).
At one end of the spectrum are those who believe that ‘hearts and minds’ is winning
the population through creating fear, then there are those who believe it means
the acquiescence of the population. At the other end of the spectrum are those
who require a greater degree of popular consent and seek the active, enthusiastic
consent, support and trust of the people. (Dixon, 2009, p. 363)
It also became apparent from the interviews with those who had served in Kenya, that
they did not use this expression during the time of the Mau Mau. They have heard of it since,
but not at the time. Respondent KENA-P- 6 responded when asked if he had heard of ‘hearts
and minds’, “Yes of course one’s heard that [phrase], very much so recently and, but I
certainly never heard of that expression in Kenya” A further indication from KENA-P-12
supporting the lack of knowledge concerning the term “I never heard the phrase ‘hearts and
minds’ used.” KENA-P-13 stated very much the same thing, “I was never involved or heard
of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in those words”. He did go on to expound that what he had
been doing could be construed as such a policy, but that it was never called ‘hearts and
minds’. “That’s not to say we didn’t practice it, as it was widely recognized as being
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necessary to encourage the local population to cooperate and side with us, which they did”.
KENA-P-6 went even further “Are we trying to win the Kikuyu ‘hearts and minds’, possibly
they were, but it certainly never ever occurred to me or anybody that was the case”.
From these comments it is possible to deduce that although post Mau Mau, many
authors, (Bennett, 2007; Branch, 2010; Carruthers, 1995a; Percox, 1998) have written of the
‘hearts and minds’ approach taken as part of overall strategy, the term was certainly not in
common usage. Whereas, in Rhodesia the term may have been known, but it was not readily
accepted as the right course of action; or certainly not by those interviewed in this study. It
also appears it is the interpretation of the term that is contested. A lot of the respondents
seemed to feel it was a ‘soft’ approach, rather than a coercive one. Although, in both Malaya
and Kenya, despite claims hearts and minds was core to strategy, mass detentions, collective
punishments and coercive activities took place too. The stick as well as the carrot applied as
circumstances dictated (Hack, 2009, p. 412).
In Rhodesia, it appears to have been more of a ‘bolt-on’ idea, tried as things began to
get desperate, but in reality it was too late to turn the population, “I still think it was a waste
of time” was the comment from RODA-P-4. A similar dissenting remark was made by both
RODA-P-5 and RODA-P-6:
The fellows working on the hearts and minds they were hopeless cases, it didn’t really
work out so Ja, that hearts and minds didn’t work up there, they had it going in the
middle of the war but it and towards the end but it didn’t really work at all. (RODA-P5; 26/01/2011)
Also from RODA-P-6:
The theory was right but in reality in never really worked because the people were more
terrified of the guerrillas then they were of the government, the people were more on
the side of the guerrillas than the side of the government so it was unsuccessful, very
unsuccessful. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
Consequently, Rhodesia was unable to fully capitalise on the support of the general
population in the same way as had occurred in Malaya; despite a high proportion of black
troops in the Army, police and Internal Affairs (INTAF). The tide of outside influences
constantly eroded internal majority support for the regime, until a negotiated settlement was
the only option. The Rhodesian Forces had “victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla
forces in the field, but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of
the population” (Evans, 2007, p. 176). Realistically it was more a question of logistics that
has to be taken into consideration for this failure. The Rhodesians just did not have the
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manpower required to protect all the villages. As a result, the population were terrorised as
soon as the Security Forces left an area (Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-82). Intimidation is the
antithesis to winning ‘hearts and minds’: threaten, kill and maim people and they will do as
they are told. Protecting them from these threats requires moving them into safe areas. The
Protected Village (PV) process was the only answer to this threat, and this met with much
resistance from the local population; who disliked being up rooted from their land. In
addition:
If you are going to keep locals "on side", you have to live cheek and jowl amongst them
and face the perils of the night, unsupported and unprotected. The chief's through which
they [the Security Forces] worked were basically fence sitters; several of them were
contact men for the Terrs [Terrorists]. (RODA-M-15; 30/06/2012)
This comment supports the assertion that the population are more hesitant to commit
themselves to one side or the other, until they are sure of the eventual outcome. The other
aspect is that once sections of the community are given power over the others, such as the
Home Guards then they terrorise the population too:
These men were permitted to carry firearms, one of the unfortunate results of that they
had a certain amount of power, because they had weapons, they would use it to their
advantage, because they were in remote rural areas without proper police coverage or
without regular visits by the regular security forces, they would use the fact that they
were armed and they would use their power for the wrong reasons and they would
intimidate and control village life so they basically became thugs if you like. (MALAM-4; 04/03/2011
Plus the ineffectiveness of protecting the villages as RODA-P-2 scoffed:
I ask how does a white civil servant convince any local that he has the government's
full support when they were unable to prevent the deaths of over 20,000 of their
number? They knew full well that his words carried no weight. Intimidation would win
the day as it did in other African conflicts. (RODA-P-2:27/01/2011)
Although a model taken from the Malayan Emergency, it appears that application was
as patchy in Rhodesia , as it had been in Kenya, and loosely linked to an overall concept of
‘hearts and minds’; thus making it piecemeal rather than a concerted integrated strategy
(Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-99). “I personally was not in favour of the PV concept in Rhodesia. It
might of worked elsewhere” RODA-P-11 summarised, but he felt it did not work in Rhodesia
nor did he agree that the other aspect of denying the insurgents food worked too well either.
RODA-P-5 endorsed this point, “they didn’t achieve much at all and no I think it was just
feeding bins for the gooks. As you give the money to the people in the stockade there, out it
goes that night to the gooks”. As indicated earlier, the problem was the inability to protect the
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villages at night; this was when the insurgents would return using intimidation to gain control
and get the resources they needed (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179).
On the other hand, RODA-P-6 argues that in fact many of the methods used by the
Rhodesian Forces actually turned much of the population against them by their actions:
We were far too hard on the local population, we punished them not the guerrillas, we
captured guerrillas in 5 minutes he was one of us; [whereas] a local fed him and got 15
years in jail and we burnt his house down, burnt his whole kraal down. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011)
The central theoretical approach underlines the importance of ensuring the population
are cut off from the intimidation and the terrorising that occurs when they are not protected
(Stockwell, 1984, p. 81). Unfortunately, this can only be effective if indeed the population are
protected and ready to accept the confines made on their movements this strategy demands. It
worked in Malaya, as the population were generally supportive. Mainly because they were
given inducements and actually given the houses they built and forced to live in together with
additional infrastructure, which included schools, clinics and veterinary support. They were
also decisively protected at all times and in most cases mounted their own defence as well, in
the form of the ‘Home Guard’(Markel, 2006, p. 39). Whereas in Rhodesia, “PV’s were
regarded purely as a means of population control rather than a basis for winning ‘Heart and
Minds” (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 180). In many ways this failure to apply the PV’s as had
been envisaged by the Briggs Plan was similar to the failure of the strategic hamlet campaign
tried during the Vietnam war; this too failed for a number of reasons, not least lack of
protection for those that had been moved (Catton, 1999, p. 921).
In essence ‘hearts and minds’ is part of the psychological warfare being waged using
every nuance to gain an advantage. Both sides are vying for this advantage, which is why the
population lie at the crux of the overall objective. The Rhodesians seemed to have been
reluctant to accept this premise, as has been explained by the respondents. In support of this
assertion, they did not set up a Psychological Operations Unit in the Army until July 1977
and the Directorate of Psychosocial Warfare was not establish until 1979, the end of the bush
War (Preston, 2004, p. 73). It can be argued this was a singular failure by the Rhodesians.
“You can’t impose goodwill, it has got to be bought and of course in the middle of
what was a war, it was very difficult to earn goodwill” (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011). This quote
sums up the nexus of the problem: it is a transitory concept that depends on a number of
fluctuating variables often based upon perceptions. Most of these variables are difficult to
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maintain in a hostile and ever changing environment. Consequently, applying the theory is
problematic.
8.7

Effective Colonial Strategy
Question: What aspects of the Colonial strategy appeared be effective?
Colonial strategy was formulated progressively in order to deal with the situations as

they evolved. Because of the limited resources there was a need to be innovative and highly
adaptable, yet in the case of Kenya and Malaya they still had to answer to Britain.
Furthermore, they could ask for, though not always receive, Imperial troop reinforcements
and request additional manpower through the Crown Agents; who administered the Colonial
service. These options were not available to Rhodesia; who was forced to go it alone once
they had declared UDI. Nonetheless, the ability to deal with the insurrection rested with the
Government of the country undergoing an insurgency. Therefore, the strategies developed
were for the most part comprehensive, as it was recognised fairly quickly that piecemeal
solutions failed if not supported by a suite of further actions.
The approach developed by the Briggs Plan demonstrated how to deal with an
insurgency, once it was applied comprehensively in Malaya. Kenya only had a limited
version of such a plan, but from 1954 onwards the Colony progressively adopted more of the
parts that had were being used in Malaya at the time (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 43; Strachan,
2007, p. 10). The military strategies in Rhodesia were predominately driven by manpower
shortages, using the Fire-Force concept to engage larger concentrations of insurgents, rather
than defending population settlements. Although strong on military strategy, any attempt at a
comprehensive plan failed; as it lacked an “effective parallel political strategy” (Mills &
Wilson, 2007, p. 30).
A French theoretical approach was discussed in the Literature Review, developing
what could be termed a French doctrinal approach to counter-insurgency (Galliéni, 1908;
Galula, 1964; Trinquier, 1964). The key elements have been extrapolated and presented in
Table 8.2. In addition, all three campaigns have been included in order to show the
comparisons between each of them. As can been in seen in table 8.2, each of them adopted
these strategies; in one form or another, and some with more success than the others.
However, the principles of this doctrine were ingrained into the counter-insurgency thinking
during the campaigns. It can be argued that they remain part of most tactical approaches to
dealing with conflicts. In fact they are used by most commanders when confronted with a
violent situation, even when dealing with a terrorist one. For example, the area needs to be
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cleared and checked by stages, with the civilians kept out of harm’s way, by progressively
clearing the area of any threats or dangers.
Table 8.2 French approach in each campaign

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)
Therefore, using these points it has been possible to identify how many aspects align
with those used in Colonial strategy and those recommended by the French approach. In
addition they also summarise the effective aspects used in Colonial strategy. In support of
using this approach, a number of commentators on counter-insurgency refer to the French
experience of conducting counter-insurgency operations (Beckett, 2012; Heuser, 2007; Jones
& Smith, 2010; Kahl, 2007; Santos, 2011).
It has been considered that the experiences acquired by the French during their
colonial campaigns are significant: especially with regard to separating the local population
from the insurgents; using grids for cordoning areas for systematic attention and ease of
referral; employing a centre out approach called the oil-spot strategy; recruiting the local
indigenous population as troops and as advocates, together with an understanding of how
important local political considerations were to the overall conduct of the campaign (Tomes,
2004).
Regroupment refers to what became known as Villagisation, New Villages or
Protected Villages all of which have been discussed at length in the case studies. (see sections
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5.7; 6.7 and 7.7). In this chapter it has been dealt with under population control in sections
8.4 and 8.6.
Another noteworthy characteristic discussed by Trinquier (1964), was the ability of
the French officer corps to identify with the local population, recruit them and learn their
languages (p. xii). It was this aspect that gave the security forces in Kenya a greater capability
to understand their enemy, the Mau Mau, with the essential lessons learnt transferred on to
Rhodesia: where the security forces fundamentally understood the importance of this aspect.
In both conflicts, knowledge of local customs, culture and language played an important role
in enhancing their capabilities, both for managing their own indigenous forces but also in
understanding their adversaries better. It also served to assist with gaining valuable
intelligence from the local population, reducing the problems associated with using
interpreters. The problems with interpreters were highlighted by MALA-M-4:
But interpreters will invariably not tell you the full story or they will tell you what they
think you want to hear so to a large extent you are at the mercy of the interpreter
because you can have lengthy conversation going on for about 5 or 10 minutes and the
interpreter will turn around and translate that into one sentence, so you know he is not
telling you the full story or you know that they told him something that he doesn’t want
you to know because he thinks it will upset you,... the ability is to learn to speak the
language yourself and communicate directly and that is the best way of doing it.
(MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)
Lastly, the use of paramilitary forces and militia has been a significant and important
factor in all of the campaigns, (see sections 5.9, 6.9; and 7.9). The steady development and
deployment of Special Forces; the SAS, Ferret Force, Pseudo Gangs, Tracker Units, Selous
Scouts, Grey Scouts, RLI and Fire-Force. These specialist units have altered the way in
which counter-insurgency were fought, taking the offensive into the heart of the insurgent’s
domain. Reflecting on the findings based upon the data, most of the respondents were very
supportive of these units and considered they had made a significant impact on the course of
the conflict in favour of the Government. RODA-P-5 summed up which units he thought
were impressive:
Fire-Force Ja, it was very very good and so good that the South Africans took over the
concept when they had problems down in Angola and in fact they formed the South
African Koevoet was actually formed [based] on the Selous Scouts.... You had the two
units combined so it was actually brilliant because you had your intelligence from Z
desk and CIO okay and then you had the fire power and the man power from the army
and the aircraft as well. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)
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Koevoet was the next generation development of pseudo operations by the South
African Forces based upon the Selous Scouts model after the Bush War had ended (O'Brien,
2001).
The other notable development was that of the Pseudo Operations, which has been
argued was one of the most influential aspects developed and used in all three campaigns
with great effect (Bailey, 2010; Baxter, 2011; Comber, 2008; Gatchel, 2008; Hughes &
Tripodi, 2009; Kitson, 1960; Nilsson, 1993; Stiff, 1982).
8.8

Primary Research Question
The primary research question: What was the role played by the Colonial forces in

counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia
(1964-1980) and can any of lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today? The question is dealt
with in two parts: the role played by the Colonial forces and can the lessons learnt be applied
in modern conflicts today?
Table 8.1, presented at the start of the chapter, indicates the number of elements
considered basic that have been identified from the data. Many of these have already been
discussed, as far as they related to the secondary questions. However, in order to respond to
the primary question it was felt necessary to build up the evidence sequentially as building
blocks first, before providing a response.
8.8.1

Substantial Advantage

The contention made at the start of this study, was that the Colonial administration
had a substantial or net advantage over most modern day conflicts, such as those in Iraq and
Afghanistan, in that they had control over the levers of power and an intimate working
knowledge of the country. This knowledge included integrated administrative structures, civil
servants, local indigenous police forces led by expatriates, together with extensive personal
networks back up by the might of the Colonial Power itself. Power and the ability to wield
that power rested firmly with the British Colonial Government; even in the case of Rhodesia:
it was Britain that ultimately decided the fate of the country, (Section 7.1).
The evidence presented in this study has shown that Britain was not as powerful as
might have been assumed. In many ways it was this perception of the all-encompassing
power that led to the poor initial responses by each of the colonial administrations in their
particular rebellions. In the case of Rhodesia, the initial response, although effective,
gradually became less capable; losing the general support of the population. Indoctrination,
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intimidation and world pressure, combined with the lack of a workable political solution
overcame the regime, negating all efforts by the Security Forces to counter the insurgency
(Preston, 2004). RODA-P-5 spoke with resignation when he pronounced “I think it was
inevitable really it would end up the way we did. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011).
In Kenya, it took the authorities ten years to subdue what was in fact an insurgency
led by one tribe, the Kikuyu, in a very limited part of the country: the Mau Mau had no
outside support (Cleary, 1990, p. 241). In contrast to that of the Rhodesian rebels; who had
received support from both China and the Soviet Union (Kirk, 1975, p. 7). Whereas, in
addition to being isolated, the Mau Mau were basically defeated by the other half of their
own tribe, which did not support Mau Mau methods and the destruction of Kikuyu cultural
values (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). Wasserman (1973) argues that Britain manipulated ‘a
potentially disruptive nationalist party into the structures and requisites of the colonial
structures” in order to maintain her influence and to “prevent the formation and mobilization
of a mass movement base” to preserve her economic well being (p. 133). “In the process it
was the local interests of both the Kenya Administration and the settlers that were sacrificed
for a negotiated settlement preserving metropolitan [Britain’s] interests” (Berman, 1976, p.
175). Ostensibly the local population were promised independence if they support the
colonial government and rejected the Mau Mau, which generally they did (Furedi, 1990).
Therefore, the major point that comes out of the research is that although the Security
Forces are used to blunt the excessive and violent nature of a terrorist inspired insurgency, the
objective is not to re-establish the status quo, rather to accept the latest political reality and
re-alignment economic interests accordingly. Security Forces are seen as expendable in the
pursuit of economic and political objectives (Eisler, 2012; Taulbee, 2002; Welch, 2001;
White, 2003). The evidence to support this assertion has been demonstrated by the way each
of the conflicts ended: transfer of political power to the dominate group in exchange for
continued economic access. Malaya was given independence and power was given to the
Malays, based upon an agreement to maintain access to tin and rubber (White, 2003). In
Kenya, Independence and the power was given to the conservative Kikuyu led by the alleged
leader of the Mau Mau rebellion, Jomo Kenyatta (Azam & Daubrée, 1997; Gordon, 1981).
Whereas in Rhodesia, despite widespread intimidation by ZANU-PF, during the elections, the
country was handed over to the Maoist supported leader Mugabe: in an effort to curb
Communist expansion by strategic alignment (Baker, 1982; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008;
Onslow, 2008).
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8.8.2

Colonial Administration

The second important point of note was the ability of the Colonial administration to
use legislation as a tool for either coercion, or to support the counter-insurgency ‘Plan’;
depending on what was the agreed agenda at the time (Killingray, 1986, p. 422). Emergency
Power enactments in all three conflicts were a substantial addition to the ability to force
obedience and compliance on the population (Hack, 2009; Killingray, 1986; Komer, 1972;
Martin, 2006). Although the ultimate draconian application of Martial Law was not imposed
in either Kenya or Malaya, it was progressively applied in Rhodesia. Kenya and Malaya
maintained that their insurgencies were internal Emergencies, thus avoiding financial
complications by insurance companies for loss of property and goods. Rhodesia was outside
of this constraint, once it became unilaterally independent: a pariah state. Nonetheless, all
three administrations sought to prosecute their counter-insurgencies within the restraints laid
down by legislation and hence the rule of law. RODA-P-6 emphasises this aspect:
It would all operate under the Law and Order Maintenance act. It was a death penalty
for being in possession of a weapon, it was death penalty to be a terrorist, receiving
communist training, it was a very serious penalty to feed guerrillas or terrorists; so it all
operated under the Law and Order Maintenance act... The purpose of that was to get the
message out to the locals, you feed a guy you are going to go to jail for 15 years.
(RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
Most of the respondents seem to agree that this hampered their efforts to fight an
insurgency, arguing they should fight fire with fire but accepted why they had to use the law:
It had to be shown to the international world that we were operating under proper
western law and order laws. Everything was according to the law, everything that was
done was according to the law; except the pseudo operations they had a ‘carte blanche’.
(RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
The last part of this statement refers to the predominately Selous Scouts operations
that were so effective (Stiff, 1982). As the war intensified they needed to conduct more
valuable and productive operations, but RODA-P-6 indicates “They had a ‘carte blanche’.
They were unanswerable [sic] to anybody” but asked if he thought this was a good thing “In
theory good, in reality no because it was abused, it was abused! [emphasised]”. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011). The lesson from this remark is that Special Forces have to be on some kind of
external supervision; otherwise they can go out of control and this would be counterproductive in winning ‘hearts and minds’ and to the propaganda effort.
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8.8.3

Using the Police

To support the rule of law, it was necessary to have an operationally effective police
force (Bennett, 2007). It has been the contention of this study that this was an often neglected
aspect of assessments of how the counter-insurgencies were enacted (Hutchinson, 1969). By
using predominately former police officers in this research, an alternative voice has been used
to review their contribution to the overall effort. The results have been mixed, but once again
have generally supported the initial supposition, that they were an essential and effective
composite of the whole counter-insurgency effort. Colonial Police Forces were central to the
integral structure of colonial administration; as they were the primary defence mechanism.
RODA-P-6 emphasised the importance of the police:
Counter insurgency was under the control of the police controlled by the law and order
maintenance act, the police were responsible for the upholding of law and order in the
country not the military, the military were only acting in support of police. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011)
RODA-P-6 continued when asked what happened when the army was involved in an
incident:
It had to be handed to the police. The police had to go and investigate every skirmish.
So after the skirmish it would be a full docket report handled by police, forensics,
bullets, everything goes to the police, all the captures go to the police, it was a police
matter. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)
Consequently, their structure and make up was based upon the paramilitary construct
to support the administration and suppress civil disorder when required (Hills, 1996, p. 279).
Placing the police at the fore front of the counter-insurgency effort was always seen as
the right course of action; despite incoming army generals wanting to take over all the
offensive actions. The army was the aid to the civil power (Epstein, 1968). It is important to
emphasise “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in
close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). In addition “counterinsurgency
requires a police presence because it aims at facilitating or imposing a new form of order, and
because developing a police is conventionally seen as ensuring justice and security (i.e. wellbeing) of a populace” (Hills, 2012, p. 101). Even in Rhodesia, the police maintained their
primary role of maintaining law and order whilst at the fore front of combating the
insurgency. It was accepted that their ability to gather intelligence and provide a visual
statement that the government was still in control was paramount.
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In all three conflicts, the police were over-stretched, as they had to meet their normal
commitments as well as combating the insurgency. Malaya and Kenya had to build their
police forces up quickly at the start of the conflicts. Malaya was able to take trained
paramilitary police from Palestine in 1948 and 113 went to Kenya (Sinclair, 2002, p. 35).
However, both countries had to recourse to recruitment of short term contract policemen who
were quickly deployed and inadequately trained (Sinclair, 2006, p. 155). MALA-P- 3;
03/03/2011, confirmed this poor state of affairs with his training in Malaya, “the course had
already been going for about six weeks and I think there were only two weeks left. So we
missed most of the information. So after two weeks we got our posting”. This is an indication
that many new recruits were rudimentarily trained and thrown in at the ‘deep-end’.
8.8.4

Special Branch

A further contention has been that Special Branch played a pivotal role in each
conflict, the literature and the data all endorsed this assertion (see sections 5.11; 6.10 and
7.11) (Comber, 2008; Flower, 1987; Franklin, 1996; Sinclair, 2011). The ability of Special
Branch officers to gather and collate intelligence has been shown to be vital if counterinsurgency is to be effectively combated and thwarted. In addition, the multiple methods used
to achieve the required results, such as informers, spies, and perhaps the most innovative, the
pseudo gang tactic have been shown to be part of the arsenal that Special Branch has
undertaken and used effectively. Pseudo Gangs developed in Kenya, transferred to both
Malaya and Rhodesia and in the latter, honed to a devastating tactic when it was combined
with the Army in the form of the Selous Scouts and the Fire-Force concept (Bailey, 2010;
Baxter, 2011; Gatchel, 2008; Kitson, 1960; Reid-Daly, 1999).
8.8.5

Knowledge of Language and Culture

Language has been identified as a significant element and an area in which the
Colonial Police were proficient; basically as they employed indigenous policemen who knew
the language, customs and foibles of the local population. It is perhaps this aspect which
stands out when analysing the achievements of the police forces in countering the
insurgencies. The ability to freely converse and fully appreciate the nuances should not be
underestimated, not least when it comes to obtaining intelligence (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 142).
Section 7.9 highlighted this aspect, which can be summarised by the response from RODA-P2:
Well we were the only people based in an area who had knowledge of that area. We
were always in that area we were always patrolling from that area. We always had
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information as to what was going on in that area. We ran our sources. (RODA-P-2;
27/01/201)
This statement applies equally to the other two conflicts, as they also ensured that
they used as many local policemen as possible. Routine intelligence gathering needs to be
also recognised as a vital component to producing a working spatial map of what is actually
going on. Chiefly this has been an evolutionary process developed in each conflict, but
certainly honed by the BSAP with their ‘Ground Coverage’ patrols:
This include the names of all those from the village, what they were doing, where they
were going, how they made their living, in fact everything that assisted in maintaining a
comprehensive intelligence image of each village. Each constable would have his own
informants and these would be paid for their information on degree of ‘usefulness’.
This was then sent back to Special Branch teams who would collate the intelligence in
to District reports, which allowed them to indentify insurgent activity and direct the
Security forces to those areas where they had the best chance of obtaining good results.
(RODA-P-12; 10/01/2011)
It is important to emphasise this aspect, as the basic routine roles are rarely
highlighted when discussing counter-insurgency, although Kitson (1971) describes a similar
process which he terms “collecting background information” (pp. 95-96). In consequence, the
blunt approach taken by the military alienates them from the general population when dealing
with rebellions. As a result they lack the basic core intelligence: only achievable with routine
patrols, which the police had been trained to undertake as a matter of course.
8.8.6

Population Control

Population control has been highlighted as the core to re-establishing the authority of
the central government. Again, this is a routine activity requiring the use of trained police
officers or in some cases the use of ‘Home Guards’ recruited and trained from the local
population. The creation of ‘Protected Villages’ requires securing them against the insurgents
in addition ensuring that food control operates and is strictly enforced. Policing the
identification schemes crucial to controlling movement, curfews together with preventing
crime are all aspects that may appear to be routine, but they vital in effort to counter the
insurgency (Epstein, 1968, p. 149).
8.8.7

Rule of Law and Legislation

Applying the rule of law; means using the legislative process to prosecute the
insurgents under the court procedure by means of evidence and procedure (Killingray, 1986;
Marenin, 1982). The military are not trained in this aspect, nor are they required to do so,
whilst the police are trained and expected to carry out this function, especially if the ultimate
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objective is to return the country back to normality. The police need to demonstrate they are
operating normally, and not taking out summary justice out on those captured. Furthermore,
acting with the rule of law assists in convincing potential converts amongst those that may be
wavering, that the ideals of the insurgents are lame and not worthy of supporting. A further
testament that the Government is in control: the police are the fore-front of this statement.
The driving force to overturn a rebellion is the Government, which has autocratic and
wide ranging powers including the use of force. These include degrees, proclamations and
laws to maintain and preserve the authority of the state (Killingray, 1986, p. 433). Amongst
the most far reaching laws were: the creation of prohibited or restricted areas, mass detention,
identification documentation, restrictions on movements, curfew restrictions and collective
punishments. The authority to forcibly remove people from their abodes and move them to a
new area, as part of the counter-insurgency plan is testimony to this power. It is the
contention of this study that the Colonial authorities possessed inordinate powers to counter
the insurgencies and that they used them extensively.
8.9

Can any of the Lessons Learnt be Applied to Conflicts Today?
The second part of the primary Research Question considered whether aspects

discussed in this study, regard to have been effective in the past, could in fact be used again
in the conflicts today. Each of the respondents was asked this question at the end of the
interview, so it would seem appropriate to use their replies in the first instance. MALA-M-4
offers what could well be a summary for this answer:
Yes, I think there is an awful lot that they did then that could work now, and the sad
thing is that the British Armed forces don’t seem to learn from the lessons of the past.
They should be reading the books that were written by army officers and others who
were involved in these counter insurgency campaigns and carefully recording why
things went wrong and making damned sure they didn’t make the same mistakes again,
but they don’t seem to do that, they don’t consult the records of past campaigns.
(MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)
A rueful answer, which was backed-up by the following statement:
Well, I’ve already mentioned in Afghanistan, why didn’t anyone talk to Soviet officers,
um Iraq, well the first Gulf war, why didn’t anybody speak to the guys who fought in
the desert in World War II, still plenty of them alive, there just seems to be this dreadful
arrogance that we don’t need to talk to people who have done this before, and in some
cases, people were in those campaigns for years on end, their experience would have
been invaluable but nobody thought to ask them. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)
RODA-P-6 was more forthright in his answer:
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Hit their logistics, without logistics, and go as far back as you can up the line of
logistics to create terror, to create the fear on their logistics chain. If it was me and I had
to advise a strategy I would look at their logistics and I’d see how far back they could
go and just hit their logistics as hard as I could and as far back as I could. (RODA-P-6;
23/01/2011)
The important point being made here is that there is much to learn from the past and
even more it is important to make sure that it is well documented and then re-appraised to see
how it could fit with what is required today. A point endorsed by MALA-M-1, “of course
there are always lessons which can be taken out but they have to be in context and probably
have to be sort of moulded and massaged in order to fit the situation”.
General Petraeus (2006) has certainly shown he is willing to ensure that the past is
recognised when he co-authored the Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on counter- terrorism.
Kilcullen (2005, 2006b, 2006c, 2010) a noted advisor to Petraeus and the US Government,
has written extensively on all aspects of counter-insurgency, firmly incorporating past
experience into his writings. Notwithstanding these developments RODA-P-12 is more
dismissive of the ability of the US to effect change on the ground because they conform to
the conventional approach:
The US approach just is totally wrong for a counter-insurgency type of operation. They
don't have a doctrine, I don't believe personally, and the experience that I've had in
Afghanistan, is that they don't actually have the doctrine to fight a counter-insurgency
war. So I can talk from experience there. Is that, you have this situation where US
policy rules supreme. So, strategy is developed at that level and that controls tactics.
So, there has been no allowance for innovation on the ground. (RODA-P-12;
10/01/2010
However, despite what can be termed modern day interpretation of how conflicts
were fought in the past and trying to apply today’s judgement to them, MALA-M-1 was
pretty emphatic about this aspect in his response to the Malayan Emergency:
It was very successful. Perhaps one or two people’s human rights were undignified in
the process – tough. We are talking 50 years ago, the whole attitude about how you
treated other people was completely different, the British and the British soldier, we
were very arrogant in the way in which we interfaced with local people, we even had
very derogatory terms for them and it all stemmed from the fact that there was very
little interaction between the two and when there was interaction it was very much one
sided, colonial master, colonial subject and nowadays people say ‘ooohhh’[sic] but then
it was normal, and therefore mostly I make no apologies for it because we were all if
you like imprisoned in the laws of the day, that’s the way we treated people, that’s the
way we treated each other. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
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Although KENA-P-1 accepts what was employed in the past may no longer be
acceptable today, so his answer to the question of what could be used today was:
Well, because times have changed and a lot of the things that went on in the emergency
at that time were accepted practice would never be accepted today. The amount of force
used could be considered no longer reasonable. You would be accused of racialism and
you would probably be taken before the International Criminal Court. No, times have
changed completely. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)
MALA-M-5 endorsees this line of thought:
I think the lesson actually was that the means which were employed to eventually win
cannot actually be replicated in a non-colonial area, the fact that it worked so well, and
I believe that it did work very well, was that the British controlled every aspect of the
country. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)
Applying the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ has been a concept that has been carried
on by all forces engaged in modern counter-insurgency operations: with varying degrees of
success. But as has been argued in this study, it is not as simple as it sounds; this is brought
out by MALA-M-1:
Difficult to translate that message into a non colonial situation but attempts obviously
have been made and the way in which you could see the British forces were operating
around Basra in Iraq , you could see that the hearts and minds were still going on, the
Squaddy [soldier] with his chocolate, the children running around, just showing people
that the troops are supposed to be there to help them. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)
Another point that came out of the responses was the need to develop Special Forces,
as large movements of troops was unproductive and was easily avoided by the insurgents
using guerrilla tactics (see sections 5.12; 6.11; and 7.12). In each of the conflicts studied,
various permutations have been tried with varying degrees of success. In Malaya, Ferret
Force and the Malayan Scouts who went on to become the SAS together with Tracker Units.
The specialised Tracker Units were used in all three campaigns employing indigenous tribe’s
people. In Kenya, this morphed into the highly effective Pseudo gangs, which were copied in
Rhodesia; becoming the Selous Scouts. Pseudo Gangs were also used in Malaya by Special
Branch under the term Q Operations (Comber, 2008, p. 165). The use of Special Forces was
endorsed by the respondents, but in many ways has already become and accepted aspect of
modern operations as indicated by RODA-P-5, “I would say that your Brit SAS who are there
in depth right now [Afghanistan], they are already doing exactly what we were doing, they
are already doing exactly what we were doing [in Rhodesia]”.
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The other aspect which endorses the use of Special Forces is the basic level at which
insurgency has to be fought. MALA-M-1 summarises the points he thought were important:
I think in the background there was always the SAS, but it wasn’t so much the SAS
war, to some extent I think maybe the Ghurkhas were more successful. The Ghurkhas
because they are well trained, but also because they think at a level which frankly most
British soldiers cant think at, and that is a real subsistent level, they could relate to these
guys who were living in the jungle and work out ways of taking them on, that is
patrolling, ambushing and so on, and I have to say the British soldier was more inclined
towards technical solutions bombing, artillery things like this. (MALA-M-1;
20/03/2011)
The research has indicated that core to counter-insurgency is the requirement for an
overall ‘Plan’, which encompasses all aspects associated with overcoming the insurgents. The
very nature of an insurgency will mean that there are multiple layers required that all have to
be interlinked to each other. Each insurgency will require an appreciation and an adaption of
the required fundamentals to compile such a plan (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 20; Rigden, 2008, p.
21). The ability to manage such a complex system has been argued requires an overall
supremo, in whatever guise that may be. Unfortunately, for modern insurgencies this is
perhaps the most difficult demand of all, because there are so many vested interests that
cannot easily be overridden or accommodated effectively. Compromise is likely to undermine
the efforts, but today this is the logical way forward (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 240;
Mills, 2006, p. 24).
A strategic long term plan is therefore central to counter-insurgency; KENA-P-7 put it
quite succinctly:
The basic idea was initially to impose law and order and prevent terrorism and
everybody was so tied up with that it really, the higher levels of government obviously,
the District Commissioner was probably thinking 5-10 years ahead for his district,
Provincial Commissioner was thinking in terms of 10, 20, 30 years ahead for his
district, and the Governor was thinking more in terms of 50 years ahead. (KENA-P-7;
05/02/2011)
Intelligence gathering is perhaps the most problematic of all functions required for
countering insurgencies. The ability to collect and collate routine information leads to
superior capabilities, but much of what is required is basic police work. A local police force
has this capability, as has been shown by the research. Unfortunately, for modern day
insurgencies this is a luxury, as the police force is normally the weakest link (Hills, 2012).
The very concept of community policing is virtually nonexistent and the police are seen more
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as enforcers of unpopular government policies, rather than upholders of communal values
being corrupt in their approach and untrustworthy (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 47).
Conversely, the Colonial Police Forces were at the fore front of the counter
campaigns and provided most of the basic intelligence, the language skills together with a
deep understanding of the local culture and conditions. It will be hard to replicate anything
similar today as has been highlighted by Hills (2012), where she argues that “the police can
play an enabling role in counterinsurgency but the nature and purpose of that role is debated”
(p. 106). The common agreement (Cassidy, 2007; Mumford, 2012, p. 8) is that indigenous
police forces are seen as the way to underpin the efforts to counter the insurgency through
assuring the security of the population. “ Yet their role is typically limited by corruption,
brutality, ineffectiveness and sectarianism, and by the knowledge that the international
counterinsurgency forces will leave” (Hills, p. 107). Recognition that although essential in
reality almost impossible to achieve in a short time span.
Regardless of the charge that Colonialists were imperialistic in attitude, the
integration of the indigenous population into all of the organs of authority, especially the
police, ensured that they were culturally aware and sensitive. Even the Rhodesians were
integrated and understood the cultural aspects of the country, speaking the local languages.
Such a view was back-up by RODA-I-15, “In Intaf [Internal Affairs] we were obliged to
study African customs and Customary Law and to write exams on them. This also applied to
African languageS”. There was an empathy between the Europeans and those that worked
with them, which should not be underestimated in the ability to undermine their opponents.
Transferring this deep cultural awareness to modern conflicts is far more problematic;
as the majority of the troops are mostly strangers to the country lacking language skills and
social or cultural knowledge. There has been recognition by military authorities that this
aspect needs to be addressed in some way and the US Army manual FM 3-07. 22 (2006)
states. Although Gonzalez (2007) is highly critical of the superficial approach the manual
takes failing to recognise that culture “has been profoundly shaped by capitalism, colonialism
and other political and economic factors on a global scale (p. 15).
In order for U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and
maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the
society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values,
religions, customs, and needs. (The US Army/Marine Corps, 2006, pp. sec 4-11)
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For the US Forces the experiences of Vietnam runs deep and warn the politicians of
the dangers involved in underestimating your insurgency foe. Vietnam was a prime example
of how not to fight an insurgency, as a foreign power. Without over generalising, the Vietnam
conflict was a long and drawn out failure by the US forces unprepared to fight a counterinsurgency campaign (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 131). Convinced that overwhelming
technological fire power and the use of American forces on the ground would overwhelm the
enemy, lay at the heart of the misconception (Joes, 2004, p. 230). Despite informed advice
from the British conflict in Malaya, including Thompson (1966) who helped develop the
Briggs Plan, the American hierarchy was loathed to implement new tactics and strategies. An
attempt was made at creating protected villages called the strategic hamlet campaign, but this
was never implemented effectively (Rosen, 1982, p. 90).
The contention argued here is that the US failed to “adapt its organizational structure
and strategy to win the support of the local population and directly defeat [the] insurgents”
(Nagl, 2002, p. xiv). Therefore, much of what has been argued in this study regarding the
advantages the Colonial forces had in prosecuting the insurgencies were not available to the
US. Consequently, it had to rely too much on its military power and not enough on its ability
to gain the support of the population and ensure they were protected from intimidation. Nor
did the US embrace ‘hearts and minds’ sufficiently to have any positive impact on its
relationship with the Vietnamese people. As a result of re-interpretation of past mistakes, a
whole new section of what is termed ‘cultural anthropology’ or sometimes ‘Human Terrain’
has been developed and used by the US Military (González, 2008; Heuser, 2007; Lucas,
2008; McFate, 2005; Sluka, 2010). Therefore, the contention is that many of the points
identified in this study are in fact being assessed -in many cases already being implemented
into modern day counter-insurgency strategy.
It would be wrong to presume the US did not learn a lot of important counterinsurgency lessons. One of these was the use of Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), which
were joint operations between the Marines and the South Vietnamese Popular Forces.
Another imitative was similar to pseudo operations, called the Phoenix programme run by the
CIA, using South Vietnamese to infiltrate the Viet Cong to gather intelligence and eliminate
threats (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 257; Rosenau & Long, 2009). The creation of
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU’s) fulfilled very similar functions to the Tracker Units
in Kenya and Rhodesia.
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8.10 Underlying Theory
The underlying theory discussed and considered at the start of this study has remained
appropriate throughout. The complex and inter-connected aspects related to rebellion,
insurrection and social upheaval required an interpretation of these events within a
framework expounded by social scientists such as Marx (1867/1999; 1969/1848) and Simmel
(1950; 1955), Williams (1947, 1970), Mack and Snyder (1957), Schelling (1960), Turner
(1975), Boulding (1962), Horton(1966) and Blalock (1967).
As discussed in Section 2.18, there were more than one series of upheaves taking
place within the same event and at the same time, as social change was occurring within all
sections of society. Revolution and rebellion, by their inherent nature are a purging of the old
order and when this was happening within the context of decolonisation, which was
empowering a generation with new demands related to emancipation, it was even more
dramatic. In addition, the accepted norms that had structured the pre-1940s were no longer
tolerated; both in colonial and British society. The stresses and strains were evident on all
sides during all of these conflicts.
Therefore, the strongest theory to support this study remains conflict theory as
expounded by Marx (Marx, 1867/1999, 1970/1843; Marx & Engels, 1969/1848). Based upon
this analysis of the conflicts that is inherent in society, other authors (Boulding, 1962; Cohen,
1965; Dahrendorf, 1959; Durkheim, 1964/1893; Hungerford, 2008; Lockwood, 1966) have
developed the theory further, particularly in relation to strain theory and anomie theory as
developed by Merton (Merton, 1938) and Cohen (Cohen, 1965).
In addition, the concept of ideology linked to the consciousness of identity, as
represented in the form of nationalism, must also be considered; as expounded by Ormsbee
(Ormsbee, 2004 ). It can be argued, this is a progressive development from the tenets of
Marxism based upon the fluid dynamics created by conflict within society seeking to
establish new hierarchical orders with nationalism becoming the vehicle to establish this.
8.11 Conclusion
By analysing the Table 8.1, it has been possible to identify the key components and
assess these in relation to the research questions. In so far as effectiveness is concerned, the
following have been acknowledged as core to the process:


The necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure following a
defined plan under an over arching supremo;
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A politically achievable objective that is widely supported and promoted;



An effective intelligence gathering structure operated and managed by Special
Branch, with support from the police and the military units in the field;



A multilayered interlocking structure that combines the police, military and
civil administration under an joint command structure;



Substantial legislation enforced by the police using the rule of law through a
transparent judicial process;



Incorporation of indigenous forces in all aspects of operations and defence;



Special Forces Units capable of operating in the insurgent’s terrain;



Balance between counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgent objectives;



Population centric: Linguistic and culturally aware;



‘Hearts and minds’ approach balanced by dealing with intimidation in all its
guises: religious, sorcerous and ideologically based.

Programmes were put in place in all three conflicts in an effort to counter all aspects
of intimidation including the psychological manipulation through sorcery, witchcraft,
ideology and religion. Both sides were vying for control of the population and it would
appear this needed to be fully understood. Exploring the relationship of witchcraft and
sorcery as part of the psychological manipulation of the population, particularly in Africa, has
brought a new dimension to the discussion on ‘hearts and minds’. The effectiveness of the
concept has been assessed in this study and has been found to encompass a lot more than
most other studies have recognised: namely intimidation, coercion and psychological
oppression are the antithesis of the term.
Although ‘hearts and minds’ is commonly accepted term in today’s counterinsurgency parlance, it has been shown to be less well known by the combatants interviewed.
Much of the intents of the concept were being applied in Kenya anyway, regardless of having
a term for their actions. However, the Rhodesians were far less supportive of this approach;
as they felt they could not overcome the violent intimidation without defeating the insurgents
in the field. They did not have the resources necessary to carry out many of the components
required to ensure the population was cut off from the insurgents. Arguments have been made
that this was a failure in the long term, but from a strategic perspective their counter-guerrilla
approach, or containment, was perhaps the only viable option open to them (Arbuckle, 1979,
p. 29). International pressure, financial constraints and lack of manpower and resources
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conspired against their objectives; however this is beyond this study to expound the merits or
otherwise one way or the other.
The research conducted into the three historical counter-insurgency campaigns has
identified that there were a number of advantages that are difficult to replicate in today’s
conflicts. However, there now appears to be belated recognition of these key aspects by
military strategists with a view to incorporating them into overall strategy (Heuser, 2007, pp.
160-170). Counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary and often slow process; fortunately
during colonial times innovation was often quicker, forced by necessity with less oversight
due to the tyranny of distance.
Each insurgency is different, which requires adopting adjusted strategies and tactics to
overcome them. The Colonial administrations did have net advantages due to the amount of
control they could exert in their respective countries. Nevertheless, each Government had far
less support and resources necessary to bring the insurgencies to an early resolution. The
conflicts were all long drawn out affairs, each averaging ten years, but ingenuity and
adaptation were very much in action with many innovative approaches being used (Johnston
& Urlacher, 2012).
The last chapter gathers together all the key aspects discussed and extracts the
pertinent points to allow conclusions to be drawn. Based upon these conclusions a series of
theoretical recommendations are presented together with the perceived difficulties envisaged
by modern day military strategists and planners in implementing any of them.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
LIMITATIONS
9.1

Introduction
The intention of this multi-case-study was to explore three historical insurgencies

from the perspective of former participants of the role played by the Colonial Forces in
countering the insurgency. The hypothesis considered that within the framework of the
Colonial structure there was a substantial advantage, not available to most modern counterinsurgency forces. This advantage included the composition of the forces, with the integration
of the indigenes working with a core of settlers and colonialists who also had a considerable
understanding of the culture, languages and makeup of the country. Furthermore, this was
coupled with the ability of the Colonial Administration to enact draconian, although
necessary and supporting, legislation to underpin the counter-insurgency plan. The Forces
consisted primarily of the police force, the locally recruited army units and the Colonial
Administration. Moreover, self reliance brought about due to limited resources in the colonies
instigated improvised solutions, lateral thinking and home grown tactics difficult to mimic in
today’s conflicts; but nonetheless effective.
In order to respond further to the research objectives, this last chapter condenses the
discussions developed in Chapter 8, into manageable segments. Consequently, the
conclusions drawn from this study are based upon the findings to the research questions,
already discussed, addressing six principal areas:


Objective of using colonial forces;



Effectiveness of factors and roles adopted by the Security Forces to combat the
insurgencies;



Substantial factor of ‘hearts and minds’ to the strategy for prosecuting the
campaigns;



Understood and applied as an overt concept and strategy on the ground by the
colonial forces;



Significance of strategy used by the Colonial administration to counter-insurgency



Applicability of any of the factors to modern day counter-insurgency practice.
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The sixth point addresses the functionality of the findings, in an effort to apply them
to modern day counter-insurgency strategies and tactics. The first five points used the
empirical data upon which the recommendations are based. Furthermore, having used a
comparative analytical structure across the three case studies, it has been possible to identify
significant trends in relation to results, thus substantiating the empirical data. By triangulating
the narratives provided by the respondents back through the existing literature, and also
checking for verification by selected respondents, it has been possible to validate the majority
of the material used (Costantino, 2008, p. 402). As a result the recommendations are a
personal perspective based upon interpretation of the data supported by what Stake (1995)
calls, “the quality and utility of the research is not based upon its reproducibility, but on
whether or not the meanings generated, by the researcher or the reader, are valued” (p. 135).
The previous chapter, presented the findings in relation to the research questions,
drawing together the material gathered in the three case studies, in order to make a
comparative analysis possible. Although it is problematic to draw generalised conclusions
from the data across conflicts that were unique to their time and geography; nonetheless, a
series of trends have emerged that are worthy of note. These have been presented in bullet
points above. By extracting what can be considered the essence of each of the research
questions, it has been possible to provide a summary of the results in a more digestible
format. A considerable amount of data has emerged from the research; therefore, it needed to
be prioritised for greater clarity.
9.2

Pertinent Points Addressing the Research Questions
Each of the following sections addressed one of the six bullet points expounding the

interpretation and synthesis developed in Chapter 8. By extracting the significant points in
relation to the research question, the context has been elaborated to provide a stronger
personal interpretation and discussion.
9.3

Objective-Using Colonial Forces
The primary research question used the word ‘role’ and this needs to be defined

before the subsidiary parts of the sentence can be addressed; as it has multiple connotations.
Amongst these connotations are: function, character, part, purpose, contribution and
intention. Each of which holds a differing nuance to the word ‘role’.
In the first instance, the role played by the Colonial forces was to defend the interests
of the Colonial State in relation to those of the mother country. In Kenya and Malaya this was
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Britain, and in Rhodesia principally the Rhodesian regime, although ultimately it too was
Britain. These interests were both political and economic, but essentially economic.
Therefore, the objective of the forces was to uphold these interests. The character of the
Colony was its combined make up, providing the resources necessary to undertake this role.
In the second instance, it is the contribution made by the Colonial forces in pursuing
their role and this has been dealt with in great depth in the case studies. Essentially, because it
was the contribution these forces made that is under scrutiny, to explore their role in
combating insurgency to ascertain whether this was unique, and if so how unique was it.
Lastly, in defining the word role is the undertone of the word and that is intention. It
is argued intention is an extension of the principal understanding of role, which was to defend
the vested interests. These interests have been shown to have altered during the conflicts, as
world pressure changed the initial objectives from maintaining the status quo, to actually
relinquishing the possessions yet ensuring continued economic access to the territories post
conflict resolution. Malaya was granted Independence, whilst continuing to remain within the
economic sphere of British influence, as was Kenya. Rhodesia too, was forced to accept an
outcome that sought to achieve the same result as for Kenya and Malaya; namely continued
favoured economic access. Therefore, the Colonial forces were to uphold the political
objectives of the dominant power, Britain, regardless of what the Colonies might have
considered to be in their best interests.
The other important distinction is that without the support of the British Army in both
Kenya and Malaya it is doubtful whether the insurgency could ever have been brought to a
comprehensive conclusion, certainly not in the time frames it took; as there was not sufficient
resources available to accomplish this task. In support of this assertion, Rhodesia did not have
the benefit of outside support and its capability to maintain the Bush War inextricably drained
not only its resources but its will to pursue the conflict any further. Therefore, although the
Colonial Forces were the first line of defence, they required additional support to ensure they
could accomplish the task required of them.
Notwithstanding this point, the ability of the Colonies, Rhodesia as well, to recruit
local forces was imperative. The strains placed on Britain during the end of empire retreat,
meant it did not have sufficient resources to conduct multiple overseas commitments without
the valuable resource of locally recruited ingenious forces.
As in Chapter 8, the second part of the question: “can any lessons learnt be applied to
conflicts today”, is dealt with last. First and foremost because the data needs to be explained
before the question can be addressed appropriately.
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9.4

Effectiveness: the Factors and Roles Adopted by the Security Forces
The argument has been made in this research regarding the effectiveness of being able

to work successfully with indigenous local forces that were incorporated into the structure of
the colonial apparatus. The advantages of knowing and understanding local culture, traditions
and languages all enhanced the net capabilities on the ground. In addition, this capability
harnessed what is considered to be the fundamental requirement for countering an
insurgency: the ability to know your enemy. It is perhaps this, more than any other aspect that
has been shown to be crucial to effectiveness when combating an insurgency. The ability to
get inside the mind of your adversary assists in developing counter-measures to overcome
their known capabilities: it is a capacity highly sought after by all military strategists and
planners.
The corollary to this capability is superior intelligence was gained by utilising all the
assets available and fully understanding not only the advantages, but also the negatives of
that information. Intelligence is recognised as crucial to developing effective counterinsurgency plans and operations. Police Special Branch has been identified as central to this
role. The unique position Special Branch occupied in the Colonial structure, at the heart of
operations; was seen as pivotal to the argued effectiveness of the forces. By harnessing not
only the capabilities of the settlers and the indigenes in the central structure, but also the
routine and unique capabilities of the police on the ground, Special Branch was able to utilise
the limited resources to the best effect. Consequently, it is perhaps this synergy that
epitomises the effectiveness of the Security Forces more than the other elements that have
been identified in this study.
As a result of this capability the development of specialised units took place. These
units were able to utilise the intelligence in a targeted operations; which would have been
impracticable without such explicit information on their foes. The comprehensive knowledge
of the set up and structures of the adversaries, particularly in Malaya and Rhodesia, was
impressive. Ultimately, this capability led to what has been termed ‘turning’ of insurgents
leading to the creation of pseudo gangs and pseudo operations. It has been argued that these
were amongst the most effective of all the developments during the three campaigns,
particularly in Rhodesia, where it became one of the most accomplished and formidable
tactics of the Bush War (Stiff, 1982).
In support of Special Branch were not only the police, but the other auxiliary units
such as the Home Guard, Internal Affairs, District Officers, Tribal Police, local Army units
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and the volunteer support units. Each was part of the combined structure working in a
sustained approach towards the same objective. In both Malaya and Kenya, the British Army
was brought in to support the civil authority and provide additional an much needed
resources. The Army brought a different, but needed expertise that complimented the police.
In Rhodesia the Army was made up of settlers sharing a commonly accepted objective, which
bonded them together more than the addition of the British Army did in the other two
campaigns.
9.5

Substantial Factor: ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Strategy
The concept of ‘hearts and minds’ has been examined as one of the contributing

factors in an effort to ascertain how substantial it was overall to the prosecution of the
campaigns. Chiefly because of the many conflicting claims of how important it has become
to the counter-insurgency strategy. There is no dispute that the Malayan Emergency saw the
holistic application of the concept across the concerted strategy, becoming one of the overarching core principles to the Plan. However, the evidence from Kenya and Rhodesia is less
supportive of this concept as being core to a recognised strategy for conducting the
campaigns. It may well have been implied but there is not enough data to support the
contention to justify any claims it was central to the Plan. Rhodesia did try to adopt the
concept towards the end of the war, but it was too late to have a substantial effect on the
eventual outcome (Cilliers, 1985).
Analysing the data further it was perhaps the interpretation of what hearts and minds
meant that was more in dispute. For many of the respondents their understanding was that it
was a ‘soft’ approach as opposed to a more hard line military one where little effort, or
consideration, was expended in considering the collateral damage to the local population. The
respondents’ understanding was that military objectives need to be accomplished regardless;
as that was the only way to defeat the rebellions. Whereas, what they perceive to be the ‘soft’
approach, acquiring popular support for the government against the insurgents, was not
effective. Therefore, what was contested by the respondents was the interpretation of what
‘hearts and minds’ meant. Paradoxically, it can mean different things to different people and
this is why those respondents from Rhodesia were less supportive of the concept; as they
considered the ‘soft’ interpretation could not match the coercive intimidation used by the
insurgents and therefore was doomed to failure.
As far as this study is concerned the interpretation of the concept is as follows: on one
side, control of the population is created by fear and psychological control, such as
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intimidation and terrorism used by the insurgents. On the other, support is gained through
expectation, approval and less coercive measures to achieve the preferred outcome, which is
the support of the general populous. In essence it is about psychological control of the
population though a less despotic approach (Dixon, 2009; Greenhill & Staniland, 2007; Wolf,
1965). This is the meaning that aligns more closely with the data from the respondents. The
argument concerning how much coercion can be applied without a detrimental effect, is one
that haunts advocates for a softer approach.
Notwithstanding this explanation, what has become apparent from the research has
been the contention that the use of intimidation by the insurgents was far more effective than
the efforts made by the Government’s apparatus to persuade the population they could
depend on the ability of the state to protect them. The majority of the data collected indicates
defending the population against terror was not as easy as it may have seemed; a fact that
needs to be recognised and understood today.
Furthermore, the counter-battle being fought for the ‘hearts and minds of the
population was dominated by the insurgents; especially the Mau Mau and the Zimbabwean
rebel groups where tribal religion was used to maintain a psychological hold over them. The
Mau Mau created a bastardised oathing ceremony, loosely based upon tribal beliefs to force
other members of their tribe, the Kikuyu, to remain loyal to their cause on pain of death. The
oath proved to be very effective in achieving this aim. Although there is no evidence for the
use of oaths in Rhodesia, there was considerable psychological control through the use of
spirit mediums and witchcraft, which had very much the same effect as the oaths had on the
Kikuyu population: this was a form of psychological control.
The ability to apply this level of control though witchcraft and sorcery in African
conflicts, has had little discussion in previous studies, consequently it is considered to be a
significant factor that has emerged from this study requiring further research. Although this
does not apply directly to the Malayan Emergency, the use of indoctrination was rampant
during the Emergency, as well as being backed up with intimidation and the use of terror.
Ideological indoctrination took place in both Kenya and Rhodesia and was reinforced by
witchcraft and terror. Therefore, to fully understand how ineffectual ‘soft-hearts and minds’
was in the African conflicts it is important to understand the power of tribal beliefs over the
indigenous population. Unless this was countered—and attempts were made in both Kenya
and Rhodesia to achieve this—little headway could be made to secure the whole-hearted
support of the population as propounded by the advocates of ‘hearts and minds’ strategy.

255

Conversely, some of those involved on the side of Security Forces were acutely aware
of the power of witchcraft over the minds of their adversaries and this was used this to gain
control of many once captured. Once accomplished, the erstwhile insurgent would be used as
part of the pseudo operations Turning captured insurgents required a ‘power relationship’ to
occur whereby the former rebel accepted in his mind the superiority of his capturers and that
their magic was stronger. Once this had occurred, and the evidence obtained from the
respondents confirms it could be accomplished relatively quickly with allegiances changing.
Once again it is a difficult concept to comprehend from a Western perspective, but research
into radicalisation explores many of the ambiguities that are present in highly susceptible
converts (Aly, 2010; Johnston, 2009; Sageman, 2004). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope
of this study to expand this area any further.
9.6

Understood and Applied: Overt Concept and Strategies
In addition to the previous points discussed, it was important to clarify claims that the

use of a ‘hearts and minds’ was central to the tactical objectives of prosecuting the
campaigns. In so far that it not only formed part of the strategy, but was understood by those
on the ground as a necessary part of the operations too. Basically, in an effort to appreciate if
this concept was more of a post-event-interpretation that is to say revisionist, rather than a
known concept at the time.
Indications are that the concept was not well known at the time, or at least not as the
phrase has come to be known. Nonetheless, aspects of this strategy were apparent in all of the
counter-insurgency plans, as separating the population from the insurgents is a well
understood concept. Villagisation took place in all three conflicts, although with less zeal
than was seen in Malaya. Kenya, also undertook mass detention of the Kikuyu tribe in an
effort to separate the Mau Mau from their resources. The ramification of using this policy are
still being debated and are before the British Court system at this juncture (Anderson, 2011b;
Bennett, 2011; Elkins, 2011; Howe, 2011).
It is quite significant to note that mass detention did not take place in Rhodesia
despite the legislation that could have accomplished this. It is therefore argued that this was
an appreciation of ‘hearts and minds’; as it was recognised that such an act would have been
detrimental to the support the Government was actively courting amongst the African
population. Conversely, mass detention of the Kikuyu did take place in Kenya, causing great
resentment and this could be considered as very much against winning hearts and minds, or
certainly of those detained in the camps (Furedi, 1989). On the other hand it was welcomed
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by those that thought the Mau Mau was a direct threat to them and that detainment was more
about winning, rather than pandering to the rebel’s hearts and minds. The policy was also
used in Malaya, with mass detention camps, burning of villages and whole scale resettlement
of the Chinese squatter population (Hack, 2009, p. 412). All of which could be considered as
contrary to any thoughts of winning hearts and minds, but it was the minds of those not
detained that was the quest, not those being detained.
The ability to use intimidation against the population by the insurgents has become
apparent from the data as presented. It has been argued that this is the antithesis of ‘hearts and
minds’ and indicates how difficult it is to secure the population from such assaults, if they are
not segregated from the insurgents. Mindful of this aspect, the respondents were less than
supportive that ‘soft’ approach would ever have succeed as long as intimidation could not be
combated. A series of measures were used to try and lower the incidences. Protective
villages, the use of informers providing good actionable intelligence, together with weeding
out the instigators and leaders all helped to lower the fear of intimidation. Providing locals
with the ability to defend themselves, which led to formation of the Home Guard units, was
another incentive to support of the population. Empowering the population to defend
themselves accomplished many objectives, as it gave them a sense of purpose, as well as
making them ‘buy-into’ the concept of their own destiny was in their hands; not solely in the
hands of the Security Forces.
In addition, the data has indicated that the Colonial Administration used as many
means as were at its disposal to encourage the local population to support the Government.
Civil projects were undertaken, building of clinics, schools and roads together with increasing
the number of jobs available. Additional assistance was given to farmers, as access to dealing
with the government. The District Commissioners and their staff generally understood that
only by actively improving the living conditions and standards could they every hope to
swing the population behind the thrust against the insurgents. Therefore it is fair to say, the
concept of ‘hearts and minds’ was applied even though it may not have been a stated term at
the time. Generally it was felt it made good sense to coax the population to support the
Government in its efforts to defeat the rebellion and the insurgency.
9.7

Significance of Strategy: Administration and Counter-Insurgency
The contention has been made that the Colonial administration was part of an

exceptional advantage as far as being able to implement almost unlimited legislation in
support of the counter-insurgency effort. The ability to have almost unbridled control over the
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levers of power with very little outside interference was certainly a distinct advantage. The
down side for the Colonies was the lack of resources needed to support many initiatives.
From this perspective it can be seen the Administrations in all of the conflicts discussed, were
able to mobilise the whole counter-insurgency effort to their advantage. Virtually any
legislation the Government required could be brought in to support the objectives. For
example, what could be considered very draconian measures: mass detentions, collective
punishments, and death for possession of weapons: the absolute power of the State was
formidable.
On the other hand, they were also able to bring about support for the population in the
way of civic improvements, greater access to facilities, more jobs and generally ensure the
softer side was more in evidence than the harsher one. Land grievances lay at the heart of all
three conflicts; consequently, dealing with these issues was key to gaining support from the
population. In the case of Malaya and Kenya, the promise of independence altered the course
of the insurgency and brought the majority over to the Government’s side. Rhodesia
attempted a series of initiatives to increase the power sharing proposals, but all of them fell
on stony ground. But the concept of divide and rule runs through each of the Government’s
main policy objectives, predominately by supporting all those opposed to the main rebels.
Restructuring the Security Forces was crucial, especially Special Branch, which has
been shown to be a very effective tool for countering an insurgency. Rhodesia recognised this
aspect and even with the creation of the Central Intelligence Organisation, it however kept
Special Branch independent. The need to keep it independent from the Army was also
recognised as necessary in both Kenya and Malaya. Although the Army operated in support
of the civil authority, namely the police, it was important not to let them dominate the
intelligence domain; as they did not have the local knowledge, resources, language or
expertise to be effective. It could also be argued that the political objectives of the Army did
not always align with those in the Colonies either. The data suggests the role of Special
Branch in all three conflicts to have been significant.
In support of Special Branch was the police. It was important to restructure and
develop this valuable resource, which in both Malaya and Kenya was under strength and
poorly resourced at the start of both conflicts; this was not the case in Rhodesia. Building up
the police, particularly the recruitment of local officers, greatly enhanced its capabilities. The
most notable of these capabilities was acquiring intelligence though its local officers, vital to
the Special Branch for planning and operations.
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Curiously, the under-resourcing forced the Security Forces to become more
innovative and develop new initiatives and units. These have been discussed at length in
sections 5.12; 6.13 and 7.13. Suffice to say, the police in all three countries formed
specialised anti insurgency units, called by various names, which were at the fore front of
taking the conflict direct to the insurgents. All of these units used the expertise of the
indigenous forces, particularly tracking and local knowledge to great advantage. Such
expertise was also core to developing the more specialised strike units; most notably of these
were the pseudo operations.
In addition to the development of specialised and elite units such as the SAS, Selous
Scouts and the Tracker Units was the creation the Home Guard. By utilising the local
population to defend themselves, in predominately the Protected Villages, this freed up the
other units to concentrate on the insurgents. The use of local people in their own defence was
also an inclusive strategy, giving them a stake in their own destiny. Empowerment provided
them with a sense of purpose, which greatly benefited the governments cause. It must not be
over simplified either, as a great number of abuses were committed by the Home Guards for
example, settling old scores and “they divided the spoils-land- of the Mau Mau amongst
themselves”(Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 41). Nonetheless, the strategy of using local people
was generally effective.
Further to the concept of divide-and-rule, is the strategy of separating the population
from the insurgents to prevent support and succour being given, as well as trying to prevent
intimidation occurring. The main policy was the creation of new or protected villages, as they
were called. In Malaya they were heavily guarded, as much to stop the insurgents getting in
as to prevent the inhabitants from supplying the insurgents with food and supplies. The policy
was less effective in Kenya, although mass detention did take place, and in Rhodesia it was
used, but once again was not that effective. There are a number of reasons why this was not
effective not least of these was the difficulty in supporting such large numbers of people in a
central place. The cost to the Government was large, forcing it to use finances it did not have,
which could account for it being less promoted than it had been in Malaya. It could be argued
therefore, keeping the population in their own villages was more cost effective but less
aligned with the principles of separating the population from the insurgents.
The other major strategy used by the Government was to evoke the propaganda war,
using all the resources at its disposal: the press, radio, leaflet drops, village meetings, posters
and word of mouth. Promoting the success of the Security Forces was important in
maintaining the support of the population. In Malaya, it was common to show the dead
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bodies of the killed and captured, as it was in both Kenya and Rhodesia. Convincing the
waverers, as they were called, to leave the insurgents also called for the payment of large
bribes and incentives in Malaya. Informers were rife in Kenya and Rhodesia, with
information money being paid regularly to gain intelligence. Captured insurgents were
offered many incentives to inform on their comrades in arms. Everything possible was used
by the Government to undermine the insurgency and money played a large part in this
strategy.
9.8

Applicability: Past Factors to Modern day Counter-Insurgency Practice
It has been argued that the Colonial administration had a net advantage in that it had

control over the levers of power and an intimate working knowledge of the country. This
knowledge included integrated administrative structures, civil servants, local indigenous
police forces led by expatriates, together with extensive personal networks back up by the
might of the Colonial Power itself. An additional factor was the ability of the colonial
administration to use legislation as a tool for either coercion or to support the counterinsurgency ‘Plan’ for example, the ability to apply Emergency Powers, including Martial
Law, to force obedience and compliance on the population through the rule of law.
The use of the rule of law is seen as a legitimising factor in the eyes of world opinion,
which in today’s conflicts monitors events to protect against substantial human rights abuses.
Therefore, ensuring the power of the State through its legislation is seen as a major
contribution to effective counter-insurgency.
To support the rule of law, it is important to have an operationally effective police
force: a point that has been made repeatedly. These forces need to be well trained, socially
integrated and well financed; to limit corruption and abuses of power. In addition, they
should be drawn from all sections of the ethnic make up to avoid sectarianism. Perhaps more
than any other point, the role of having an effective police force stands out.
Applying the rule of law also means using the legislative process to prosecute the
insurgents under the court procedure by means of evidence and procedure. The military are
not trained in this aspect, nor are they required to do so. Whilst the police are trained and
expected to carry out this function especially if the ultimate objective is to return the country
back to normality. The police need to demonstrate they are operating normally, and not
taking summary justice out on those captured. Furthermore, acting with the rule of law assists
in convincing potential converts amongst those that may be wavering, that the ideals of the
insurgents are lame and not worthy of supporting. The removal of the army from the streets
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and replacing them with police is a further demonstration that the Government is confident it
has regained control of the country.
Although it is not always practical to place the police at the vanguard of many
insurgencies today, due in most cases because there is not an effective police force available.
Consequently, the role of policing falls on the military in the first instance, whilst the police
are recruited and trained to eventually take over. Stability and public order are required
through the rule of law. The long term goals require a substantial police presence. Stability is
gauged by the number of military personnel it takes to keep order. The fewer there are,
generally signifies greater stability; therefore, once again establishing an effective police
force is seen as paramount for achieving an acceptable political outcome (Hills, 2012, p.
103).
The study has contended that tied to having an effective Police Force, is the
requirement of having a Special Branch ‘type’ set up. The ability of Special Branch Officers
to gather and collate intelligence has been shown to be vital if counter-insurgency is to be
effectively combated and thwarted. In addition, the multiple methods used to achieve the
required results, such as informers, spies, and perhaps the most innovative, the Pseudo Gang
tactic have been shown to be part of the arsenal that Special Branch has undertaken and used
effectively. However, it can be seen this could be one of the most problematic areas, as this
‘type’ of organisation is renowned for its abuses of power in some countries. The Secret
Police, as they often called, have often operated with impunity and not under the restraints
shown to have existed in the Colonies in this research. Therefore, although effective a Special
Branch set up is proposed, it would certainly be problematic to replicate today.
Language has been identified as a significant element and an area in which the
Colonial Police were proficient; basically as they employed indigenous policemen who knew
the language, customs and foibles of the local population. The ability to freely converse and
fully appreciate the nuances should not be underestimated, not least when it comes to
obtaining intelligence. Routine intelligence gathering needs to be also recognised as a vital
component to producing a working knowledge of the activities of the general population. It is
important to emphasise this aspect, as recognising changes in attitude of the population is an
indicator of insurgent activity, namely intimidation (Bowers, 2013).
The ability to limit intimidation must be one of the prime objectives to ensure the
population is not being terrorised into supporting the insurgency. Achieving this objective
will require numerous measures, including separation and defence of the general population.
It will also require extensive intelligence to ensure these are no agitators within the separated
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areas. Knowledge of local traditions and religions has also been shown to be important; as
this can be used to intimidate the population through psychological control.
Population control has been highlighted as the core to re-establishing the authority of
the central government. Again, this is a routine activity requiring the use of trained police
officers or in some cases the use of ‘Home Guards’ recruited and trained from the local
population. The creation of ‘Protected Villages’ requires securing them against the insurgents
in addition ensuring that food control operates and is strictly enforced. Policing the
identification schemes crucial to controlling movement, curfews together with preventing
crime are all aspects that may appear to be routine, but they vital in effort to counter the
insurgency.
9.9

Theoretical Recommendations
Research requires tangible benefits and is not conducted for its own sake. By

assessing three historical campaigns, in particular the role of the police in countering
insurgency in Kenya and Rhodesia, it was envisaged some alternative perspectives would
emerge. Although the fundamentals can be equated to other studies conducted analysing the
same campaigns, certain aspects have been highlighted and identified that are considered
noteworthy.
A proviso is offered here; as the recommendations offered are based upon the
assumption about the involvement of western forces in insurgencies requiring support of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance rather than internal insurgencies, such
as in the Philippines against the Moro separatists or the insurgency in southern Thailand.
These would require an additional interpretation of these recommendations for them to be
applied effectively.
The primary interpretation has been how important it is to have a deep and incisive
understanding of the country, the nature of its peoples, the grievances that have driven them
to rebel and what the rebels are trying to achieve through an insurgency. In essence know
your adversary as well as he knows himself. To achieve this objective will require a far more
comprehensive capability than most military forces can achieve at present. Recently steps
have been made to incorporate Anthropology into assessments of strategy and structure of
military forces (Gonzalez, 2007; Price, 2012). Unfortunately, this can only be very superficial
at the onset of the conflict and requires a number of years for any meaningful outcomes to
emerge. In addition, there will need to be a greater number of competent linguists to the point
of being bi-lingual to be present at all levels of operations. Incorporating indigenous forces
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into the structure is part of this process. However it is recognised this is not as easy simple, as
events in Afghanistan have proved with green-on-blue attacks; Afghan forces attacking their
western allies. Cultural sensitivities require a considerable effort to understand and
appreciate; nonetheless it forms a central recommendation from this research.
Developing working relationships with the indigenous forces is paramount, but so is
understanding that a military solution is rarely sustainable despite being the dominant force in
the country. Rhodesia was proof of this statement. The military objectives must be allied with
the long term political objectives incorporating social, economic and cultural alignment.
Therefore, the military needs to be set achievable objectives, as part of an overall structured
Plan, which encompasses all aspects associated with overcoming the insurgents. The very
nature of an insurgency will mean that there are multiple layers required that all have to be
interlinked to each other. Each insurgency will require an appreciation and an adaption of the
required fundamentals to compile such a plan.
Developing such a plan is achievable with outside expertise both the Australian and
US Militaries have recognised this requirement. The Australian Army's modernisation is
guided by three documents: The Army Objective Force 2030 (Australian Army Headquaters,
2011b), Army Modernisation Handbook 2011(Australian Army Headquaters, 2011a) and the
Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept (Australian Army Headquaters,
2009). The Australian Army has also set the Army Knowledge Group (AKG) with the task
ensuring that all available resources are examined and analysed to benefit the future of
operations involving Australia. The US Army has a similar Centre for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL) based in the Combined Arms Centre at Fort Leavenworth.
The concept of ‘hearts and minds’ has become an accepted component of counterinsurgency doctrine and this needs to continue. Population centric operations are de rigueur,
with all units trained in what this means for them. The ‘Plan’ should have elements to support
these ideals, as it attempts to gain and garner the support of the population. Legislation
should address inequalities and create a climate where the rule of law is accepted as the norm.
Only by convincing the population they have a long term sustainable future in their own
country, will they accept the measures put in place to counter the insurgency.
Any recommendations to form a replica of Special Branch are fraught with
complications. The complexity of such a unit, coupled with the necessary personnel needed
to make such a unit function effectively, put it beyond the scope of most modern day
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conflicts. Curiously, this might be the one recommendation that could be tailored to internal
insurgencies without western support or troops.
Crucially, there needs to be an organisation that is capable of mimicking the
intelligence gathering capabilities that Special Branch has been shown to be proficient at
acquiring. A creation of intricate networks of informers working through specialised agents
would seem achievable. The ability to interpret developments would also seem to be
attainable. Many nations have developed a secret police force, but they have dubious
reputations and predominately work through fear and intimidation; not the best tools for
gaining valuable intelligence. Furthermore, the ability to work with external forces would
appear to be problematic for a variety of reasons, not least of these being nationalism.
As a consequence of limited access to necessary intelligence the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), has developed a highly integrated network within most countries that are of
interest to the USA and its allies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also
developed a considerable competence overseas too (Barno, 2006; Kuzmarov, 2008). The
Army intelligence structure should link to this network creating an in-country intelligence
gathering and interpretation capability. The sole recommendation that may be made is
therefore to try and mimic, as far as possible, the aspects of Colonial Special Branches, with
the resources available, such as recruitment of indigenous operatives. Training handlers
would also be necessary, but this takes a long time to achieve, in order to gain competency in
the language thus avoiding misunderstandings: unfortunately all too common when using
interpreters, or using basic lingual skills.
The importance of having a structured, balanced police force incorporating all ethnic
groups needs to be emphasised. Part of the agreement in Northern Ireland was this
recommendation. Consequently the old Royal Ulster Constabulary was disbanded and
reformed incorporating both sides of the cultural divide into a new force called the Police
Service of Northern Ireland. The UN has started to develop international policing structures
calling on serving policemen from its members to form the basis of these units sent to police
troubled areas (Hills, 2009). Again, the difficult is always the language and no matter how
many interpreters are used, the problems related to vested interests will always be present.
Far better this international unit is used to train indigenous forces in how to police their own
communities, rather than use them as police in country. At present even the US is deficient in
this area of training (Ladwig, 2007).
A joint command structure needs to be set up encompassing all the major players. The
ability to manage such a complex system has been argued requires a joint-operations
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command, in whatever guise that may be. A supremo might have been effective in Malaya
with General Templar, but such a position is considered incongruous in today’s coalition of
partners (Mumford, 2012, p. 153). As has been discussed, this would be very problematic in
most modern day scenarios. Nonetheless, establishing an operational structure, often termed
Tripartite, as it encompasses the Military, the civil in the form of political power and the
Intelligence Organisation, is deemed essential (Mumford, 2012, p. 2).
Since these conflicts were fought, there has been a considerable development of
specialised elite units capable of matching their foes in the field. One addition that could be
considered is the use of pseudo operations. These proved to be highly successful in
countering the insurgencies in the past and a hybrid capability might be possible. A
considerable amount has been written about the legitimacy of such operations today,
nonetheless consideration should be given to assessing whether they could again be
successful (Gatchel, 2008).
Paradoxically the most profound interpretation that has come out of the research is the
need to know yourself and your capabilities before you can assess those of your adversaries.
By using this type of appreciation, one is then able to assess the capabilities of your foe but
also of your indigenous allies. It is imperative that empathy allows for consideration of
culture, language and religion displayed by respect. Having no respect for your own culture
demeans you in the eyes of your allies, as all of these aspects mentioned signify who one is
and why one is prepared to stand up and fight for these beliefs. If the troops from outside of
the country show distain for their own culture, they are hardly likely to respect another
person’s culture, therefore how can their allies respect them or what the purport to stand for.
The majority of those intervened had a profound respect for not only those that fought
with them, but in the case of Kenya and Rhodesia, for the African as a whole by taking time
to understand their culture and their beliefs. Notwithstanding this statement, the settlers also
believed in their own racial superiority, their culture and their religious beliefs. All of which
surprisingly the general population could align with and understand. What was at stake was
these Africans wanted to have the same chance at equality and status, for which a large
proportion were prepared to support the Colonial authorities in the hope this would accrue to
them as well. A lesson that needs to be understood by any forces, in any foreign land, fighting
a counter-insurgency campaign, what values are being presented and are these transferable.
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9.10 Further Research
The power of witchcraft and sorcery has been identified as a substantial factor in the
psychological control of the populations in African conflicts. More needs to be done to
understand how far this control works and what influence this is having on modern conflicts
today, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Central African Republic and Southern Sudan. Tribal religion is also linked to interpretations
of Islam and this has a considerable influence on conflicts, such as in northern Mali, Niger
and Nigeria.
The evolution and origin of the Pseudo Gang needs to be researched further as
indications are this has become very confused, with claims and counter claims being made as
to where it started first and how it evolved. Unfortunately, those involved at the time in both
Kenya and Malaya are few in number, which requires haste to interview the last remaining
participants of this important aspect in countering insurgency.
The relationship between insurgencies and international terrorism together with
lessons learnt from counter-insurgency needs to be analysed in an effort to understand if they
can be applied to countering terrorism. A complex and interrelated asymmetrical correlation
has been noted, which requires further study.
Recent technological advances have added new capabilities to both sides, which will
need to be countered, as they have created a whole new dimension where insurgency can take
hold outside of the normal remit of the Security Forces. Any attempts at separating the
population from technology will present substantial challenges and these need to be
researched.
A further area of research has been highlighted by this research and that concerns the
role of the police in future counter-insurgency efforts (Gentile, 2008). Moves have been made
to increase the capability to use international policemen in the transition back to stability, but
as has been pointed out, this is limited by their knowledge of language and customs.
Developing key attributes for the training wing for such a police force might improve their
competence to operate earlier in the re-training phase.
Understanding the language, customs and culture through the use of anthropological
studies has also been discussed. Although some disquiet has been observed over this
development, there is nonetheless a need to increase this aspect for all those engaged in
countering-insurgency. The modern NGOs are also involved and they too require a greater
appreciation of the anthropology to give them a greater understanding of the country in which
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they are working. The conflict in Afghanistan would benefit from a re-appraisal of the
approach being taken based upon much of what has been discussed in this thesis.
Lastly, the development of human rights has seen the extension of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to bring to justice abuses of these rights, particularly in the form of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Prohibitions and limitations on warfare as
laid out in the Geneva Conventions will extend to all conflicts and those who commit abuses
will be unable to avoid the increased powers the ICC is bringing to insurgencies. In essence
these developments are set to change the nature of conflicts and are an area of further
research.
9.11 Limitations
As with all research there are limitations to the ability of the study to fully address all
the issues involved, and this study is no exception (Erickson, 1986). The Material and
Methods Chapter 3 discussed the many considerations needed to reduce the effects on
reliability and validity of the research through triangulation, where possible and if
appropriate. An investigation involving three case studies dealing with complex historical
events must by design have its limitations. Consequently, there have been areas of research
that could not be investigated fully, as they would have strayed outside of the conceptual
design. When dealing with older respondents, it must also be accepted their memories are
selective; consequently support for any controversial statements has been used where
possible; whether this was in the form of supporting literature or statements from other
respondents. Therefore, it has been necessary to restrict the research around the agreed
methodology and to incorporate as many checks on reliability and validity as possible.
Interpretations of findings are by the nature of qualitative research subjective. In an
effort to reduce any controversial results, use has been made of colleagues to assess the work
and comment when and where necessary. Any such comments have been incorporated or
addressed to reduce any such incidences, whereby the research may have been unsupported
and lack sufficient validity.
Although the scope of this research was to add to the role played by the Security
Forces in counter-insurgency, particularly that of the police and Special Branch in particular,
it is recognised that the criterion selection of the respondents makes this a defined sample,
which limits the ability to generalise. The conclusions of this study are therefore tempered by
this limitation.
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It is recognised that within a qualitative study the bias of the researcher is difficult to
eliminate and is consequently subjective. Efforts have been made to limit this bias by
allowing colleagues to read and comment on the work. Where appropriate their comments
have been incorporated into the main body of the work.
9.12 Conclusion
This chapter summarised the study in relation to the research questions raised in
Chapter1, taking into consideration the Literature Review. The research problem was
addressed employing the methodology outlined in the study design in Chapter 3. All the
pertinent data from the three case studies has been discussed, as part of a comparative
analysis process in Chapter 8. The ensuing results have been synthesised to form a
conclusion. As a result of undertaking this research, a series of recommendations have been
presented, whilst acknowledging the limitations and constraints of the study; including
potential bias. A study of this nature has indentified areas of further research, which can be
pursued in further journal articles and papers.
The argument has been put forward that only by studying the past can costly mistakes
be avoided in the future; a statement that has to be tempered by saying, only if the right
lessons are learnt and applied, can this be accomplished. Therefore, a further interpretation is
required by strategists and planners to ascertain what elements might be worthy of note from
this study, before trying to re-apply them to modern conflicts.
The countering of insurgencies is a complex and difficult process. It requires a deep
understanding of the nature of the conflict, the reasons and the origins of the conflict,
together with sufficient resources in order to combat it. This study has sought to offer an
interpretation based upon the experiences of those that took part in three historical conflicts in
order to present a comparative paradigm, which might provide useful strategies, examples
and tactics for the future. The outcomes have demonstrated the complexity required to
prosecute a strategy capable of achieving the desired results. In addition, by using actual
combatants, it has been possible to gain a better understanding of the way the counterinsurgency took place through their recollections, rather than through existing secondary
literature. Although the literature offers a point of reference to aid validity and improve
reliability, it is important to recognise that it is not always correct either, and it too often
needs verification.
Primarily, this study has sought to indentify the significant role played by the Colonial
Police Forces in combating the insurgencies and how important the role of the police force is
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to re-asserting the rule of law in support of a fair judicial system. Understanding how
important it was to have a functioning and accepted police force to created confidence in the
elected government has been one of the dominant interpretations gained from this study.
Achieving this aim was not without its difficulties; therefore, in order to deal with the
insurgency in each colony, a substantial re-organisation of the police was required, although
much less so in Rhodesia.
A further significant area was the relationship the Colonial Forces had with their
indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently, this study has
provided more recorded primary data on the important role indigenous forces played, as part
of the structure for combating insurgencies.
The other significant feature discussed in this research, has been the role of religion,
particularly the role of tribal religion and beliefs. Specifically, the psychological control this
was capable of applying to the minds of the population. A failure to recognise and understand
how this manifests itself, is capable of undermining all attempts to win the ‘hearts and minds’
of the population; considered so necessary in combating insurgencies. Furthermore, in
developing societies, underestimating the role of the local witch-doctor, sprit medium or
Imam can seriously challenge all endeavours to garner the support of the local population. In
essence, this re-enforces the importance to understand the cultural, social and religious
aspects of the local population.
Regardless of the charge that colonialists were imperialistic in attitude, the integration
of the indigenous population into all of the organs of authority, especially the police, ensured
that they were culturally aware and sensitive to local issues. Even the Rhodesians, often
considered racists, were integrated and understood the cultural aspects of the country,
speaking the local languages as well as being culturally aware. There was empathy between
the Europeans and those black Africans that worked with them, which should not be
underestimated when assessing their capabilities to harness this advantage and thus
undermine their opponents in the field.
Intimidation has been shown to be the major stumbling block to winning ‘hearts and
minds. The ability to counter this threat needs to be fully understood as indoctrination, tribal
religion and loyalties all play an important part in the control of the population. Exploring the
relationship of witchcraft and sorcery as part of the psychological manipulation of the
population, particularly in Africa, has brought a new dimension to the discussion on ‘hearts
and minds. The effectiveness of the concept has been assessed in this study and has been
found to encompass a lot more than most other studies have recognised: namely intimidation,
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coercion and psychological oppression through witchcraft, oaths and sprit mediums are the
antithesis of the concept. Consequently, greater attention needs to be exercised when
applying the concept, to ensure all the potential threats to its application can be assessed and
dealt with accordingly.
‘Hearts and minds’, has become an accepted term in today’s counter-insurgency
jargon, although it has been shown to be less well known by the combatants interviewed,
during their conflicts. However, once broken down into its component parts it has been
shown to have been interwoven into the fabric of the actions being undertaken anyway. It was
just not known by the phrase at that time by those involved. In Rhodesia, it even appears to
have been shunned as strategy, predominately because it required considerable resources to
be effective: resources the Rhodesians did not have.
The process of developing a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary one: each
conflict adds to the process and allows the doctrine to build up; although it should be
understood that no two insurgencies are the same (Alderson, 2007a, 2007b; Harvey &
Wilkinson, 2009). Each insurgency requires adaptations from the accepted doctrine to suit the
time and circumstances. Some aspects appear to be quickly forgotten and it takes a review of
the past to understand that these elements are still pertinent and useful. Insurgency is also a
social phenomenon and therefore a product of the society from which it derives (Rich &
Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 360). Consequently, a political solution has to be sought eventually in
which all the belligerents are seen to gain. A purely military solution is not sustainable long
term.
Therefore, although the evolution of warfare has required the use of new technologies
to compete and defeat the enemy, the fundamental principals remain consistent today (Artelli
& Deckro, 2008, p. 228). Fuller (1916) made similar observations almost a century ago
quoting from the ‘Field Service Regulations’ of the British Army, “the correct application of
principals to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge built up by study and
practice” (p. 1). Nothing has changed; therefore the application of the principals to the actual
situation is where the difficulty lies. The adage “no need to reinvent the wheel” applies not
only to modern warfare but to counter-insurgency, as well.
In the US, two notable military reviews conducted by Aspin (1993) and Petraeus
(2006), re-evaluated the past and applied effective principals to the requirements of the day.
What is prominent in these reviews, was how much was taken from the past and reapplied to
the modern conflicts, particularly in the US manual FM 3-24 (2006) Counterinsurgency
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followed by Field Manual 3-0 Operations in 2008 (Heuser, 2007; Rid, 2010; Santos, 2011;
Tomes, 2004).
However, in answer to the contention did the Colonial states have any net advantages
over those insurgencies being fought today; the assertion made here is in the affirmative.
Control of the legislation, the administrative capabilities, the local police force and the use of
indigenous local forces, the intelligence gathering apparatus run by Special Branch, coupled
with the local knowledge of language and customs considerably benefited their counterinsurgency campaigns. Control of ‘hearts and minds’ may have played a part in countering
the insurgents, in Malaya and Kenya, but as has been argued in Rhodesia, it was the
insurgents that ultimately won the control of their minds through their manipulation of tribal
beliefs. The population remained the crucial focus for both sides in an insurgency and
whoever can win their ‘hearts and minds’ will prevail (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 361).
Consequently, underestimating the physiological; power religion and beliefs have over the
population can have serious repercussions for any forces attempting to subdue an insurgency
in foreign lands. A fact confirmed by the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Attempting to reproduction these effective elements indentified in this study is the
task of today’s counter-insurgency planners and strategists. The past does have lessons for the
future; the difficulty is interpreting which lessons and how to apply them effectively again.
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Appendix A has been removed from this
version of the thesis

APPENDIX B
10.5 Significant Actors
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Throughout the research for this study a number of what have been termed actors appeared
regularly in different campaigns. As this was a comparative study this was thought to be
significant enough to record the names and present them separately as recognition of their
importance. A completely new study would have to expand further on their roles and
contributions overall, but this is bond the scope of this work.
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APPENDIX C
10.6 Combined Table of Elements
What is apparent from a review of Table 8.1 is the complexity of the elements
involved in countering an insurgency. Although, the elements are presented in a précis form,
they reflect the essential fundamentals; these are also interlinked. It is this aspect that has
emerged from the study: the necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure
following a defined plan under an over arching supremo. “Operational design for a
counterinsurgency campaign must integrate the political, social, military, economic, legal,
informational, and intelligence spheres to fully pacify the population and to establish the
legitimacy of the host government” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127).
By assessing the various elements presented in Table 8.1, it is possible to draw
together the key aspects that have emerged from the study. The component parts of the
research questions are represented in the table, but require synthesizing to illuminate their
inter-relationship with each other; for it is considered this relationship forms the rudiments
required to combat an insurgency effectively. To this end, the table will be utilised during this
Chapter for reference to indicate where the synergies lie and what is required as part of
preparing a detailed counter-insurgency ‘Plan’. A number of studies have indicated the
importance of having a comprehensive counter-insurgency ‘Plan’ (Hack, 2009; Strachan,
2007).
Table 8.1 is the culmination of the comparative analysis results from using three cases
studies. The pilot study emphasised the importance of being able to compare more than two
studies. Consequently, Table 8.1 demonstrates in a visual form the similarities between the
three campaigns even though two of these were in Africa and one in Asia. Nonetheless, many
of the requirements were the same, as is indicated by the Table.
All the elements have been dealt with during the study, the table is a reflection of the
comparative approach this study has used. Each element has a story, which crosses into each
of the conflicts.
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Element

Malaya

Kenya

Rhodesia

Administration

part of combined strategy

held sway over decision process

part of the wider political process

Aircraft

bombing used but halted

bombing but not effective

effectively used/ short supply

communications

improved/ telephones targeted

improved/ radio net work set up

highly effective radio net work

Dogs

limited use by army/ not by police

large use of dogs by police/army

extensive use/effective

Emergency Powers

issued in 1948/draconian

issued in 1952/draconian

Progressively applied 1960/ Martial law

Food control

yes, harsh/strict imposition

limited but used effectively

limited success/ hard to police

French lessons

oil spot used and pop control

pop control, sweeps/ detentions

pop control, sweeps/ detentions

Ground coverage

no, very limited intelligence gathering

patchy and limited use/ improved

Highly developed/ Very successful

Hearts and Minds

developed successfully

Limited and not generally known

limited success/patchy/half hearted

Helicopters

early development/ effective/ jungle

tested but no used; too high for lift

extensive use/ shortage/effective

Home Guard

vital part of overall strategy

vital part of overall strategy

set up as Guard Force/poor

Indigenous forces

used in police/ army/home guard

used in police/ army/home guard

volunteers in the all units

Insurgents

predominately Chinese communist

Predominately Kikuyu tribe

Communist/ Shona and Nedebele

Intimidation

wide and extensive

limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily

grew consistently/intimidation

Intelligence

became very effective/monetary bribes

limited and patchy/ informers used

very effective and comprehensive

Language

major problem/ little Chinese speakers

few Kikuyu but many Swahili speakers

large number of local speakers

Legislation

extensive and draconian

extensive and draconian

extensive and progressively draconian

Martial Law

Never imposed/ emergency powers

Never Imposed/emergency powers

Gradually imposed as war progressed

Mechanisms

over-arching supremo

no overarching supremo

JOC /plus overarching supremo/political

Mounted units

not used but Mules for transport were

Both the Police and KR used effectively

BSAP/ Grey Scouts effective

Notable actors

Templer/Briggs/Catling/Young

Erskine/ Kitson/ Henderson/Catling

Walls/ Reid Daley/ Flower/Henderson

Plan

Briggs Plan/ an overall blue print

series of semi-interrelated plans

Military plan /unsupported politically

Problems

poor intelligence at start/language poor

unstructured until 1954/ army conscripts

limited resources/sanctions/politics

Oaths and sorcery

Chinese religion and Triad control

main aspect of Mau Mau/de-oathing

Spirit mediums very influential
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Organisation

poor at first then highly successful

poor becoming moderately successful

highly effective/ restricted numbers

Police

poor at first then highly successful

poor at first then highly successful

highly effective/ well structured

Population

part of overall strategy

part of overall strategy

not inclusive enough/ failure

Propaganda

comprehensive/effective

Limited and piecemeal

comprehensive/ limited success

Pseudo gangs

limited/ used near the end of conflict

Highly successful/used from '53

highly successful/widely used

Psychological
operations

very successful/comprehensive

limited success/limited

limited success/limited

Public works

used extensively to support Plan

limited use; but accelerated later

limited use/ piecemeal/

Reasons for conflict

Communism/Colonialism/identity

land issues/ tribal/Colonialism

Communism/Colonialism/land issues

Restricted areas

security areas/ enforced

Prohibited & special areas/ enforced

curfew areas/de facto restricted

Roads

used to infiltrate the jungle

used to infiltrate the forests

Access good as not dense bush

Special Branch

poor at first then highly successful

poor at first then moderately successful

pivotal/integrated/highly successful

Special units

SAS, Jungle squads, Ghurkhas

combat tracker units/Pseudos/GSU

SAS/Selous Scouts/ RLI/Fire-Force

Spotter planes

used but not effective without infrared

became very effective

used effectively / PRAW

Strategy

developed through central Plan

Loosely held together/no central Plan

dominated by political/generalist

Structure of forces

colonial forces with British army units

colonial forces with British army units

based on British model/adapted

subversion

wide and extensive

limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily

grew consistently/intimidation

tactics

progressively developed/ effective

mixed effect/ limited/pseudo gangs

multiple combined tactics/effective

Villages

developed successfully/ Briggs Plan

used limited success/hostility

used but not supported/unpopular

Combined elements derived from the three case studies to show what was important and how in each conflict.
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